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## The Phenomenon of Urban Terrorism in India



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Recent bomb blast in Bangalore (17 April 2013) and twin bomb blasts that took place in Hyderabad in February 2013 have reiterated that urban terrorism has taken firm root in India. In less than a decade, the Indian urban areas like Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata, Guwahati, Bangalore, Jaipur, Varanasi, Pune, Kanpur, Coimbatore, Srinagar, Jammu and Ahmedabad have witnessed over 20 major attacks. The scale of casualties, material damage and disruption of life and economic activity as a result.

### The Phenomenon

The phenomenon of urban terrorism is relatively new to India, but it has a long history in the international arena. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) and British forces in Northern Ireland for several decades mostly in urban areas. The Baader-Meinhof gang, a communist urban guerrilla group, was responsible for several acts of terrorism in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. Most of the terror groups in Latin America are urban-based. Palestinians managed to launch numerous urban terror attacks on Israeli civilians despite Israel's vigorous pre-emptive measures and a pro-active security policy. Members of Aum Shinrikyo, a cult group, carried out five coordinated sarin gas attacks on several lines of the Tokyo metro in March 1995. In Chechnya, have been fighting Russia since the 1990s mostly in the urban set-up.

As terrorists are rational in their choice of terrain and targets, evaluating strengths and weaknesses and costs and benefits, urban terrorism offers several advantages. As is the characteristic of urban areas, population is not only high, but also densely concentrated. Unlike in rural areas, inhospitable towns are more heterogeneous that gives more space for anonymity. It is this posture of anonymity that enables the terrorist to find an excellent place for camouflage. For terrorists, logistical support like arms, medicines, food, and lodging are readily available in an urban area. The manoeuvrability of terrorists is guaranteed by the presence of public and private transportation facilities that are both dependable and accessible. In urban areas, a terrorist group may find it easier to recruit prospective terrorists in a predictable manner, for it is the city that nurtures dissent.

Cities are the nerve centres of any country. It is in urban areas where targets are most varied and abundant: laymen, officials, foreign diplomats, heavy weights, government buildings with symbolic/strategic value, bus stands, railway stations, airports, markets, foreign missions, educational centres etc. By attacking high profile symbolic targets, the terrorists wish to make a point that if a government fails to protect high profile targets, it may not be in a position to protect the normal ones. As a result, the credibility of the government of the day is undermined. Since the number and quantity of terrorists' 'defined enemy' is high in cities, the impact of a destructive act is more widespread. This also gives an incentive to terrorists to prevent any kind of indiscriminate counter-terrorist operation by the state that could maximise collateral damage. For the state, aerial bombardments against the terrorists becomes difficult. Urban operations for terrorists also often demand less in the way of brute force and endurance than do operations in mountainous or rural terrain. And they do not need sophisticated long-range weapons to inflict desired damage.

Since terrorism is 'propaganda by the deed' the attention seeking goal of terrorists is well served in the urban environment where the media is the greatest and where representatives of print and electronic media are readily available and quite eager to report. The media coverage of attacks exemplify this. Such coverage also magnifies the fear-generating capabilities of terrorists. If the general population begins to fear, the goal of a terrorist group may have been achieved. Overall, an urban landscape facilitates terrorists in realising their goals: surprise, maximum damage, high risk, hyper media attention and subsequent disappearance. As the 26/11 experience has shown, well-armed terrorists are not easy to find. Tall buildings and narrow lanes and alleys provide inherent protection to them and make the security forces easy targets. The presence of the media further complicates military or police operations. Similarly, IED attacks and suicide bombings are extremely difficult to detect or prevent in an urban environment.

### Counter-measures

The key to success in fighting urban terrorism lies in obtaining accurate intelligence about impending attacks and the neutralisation of the targets before they can launch their planned attacks. Since the threat of urban terrorism is transnational in nature, there is an urgent need for regional and international networking of friendly intelligence agencies. Most importantly, the Central and state intelligence agencies should share information methodically.

trickle down in real-time to the user. While electronic surveillance, including the interception of communications, is no doubt use importance to penetrate the networks and sleeper cells of the terrorist organisations so as to gain actionable intelligence.

Since the terrorists usually choose high-profile soft targets, where the presence of 'defined enemy' is abundant, they should be put under surveillance and protection. The staff manning these places should be trained in rendering first aid, evacuation techniques, and rescue operations. Surveillance cameras, metal and explosive vapour detectors and X-ray scanning machines should be installed at key access points. Technological alert for suspicious activity such as loitering by an individual or vehicle should be made use of. Security personnel should be sensitive in segregating suspicious objects that are left behind.

The success of counter-terrorism operations, especially in the urban domain, depends to a considerable extent on a speedy response by a force that is trained, armed and equipped suitably for the job at hand. As the National Security Guard is India's primary strike force for counter-terrorism, it must be given the wherewithal to respond swiftly to urban terror attacks to minimise casualties and deny the perpetrators the ability to escape. Central Government's recent decision to locate NSG echelons in the cities that have been targeted most frequently will enable the force to respond in a more effective manner. The NSG, however, must also be equipped with state-of-the-art technology and equipment to enable the commandos to enhance their performance and minimise their own casualties. Where necessary, the Indian Army's elite Special Forces should be employed to counter threats in urban areas. Every state, in fact, should have a NSG-type of commando force to counter lethal terror strikes. Rehearsals should be periodically conducted for search-and-rescue operations after large-scale terrorist strikes. Different contingencies should be simulated and practised. Future efforts should cater for tackling terrorist attacks using WMDs.

Without the eyes, ears and intuition of the general public, it is difficult to identify a terrorist who is anonymous and blends seamlessly into the environment in which he is living and operating. An effective battle against terrorism can be waged only by involving members of the public. Through societal awareness to keep a steady eye on tentative or errant behavior in the neighbourhood and sharing of information of suspicious persons with the police and intelligence agencies. For instance, on every New York City subway train, the message to passengers after the attacks of 9/11 has been clear: "If you see something, say something." For this purpose, urban Indians must organise themselves into neighbourhood committees through community consensus mechanisms based on genuine concern to prevent future terrorist attacks. All communities should take counter-terror measures instead of perceiving some as the "other". The community of Indian fishermen should keep a constant tab on suspicious activity. Awareness creation among people should also include 'golden rules' to be followed by the people in case of a terrorist attack. Such efforts can only minimise the lethality of terrorist attacks, but also reduce the consequent panic. In short, unless a comprehensive approach is adopted by the stakeholders of the society, it is difficult to counter urban terrorism.

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