

Chapter VI

- *The Master said, Set your sights on the Way, base yourself on virtue, rely on humaneness, relax with the arts.*⁹¹⁷
- *The Master said to Yan Yuan, When needed, to act; when cast aside, to retire - only you and I know how to do that - isn't that so?*⁹¹⁸
- *The Master exercised great care with regard to the following: preparations for a sacrifice, warfare, and illness.*⁹¹⁹

6. Defence/PLA

China's People's Liberation Army, formed in August 1927, continues to remain "Party-Army" and to respond only to the Communist Party of China.

⁹¹⁷ The Analects of Confucius, Translated by Burton Watson, Book Seven: 6, Pg 43

⁹¹⁸ The Analects of Confucius, Translated by Burton Watson, Book Seven: 10, Pg 43

⁹¹⁹ The Analects of Confucius, Translated by Burton Watson, Book Seven:12, Pg 43

Confucius himself disclaimed any knowledge of military matters and deplored the warlike tenor of the age, but it is reflected in numerous passages of the Analects Pg 10.

Confucius gives various instructions on how to behave when "the Way prevails in the world" or when it does not. He clearly believed that it did not prevail in his time, as evidenced by the wars, usurpations of power, and departures from correct ritual practice that marked the age. But he also makes clear that he believes it can be restored at any time. China is not fated to suffer chaos and misrule Pg 13.

According to the teachings, militarism is contrary to the principle of benevolent government. The Spring and Autumn records some four hundred wars within a period of two hundred and forty two years; and the author condemns all of them, since war is contrary to humanity. Mencius says that in Spring and Autumn there are no righteous wars. He holds that there is no justification for any war. Book of Poetry contains a number of poems picturing the calamity of broken homes, the sorrow of widows, and the crying of mothers to show the human waste of war.

The Confucianists, however, are not advocates of peace at any price. The Book of Change declares that wise rulers provide strong forts in order to protect the country from foreign aggression. Confucius himself was asked what was essential in the government of a country. He replied that there must be sufficient food for the people, sufficient military equipment, and the confidence of the people in their government. Thus military equipment, along with economic sufficiency and popular trust, are regarded by Confucius as the three essentials of political security. The Book of Change declares the function of military forces and military expeditions is that of rectification. When military force is used for the purpose of rectification, it will not only bring no harm to the people, but deliver them from tyranny and lead them to goodness.

A nation not only should have sufficient military equipment, but also should train its men as well. Confucius declares that "to lead an uninstructed people to war is to throw them away". Again "let a good man teach the people seven years, and they may then be led to war". According to Li Chi, in a certain time of the year the government should teach the people military tactics by means of hunting trips.

The Book of Change says: "There is water in the ground. Army, the wise man trains the mass of people in military art". This refers to the system of training the farmers for war. There is army in the farm just as the phenomena of having water in ground, and in times of war all people are regular soldiers.^a

a: {Excerpts from "Chapter VI: The Principle of Benevolent Government" book "The Political Philosophy of Confucianism: An Interpretation of the Social and Political Ideas of Confucius, His Forerunners, and His Early Disciples", written by Leonard Shihlien Hsü, Published by Routledge in 2005, (First published in 1932)}, Pg: 116-117.

Developments in Chinese Military are being keenly observed by PLA watchers.

In a book titled “PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking” edited by Phillips C. Saunders (Director of the Centre for the Studies of the Chinese Military Affairs at the National Defence University) and Andrew Scobell (Senior Political Scientist at Rand Corporation), it is accessed that PLA does appear to have more influence on purely military issues than in the past-but much less influence on political issues and to be more actively engaged in policy debates on mixed civil-military issues where military equities are at stake.⁹²⁰

PLA is the world’s largest force with second largest budget.⁹²¹ Due to ongoing restructuring of combat units as part of PLA reforms, the characterization and numbers of units and systems are approximate as units are in the process of establishing, downsizing, reorganizing, or disbanding.⁹²² “We will make it our mission to see that by 2035, the modernization of our national defense and our forces is basically complete; and that by the mid-21st century our people's armed forces have been fully transformed into world-class forces,” said President Xi Jinping, also general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC), in the report to the 19th CPC National Congress. Following reforms, the number of PLA officers was also reduced by 30 percent, and hundreds of generals switched posts. In the meantime, the percentage of land forces’ personnel among the entire PLA was cut to less than half for the first time.⁹²³ 300,000⁹²⁴ personnel have been cut to keep the total active force at 2 million. Thus, the number of personnel in the leading organs at and above regiment level has been cut by about 25% and that of non-combat units by almost 50%. The PLA has significantly downsized the active force of the PLAA, maintained that of the PLAAF at a steady number, moderately increased that of the PLAN and PLARF, and optimized the force structures of all services and arms.⁹²⁵

China has pledged to make advances in reforming the military leadership and management system, as well as the joint battle command system by 2020. The PLA has experienced a series of historic changes in its organization and structure since 2015. The general command of the PLA Army, the PLA Rocket Force, and the PLA Strategic Support Force were established in late 2015. The previous seven military area commands were

⁹²⁰ Excerpts from Book titled “PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking” (2015) edited by Phillips C. Saunders (Director of the Centre for the Studies of the Chinese Military Affairs at the National Defence University) and Andrew Scobell (Senior Political Scientist at Rand Corporation), Available online at URL: <https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=25670>

⁹²¹ Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924, Pg 93 available online at URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-/1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

⁹²² Ibid, Pg 115

⁹²³ Excerpts from Xinhua News item Dated August 1, 2018 titled “China Focus: Marking 91st birthday, PLA marches into new era of reform, capacity building”, available online at URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-08/01/c_137361915.htm

⁹²⁴ China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era”, published in July 2019, Pg 18, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

⁹²⁵ ibid

regrouped into five theater commands, and the four military departments - staff, politics, logistics and armaments were reorganized into 15 agencies in 2016.⁹²⁶

China does not publish in the open domain its National Security Strategy.⁹²⁷ As per White paper on China's military strategy 2015 shortly after the founding of the PRC in 1949, the Central Military Commission (CMC) established the military strategic guideline of active defense, and later, in line with the developments and changes in the national security situation, had made a number of major revisions of it. In 1993 the military strategic guideline of the new era was formulated, which took winning local wars in conditions of modern technology, particularly high technology, as the basic point in making preparation for military struggle (PMS). In 2004, the guideline was further substantiated, and the basic point for PMS was modified to winning local wars under conditions of informationization.⁹²⁸

However, since 1949, China has adopted nine national military strategies, known as "strategic guidelines." The strategies adopted in 1956, 1980, and 1993 represent major changes in China's military strategy or efforts by the People's Liberation Army to wage war in a new way.⁹²⁹ According to the People's Liberation Army Daily in an editorial on July 3, 2018, "peace disease" has infiltrated every corner of the PLA since its last battles, with Vietnam in the late 1970s, threatening to undermine the fighting capability of what is the world's largest military. Chinese President Xi Jinping has ordered the military to boost its combat-readiness in response to concerns that officers lack the required competence after having not engaged in battle for decades. Xi has launched reforms including downsizing the army and placing greater emphasis on training. To prevent some military officials falsifying training data, the Central Military Commission (CMC) has since November been sending military disciplinary officers representing the PLA's anti-graft watchdog to the army's five theatre commands as inspectors, to monitor drills. "Peace disease has been a common symptom in our military for decades," the PLA Daily editorial read. If we do not make up our mind to eliminate those evils, we must pay a heavy cost in the event of a war.⁹³⁰

So far China has published **eleven White Papers** on Defence over the years with distinctive characteristics.⁹³¹

⁹²⁶ Excerpts from Xinhua News titled "Armed forces pledge to follow Xi's order to build strong military" published in April 19, 2017 available online at URL: http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-04/19/content_7568768.htm

⁹²⁷ Vivekananda International Foundation Analysis titled "China's Defence White Paper - An Analysis" written by Maj Gen PK Mallick, VSM (Retd) Published by VIF in August 2019 available online at URL: <https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/china-s-defence-white-paper-an-analysis.pdf>

⁹²⁸ http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805_3.htm

⁹²⁹ Stanford, The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies <https://fsi.stanford.edu/events/active-defense-china%E2%80%99s-military-strategy-1949>

⁹³⁰ South China Morning Post (SCMP) editorial titled "China's army infiltrated by 'peace disease' after years without a war, says its official newspaper" written by Minnie Chan published in July 3, 2018 available online at URL: <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2153579/chinas-army-infiltrated-peace-disease-after-years>

⁹³¹ China Military Online, Top News titled "Overview of all China's white papers on national defense" released in May 27, 2015 available online at URL: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/2015-05/27/content_4587121.htm

The first **White Paper, China: Arms Control and Disarmament (November 1995)** mentions that China appreciates and supports disarmament activities proposed by the United Nations covering the following details: Promoting Peace and Development for All Mankind; Military Personnel Reduced by One Million; Maintaining a Low Level of Defence Spending; Peaceful Uses for Military Industrial Technologies; Strict Control over the Transfer of Sensitive Materials and Military Equipment; and Actively Promoting International Arms Control and Disarmament.⁹³²

The second White Paper, **China's National Defense (July 1998)** created the first complete and systemic framework for China's white paper on national defense that was consistent with not only the international practices but also the Chinese characteristics. For the first time China systematically expounded on its defense policies and explicitly expressed its new outlook on security. It was also the first time that China made judgment about the cross-straits relation in a government document on national defense, reaffirming that "the Chinese government seeks to achieve the reunification of the country by peaceful means, but will not commit itself not to resort to force".⁹³³

The third White Paper, **China's National Defense (October 2000)** highlighted the serious security situation, emphasized that "in today's world, factors that may cause instability and uncertainty have markedly increased and the world is far from peaceful", and stressed that China always prioritizes safeguarding its sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity and safety. The section on defense policy especially expatiated on the Taiwan issue for the first time, reiterating that creating splittism means giving up peace across the Taiwan Straits.⁹³⁴

For the first time the fourth White Paper, **China's National Defense (December 2002)** put forth five national interests as the fundamental basis for defense policy and systematically expounded on the military strategy and guideline in the new era. The new chapter on Armed Forces comprehensively introduced the composition of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), the Chinese People's Armed Police Force and the Chinese militia. It also gave a special introduction to the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Second Artillery Force (SAF) of the PLA, and released the aircraft number of the aviation regiment as well as the aircraft-pilot ratio.⁹³⁵

The 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) proposed that the military shall accomplish the dual historical missions of mechanization and informatization. The fifth White Paper **China's National Defense (December 2004)** set aside an independent chapter on revolution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics, which comprehensively laid down the basic guidelines and principles for that purpose. It also expounded on a number of new topics for the first time, including "reducing the military staffs by 200,000", "intensifying the development of the Navy, Air Force and the SAF of the PLA " and "promoting informatization".⁹³⁶

The world is in a critical period of multi-polarization. For the first time the sixth White Paper **China's National Defense (December 2006)** put forth the concept of national security strategy and comprehensively analyzed China's security environment. It also

⁹³² <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/army/index.htm>

⁹³³ <http://en.people.cn/whitepaper/2.html>

⁹³⁴ <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/2000/index.htm>

⁹³⁵ <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20021209/index.htm>

⁹³⁶ <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/index.htm>

publicized the main strategic thoughts on the development of the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force and the SAF as well as on China's nuclear strategy, and set aside an independent chapter to introduce the Chinese People's Armed Police Force and the information about border defense and coastal defense.⁹³⁷

For the first time the seventh white paper **China's National Defense (2008)** introduced China's strategic blueprint for national defense development and expounded on the basic mission of China's strategic missile troops and the specific tasks of its nuclear missile forces. It set aside independent chapters on the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force and the SAF respectively for the first time and comprehensively introduced their development in such aspects as development history, structure and organization, and force building. Basic data about the expenditure on national defense in the 30 years since the reform and opening up, size of public security and border defense forces and scale of militia force were also publicized for the first time.⁹³⁸

For the first time the eighth White Paper **China's National Defense (2010)** expounded on the issue of building the military security mechanism of mutual trust across the Taiwan Straits and comprehensively expatiated on the diversified employment of China's armed forces in peacetime. For the first time it introduced the military modernization drive since the founding of the People's Republic of China and set forth the Chinese military's efforts to establish the joint operation system. It also for the first time introduced the development of military legal system, implementation of laws and regulations, and military judicial system, systematically elaborated on the objectives and principles of building military mutual trust under new circumstances, and gave an all-round introduction to what China had done to promote military mutual trust in recent years.⁹³⁹

This was the first national defense ninth White Paper **Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces (April 2013)** on a specific topic published by the Chinese government. While making new judgment of the security situation, the white paper illustrated the principles for diversified employment of China's armed forces and officially publicized the designations of the 18 Group Armies in the PLA Army for the first time. It also revealed the size of the PLA Army's operational troops, the PLA Navy and the Air Force as well as the missile types equipped in the SAF, making China's armed forces more transparent.⁹⁴⁰

This is the first time that the Chinese government published the tenth White Paper **China's Military Strategy (May 2015)** specialized in China's military strategy. The white paper systematically expounded on the Chinese military's missions and strategic tasks in the new era for the first time, pointed out that the basic point in making preparation for military struggle (PMS) shall be focused on winning local wars in conditions of modern technology, and highlighted maritime military struggle and maritime PMS. In particular, a series of statements that have never appeared in previous white papers are included in China's Military Strategy, such as the PLA Navy shall be "in line with the strategic requirement of offshore waters defense and open seas protection", the PLA Air Force shall be "in line with the strategic requirement of building air-space capabilities and

⁹³⁷ <http://en.people.cn/whitepaper/defense2006/defense2006.html>

⁹³⁸ http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2017-04/11/content_4778231.htm

