



Challenges in Stabilising The Streets of Kashmir



13 Sep, 2016

Lt General S A Hasnain, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM (Bar), VSM (Bar), Distinguished Fellow, VIF

View1223

Comments 0

After two months of strife in the Kashmir Valley we may be just heading into better control of the situation which resulted from the respo Burhan Wani the young South Kashmir militant leader, on 8 Jul 2016. However, the time taken may not have been for want of trying. has been in one of the widest consultation in recent times which is proof of both the complexity of the situation and the seriousness of e streets without use of unfettered state violence. Many may respond very negatively to the above view but an explanation is due and has this piece.

It would be incorrect to give certification to Pakistan that it is not involved in the instigation, enablement and support to the violence establishment both at Srinagar and Delhi has been extremely careful in response except that the pellet guns became the villains of the that the pellet guns have become the symbol of the state response and that's because of the inability to create the right doctrines for c period between 2010 and 2016. No need lamenting that now but the necessity to be seen having removed these from the inventory r nothing else. The kind of mindless violence by a defused invisible leadership would have probably invited far greater response in many had seen tanks at Tahrir Square in Cairo within a few days of the Arab Spring rising in Cairo. It was similar at Tiananmen Square which for today's generation. Democratic states are mindful that violence will occur as a form of dissent against state authority; it's all v governance under democracy. It is the limit of tolerance for violence which differs from state to state. In India at different times reactions. It is contingent upon the security force involved, its level of training and its leadership. Sometimes forces have gone overboa the recent response of the state Provincial Armed Police (PAC) to the cult violence in Mathura district of Uttar Pradesh (UP). In the agitation early this year much property went up in flames without adequate force response. However, these were cases of law and seeking secession from the Indian Union. The situation in Kashmir is more of public order where the Army needs to step in early if reluctant to do that and rightly so because there is adequate CRPF to support the JK Police. Some reinforcements were also brought in.

The difference this time has been the far better strategy on the part of those involved in the guidance and direction to the violent s diffused leadership so to say. I believe that the final guidance comes from Pakistan's Deep State so I continue to name it. The Deep State that the 2008-10 agitation could not be as effective as desired because the rural areas were kept quiet in comparison, by the Indian tentacles deep there. The Army's very competent junior and middle leadership has for long built stakes and networked long with the pop easier to impose in urban areas but in widespread 'qasbas' and villages in the rural areas it becomes difficult to implement. Since the A in, as in the past, and its attempts at informal control through networks could not be as effective, the agitation went out of control. Surpr as Damal Hajipura and other villages hugging South Kashmir's Pir Panjal area displayed extreme violence with targeting of police st tactics. The Deep State has been smart in thinking. Perceiving JK Police to be the main force multiplier in situations of street turbulence it tongs after its personnel. From making holding of police stations with low strength untenable, to targeting individual homes of perso psychosis and paralysis in JK Police ranks, the tactics employed succeeded beyond their expectation. This emboldened the mobs. The CR task but with demoralized local police support any force will be less effective. It could not regain control of the crucial areas of Pulv Kulgam districts. It was therefore time for the Army to step in.

What is the Army's role in such situations where public order is at stake? This was the subject of debate even at the outset of street vi first year that the Separatists seriously changed tack due to inadequate terrorist strength. With presence of Armed Forces Special Power: was never a need for requisition. The Army continued to hold the periphery by persuading the rural populace against swarming on to terrorist presence in ranks of the mobs in 2008-10 was marginal, unlike this time when there has been use of hand grenades and the t the police has been virtually professional. In the earlier years Army came to the support of local authorities in some towns such as Ba without a clear cut mandate, merely showing the flag to keep the police forces bolstered and preventing spillage of the mobs beyond same methodology appeared to have been attempted at most places. Having faced this situation many times I'm aware how much diler local commanders in olive green. There is inadequacy of clarity on the task and they run the risk of troops coming in direct contact having any non-lethal means to contain them.

This time the terrorists have played a much more proactive role with even targeting of night convoys something unheard of in the last pt regain their significance they have also attempted ambushes of routine day convoys and have now upped the ante with repeated infiltrat LoC. In 2008-10 a phenomenon noticed was the attempt to intimidate the Army by surrounding small detachments of three vehicles; burnt in Pattan belonging to a Field Ambulance unit which was nodal to providing medical assistance to civilians. In 2016 an attempt Rashtriya Rifles (RR) Quick Reaction Team in Qazigund led to the RR opening fire resulting in killing of three civilians. There was no intimidate small convoys thereafter.