⁹³⁹ http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2017-04/11/content_4778206.htm

⁹⁴⁰ http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-04/16/content_16410619.htm

conducting offensive and defensive operations”, “the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned” and “expediting the development of a cyber force”.⁹⁴¹

Chinese government published the eleventh White Paper China’s National Defense in the New Era (July 2019) which covers topics including International Security Situation; China’s Defensive National Defense Policy in the New Era; Fulfilling the Missions and Tasks of China’s Armed Forces in the New Era; Reform in China’s National Defense and Armed Forces; Reasonable and Appropriate Defense Expenditure; and Actively Contributing to Building a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind.⁹⁴²

Militarism and the China model: the case of National Defense Education: The Role of Military and Paramilitary Institutions

Christopher R. Hughes, (2017) in his article “*Militarism and the China model: the case of National Defense Education*” published Journal of Contemporary China, stated “The PLA and its associated paramilitary organizations are also important institutions for designing and implementing NDE. As stated above, the PLA plays a leading role by being involved in the drafting of the NDEL and the guidelines for NDE. The 2002 *White Paper on China’s National Defense* that more than 200,000 officers had already been involved at that time in extending NDE from higher education to schools, and that over 30 million students had received training since 1985. This supports the view of those observers of China’s military who are skeptical about the assumption that its evolution as a more professionalized fighting force is same as the creation of a de-politicized ‘national’ army. China’s 2015 defense white paper leaves little doubt about this when it states that the ‘first priority’ of the PLA is ‘ideological and political building’.”⁹⁴³

There is a marked difference between the tenor of the white papers of 2015 and 2019. The 2015 white paper called for more military exchanges and greater cooperation with other countries in a rapidly changing environment. The 2019 White Paper reflects intensification, implementation and justification.⁹⁴⁴ In Its article “China accuses US of undermining global security in defence white paper” dated July 24, 2019; the South China Morning Post has summarized it succinctly: Perhaps the biggest change is in tone - cooperation is out in favour of antagonism and complaint.⁹⁴⁵

The White Paper (2019) summarises the overall character of United States defense efforts by declaring that:-

- International strategic competition is on the rise.

⁹⁴¹ http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm

⁹⁴² China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era”, published in July 2019 available online at URL:

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

⁹⁴³ Excerpts of article titled “*Militarism and the China model: the case of National Defense Education*” published in Journal of Contemporary China, Vol 26 (103) in 2017, Pg 54-67, Available online at URL: <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67686/>

⁹⁴⁴ Vivekananda International Foundation Analysis titled “China’s Defence White Paper - An Analysis” written by Maj Gen PK Mallick, VSM (Retd) Published by VIF in August 2019 available online at URL:

<https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/china-s-defence-white-paper-an-analysis.pdf>

⁹⁴⁵ South China Morning Post dated July 24, 2019 titled “China accuses US of undermining global security in defence white paper” written by Kristin Huang, available online at URL:

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3019952/china-accuses-us-undermining-global-security-defence-white>

- The U.S. has adjusted its national security and defense strategies and adopted unilateral policies.
- U.S. has provoked and intensified competition among major countries.
- U.S. significantly increased its defense expenditure.
- U.S. pushed for additional capacity in nuclear, outer space, cyber and missile defense and undermined global strategic stability.

This white paper highlights three important points:-

- Internal security issues are non-negotiable for China, and any external interference would not be tolerated.
- China is heading towards its stated goal of People's Liberation Army (PLA): Informationisation by 2020, modernization by 2035 and a world class armed force by 2050.
- China views East and Southeast Asia as its own sphere of influence and aims to keep the U.S. out of it

Red Lines

Key points of the White Paper are:-

- China's Defence Ministry warns against seeking Taiwan independence.
- China's national goal is to protect its interest and security.
- South China Sea and Diaoyu Islands are inseparable from China.

It claims that building infrastructure, deploying defensive capabilities on the islands and reefs and conducting patrols around the waters of the South China Sea is within its national sovereignty. This is opposite to Chinese President Xi Jinping's 2015 commitment to not militarize these features.

India gets 18 references in the White Paper. Whether due to Wuhan spirit or China's geopolitical compulsions the White Paper shows generally positive outlook towards India. The border issue with India is explained in non-confrontationist few words and the tone is not offensive.

The White Paper says that Beijing's policy on the Sino-Indian border question is "to implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of China and India." It states, "The two militaries have exchanged high-level visits and pushed for a hotline for border defense cooperation and mechanisms for border management and border defense exchanges". However, the white paper explains that the PLA will "take effective measures to create favorable conditions for the peaceful resolution of the Donglang (Doklam) standoff." This suggests that the tussle over Doklam is far from over, despite a simultaneous disengagement by both sides on technical terms in that area in August 2017. India must remain wary of this statement.

China views South Asia also as "generally stable," although "conflicts between India and Pakistan flare up from time to time." This suggests that Beijing is confident about its ability to manage tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad.

India should be cautious about China's ambitions in the Indian Ocean Region. The Defence White Paper mentions the Chinese military outpost in Djibouti and its use for support

functions in humanitarian operations. It states, “To address deficiencies in overseas operations and support, it builds far seas forces, develops overseas logistical facilities, and enhances capabilities in accomplishing diversified military tasks. The PLA conducts vessel protection operations, maintains the security of strategic Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOC), and carries out overseas evacuation and maritime rights protection operations.” In August 2017, the PLA Djibouti Support Base entered service. The base has provided equipment for the maintenance of four escort task groups, offered medical services for over 100 officers and sailors on board, conducted joint medical exercises with foreign militaries, and donated over 600 teaching aids to local schools. When the security situation in Yemen deteriorated in March 2015, a PLAN escort task group sailed to the Gulf of Aden, berthed for the first time directly in an engagement area. This will have serious repercussions on India’s role in the Indian Ocean Region. This might well imply more Chinese bases in the Indian Ocean Region. India has been working on getting China to yield on its admission to the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The White Paper’s assessment of the international non-proliferation regime as “compromised by pragmatism and double standards” is likely to be troubling for India.⁹⁴⁶

A commentary “China’s Military Has No Combat Experience: Does it matter” by *Timothy R. Heath*, a senior international defense research analyst at RAND Corporation had appeared on *Foreign Policy* on November 27, 2018. It points out that:

- Presently China's military has an increasingly impressive high-tech arsenal, but its ability to use these weapons and equipment remains unclear. There are reasons to be sceptical. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) struggles under the legacy of an obsolete command system, rampant corruption, and training of debatable realism, among other issues. President Xi Jinping, the chairman of the Central Military Commission, has directed major efforts to address each of these defects and improve the military's ability to fight and win wars. Since 2016, these organizational and other reforms have gained momentum.
- PLA conspicuously lacks is combat experience.
- Although it engaged in a minor naval skirmish with Vietnam over the Johnson South Reef in 1988, the PLA last fought a major conflict nearly 40 years ago, when a seasoned Vietnamese military demolished a bungled Chinese invasion in 1979. The ghost of that defeat still hovers over the PLA. In China, authorities have largely chosen to ignore an embarrassing conflict that fits awkwardly with Beijing's narrative of a peaceful rise, but the official silence has left many PLA veterans disillusioned about their participation in the war. The few combat veterans who remain in service will all retire within the next few years, which means the military will soon have no personnel with first-hand combat experience.
- Without the test of combat, the PLA's war-fighting prowess remains unproven. Chinese authorities acknowledged this point earlier this year when the military's official newspaper, the *PLA Daily*, criticized what it described as “peace disease.” Decades of peace and prosperity, the newspaper warned, have exacerbated corruption and undermined readiness.

⁹⁴⁶ Excerpts from Vivekananda International Foundation Analysis titled “China’s Defence White Paper - An Analysis” written by Maj Gen PK Mallick, VSM (Retd) Published by VIF in August 2019 available online at URL: <https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/china-s-defence-white-paper-an-analysis.pdf>

- Likewise, Chinese Lt. Gen. He Lei said in June that his biggest regret before retiring is that he never fought a war - a remark that some American and Indian commentators seized on to argue that inexperience remains China's biggest military weakness. Others have gone further, claiming inexperience and other ills render the PLA a "paper tiger." A more sober analysis by longtime PLA-watcher Dennis Blasko concluded that "book learning or even [the PLA's] gradually improving training programs cannot compare to the stress of an extended deployment in a combat zone."
- Dissenting from this view, the PLA Navy's newspaper dismissed the issue in an essay citing examples in which veteran militaries suffered defeat at the hands of less-experienced adversaries.
- Combat experience thus matters for China at the operational and strategic levels, but its significance can be overstated. At the operational level, other factors such as leadership, training, preparation, and motivation are more responsible for determining military effectiveness on the battlefield. Weaknesses in these areas are more likely to impair the PLA's performance more than inexperience. Inexperience matters mainly in that it obscures the extent of the PLA's deficiencies, impairing an accurate assessment of all the factors that contribute to combat readiness.⁹⁴⁷

6.1 Mission Statement

China has released a White Paper titled "China's National Defense in the New Era" in July 2019. The Chapter III of White Paper spelled out the mission of the People's Liberation Army as "Fulfilling the Missions and Tasks of China's Armed Forces in the New Era".

In the new era, to meet the strategic demands of national security and development, China's armed forces firmly implement the missions and tasks entrusted by the CPC and the people. They endeavor to provide strategic support for consolidating the leadership of the CPC and the socialist system, safeguarding national sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, protecting China's overseas interests, and promoting world peace and development.

6.1.1 Safeguarding National Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests

China has a land border of more than 22,000 km (as claimed by China which is being contested by neighbouring countries including India due to border disputes) and a coastline of over 18,000 km (as claimed by China based on coastline artificialization mainly driven by sea reclamation and coastal engineering which is being contested.⁹⁴⁸), China surpasses most of countries in the number of neighbouring countries, the length of land border, and the complexity of maritime security.

In reference to above land border and coast line mentioned by China, the Indian position in this matter is clear and consistent and is given below.

⁹⁴⁷ Excerpts from Commentary titled "China's Military Has No Combat Experience: Does it matter" written by Timothy R. Heath, *Foreign Policy* published in November 27, 2018, Available online at URL: <https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/11/chinas-military-has-no-combat-experience-does-it-matter.html>

⁹⁴⁸ <https://mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/BMIntro-1011.pdf>

- According to a Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) Report, the length of our (India) land borders with China is 3488 Km.⁹⁴⁹
- According to the reply of LOK SABHA UNSTARRED QUESTION NO. 441 dated 23.02.2011 on “BORDER DISPUTE WITH CHINA”, China continues to be in illegal occupation of approximately 38,000 sq. kms in the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir. In addition, under the so-called Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq. km. of Indian Territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to China. China regards the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a dispute that should be settled properly through dialogue between India and Pakistan. China also disputes the international boundary between India and China. Government has conveyed to the Chinese side its clear and consistent position that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. In 2003, India and China agreed to each appoint a **Special Representative to explore from the political perspective** of the overall bilateral relationship the framework for a boundary settlement. There have been fourteen meetings of the Special Representatives so far, the last in November 2010. An “Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question” was signed between India and China on April 11, 2005. At present the two Special Representatives are exploring the framework for a settlement covering all sectors of the boundary.⁹⁵⁰
- In another reply of LOK SABHA UNSTARRED QUESTION NO. 645 dated 26.11.2014 on “BORDER DISPUTE WITH CHINA”, China disputes the international boundary between India and China. In the Eastern Sector, China claims approximately 90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. The fact that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral and inalienable part of India has been clearly conveyed to the Chinese side on several occasions, including at the highest level.

In recent years, following agreements related to India-China border have been signed between the two countries:

1. Agreement on the maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas, signed in September 1993.
2. Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the military field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas, signed in November 1996.
3. Protocol on modalities for the implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the military field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas, signed in April 2005.
4. Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question, signed in April 2005.
5. Agreement on the establishment of Working Mechanism on Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, signed in Jan 2012.

⁹⁴⁹ <https://mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/BMIntro-1011.pdf>

⁹⁵⁰ <http://loksabhaph.nic.in/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=101301&lsno=15>

6. *Border Defence Cooperation Agreement signed in October 2013.*

These Agreements lay down the political parameters and guiding principles for settling the India-China boundary question, institute confidence building measures to facilitate contacts and enhance understanding and cooperation between the border defence forces as well as provide procedures to be followed where there is no common understanding of the Line of Actual Control. The two sides have agreed to appoint a Special Representative (SR) each, to explore the framework for a boundary settlement from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship. There have been seventeen meetings of SRs so far, last one in New Delhi on February 10-11, 2014. The two sides agree that peace and tranquillity on the border is the basis for the continued expansion of India-China relations.⁹⁵¹

- **INDO-CHINA BORDER ISSUE**

On 16 June 2017, a large construction party of the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China entered the Doklam area of Bhutan. The Royal Government of Bhutan in a Press Statement issued on 29 June 2017 has stated that 'it has conveyed to the Chinese side, both on the ground and through diplomatic channel, that the construction of the road inside Bhutanese territory is a direct violation of the agreements' between China and Bhutan signed in 1988 and 1998. Royal Government of Bhutan has asked that the status quo as before 16 June 2017 be maintained. Government of India has also conveyed to the Chinese side that their actions in Doklam area amount to a significant change in the status quo which is not in consonance with the bilateral understandings reached between India and China under the framework of the Special Representatives on the Boundary Question since the Doklam area is directly relevant for determination of the tri-junction point between India, China and Bhutan. Government of India has maintained constant communication with the Royal Government of Bhutan. Government of India is also engaged with the Government of the People's Republic of China through the diplomatic channels to maintain peace and tranquillity in accordance with various bilateral Agreements, Memorandum of Understanding, Protocol and joint statement of 1993, 1996, 2003, 2005, 2012 and 2013 and is committed to finding an amicable resolution acceptable to concerned countries.⁹⁵²

China's armed forces maintain a rigorous guard against encroachment, infiltration, sabotage or harassment so as to safeguard border security and stability. China has signed border cooperation agreements with 9 neighboring countries and set up border meeting mechanisms with 12 countries. China's armed forces have established mechanisms for exchanges with neighboring countries at three levels: national defense ministry, Theater Commands (TCs), and border troops. They conduct regular friendly mutual visits, working meetings, joint patrols and joint exercises targeting transnational crime with their foreign counterparts. They work together with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan to implement the border disarmament treaty. They strive to promote stability and security along the border with India, and take effective measures to create favorable conditions for the peaceful resolution of the Donglang (Doklam) standoff. They enhance control along the border with Afghanistan to guard against the infiltration of terrorists. They strengthen security management along the border with Myanmar, so as to secure

⁹⁵¹ https://mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/24344/Q_NO_645_BORDER_DISPUTE_WITH_CHINA

⁹⁵² <https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/28722/question+no1752+indochina+border+issue>

stability and public safety in the border areas. Since 2012, China's border troops have completed over 3,300 joint patrols and conducted over 8,100 border meetings with their foreign counterparts. They have cleared mines from 58 square kilometers of land, closed 25 square kilometers of landmine area, and disposed of 170,000 explosive devices such as landmines along the borders with Vietnam and Myanmar.

China's armed forces defend important waters, islands and reefs in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea, acquire full situation awareness of adjacent waters, conduct joint rights protection and law enforcement operations, properly handle maritime and air situations, and resolutely respond to security threats, infringements and provocations on the sea. Since 2012, China's armed forces have deployed vessels on over 4,600 maritime security patrols and 72,000 rights protection and law enforcement operations, and safeguarded maritime peace, stability and order.

China's armed forces conduct air defense, reconnaissance and early warning, monitor China's territorial air and peripheral air space, carry out alert patrols and combat takeoff, and effectively respond to emergencies and threats to maintain order and security in the air. Aiming at safeguarding national unity, China's armed forces strengthen military preparedness with emphasis on the sea. By sailing ships and flying aircraft around Taiwan, the armed forces send a stern warning to the "Taiwan independence" separatist forces.

6.1.2 Maintaining Combat Readiness

Maintaining combat readiness is an important assurance of effective response to security threats and fulfillment of tasks. The Central Military Commission (CMC) and the TCs' joint operations commands perform combat readiness duties strictly, and conduct regular inspections and drills to ensure combat readiness at all times. Consistent efforts are made to improve the capabilities of joint operations command to exercise reliable and efficient command over emergency responses, and to effectively accomplish urgent, tough and dangerous tasks. In 2018, the CMC conducted surprise inspections throughout the armed forces and organized readiness drills for the units, covering 21 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government, and parts of the East China Sea and South China Sea.

The PLA and the People's Armed Police Force (PAP) give greater priority to combat readiness. Efforts are made to strictly act on relevant regulations and procedures, fulfill readiness duties, conduct targeted exercises and training, and maintain standardized order, with a view to staying ready to act when required and effectively carrying out readiness (combat) duties.

6.1.3 Carrying Out Military Training in Real Combat Conditions

Military training is the basic practice of the armed forces in peacetime. China's armed forces put military training in an important position and take combat effectiveness as the sole and fundamental criterion. In order to enhance realistic training, they optimize the policy framework and criteria in this respect, establish and improve the relevant supervision system, conduct supervision on military training for emergencies and combat across the services, implement the responsibility system for training and

readiness, and organize extensive contests and competitions to encourage officers and soldiers to step up military training.

Military training in real combat conditions across the armed forces is in full swing. Since 2012, China's armed forces have carried out extensive mission-oriented training tailored to the specific needs of different strategic directions and exercises of all services and arms, including 80 joint exercises at and above brigade/division level.

The TCs have strengthened their leading role in joint training and organized serial joint exercises codenamed *the East, the South, the West, the North* and *the Central*, to improve joint combat capabilities.

The PLA Army (PLAA) has organized training competitions and conducted live exercises codenamed *Stride* and *Firepower*. The PLA Navy (PLAN) has extended training to the far seas and deployed the aircraft carrier task group for its first far seas combat exercise in the West Pacific. It has organized naval parades in the South China Sea and the waters and airspace near Qingdao, and conducted a series of live force-on-force exercises codenamed *Mobility* and systematic all-elements exercises. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has strengthened systematic and all-airspace training based on operational plans. It has conducted combat patrols in the South China Sea and security patrols in the East China Sea, and operated in the West Pacific. It has completed a series of regular system-vs.-system exercises such as *Red Sword*. The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) has organized force-on-force evaluation-oriented training and training based on operational plans at brigade and regiment levels, strengthened training for joint strikes, and completed regular exercises such as *Heavenly Sword*. The PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) has made active efforts to integrate into the joint operations systems. It has carried out confrontational training in new domains and trained for emergencies and combats. The PLA Joint Logistic Support Force (PLAJLSF) has striven to align itself with the joint operations systems, and conducted exercises such as *Joint Logistics Mission 2018*. The PAP has developed to meet the requirements of nationwide coverage, effective connectivity, all-area response and integrated functions, and conducted a series of exercises including *Guard*.

6.1.4 Safeguarding Interests in Major Security Fields

Nuclear capability is the strategic cornerstone to safeguarding national sovereignty and security. China's armed forces strengthen the safety management of nuclear weapons and facilities, maintain the appropriate level of readiness and enhance strategic deterrence capability to protect national strategic security and maintain international strategic stability.

Outer space is a critical domain in international strategic competition. Outer space security provides strategic assurance for national and social development. In the interest of the peaceful use of outer space, China actively participates in international space cooperation, develops relevant technologies and capabilities, advances holistic management of space-based information resources, strengthens space situation awareness, safeguards space assets, and enhances the capacity to safely enter, exit and openly use outer space.

Cyberspace is a key area for national security, economic growth and social development. Cyber security remains a global challenge and poses a severe threat to China. China's armed forces accelerate the building of their cyberspace capabilities, develop cyber security and defense means, and build cyber defense capabilities consistent with China's international standing and its status as a major cyber country. They reinforce national cyber border defense, and promptly detect and counter network intrusions. They safeguard information and cyber security, and resolutely maintain national cyber sovereignty, information security and social stability.

6.1.5 Countering Terrorism and Maintaining Stability

China firmly opposes all forms of terrorism and extremism. As mandated by law, China's armed forces participate in operations for maintaining social order, prevent and combat violence and terrorism, safeguard political security and social stability, and secure the public's right to live and work in peace.

The PAP fulfills missions such as guarding key targets, on-site security protection, setting check points on key passages, and armed urban patrols. In accordance with the law, the PAP supports civil authorities in law enforcement operations to combat criminal gangs and terrorist activities, actively participates in the maintenance of public order, and prevents and responds to potential threats to China's political security and social order, thus making a significant contribution to the Peaceful China initiative. Since 2012, the PAP has deployed large numbers of troops annually in security duties, counter-terrorism, emergency response, and maritime rights protection and law enforcement. It has completed around 10,000 security assignments during major events such as the G20 Summit, the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, the BRICS Leaders Meeting, and the SCO Qingdao Summit, and participated in the response to 671 hostage situations, incidents of severe violence, and terrorist attacks. Since 2014, the PAP has assisted the government of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in taking out 1,588 violent terrorist gangs and capturing 12,995 terrorists. The PLA supports the civil authorities in maintaining social stability, provides security for major events, and responds to emergencies in accordance with the law. It is mainly tasked with missions such as counter-terrorism, NBCE detection and test, medical relief, and transport support. It disposes of potential safety hazards in the waters and protects security in the air over and around major event venues.

6.1.6 Protecting China's Overseas Interests

Overseas interests are a crucial part of China's national interests. One of the missions of China's armed forces is to effectively protect the security and legitimate rights and interests of overseas Chinese people, organizations and institutions.

The PLA actively promotes international security and military cooperation and refines relevant mechanisms for protecting China's overseas interests. To address deficiencies in overseas operations and support, it builds far seas forces, develops overseas logistical facilities, and enhances capabilities in accomplishing diversified military tasks. The PLA conducts vessel protection operations, maintains the security of strategic SLOCs, and carries out overseas evacuation and maritime rights protection operations.

In August 2017, the PLA Djibouti Support Base entered service. The base has provided equipment for the maintenance of four escort task groups, offered medical services for over 100 officers and sailors on board, conducted joint medical exercises with foreign militaries, and donated over 600 teaching aids to local schools.

When the security situation in Yemen deteriorated in March 2015, a PLAN escort task group sailed to the Gulf of Aden, berthed for the first time directly in an engagement area, and evacuated 621 Chinese citizens and 279 foreign citizens from 15 countries including Pakistan, Ethiopia, Singapore, Italy, Poland, Germany, Canada, the UK, India and Japan.

6.1.7 Participating in Disaster Rescue and Relief

Participating in national development and protecting the public's rights to work in peace are the responsibilities of China's armed forces mandated by the Constitution of the PRC. As stipulated in the *Regulations on Participation in Emergency Rescue and Disaster Relief by China's Armed Forces*, China's armed forces are mainly tasked with rescuing, transferring and evacuating trapped populations; ensuring the security of important targets; salvaging and transporting important materials; conducting specialized operations such as restoration of transport facilities including roads, bridges and tunnels, maritime search and rescue, NBC rescue, epidemic control and medical relief; eliminating or controlling other major threats, dangerous situations and disasters; and supporting civil authorities in post-disaster reconstruction.

Since 2012, the PLA and the PAP have deployed 950,000 soldiers, 1.41 million militia, 190,000 vehicles and items of equipment, and sortied 26,000 vessels and 820 aircraft in emergency response and disaster relief. They have participated in rescue and relief efforts such as the earthquake in Ludian County of Yunnan Province, the rainstorm and flood in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River, and the removal of the barrier lake in the Yarlung Zangbo River. They have assisted local governments to rescue and transfer over 5 million people, treated over 210,000 patients, transported over 360,000 tons of goods, and reinforced over 3,600 km of levees. In 2017, the PLA Macao Garrison sent 2,631 soldiers and over 160 vehicles to assist the government of Macao Special Administrative Region in its relief efforts in the wake of Typhoon Hato.⁹⁵³

6.2 History

History of PLA

The PLA is a people's army led by the Communist Party of China. Its duty is to consolidate national defence, resist aggression, curb subversion and efforts to split the nation, defend the motherland, safeguard the people's peaceful labour, join in building the country and strive, to serve the people.⁹⁵⁴

Salient points are given below:

⁹⁵³ China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled "China's National Defense in the New Era", published in July 2019,

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

⁹⁵⁴ http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/China-Defense-White-Paper_1995_Arms-Control_English.pdf

- People's Liberation Army was founded 92 years ago. On August 1, 1927, the Communist Party of China (CPC) initiated the Nanchang Uprising to counter the anti-communist purges by the Kuomintang. The Nanchang Uprising was seen as CPC's initial bid to establish the people's army. August 1 has been used as the major symbol of the PLA flag and army emblem since 1949. The date is also celebrated as China's Army Day. Originally called the "Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army", the Chinese military has played a key role in determining the course of the country.⁹⁵⁵
- On September 9, 1927, Mao Zedong led the Autumn Harvest Uprising in Central China's Hunan province. In October, the troops arrived at Jinggang Mountain where Mao decided to name them the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army - the military arm of the CPC.⁹⁵⁶
- The Long March, which lasted from October 1934 to October 1936, was a military maneuver by the Red Army, the forerunner of the People's Liberation Army. The three major forces of Red Army, the First, Second and Fourth Front Armies joined together in Northwest China's Gansu province, on October 1936.⁹⁵⁷
During the anti-Japanese war, under the leadership of the Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and other anti-Japanese armed forces of the people penetrated deep behind enemy lines to mobilize the masses, peasants in particular, to launch guerrilla warfare. Land mine warfare was widely used in Hebei province and played a key role in blocking the Japanese troops. In May 1943, over 15,000 militiamen were engaged to counter Japanese "mopping-up" operations in the Taihang area, taking part in more than 2,000 engagements. In the heartland of the Taihang Mountains, it was said that the "sound of gunfire permeated the air" as Japanese soldiers were under attack in almost every village.⁹⁵⁸
- From June 1946, the **Kuomintang** armies launched a concerted attack on the Liberated Areas led by the CPC, and a large-scale civil war started. On November 6, 1948, the East China Field Army and the Central Plain Field Army jointly launched the Huaihai Campaign against Kuomintang troops, which ended on January 10, 1949, with the victory of the PLA. With the victories of two other major campaigns Liaoshen Campaign and Pingjin Campaign, which were launched during the War of Liberation, the CPC overthrew the Kuomintang and won a victory in 1949.⁹⁵⁹ The **Pingjin Campaign** was a decisive campaign fought between November 29, 1948, and January 31, 1949, by the PLA Northeast Field Army, two armies of the North China Field Army and part of local armed forces against Kuomintang troops over an area extending from Zhangjiakou in the west to Tanggu and Tangshan in the East, including Beiping and Tianjin. The PLA wiped out the defending Kuomintang forces in Xinbao'an, Zhangjiakou and Tianjin.⁹⁶⁰ From the night of 20th to the night of 21st of April, 1949, the Second Field Army, the Third Field Army and part of the Fourth Field Army of the PLA launched the Crossing the Yangtze River Campaign by forcing the Yangtze River on a front

⁹⁵⁵ Excerpts from China Daily titled "Memorable moments in the history of PLA" updated in August 1, 2018
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_1.html

⁹⁵⁶ https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_2.html

⁹⁵⁷ https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_3.html

⁹⁵⁸ https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_6.html

⁹⁵⁹ https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_7.html

⁹⁶⁰ https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_8.html

extending more than five hundred kilometers from Hukou in the west to Jiangyin in the east and completely destroyed the Kuomintang troops' defense line along the Yangtze River.⁹⁶¹

- On May 27, 1949, the Third Field Army liberated Shanghai.⁹⁶²

6.2.1 Second Sino-Japanese War

The Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s and 1940s is referred to as the Second Sino-Japanese War in the West (*The 1894-95 war between the two countries is referred to as the first Sino-Japanese war, which took place exclusively in two coastal regions of northeastern China and involved minimal and mostly military casualties (an estimated total of 31,500 soldiers died)*).⁹⁶³ From 1937 to 1941, China fought Japan alone. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, the war became a major front of the Pacific War in World War II. This was the largest Asian war in the 20th century.