Now that the Army has deployed in greater numbers in South Kashmir in the Pulwama-Shupian belt from where it had progressively with few years, there is every possibility that it will be tested by the diffused leadership. It will run the risk of being accused of being inadequately hard against those who deservingly need to be brought to book. The first thing is that the control over the police stations and the local police have to return to duty with full backing of the Army to support it whenever intimidated. For the Army restoring con but the policemen who are locals from the same area (a principle in policing duties) may find it yet difficult to serve there. Some an redeployment of its personnel by JK Police may have to be done without prejudice to later returning to the basic practice of local content

The Army's show of force is usually done through flag marches in law and order stricken areas. However, here the threats are higher den of the smaller townships through large size patrolling, both mobile and foot borne. It was heartening to see that the Army has not forgott as the area around Shupian was burning a medical and vet camp was underway near Balapur the HQ of an RR Sector. There is a hug which the Chief Minister has often spoken; I too am aware that it is there, stricken by fear of the radicalized youth who need to be contr need to be taken out systematically and sent for de-radicalization outside the Valley. This is where firmness has to be displaye continuously train and retrain its leadership and troops because they are all going to be involved in sensitive responsibilities. Some of come from outside the Valley and given the large scale turnover in the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) units there will be too many raw hands pressure of the awkward situation they are in.

Given Kashmir's inadequate holding facilities for detainees the absolutely last thing acceptable is the clubbing of detainees with terrorists elements in Central Jail Srinagar. The Jail needs a thorough review as many a time even the DG police finds his control challenged. Sins are common, as are daily visits by relatives with home cooked food. Detainees need to feel the pressure of detention and the authority should largely be sent into detention facilities in Jammu or beyond.

Lastly, in sensitive times there will be mistakes and the Army too will make them. Its rank and file needs to hold its horses and not found technique of placing everything in the public domain by use of social media. I also hope that staff of Media Branches at HQ North HQ 15 Corps remains ever alert on the attempts of the adversaries to paint the Army Red all over. More than just the defensive side it is the outreach through information operations that will make the difference. This is the first real test of proactive information operations. the Army takes up the challenge. It should be reinforcing these branches for good measure.

Given its propensity to think out of the box, exercise adequate control and allow its commanders the flexibility they need to be empow doubt the Indian Army will achieve its objectives very shortly. This will enable the return to full governance as deserved by the largely pe of the people of the Valley.

Post new comment

Your name: *

Anonymous

E-mail: *

The content of this field is kept private and will not be shown publicly.

Comment: *

Message*

Input format

I'm not a robot

reCAPTCHA
Privacy - Terms

Save

Preview

Related Articles

A Social and Psychological Approach to Conflict Management i

People of the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) region practiced Hinduism,



J&K Security Review-2017: State of Conflict Continues

The Security Situation
While recovering from



Stone Pelting: Is of Anger or a Str

No state car overlooks t
act of violen



Commentary: Exhibition - India at 70 and the Jammu & Kashmir

On the occasion of 70 years of Jammu & Kashmir's accession to I



गिलगित-बाल्टिस्त
गिलगित-बाल्टिस्त



Commentary: Understanding the Recent Protests in Gilgit-Balt

A wave of strong protests swept across Gilgit-Baltistan recently,



कश्मीर - सामने आया नया
केंद्रीय गृह मंत्री राज



जम्मू कश्मीर: विशे
खुफिया ब्यूरो के



Key to Conflict Management in Kashmir is People, Politics an

Violence is a type of backwardness and it is enormously powerful

About Us

The Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) is a New Delhi-based think tank set up with the collaborative

Contact Us

Name*

Email Id*

Tweet With Us

efforts of India's leading security experts, diplomats, industrialists and philanthropists under the aegis of the Vivekananda Kendra. The VIF's objective is to become a centre of excellence to kick start innovative ideas and thoughts that can lead ...

[Read More](#)

Phone Number*

Message*

I'm not a robot

reCAPTCHA
[Privacy](#) - [Terms](#)

Submit



VIF India

@vifindia

'The organs are the horses, the rein, the intellect is the charioteer, the rider, and the body is the chariot master of the household, the King of man, is sitting in this chariot.'
[#SwamiVivekananda](#)



[Home](#) [About Us](#) [Area of Study](#) [Events](#) [Team](#) [Media](#) [Career](#) [Contact Us](#)

VISITORS: [StatCounter - Free Web Tracker and Counter](#)

© 2017 Vivekananda International Foundation.