The breakout of the War was by no means a historical accident. Japan had aimed to dominate China politically and militarily to secure its abundant economic resources. Military conflicts in the form of small and localized engagements between China and Japan started in 1931. In September 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria immediately after the Mukden Incident, and established the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932 by installing Puyi, the last emperor of Imperial China, as a puppet ruler. Incessant fighting ensued.

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, 1937 marks the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War. In other words, the Sino-Japanese military conflict entered the stage of total war. Unlike Japan, China had little military and industrial strength to undertake a full-scale war. Consequently, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) easily defeated the poorly equipped Chinese army and captured Beijing and Tianjin. To prove their ability to fight the IJA and then win support from the U.S. and other foreign nations, the Kuomintang (KMT) central government led by Chiang Kai-shek started a fierce battle with the IJA in Shanghai in August 1937. After over three months of cruel fighting, the IJA eventually captured Shanghai; nonetheless, the Chinese demonstrated to the world their determination to defend their territories.

Encouraged by the hard-won victory in Shanghai, the IJA captured the KMT capital of Nanjing and southern Shanxi by the end of 1937. After the fall of Nanjing on December 13, 1937, up to 300,000 Chinese were estimated to become the victims of mass murder in the astonishing Nanjing Massacre, also known as the "Rape of Nanjing". In October 1938, the IJA captured the city of Wuhan, the political, economic and military center of China at that time. The KMT central government was forced to retreat to Chongqing to set up a provisional capital. At the same time, the IJA launched massive air raids on

⁹⁶¹ https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_9.html

⁹⁶² https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_10.html

⁹⁶³ Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) Paper Number: 38791 titled "Once an enemy, forever an enemy? the long-run impact of the Japanese invasion of China from 1937 to 1945 on trade and investment" written by Yi Che (University of Hong Kong), Julian Du (Chinese University of Hong Kong), Yi Lu (National University of Singapore), Zhigang Tao (University of Hong Kong), Pg 6.

URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38791/1/MPRA_paper_38791.pdf

civilian targets in the provisional capital of Chongqing and other major cities in the unoccupied areas, leaving millions dead, injured and homeless.

By 1941, Japan occupied much of northern and coastal China, but the KMT central government and military continued their resistance in the western interior, while the Chinese communists kept control of base areas in Shaanxi. Due to the stubborn Chinese resistance, Japan suffered tremendous casualties and failed to conquer China in a manner resembling the fall of France and Western Europe to Nazi Germany.

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, the Sino-Japanese war was merged into the Pacific Front of World War II. Nonetheless, foreign aid was extremely limited because sea routes to China and the Yunnan-Vietnam Railway had been closed since 1940. Most of China's own industrial base had already been captured or destroyed by Japan. Despite the severe shortage of resources and materials, in 1943, the Chinese were successful in repelling major Japanese offensives such as the Battle of Western Hubei and the Battle of Changde.

The Second Sino-Japanese War came to an end in 1945. In the spring of 1945, the Chinese military launched offensives and retook Hunan and Guangxi. In August, the U.S. dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet Union attack on the IJA in Manchuria hastened the Japanese surrender. The official surrender was signed on September 2, 1945.

The eight-year Second Sino-Japanese War caused tremendous losses to the Chinese people. Official Chinese statistics put China's civilian and military casualties at 20 million dead and 15 million wounded in the 1937-45 period.⁹⁶⁴ Most Western historians believe that the total number of casualties was at least 20 million.⁹⁶⁵ According to historian Mitsuyoshi Himeta, at least 2.7 million civilians died in a single episode, i.e., the Three Alls Policy - kill all, loot all, burn all - operation implemented in May 1942 in northern China.⁹⁶⁶ The war also wreaked havoc on the Chinese economy. Property losses suffered by the Chinese were estimated to be at US\$383 billion based on the currency exchange rate in July 1937, roughly 50 times the GDP of Japan at that time.⁹⁶⁷

The huge number of Chinese casualties in the War was a result of massive killings and other severe war crimes committed by the Japanese military forces against millions of civilians and prisoners of war. According to documents produced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, the Japanese military carried out a wide variety of war crimes that encompassed mass killings, human experimentation and biological warfare, the use of chemical weapons, torturing of prisoners of war, cannibalism, forced labour, comfort women (sexual slaves in military brothels), and looting.⁹⁶⁸

⁹⁶⁴ China Daily titled "Remember Role in Ending Fascist War", published August 15, 2005 available online at URL: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-08/15/content_468908.htm

⁹⁶⁵ "Nuclear Power: The End of the War Against Japan" written by Prof. Duncan Anderson last updated in February 17, 2011 available online at URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/nuclear_01.shtml

⁹⁶⁶ Himeta, Sanko sakusen towa nan dataka-Chogokujin no mita Nihon no senso, Iwanami Bukuretto 1996, Pg. 43.

⁹⁶⁷ Ho Ying-chin (1978), Who Actually Fought the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945?

⁹⁶⁸ Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) Paper Number: 38791 titled "Once an enemy, forever an enemy? the long-run impact of the Japanese invasion of China from 1937 to 1945 on trade and investment" written by Yi

The war has created a permanent scar on the heart of the Chinese people, partly because of the atrocities committed by the Japanese military during the war, and more importantly because of the lack of sincere remorse for the war crimes on the Japanese side. Although China and Japan normalized their diplomatic relations in 1972 and there have been several episodes indicating warm bilateral relations in recent decades, the war still remains a primary point of contention and a stumbling block to Sino-Japanese relations.

China and Japan continually debate the actual number of people killed in the Nanking Massacre. China claims that at least 300,000 civilians were killed, whereas Japan argues the number was far lower. Some Japanese nationalists even claim that the Rape of Nanking did not even occur.⁹⁶⁹

According to the China Topline Report of Global Views 2006 released by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 31% of the Chinese people surveyed were against China having a free trade agreement with Japan, whereas the corresponding figure for those opposing a free trade agreement with the U.S. was 19%. Similarly, 58% of the Chinese surveyed did not agree that Japanese companies should be allowed to purchase a controlling stake in Chinese companies, whereas the corresponding figure for EU countries was 33%.⁹⁷⁰

6.2.2 1950s, 1960s and 1970s

6.2.2.1 1950s

6.2.2.1.1 Chinese Troops in Tibet

- In October 1950 Chinese troops entered Tibet from the East.⁹⁷¹

Che (University of Hong Kong), Julan Du (Chinese University of Hong Kong), Yi Lu (National University of Singapore), Zhigang Tao (University of Hong Kong), Pg 8. available online at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38791/1/MPRA_paper_38791.pdf

⁹⁶⁹ Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) Paper Number: 38791 titled “Once an enemy, forever an enemy? the long-run impact of the Japanese invasion of China from 1937 to 1945 on trade and investment” written by Yi Che (University of Hong Kong), Julan Du (Chinese University of Hong Kong), Yi Lu (National University of Singapore), Zhigang Tao (University of Hong Kong), Pg 8. available online at URL:

https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38791/1/MPRA_paper_38791.pdf

Abstract: We are living in an increasingly globalized world yet with constant and endless conflicts among countries. While studies have uncovered the impacts of various economic factors and policy regimes on trade and investment, a much less understood issue is whether conflicts among countries have any, especially long-lasting, impacts on cross-border trade and investment. In this paper, we exploit one of the most important conflicts of the 20th century between what are currently the **world’s second and third largest economies**, the Japanese invasion of China from 1937 to 1945, to investigate its long-run impact on contemporary trade and investment between the two countries. We find that Chinese regions that suffered more severe damage in the Japanese invasion are both less likely to trade with and trade less with Japan. Consistently, we also find that Japanese multinationals are less likely to invest in Chinese regions that suffered greater numbers of casualties during the Japanese invasion. Our study shows that historical animosity still matters for international trade and investment, despite the trend toward a flat world.

https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38791/1/MPRA_paper_38791.pdf

⁹⁷⁰ Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) Paper Number: 38791 titled “Once an enemy, forever an enemy? the long-run impact of the Japanese invasion of China from 1937 to 1945 on trade and investment” written by Yi Che (University of Hong Kong), Julan Du (Chinese University of Hong Kong), Yi Lu (National University of Singapore), Zhigang Tao (University of Hong Kong), Pg 25. available online at URL:

https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38791/1/MPRA_paper_38791.pdf

⁹⁷¹ MEA Report 1950-51, pg 12 available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2477?000>

- In 1951, **Tibet** saw political changes of great historical interest. **The Sino-Tibetan Treaty**, which provided for the assumption by China of control over Tibet's external affairs, for the establishment of Chinese Military Headquarters in Tibet, and the incorporation of the Tibetan forces into the Chinese Army, and for the defence of Tibet's borders by China was concluded during this year.⁹⁷²

6.2.2.1.2 1950s ⁹⁷³

The year of 1950

In January 1950, the PLA launched large-sized operations to suppress the bandits and remaining forces of the Kuomintang. In March 1950, the 15th Army Corps of the 4th Field Army launched the campaign to liberate the Hainan Island. On April 14, 1950, the leading organ of the PLA Navy was founded in Beijing.

On April 14, 1950, the General Staff Headquarters of the PLA informed by telegraph the leaders of different strategic areas of the resolution adopted at a meeting held by the CPC Political Bureau. According to the resolution, the total number of the PLA would be cut to 4 million from the existing 5.5 million. On July 13, 1950, the Central Military Commission made a decision to establish the Northeast Frontier Defense Army with the 13th Army Corps as the main force. On August 1, 1950, the leading organ of the artillery force of the PLA was set up in Beijing. On September 1, 1950, the leading organ of the armored force of the PLA was set up in Beijing. September 25-30, 1950, the First National Combat Heroes Representatives Meeting was held in Beijing.

Aid Korea: In early October, 1950, the CPC Central Committee made a decision to set up the Chinese People's Volunteers to fight against the U.S. aggression and aid Korea. The Chinese People's Volunteers entered **Korea** on October 19, 1950. On July 27, 1953, the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed, marking the end of the War to Resist the U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. From March 15 to October 26, 1958, the Chinese People's Volunteers withdrew from **Korea** in batches and returned to China.

On October 23, 1950, the leading organ of the aerial defense force of the PLA was set up in Beijing. On November 8, 1950, the leading organ of the public security force of the PLA was set up in Beijing. On December 25, 1950, the leading organ of the engineer corps of the PLA was set up in Beijing. In August of 1955, the engineer corps was renamed engineering corps.

The year of 1951

On January 4, 1951, the Ordnance Industry Committee of the Central Military Commission was founded. On January 15, 1951, the Military College of the PLA was founded in Nanjing, capital of east China's Jiangsu Province. On February 1, 1951, the General Staff Headquarters of the PLA promulgated the Routine Service Regulations (draft), the Formation Regulations (draft) and the Discipline Regulations (draft) within the whole army.

⁹⁷² MEA Report 1951-52, pg 15 available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2478?000>

⁹⁷³ Chinadaily: PLA History, titled "Major events in PLA's history 1950-1966" published in July 29, 2010 available online at URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/pla2010/2010-07/29/content_11067041.htm

The year of 1952

On May 16, 1952, the Logistics Academy of the PLA was founded in Beijing. From 1st to 11th of August, 1952, the 1st Sports Meeting of the PLA was held in Beijing.

The year of 1953

On June 1, 1953, the PLA started to implement the unified military training plan stipulated by the Central Military Commission, which was seen as an important step made by the PLA towards the regularization of the troops. On September 1, 1953, the Military Engineering College of the PLA was founded in Harbin, northeast China's Heilongjiang Province. From December 7, 1953 to January 26, 1954, a meeting attended by senior cadres of the CPC in the PLA was held in Beijing and a general objective to realize the modernization and regularization of the PLA was made at the meeting.

The year of 1954

On April 15, 1954, the CPC Central Committee and the People's Revolutionary Military Commission promulgated the Regulations on Political Work of the PLA (draft). On September 3, 1954, the PLA combat troops stationed in the front line in Fujian started as ordered the bombardment against the Kuomintang troops who were entrenched on the Greater and Lesser Kinmen Islands. On September 28, 1954, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC adopted a resolution on the establishment of the Central Military Commission of the CPC.

The year of 1955

On January 15, 1955, the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee held an enlarged meeting in Beijing to make a decision on the development of A-energy and the A-bomb. On January 18, 1955, the PLA launched a joint operation involving the troops of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force to liberate the Yijiangshan Island occupied by the Kuomintang troops. On February 11, 1955, the State Council made a decision to divide the existing 6 military area commands in northeast China, north China, northwest China, east China, central and south China and southwest China into 12 military area commands, namely, the Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chengdu, Kunming, Lanzhou, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet Military Area Commands.

On July 30, 1955, the Second Meeting of the 1st National People's Congress ratified the Military Service Law of the People's Republic of China, which stipulated the People's Republic of China shall practice a military service system based mainly on conscription. According to this law, China started to practice the conscription in 1956.

In September 1955, the PLA started to practice the military rank system. The grand ceremony of conferring military ranks and medals to marshals and generals was held in Beijing on Sept 27, 1955. On October 24, 1955, the navies of the East China and the Central and South China Military Area Commands were renamed respectively the East China Sea Fleet and the South China Sea Fleet of the PLA Navy.

The year of 1956 - 1958

On January 1, 1956, the PLA Daily was officially published in the military circle. On March 15, 1958, the Academy of Military Science of the PLA was established in Beijing. With a command from the Central Military Commission, the PLA combat troops stationed in the

front line in Fujian bombarded against the Kuomintang troops who were entrenched on the Greater and Lesser Kinmen Islands on August 23, 1958.

The year of 1959 - 1960

On August 1, 1960, the North China Sea Fleet of the PLA Navy on the basis of the Qingdao Base of the PLA Navy was founded.

6.2.2.2 1960s⁹⁷⁴

Indo-China War October 1960: separately being included in Chapter V-Foreign Relations under subheading 5.9.1 "Territorial Disputes".

The Year of 1962

Indo-China War: Border intrusion by the Chinese troops resulting in Indo-China war in October 1962.

The year of 1963 - 1964

On March 5, 1963, Mao Zedong issued his autograph "Learn from Comrade Lei Feng" to call on Chinese people to follow the example of Lei Feng, a soldier of the PLA who was selfless, modest and devoted to the CPC and a model of serving people wholeheartedly. In June 1964, the contests of military skills were kicked off in all the combat units of the PLA. On October 16, 1964, China successfully conducted the explosion test of its first A-bomb.

The year of 1965 - 1966

On June 1, 1965, the PLA cancelled the military rank system and all the officers and men began to have new-type military uniforms. On July 1, 1966, the leading organ of the Second Artillery Force of the PLA was founded in Beijing. On October 27, 1966, China got a success in its first nuclear missile launching test.

Sino-Russian Border Dispute

According to a CNA analysis China and the Soviet Union had initially enjoyed good relations in the aftermath of the Chinese civil war. On 14 February 1950, China and the Soviet Union signed the 30-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, which obligated each state to provide "military and other assistance" to the other if either were attacked by their common enemy, Japan, or a state allied with Japan. On 15 October 1957, Moscow and Beijing signed the New Defense Technical Accord, which committed Moscow to provide China with a prototype atomic bomb. The Soviets also agreed to sell China equipment for uranium enrichment and provide an initial batch of uranium hexafluoride. The 2 March 1969 firefight between China and Soviet troops across the frozen Ussuri River, which forms a boundary line between China and the Soviet Union in the east, toward a disputed river island called Zhenbao (Damansky in Russian), ignited Sino-Soviet hostilities. While China was still in its nuclear infancy, having only tested its first nuclear device in October 1964, the Soviets by 1969 had built up a large and diverse nuclear arsenal. By mid-October 1969, China had become so concerned about a Soviet

⁹⁷⁴ Chinadaily: PLA History, titled "Major events in PLA's history 1950-1966" published in July 29, 2010 available online at URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/pla2010/2010-07/29/content_11067041.htm

nuclear strike that the central leadership, including Mao Zedong, fled Beijing, and on 18 October China placed its rudimentary nuclear forces, the first and only time this order has been issued.⁹⁷⁵

The 1960s saw a deepening split between Moscow and Beijing, and even a small-scale border war that rumbled throughout 1969 causing over 100 fatalities. These tensions prepared the ground for the Chinese regime's historic diplomatic flip-flop in 1971, allying with US imperialism against the Soviet Union, thus strengthening US imperialism and undermining the global struggle against it.⁹⁷⁶

6.2.2.3 1970s: China and Vietnam: a timeline of conflict (1973-2011)⁹⁷⁷

Hanoi's embrace of one-time foe the U.S. and growing rancor with Vietnam War-era ally China may appear surprising, but the two nations share a long and complicated history of territorial disputes. Vietnam and China, who established formal ties in 1950, have had border differences that trace back to the 1950's. These disputes were deferred while Beijing's southern neighbour was battling a civil war, and the U.S. entry into the conflict tied Northern Vietnam more closely to Beijing. As the Vietnam War wound down, however, territorial disputes began anew.

The year of 1973 - Hanoi announces to Beijing its intentions to negotiate contracts with foreign firms for the exploration of oil in the Gulf of Tonkin, part of the South China Sea. The disputed islands in the South China Sea assume importance only after it is disclosed that they are near the potential sites of substantial offshore oil deposits.

The year of January 1974 - Chinese military units seize islands in the Paracels occupied by South Vietnamese armed forces, and Beijing claims sovereignty over the Spratlys.

The year of Spring 1975 - South Vietnam occupies part of the Spratly Islands.

The year of 1976 - North and South Vietnam unify.

The year of 1978 - Vietnam's treatment of the Hoa people - an ethnic Chinese group - becomes an issue when Hanoi institutes a crackdown on the Chinese community because of its pervasive role in domestic commerce in the South and its alleged subversive activities in the North. Vietnam's actions force an unprecedented exodus of thousands of Hoa across the border into China.

The year of November 1978 - Sino-Vietnam relations worsen when the Soviet Union and Vietnam sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that calls for mutual assistance and consultation in the event of a security threat to either country.

The year of February to March 1979 - In the Sino-Vietnamese Border War, China launches the offensive in response to Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia,

⁹⁷⁵ Excerpts from Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) analysis titled "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969" written by Michael S. Gerson published in November 2010 available online at URL: https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0022974.A2.pdf

⁹⁷⁶ ChinaWorkerInfo paper titled "The invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Sino-Soviet split" published in August 22, 2018 available online at URL: <https://chinaworker.info/en/2018/08/22/18403/>

⁹⁷⁷ CNN Report titled "China and Vietnam: a timeline of conflict" published in June 28, 2011 available online at URL: <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/06/27/china.vietnam.timeline/index.html>

which ends the reign of the China-backed Khmer Rouge. This becomes China's largest military operation since the Korean War.

The year of 1985 - Throughout most of 1985 and into the early months of 1986, Vietnam's border provinces are subject to intense artillery and mortar shelling. China issues vague threats to Vietnam of a "second lesson" over the stalemate with Cambodia.

The year of 1988 - China and Vietnam fight a naval battle just off the Spratly Islands. 70 Vietnamese sailors are killed.

The year of November 1991 - China and Vietnam normalize relations after more than a decade of hostility.

The year of December 1999 - The two countries sign the Land Border Treaty.

The year of December 2000 - Vietnam and China sign two agreements to resolve a long-standing territorial dispute over the resource rich Gulf of Tonkin. The agreements demarcate territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, as well as outlining regulations for fisheries.

The year of May 2003 - The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry issues a "sovereignty" declaration on the Chinese ban on fishing in the South China Sea, claiming that Vietnam had undisputed "sovereignty" rights over the Paracel and Spratly islands.

The year of May 25, 2011 - A Vietnamese ship has its cables cut by Chinese patrol boats while conducting a underwater survey of the South China Sea.

The year of June 9, 2011 - Vietnam's foreign ministry says a Chinese fishing boat supported by two Chinese naval patrol craft cut a cable being used by a seismic survey craft operated by state-run energy company Petro Vietnam.

The year of June 13, 2011 - Vietnam holds live-fire drills in the South China Sea amid high tensions with China over disputed waters.

6.2.3 Since 1980s

The Chinese armed forces were reduced, reorganized and restructured between 1982 and 1984.⁹⁷⁸

- In May, 1985, China declared that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would reduce military personnel by one million.⁹⁷⁹
- Reducing personnel: By 1987, the 4.238-million-strong PLA had been reduced to 3.235 million. Subsequently By 1990, the PLA manpower was further reduced to 3.199 million. The 1.039 million demobilized soldiers represented 24.5 percent of the army's original strength.

⁹⁷⁸ http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/China-Defense-WhitePaper_1995_Arms-Control_English.pdf

⁹⁷⁹ *ibid*

- Reductions in weaponry. Throughout the armed forces 10,000 artillery pieces of various kinds were removed from service, along with over 1,100 tanks, approximately 2,500 airplanes, and over 610 naval vessels.
- According to the claims made by the White Paper 1995, China's expenditure on national defence has consistently been kept at a low level necessary to ensure that the requirements for national security are met. Between 1979 and 1994 defence spending increased 6.22 percent annually in absolute terms. Over that same period, the general retail price index of commodities increased 7.7 percent annually. During these sixteen years an expenditure of 581.294 billion Yuan would have been needed to maintain the 1979 level of defence spending. However, only 71.65 percent of this figure, 416.499 billion Yuan, was appropriated. Expenditure on personnel's living expenses was increased by a large margin to keep up with the spiralling costs of living. In recent years, increases in annual defence spending have for the most part simply matched price increases or gone to ensure the standard of living of personnel.
- China has a fairly low level of defence spending compared with that announced by other countries. It spent only US\$ 6.39 billion on defence in 1994 (calculated at the average annual exchange rate of the RMB yuan to the US dollar), 2.3 percent that spent by the United States, 18.3 percent that by Britain, 18.6 percent that by France and 13.9 percent that by Japan. Per capita defence spending by that year was only US\$ 5.36. China's spending on defence is low in relative terms as well as absolute terms. In 1979, defence expenditure in China accounted for 5.6 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP); in 1994, 1.3 percent. This may be compared with 4.2 percent in the United States, 3.6 percent in Britain and 3.18 percent in France. Again, in 1979, defence accounted for 18.5 percent of total expenditure by the Chinese government; in 1994, 9.5 percent. In the United States this figure stood at 18.9 percent, in Britain 9.64 percent and in France 13.6 percent.⁹⁸⁰
- Since 1990, the People's Liberation Army has been involved in 29 UN peacekeeping operations, deploying more than 35,000 personnel.⁹⁸¹
- The PLA Hong Kong Garrison's moved into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on July 1, 1997.⁹⁸²
- After the massive earthquake hit Wenchuan County on May 12, 2008, the PLA troops were involved in rescue missions.⁹⁸³
- A Chinese warship set off from Sanya, Hainan province, for an escort mission in Gulf of Aden, Dec 26, 2008.⁹⁸⁴

⁹⁸⁰ White Paper titled "China: Arms Control and Disarmament" issued in November 1995, available online at URL: <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/bjzl/t176939.htm>
 Information Office of the State Council Of the People's Republic of China November 1995, Beijing:
<http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/army/index.htm>
http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/China-Defense-WhitePaper_1995_Arms-Control_English.pdf

⁹⁸¹ https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_12.html

⁹⁸² https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_14.html

⁹⁸³ https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_15.html

⁹⁸⁴ https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_16.html

- The PLA Rocket Force was established in December 2015 to replace the former PLA Second Artillery Corps, which had managed the country's ballistic missiles since the 1960s.⁹⁸⁵
- DF-26 Missile, an IRBM were displayed during the military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, in Beijing, Sept 3, 2015.⁹⁸⁶
- Troops train for a military parade at Zhurihe training base in North China's Inner Mongolia autonomous region, July 30, 2017. The parade was held to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.⁹⁸⁷
- China launched a new domestically developed destroyer in Shanghai on June 28, 2017, marking a milestone in building a strong and modern naval force. The ship is the first of the country's new-generation guided-missile destroyer class, with a full displacement of around 10,000 metric tons. It is called one of the largest and mightiest of its kind in the world.⁹⁸⁸
- The responsibility for guarding China's national flag and firing salute cannons was transferred to the People's Liberation Army starting Jan 1, 2018, as authorized by the Communist Party of China Central Committee.⁹⁸⁹
- The ship, the largest and most sophisticated naval vessel in China, was designed and built by the nation on its own. Currently, the Navy operates a sole aircraft carrier, CNS Liaoning, which was originally a Soviet-era vessel that was extensively refitted at the Dalian shipbuilder.⁹⁹⁰
- During the past decades, the PLA has spared no effort to modernize and strengthen its capabilities as a fighting force. It gradually developed its own tanks, aircraft and ships to replace weapons bought from other countries.⁹⁹¹

6.2.4 Peacekeeping Operations

Committed to the principle of win-win cooperation, China's armed forces will fulfill their international responsibilities and obligations, and provide more public security goods to the international community to the best of their capacity. They actively participate in the UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs), vessel protection operations, and international efforts in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), strengthen international cooperation in arms control and non-proliferation, play a constructive role in the political settlement of hotspot issues, jointly maintain the security of international passages, and make concerted efforts to respond to global challenges such as terrorism, cyber security and major natural disasters, thus making a positive contribution to building a community with a shared future for mankind.

In recent years, China has regularly held serial joint exercises and training on counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, search and rescue, and tactical skills with its neighboring countries, and carried out extensive exchanges and practical cooperation on border and

⁹⁸⁵ https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_17.html

⁹⁸⁶ https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_18.html

⁹⁸⁷ https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_19.html

⁹⁸⁸ https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_21.html

⁹⁸⁹ https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_20.html

⁹⁹⁰ https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_22.html

⁹⁹¹ Excerpts from China Daily titled "Memorable moments in the history of PLA" updated in August 1, 2018 available online at URL:

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/01/WS5b60ed92a31031a351e914f9_1.html

coastal defense, academic institutions, think tanks, education, training, medical science, medical service, and equipment and technology. In addition, defense cooperation with ASEAN countries is moving forward. The military relationships between China and its neighboring countries are generally stable.

Actively Providing International Public Security Goods: China actively supports the UNPKOs. It is a major contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget and the largest troop contributing country among the permanent members of the UNSC. As of December 2018, China has participated in 24 UN peacekeeping missions and has contributed more than 39,000 peacekeepers. 13 Chinese military personnel have sacrificed their lives in the UNPKOs. In the missions, China's peacekeepers have built and repaired over 13,000 kilometers of roads, cleared and disposed of 10,342 mines and various items of unexploded ordnance, transported more than 1.35 million tons of materials over a total distance of more than 13 million kilometers, treated over 170,000 patients, and fulfilled over 300 armed escorts and long or short-distance patrols.

In September 2015, China joined the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) and built a peacekeeping standby force of 8,000 troops. In September 2017, China completed the registration of PCRS Level 1. In October 2018, 13 Chinese PCRS Level 1 units scored high in the UN assessment and were elevated to PCRS Level 2. Five among these units were elevated from Level 2 to Level 3 in February 2019. China has made active efforts to train international peacekeepers and trained over 1,500 individuals from dozens of countries. In December 2018, 2,506 peacekeepers from the PLA served in 7 UN missions and in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

In line with relevant UNSC resolutions, since December 2008, the Chinese government has dispatched naval ships to carry out regular vessel protection operations in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the coast of Somalia. Chinese PLAN task groups cooperate with multiple naval forces in the area to safeguard international SLOCs. In the past decade, over 100 vessels and 26,000 officers and sailors have been regularly deployed in 31 convoys, each consisting of three to four ships, in vessel protection operations. They have provided security protection for over 6,600 Chinese and foreign ships, and rescued, protected or assisted over 70 ships in distress.

China's armed forces take an active part in the international efforts for HADR. Military professionals are dispatched to conduct disaster relief operations in affected countries, provide relief materials and medical aid, and strengthen international exchanges in this respect. Since 2012, China's armed forces have participated in the search for the missing Malaysian Airliner MH370, and in the relief operations for Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, the water scarcity in Maldives, the earthquake in Nepal, and the flood caused by a dam collapse in Laos. Since it entered service a decade ago, the PLAN's hospital ship *Ark Peace* has fulfilled 7 voyages coded as *Mission Harmony* and visited 43 countries. During these visits, it provided medical services to the local communities, organized medical exchanges, and helped over 230,000 people.

China is active in international and regional counter-terrorism cooperation. It has strengthened such cooperation within the framework of the SCO. China hosts and participates in joint counter-terrorism exercises, cracks down on illegal trafficking of

weapons, ammunition and explosives, cooperates with SCO members to identify and cut off channels for terrorist infiltration, and promotes international counter-terrorism intelligence exchange and information sharing. It hosts the Great Wall International Forum on Counter-Terrorism, and actively participates in multilateral counter-terrorism mechanisms such as the APEC Counter-Terrorism Working Group and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum. Bilateral counter-terrorism consultations have been held with certain countries. China initiated the establishment of the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM), a counter-terrorism cooperation and coordination mechanism by the militaries of Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and Tajikistan. The QCCM has convened two military leaders' meetings and conducted counter-terrorism exchange and cooperation, actively safeguarding regional security.⁹⁹²

Table of Major Regional Security Dialogues and Cooperation Platforms Joined by the PLA and the PAP (Up to Dec. 2018):⁹⁹³

Platform	Year of Inception	Description
ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus	2010	ADMM-Plus is the largest and highest-level dialogue and cooperation mechanism on defense and security in the Asia-Pacific region. Since 2016, under the mechanism, the PLA has participated in a joint exercise on peacekeeping and demining in India, and exercises on maritime security and counter-terrorism in both Brunei and Singapore. From 2017 to 2020, China and Thailand co-chair the counter-terrorism expert working group.
ASEAN Regional Forum	1994	The forum has a membership of 27 countries and is the official multilateral platform for security dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. Since 2015, China has hosted important meetings and events including the ARF Peacekeeping Experts' Meeting, the ARF Defense Officials' Dialogue, the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) Heads of Defense Universities/Colleges/Institutions Meeting, and the ARF Security Policy Conference.

6.2.5 Notable Events

Office of the Secretary of Defence, Department of Defense, USA published an Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019 in May 2019, which refers to **China's territorial disputes including East China Sea, South China Sea in Asia Pacific and Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin** relating to **India besides China in the Arctic and China's One Belt, One Road (OBOR)** initiative.

China in Arctic

China has increased activities and engagement in the Arctic region since gaining observer status on the Arctic Council in 2013. China published an Arctic Strategy in January 2018 that promoted a **"Polar Silk Road"**, self-declared China to be a **"Near-Arctic State"**, and

⁹⁹² Excerpts from China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled "China's National Defense in the New Era", published in July 2019 available online at URL:

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

⁹⁹³ Excerpts from China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled "China's National Defense in the New Era", published in July 2019 available online at URL:

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

identified China's interests as access to natural resources and sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and promoting an image of a "responsible major country" in Arctic affairs. The strategy highlights China's icebreaker vessels and research stations in Iceland and Norway as integral to its implementation. Arctic border countries have raised concerns about China's expanding capabilities and interest in the region. Civilian research could support a strengthened Chinese military presence in the Arctic Ocean, which could include deploying submarines to the region as a deterrent against nuclear attacks.⁹⁹⁴

Arctic border countries have raised concerns about China's expanding capabilities and interest in the region. The government of Denmark has publicly expressed concern about China's interest in Greenland, which has included proposals to establish a research station in Greenland, establish a satellite ground station, renovate airports, and expand mining. Civilian research could support a strengthened Chinese military presence in the Arctic Ocean, which could include deploying submarines to the region as a deterrent against nuclear attacks. In September 2018, a Russian expert at the Russian International Affairs Council stated the Russian Federation was strongly opposed to foreign icebreakers operating on the Northern Sea Route, including U.S. and Chinese icebreakers.⁹⁹⁵

Further, China's leaders are leveraging China's growing economic, diplomatic, and military clout to establish regional pre-eminence and expand the country's international influence. China's advancement of projects such as the "**One Belt, One Road**" Initiative (**OBOR**) will probably drive military overseas basing through a perceived need to provide security for OBOR projects. China conducts influence operations against media, cultural, business, academic, and policy communities of the United States, other countries, and international institutions to achieve outcomes favourable to its security and military strategy objectives. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks to condition foreign and multilateral political establishments and public opinion to accept China's narrative surrounding its priorities like OBOR and South China Sea territorial and maritime claims. Recognizing that programs such as "Made in China 2025" and OBOR have sparked concerns about China's intentions, China's leaders have softened their rhetoric when promoting these programs without altering the programs' fundamental strategic goals.

South and East China Seas

China's pursuit of its territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas as well as along its borders with India and Bhutan are evident. In 2018, China continued militarization in the South China Sea by placing anti-ship cruise missiles and long range surface-to-air missiles on outposts in the Spratly Islands, violating a 2015 pledge by Chinese President Xi Jinping that "China does not intend to pursue militarization" of the Spratly Islands. China is also willing to employ coercive measures – both military and non-military – to advance its interests and mitigate opposition from other countries.

⁹⁹⁴ Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924, Pg V Available online at URL:

https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

⁹⁹⁵ *ibid*, pg 114

China's Territorial Disputes in Context

China and Japan have overlapping claims to both the continental shelves and the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the **East China Sea**. The East China Sea contains natural gas and oil, though hydrocarbon reserves are difficult to estimate. Japan maintains that an equidistant line from each country involved should separate the EEZs, while China claims an extended continental shelf beyond the equidistant line to the Okinawa Trench. Japan has accused China of breaching a principled consensus reached in 2008 that both sides would respect an equidistant median line in the East China Sea for resource development while conducting joint development of oil and natural gas field in a delineated area spanning the line near the northern end. Japan is concerned that China has conducted oil and gas drilling on the Chinese side of the median line of the East China Sea since 2013. China continues to contest Japan's administration of the nearby Senkaku Islands.

The **South China Sea** plays an important role in security considerations across East Asia because Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil and commerce through South China Sea shipping lanes, including more than 80 percent of the crude oil to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. China claims sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Island groups and other land features within its self-proclaimed "nine-dash line" – claims disputed in whole or part by Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Taiwan, which occupies Itu Aba Island in the Spratly Islands, makes the same territorial assertions as China. In 2009, China protested extended continental shelf submissions in the South China Sea made by Malaysia and Vietnam. In its protest to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, China included its ambiguous "nine-dash line" map. China also stated in a 2009 note verbale that it has "indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof." In July 2016, a tribunal established pursuant to the Law of the Sea Convention ruled that China's claims to "historic rights" over the South China Sea encompassed by the "nine-dash line" could not exceed its maritime rights under the Law of the Sea Convention. China did not participate in the arbitration, and Chinese officials publicly voiced opposition to the ruling. By the terms of the Convention, the ruling is binding on China.⁹⁹⁶

Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin region are integral part of India. In 2017, PLA had intruded into Doklam Plateau near the Doka La Pass, near the tri-border region of China, Bhutan, and India.

Outposts Capable of Supporting Military Operations

No substantial land has been reclaimed at any of the outposts since China completed its artificial island creation in the Spratly Islands in late 2015, after adding over 3,200 acres of land to the seven features it occupies in the Spratlys. China has stated these projects are mainly to improve marine research, safety of navigation, and the living and working conditions of personnel stationed on the outposts. However, the outposts provide

⁹⁹⁶Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924, Available online at URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

airfields, berthing areas, and resupply facilities that will allow China to maintain a more flexible and persistent military and paramilitary presence in the area. This improves China's ability to detect and challenge activities by rival claimants or third parties, widen the range of capabilities available to China, and reduce the time required to deploy them.

6.3 Organization

6.3.1 National Military Command

The latest position after the release of the eleventh White Paper (2019) on Defence is that PLA continuous to remain the CPC's Army. China's National Military Command/National Command Authority is the leaders of the Central Military Commission (CMC), which functions under the Central Committee of CPC. The latest position after the release of the eleventh White Paper (2019) on Defence is that PLA continuous to remain the CPC's Army. China's National Military Command/National Command Authority is the leaders of the Central Military Commission (CMC), which functions under the Central Committee of CPC. China's National Security Management China's broad concept of national security spans both domestic stability and foreign threats, including areas where external influence affects internal stability, such as terrorism or the spread of pro-democratic ideas. China is modernizing the CCP, its military and state institutions to ensure greater coherence in the coordination and development of China's national security policy and strengthen Party control of national security management. These efforts address long-standing concerns that China's legacy system of stove-piped organizations is ill-equipped to meet the growing, dynamic challenges that China faces as its interests and capabilities expand. Over the past four years, the National People's Congress passed a suite of laws meant to address complex national security concerns, including counterespionage, intelligence, counterterrorism, and cyber security. In addition, an expansive 2015 *National Security Law* appeared to group these issues and others under a broad concept of national security and strengthen the role of central authorities in its protection.⁹⁹⁷

National Security Law (2015)⁹⁹⁸ was issued Order (29) of the President of the People's Republic of China and as adopted at the 15th session of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on July 1, 2015.

The Article 2 of this Law defines National security. Article 11 Includes roles of Arms Forces in maintaining National Security along with Citizen, State authorities of PRC and Political parties. Article 17 describes role of State in maintaining National Security and Article 18 mentions the role of State to revolutionize, modernize, and standardize the armed forces etc. These articles of the of National security law are given below.

Article 2 "National security" means a status in which the regime, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, welfare of the people, sustainable economic and social development, and other major interests of the state are relatively not faced with any danger and not

⁹⁹⁷ Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924, Available online at URL:

https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

⁹⁹⁸ Ministry of Defence of PRC: Laws and Regulation, titled "National Security Law of the People's Republic of China" issued in 2015, available online at URL:

http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2017-03/03/content_4774229.htm

threatened internally or externally and the capability to maintain a sustained security status.

Article 11 All citizens of the People's Republic of China, state authorities, armed forces, political parties, people's groups, enterprises, public institutions, and other social organizations shall have the responsibility and obligation to maintain national security. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of China shall not be infringed upon or partitioned. Maintaining the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of the state shall be the common obligation of all Chinese people including Hong Kong and Macao compatriots and Taiwan compatriots.

Article 17 The state shall strengthen the construction of border defense, maritime defense, and air defense, and take all necessary defense, management, and control measures to protect the security of territorial land, inland waters, territorial sea, and territorial airspace and maintain the state's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.

Article 18 The state shall attach great importance to revolutionize, modernize, and standardize the armed forces, build armed forces satisfying the requirements for protecting national security and development interest; implement active defense military strategies and guidelines, prevent and resist invasion, and prevent armed subversion and secession; conduct international military security cooperation, conduct peace-keeping operations of the United Nations, international rescue, maritime escort operations, and military actions that protect the state's overseas interests, to maintain the sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and development interest of the state and the world peace

6.3.1.1 China's National Security Management

6.3.1.1.1 National Security Commission

By 2015, the CCP adopted China's first national security strategy outline following the establishment of a new National Security Commission (NSC) in 2013. Official media noted the strategy intends to unify efforts by various departments under the central leadership's guidance. During the NSC's first meeting, President Xi tasked the NSC with establishing "a centralized, unified, highly-effective and authoritative national security leading system." The NSC advises the Politburo, oversees the coordination of national security issues across the government, and manages crises, according to academics. The Commission's purview appears to address security issues where foreign influence affects domestic stability, a much wider scope than the U.S. National Security Council. The Chinese NSC's mission, codification in law, sprawling definition of national security, and powerful leaders suggest the NSC may claim broad authority in Xi's second term.

The NSC is currently led by Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, and probably Li Zhanshu, China's top three Party leaders. The head of its general office is likely Politburo member and CCP General Office Director Ding Xuexiang, who probably had little experience with international affairs during his decades-long career in provincial-level government and Party positions. As of May 2018, Chen Wenqing, a Politburo member and the Minister of State Security, has also filled the role of Deputy Director for the NSC General Office, responsible for the commission's daily work. At least one Vice Chairman of the CMC may

also be a member of the NSC.⁹⁹⁹ Chinese President Xi Jinping on April 17, 2018 called for efforts to fully implement a holistic approach to national security and break new ground in national security in the new era. Xi, also general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, made the remarks at the first meeting of the 19th CPC Central Committee National Security Commission which he heads. Senior leaders Li Keqiang and Li Zhanshu also attended the meeting which was presided over by Xi.¹⁰⁰⁰

6.3.2 Military Leadership

The military's highest decision-making body, the CMC, is technically a department of the CCP Central Committee. The CMC Chairman is a civilian, usually serving concurrently as the General Secretary of the CCP and President of China. Following the 19th Party Congress, the CMC consists of two vice chairs, the chiefs of the Joint Staff and Political Work Departments, the head of the Discipline Inspection Commission, and the Minister of National Defense.

Chairman of Central Military Commission¹⁰⁰¹



Xi Jinping

Chairman Xi Jinping's appointment as Party General Secretary and CMC Chairman in 2012 and his selection as President in the spring of 2013 represented the first simultaneous transfer of all three of China's top positions to an incoming leader in recent decades. Xi was reappointed to his Party positions at the 19th Party Congress and was reappointed president in spring 2018 at the National People's Congress. The same meeting also granted approval to remove presidential term limits, allowing Xi to potentially remain president beyond his second term. In 2016, Xi was announced as the commander-in-chief of the CMC's Joint Operations Command Center and was named "core" leader of the CCP Central Committee. Prior to becoming CMC Chairman, Xi served as the CMC's only civilian Vice Chairman under Hu Jintao. Xi's father was an important military figure during China's communist revolution and was a Politburo member in the 1980s. The younger Xi served as an aide to a defense minister early in his career and had regular interactions with the PLA as a provincial Party official. In meetings with U.S.

⁹⁹⁹ Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924, Available online at URL:

https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

¹⁰⁰⁰ Xinhua News item Dated April 17, 2018 titled "Xi calls for efforts to break new ground in national security" available online at URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/17/c_137118101.htm

¹⁰⁰¹ http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/cmcc/node_86684.htm

officials, Xi has emphasized improving military-to military relations between China and the United States.¹⁰⁰²

Vice Chairmen of Central Military Commission¹⁰⁰³



Xu Qiliang



Zhang Youxia

Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang is the first career air force officer to be appointed China's top uniformed official. Xu is a public advocate for reform and guides the effort as a deputy secretary of the CMC's reform leading group. Xu previously served on the CMC as the PLAAF commander, where he oversaw rapid force modernization and expanded the air force's foreign engagement. He may have crossed paths with Xi Jinping early in his career, when both men served in Fujian Province. Xu was the first PLAAF officer to serve as deputy chief of the General Staff Department since the Cultural Revolution period, and – at 54 years of age at the time – the youngest in PLA history. Xu is serving a third term as a CMC member.¹⁰⁰⁴

Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia is China's second-most senior officer and former head of the Equipment Development Department. Zhang gained rare experience as a combat commander during China's brief war with Vietnam in 1979. Zhang formerly commanded the Shenyang Military Region, which shared a border with North Korea and Russia. Zhang is one of China's military "princelings." His father, a well-known military figure in China, served with Xi Jinping's father at the close of China's Civil War in 1949. Zhang is currently serving his second term on the CMC.¹⁰⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰² Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924, Pg 19 Available online at URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

¹⁰⁰³ http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/cmc/node_86684.htm

¹⁰⁰⁴ Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924, Pg 19 Available online at URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

¹⁰⁰⁵ *ibid*

Members of Central Military Commission¹⁰⁰⁶



Wei Fenghe
(Defence Minister)

Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe was appointed Minister of National Defense at the National People's Congress in March 2018. The Minister of National Defense is the PLA's third-most senior officer and manages its relationship with state bureaucracies and foreign militaries. Unlike the U.S. Secretary of Defense, he is not part of the chain of command and his primary policy influence is derived from membership in the CMC. Wei served in multiple missile bases across different military regions and held top posts in the headquarters of the former PLA Second Artillery Force, the PLA Rocket Force's predecessor, before being promoted in late 2010 to Deputy Chief of the General Staff – the first officer from the Second Artillery to do so. Wei most recently was the PLARF commander. Wei is serving a second term as a CMC member.¹⁰⁰⁷

Li Zuocheng

Joint Staff Department Chief Li Zuocheng oversees PLA operations, a narrowing of the wider responsibilities held by the former General Staff Department prior to reforms initiated in 2015. Li is one of few remaining active duty PLA officers with combat experience and is recognized as a combat hero for his service in China's border war with Vietnam. He was also the first Army commander after the PLA Army became a separate service in 2015. Li previously commanded the Chengdu Military Region, which was responsible for the sensitive area of Tibet.¹⁰⁰⁸

Miao Hua

Political Work Department Director Miao Hua oversees the PLA's political work, including propaganda, organization, and education. Miao is a former Army officer who switched services to the Navy in December 2014 when he became political commissar of the PLA Navy. Miao may have ties to Xi from his time serving in the 31st Group Army in Fujian Province, when his career overlapped with Xi's. Miao participated as the PLA Navy political commissar during the Navy's OBOR cruise conducted in mid-2017.¹⁰⁰⁹

¹⁰⁰⁶ http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/cmc/node_86684.htm

¹⁰⁰⁷ Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924, Pg 20 Available online at URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-/1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

¹⁰⁰⁸ *ibid*

¹⁰⁰⁹ *ibid*

Zhang Shengmin

Discipline Inspection Commission Secretary Zhang Shengmin oversees the highest-level organization responsible for investigating military violations of Party discipline. Zhang is also a deputy secretary and third ranking member on the standing committee of the Party's Discipline Inspection Commission. Zhang's appointments indicate the anticorruption campaign will receive a higher profile in the military going forward. Shortly after his appointment to the CMC, Zhang was promoted to the rank of general, the highest rank in the Chinese military.¹⁰¹⁰

6.3.3 Central Military Commission

On September 28, 1954, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC adopted a resolution on the establishment of the Central Military Commission of the CPC.¹⁰¹¹ Zhou Enlai was nominated the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC).¹⁰¹²

China's military leaders are influential in defense and foreign policy. As the CCP's armed wing, the PLA is organizationally part of the party apparatus. Career military officers for the most part are party members, and units at the company level and above have political officers responsible for personnel decisions, propaganda, and counterintelligence. These political officers also are responsible for ensuring that party orders are carried out throughout the PLA. CCP committees, led by the political officers and military commanders, make major decisions in units at all levels. The CMC, the PLA's highest decision making body, is technically both a party organ subordinate to the CCP Central Committee and a governmental office appointed by the National People's Congress, but it is staffed almost exclusively by military officers. The CMC chairman is a civilian who usually serves concurrently as the CCP general secretary and China's president. During the past decade, the CMC's membership has included two military vice chairmen who serve concurrently on the politburo; the minister of national defense, who serves as the face of the military for foreign engagement; the service commanders; and the directors of the four general headquarters departments. This framework occasionally shifts; it was revised during the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, at which point the service chiefs were removed from the body, leaving the chairman, vice chair - men, minister of national defense, Joint Staff Department chief, Political Work Department director, and Discipline Inspection Commission secretary. These changes align the military's top body to its post reform structure and underscore key themes of jointness, party loyalty, and anticorruption.¹⁰¹³

¹⁰¹⁰ Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924, Pg 20 Available online at URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

¹⁰¹¹ Chinadaily: PLA History, titled "Major events in PLA's history 1950-1966" published in July 29, 2010 available online at URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/pla2010/2010-07/29/content_11067041.htm


¹⁰¹² Zhou Enlai, http://cpcchina.chinadaily.com.cn/2010-09/15/content_14470697.htm

¹⁰¹³ Defence Intelligence Army (DIA) Report titled "China's Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win" Published in 2019, Pg 1, available online at URL:

The Party's new general-secretary Xi Jinping, who had been the only civilian CMC Vice Chairman since 2010, also replaced Hu Jintao as CMC Chairman. Xi Jinping was named chairman of the Central Military Commission at the first plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee.¹⁰¹⁴

- In 2018, the Central Military Commission (CMC) assumed direct control of the PAP (People's Armed Police) after the Party ended the PAP's previous CMC-State Council dual-command system, and the China Coast Guard (CCG) was subordinated to the PAP, codifying the PLA's enduring role in internal security and possibly increasing the PLA's oversight and interoperability with the paramilitary forces.
- As a strategic organization, the SSF (Strategic Support Force) reports directly to the Central Military Commission (CMC) and not to the Theater Commands.
- Under the direction of the Central Military Commission (CMC), each Theater Command has authority over the services and conventional forces within the theater.¹⁰¹⁵

After structural reforms as mentioned in White Paper (2019) "China's National Defense in the New Era", so far no official chart of CMC has not been found. In this regard a chart from US based organization "Global Security" was found depicting the latest reforms showing the current structure of CMC and its related organs and linkages with party organizations.



Global Security: Central Military Commission
<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/cmc.htm>

https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

¹⁰¹⁴ Excerpts from article titled "The New Central Military Commission" written James Mulvenon available online at the URL: <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/CLM40JM.pdf>

¹⁰¹⁵ Excerpts from "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019", issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924, Available online at URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

6.3.4 2016 Military Reforms

The Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) has presented a working paper No. 313 titled “Xi Jinping and PLA Transformation through Reforms” written by *You Ji* dated May 21, 2018. According to the paper, on 23 November 2015, Xi Jinping announced a new five-year plan of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reform. This marked a new page in the history of PLA transformation through a revolutionary program to remould China’s armed forces. This article analysed two major aspects of this round of unprecedented PLA reforms: (i) the politics of the military reform; and (ii) the PLA’s efforts to reshape its force establishments, organizational structure, and command chains. The first concerns Xi’s political leadership broadly with the primary ingredients of power centralization and personalization in the chair responsibility system of the Central Military Commission (CMC). The second is extremely rich in content. Under a roadmap drawn by Xi in the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, the reform process goes through three stages: the overhaul of the apex of power; the reshaping of the mid-level command chains of the war zone and service; and the restructuring of the overall force establishments.¹⁰¹⁶

There are two major aspects of this round of unprecedented PLA reforms: (i) the politics of the military reform; and (ii) the PLA’s efforts to reshape its force establishments, organizational structure, and command chains. The first concerns Xi’s political leadership and the second draw a roadmap to remould the PLA by 2020. By now the reform has yielded substantial achievements: (i) the overhaul of the apex of power; (ii) the reshaping of the mid-level command chains of the war zone and service; and (iii) the restructuring of the overall force establishments. It has also created some transitional uncertainties as well. Under a roadmap drawn by Xi in the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, the reform process goes through three stages: the overhaul of the apex of power; the reshaping of the mid-level command chains of the war zone and service; and the restructuring of the overall force establishments.¹⁰¹⁷

While addressing 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 18, 2017, Xi Jinping spoke on the topic “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, highlighting the ongoing reforms in the Chinese armed forces. Staying Committed to the Chinese Path of Building Strong Armed Forces and Fully Advancing the Modernization of National Defense and the Military, he said that we have reached a new historical starting point in strengthening national defense and the armed forces. Confronted with profound changes in our national security environment and responding to the demands of the day for a strong country with a strong military, we must fully implement the Party’s thinking on strengthening the military for the new era and the military strategy for new conditions, build a powerful and modernized army, navy, air force, rocket force, and strategic support force, develop strong and efficient joint operations commanding institutions for theater commands, and create a modern combat system with distinctive Chinese characteristics. Our armed forces must be up to

¹⁰¹⁶ RSIS Working Paper, titled “Xi Jinping and PLA Transformation through Reforms” written by *You Ji* published in May 21, 2018”, Pg 1, available online at URL:

<https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/WP313.pdf>

¹⁰¹⁷ *ibid*, Pg 2

shouldering the missions and tasks of the new era entrusted to them by the Party and the people.

We will adapt to the trend of a new global military revolution and to national security needs; we will upgrade our military capabilities, and see that, by the year 2020, mechanization is basically achieved, IT application has come a long way, and strategic capabilities have seen a big improvement. In step with our country's modernization process, we will modernize our military across the board in terms of theory, organizational structure, service personnel, and weaponry. We will make it our mission to see that by 2035, the modernization of our national defense and our forces is basically completed; and that by the mid-21st century our people's armed forces have been fully transformed into world-class forces.

We will strengthen Party building in the military. We will launch activities under the theme of "passing on the traditions of revolution; stepping up to the task of making the military strong." We will move forward with the development of the military honours system. We will train the revolutionary officers and soldiers of a new era with faith, ability, courage, and integrity, and see that our forces forever preserve their nature, purpose, and character as the forces of the people.

We will continue to deepen national defense and military reform. We will further the reform of major policy systems, including the career officers system, the system for posting civilian personnel in the military, and the military service system. We will push ahead with transformation of military management, and improve and develop our distinctively Chinese socialist military institutions. We must keep it firm in our minds that technology is the core combat capability, encourage innovations in major technologies, and conduct innovations independently. We will strengthen the system for training military personnel, and make our people's forces more innovative. We will govern the military with strict discipline in every respect, push for a fundamental transformation in the way our military is run, and strengthen the role of rule of law in enhancing national defense and military capabilities.

A military is built to fight. Our military must regard combat capability as the criterion to meet in all its work and focus on how to win when it is called on. We will take solid steps to ensure military preparedness for all strategic directions, and make progress in combat readiness in both traditional and new security fields. We will develop new combat forces and support forces, conduct military training under combat conditions, strengthen the application of military strength, speed up development of intelligent military, and improve combat capabilities for joint operations based on the network information system and the ability to fight under multi-dimensional conditions. This will enable us to effectively shape our military posture, manage crises, and deter and win wars.

We should ensure that efforts to make our country prosperous and efforts to make our military strong go hand in hand. We will strengthen unified leadership, top-level design, reform, and innovation. We will speed up implementation of major projects, deepen reform of defense-related science, technology, and industry, achieve greater military-civilian integration, and build integrated national strategies and strategic capabilities. We will improve our national defense mobilization system, and build a strong, well-structured, and modern border defense, coastal defense, and air defense. We will

establish an administration for veterans; we will protect the legitimate rights and interests of military personnel and their families; and we will make military service an occupation that enjoys public respect. We will carry out further reforms to build a modernized armed police force.

Our military is the people's military, and our national defense is the responsibility of every one of us. We must raise public awareness about the importance of national defense and strengthen unity between the government and the military and between the people and the military. Let us work together to create a mighty force for realizing the Chinese Dream and the dream of building a powerful military.¹⁰¹⁸

For lifelong political leadership and power centralization of Xi Jinping, China's National People's Congress (NPC), the national legislature, adopted an amendment to the Constitution of China on March 11, 2018.¹⁰¹⁹

As per the amendment, Article 45 Paragraph 3 of Article 79 of the Constitution:

“The terms of office for the President and Vice-President of the People's Republic of China are the same as those of deputies to the National People's Congress; presidents and vice-presidents shall serve no more than two consecutive terms.” shall be amended to read as: “The terms of office for the President and Vice-President of the People's Republic of China are the same as those of deputies to the National People's Congress.”¹⁰²⁰

The removal of the presidential term limits also reverses China's exploration for a power-sharing structure at the top, signaling an end to the efforts to separate party and state, which have been a goal of political reform since 1980.¹⁰²¹ Now, the only clause that had prevented Xi Jinping from staying in power beyond 2023 has been removed from the constitution. Although Xi's real power lies in his two other titles – Communist Party general secretary and Central Military Commission chairman neither of which have term limits.¹⁰²² With this amendment Xi Jinping is eligible to serve the third term and beyond as chairman of China's government what could be life tenure for Xi establishing his supremacy.

According to the White Paper (2019), China's National Defense in the New Era, Reform in China's National Defense and Armed Forces are being undertaken. The history of the

¹⁰¹⁸ Xi Jinping Speech delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 18, 2017, available online at the URL:

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf

¹⁰¹⁹ Xinhua News item Dated MAech 11, 2018 titled “China's national legislature adopts constitutional amendment”, available online at URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/11/c_137031606.htm

¹⁰²⁰ Invest in China (fdi.gov.cn), “Amendment to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China”, issued on March 11, 2018 available online at URL: http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4866_0_7.html

¹⁰²¹ South China Morning Post News Item Dated March 23, 2018, titled “Beyond term limits: China's new constitution is written for a nation on the rise” written by Tian Feilong, available online at URL: <https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2138542/beyond-term-limits-chinas-new-constitution-written-nation>

¹⁰²² South China Morning Post News Item Dated March 22, 2018, titled “Does Xi Jinping really want to be Chinese president for life?” written by Choi Chi-yuk, available online at URL: <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2138439/does-xi-jinping-really-want-be-chinese-president-life>

people's armed forces is a history of reform and innovation. In the new era, China is advancing defense and military modernization across the board and deepening reform in national defense and armed forces in all respects, with a focus on removing institutional barriers and solving structural and policy-related problems to adapt to the trends of worldwide RMA and the demands of national security. Historic strides have been made in strengthening the armed forces.

Reforming the Leadership and Command System

The reform in the leadership and command system is a significant measure in response to the call of a modern and specialized military capable of fighting and winning wars in the information age, aiming to improve the operational effectiveness and development efficiency of the military. Adhering to the general principle of “the CMC exercising overall leadership, the Theater Commands (TCs) responsible for military operations and the services focusing on developing capabilities”, the PLA endeavors to enhance the CMC's centralized and unified leadership and its functions of strategic command and strategic management. The PLA has dismantled the long-established systems of general departments, military area commands (MAC) and the force composition with a dominating land force, and established new leadership, management and operational command systems.

Reorganizing and establishing new CMC functional organs:

To optimize the functional and institutional setup of the CMC organs, the former General Staff Headquarters, General Political Department, General Logistics Department and General Armaments Department have been reshuffled into ‘15 Functional Organs’¹⁰²³ under the centralized CMC leadership to advise, execute and serve. Thus, the chains of command, development, management and supervision are more streamlined, and the responsibilities of decision-making, planning, execution and assessment are more properly delegated.

Improving the leadership and management system for services and arms:


The PLA has:

- Established the PLA Army (PLAA) leading organs by integrating the functions of the former general departments concerning the development of the land force;
- Established the PLASSF (PLA Strategic Support Force) by combining strategic support forces across the services and CMC organs;
- Renamed the Second Artillery Force the (PLA Rocket Force) PLARF; and
- Established the PLA Joint Logistic Support Force (PLAJLSF) by integrating strategic and campaign level forces mainly for general-purpose support.

Thus, a CMC-Services-Troops leadership and management system has been put in place.

¹⁰²³ CMC Functional Organs, China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled “China's National Defense in the New Era”, published in July 2019, Pg 38, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

Leadership and Management Structure of the PLA




Source: China’s State Council Information Office White paper (2019), Pg 17

URL:http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

Establishing and improving the joint operations command system:

By improving the joint operations command organ of the CMC and setting up those at the theater level, the PLA has established a lean and efficient joint operations command system composed of permanent and specialized commanding establishments for both peacetime and wartime operations. The former Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu MACs have been reorganized into 5 TCs: Eastern Theater Command (ETC), Southern Theater Command (STC), Western Theater Command (WTC), Northern Theater Command (NTC), and Central Theater Command (CTC). Thus, a CMC-TCs-Troops operations command system has been established.

Operational Command Structure of the PLA



Source: China’s State Council Information Office White paper (2019), Pg 18

URL:http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

Building and improving the law-based supervision system:

The Chinese military has established the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission (CMCDIC, also the CMC Supervision Commission, CMCS) under the direct leadership of the CMC, and dispatched disciplinary inspection teams to the CMC functional organs and all TCs. It has set up the CMC Politics and Law Commission (CMCPLC) and established regional military courts and procuratorates. It has put into place the CMC Audit Office (CMCAO), reformed the audit-based oversight system, and implemented PLA-wide resident auditing. Thus, power is exercised in a way that decision-making, execution and supervision check each other and function in coordination.

Optimizing Size, Structure and Force Composition

Reform in size, structure and force composition is a pivotal step to optimizing military organizational structure and establishing a modern military force structure with Chinese characteristics. Following the instruction to optimize structures, develop new-type forces, adjust proportions and reduce sizes, the PLA is striving to transform from a quantity-and-scale model to that of quality and efficiency, as well as from being personnel-intensive to one that is S&T-intensive.

Adjusting scale and proportion, and restructuring force composition:

300,000 personnel have been cut to keep the total active force at 2 million. Reform measures have been taken to transfer more officer positions to non-commissioned officers and civilian staff, downsize the leading organs at all levels by reducing their subordinate sections, leadership hierarchies and staff, and streamline the institutions and personnel in arts, sports, press, publication, logistical support, medical facilities, depots, and educational and research institutes. Thus, the number of personnel in the leading organs at and above regiment level has been cut by about 25% and that of non-combat units by almost 50%. The PLA has significantly downsized the active force of the PLAA, maintained that of the PLAAF at a steady number, moderately increased that of the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLARF, and optimized the force structures of all services and arms. The PLA has restructured the defense reserves. The deployment of combat forces has been adjusted for a strategic configuration that meets the demands of safeguarding China's national security in the new era.

Reorganizing the troops and rebuilding new-type combat forces:

The previous 18 group armies have been reorganized into 13 new ones. All major combat units of the PLA follow a group army-brigade-battalion system. Reform measures have been taken to reinforce the combat capacity of the arms, reduce the command hierarchies and combine the troops at lower levels. New types of combat forces have been enhanced to conduct special operations, all-dimensional offense and defense, amphibious operations, far seas protection and strategic projection, aiming to make the force composition complete, combined, multi-functional and flexible.

Rebalancing and reorganizing military educational and research institutions:

The PLA and the PAP have restructured the previous 77 universities and colleges into 44. The National Defense University (NDU) and the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT) have been reorganized. China's armed forces have established the CMC Steering Committee on Military Scientific Research and reorganized the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) and the research institutes of the services. Thus, the military scientific research forces have been rebalanced with the AMS as the lead, the research institutes of the services and arms as the main forces, and the research components in educational institutions and the troops as supplements.

Reforming Military Policies and Institutions

China's armed forces take combat effectiveness as the criterion in the reform of military policies and institutions and encourage the initiative, enthusiasm and creativity of all members of the armed forces. Reform is designed to build and improve the system of socialist military policies and institutions with Chinese characteristics.

They have deepened reform in the institutions for Party building in the military to uphold the authority of the CPC Central Committee (CPCCC) and its centralized and unified leadership, and ensure the absolute leadership of the CPC over the military. Rules and regulations including the *Decision of China's Armed Forces on Strengthening Party Building in the Military in the New Era* have been formulated to improve the Party's institutions in the military in order to enhance its political and theoretical buildup, consolidate organizations, improve conduct, and enforce discipline.

They have innovated in policies and institutions for military force employment in a bid to effectively perform all missions and tasks in the new era. Rules and regulations have been formulated including the *Regulations on Vessel Protection Operations (Trial)*. The institutions of military strategic guidance, regulations on combat readiness duties, and rules and regulations on joint operations have all been optimized.

They have reformulated policies and institutions to further develop combat capabilities. Laws and regulations have been formulated and amended including the *Law of the People's Republic of China on National Defense Transportation*, the *Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Military Installations* and the *Regulations on Civilian Personnel in the Military*. Newly-updated military training regulations and outlines have been promulgated. They have made progress in establishing the career officers system, optimizing the institutions of military welfare and support, improving the military honors system, and refining policies and institutions in training, equipment development, logistics, military research and national defense mobilization. Meanwhile, bigger legislative steps have been taken in relation to military officers and military service.

They have reformed the policies and institutions for military management to elevate the efficacy of military systems and boost quality development of the military. Rules and regulations have been formulated including the newly-updated *Regulations on Routine Service of the People's Liberation Army (Trial)*, the *Regulations on Discipline of the People's*

Liberation Army (Trial), the *Regulations on Formation of the People's Liberation Army (Trial)*, and the *Regulations on Military Legislation*. China's armed forces are enhancing institutional innovation in strategic management, defense expenditure management, and the military judicial system.

They have suspended all paid services. As of June, 2018, paid services provided by leading organs, operational units, and military-affiliated public institutions at all levels had been basically suspended, involving 15 sectors such as real estate lease, agricultural and associated products, and hospitality. Over 100,000 such projects have been suspended as scheduled, accounting for 94% of the total. The armed forces have achieved the goal of withdrawing from running businesses.

Reshuffled PLA and PAP Troops

The PLAA plays an irreplaceable role in maintaining China's national sovereignty, security and development interests. It comprises maneuver operation, border and coastal defense, and garrison forces. Under the PLAA, there are 5 TC army commands, the Xinjiang military command, and the Tibet military command. The ETC Army has under it the 71st, 72nd, and 73rd group armies; the STC Army has the 74th and 75th group armies; the WTC Army has the 76th and 77th group armies; the NTC Army has the 78th, 79th and 80th group armies; and the CTC Army has the 81st, 82nd and 83rd group armies. In line with the strategic requirements of maneuver operations as well as multi-dimensional offense and defense, the PLAA is speeding up the transition of its tasks from regional defense to trans-theater operations, and improving the capabilities for precise, multi-dimensional, trans-theater, multi-functional and sustained operations, so as to build a new type of strong and modernized land force.

The PLAN has a very important standing in the overall configuration of China's national security and development. It comprises submarine, surface ship, aviation, marine and coastal defense forces. Under the PLAN, there are the ETC Navy (Donghai Fleet), the STC Navy (Nanhai Fleet), the NTC Navy (Beihai Fleet), and the PLAN Marine Corps. Under the TC navies there are naval bases, submarine flotillas, surface ship flotillas and aviation brigades. In line with the strategic requirements of near seas defense and far seas protection, the PLAN is speeding up the transition of its tasks from defense on the near seas to protection missions on the far seas, and improving its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuver operations, maritime joint operations, comprehensive defense, and integrated support, so as to build a strong and modernized naval force.

The PLAAF plays a crucial role in overall national security and military strategy. It comprises aviation, airborne, ground-to-air missile, radar, ECM, and communications forces. Under the PLAAF, there are 5 TC air force commands and one airborne corps. Under the TC air forces, there are air bases, aviation brigades (divisions), ground-to-air missile brigades (divisions) and radar brigades. In line with the strategic requirements of integrating air and space capabilities as well as coordinating offensive and defensive operations, the PLAAF is accelerating the transition of its tasks from territorial air defense to both offensive and defensive operations, and improving its capabilities for strategic early warning, air strikes, air and missile defense, information countermeasures, airborne operations, strategic projection, and integrated support, so as to build a strong and modernized air force.

The PLARF plays a critical role in maintaining China's national sovereignty and security. It comprises nuclear missile, conventional missile and support forces, and subordinate missile bases. In line with the strategic requirements of having both nuclear and conventional capabilities and deterring wars in all battlespaces, the PLARF is enhancing its credible and reliable capabilities of nuclear deterrence and counterattack, strengthening intermediate and long-range precision strike forces, and enhancing strategic counter-balance capability, so as to build a strong and modernized rocket force.

The PLASSF is a new type of combat force for safeguarding national security and an important driver for the growth of new combat capabilities. It comprises supporting forces for battlefield environment, information, communications, information security, and new technology testing. In line with the strategic requirements of integrating existing systems and aligning civil and military endeavors, the PLASSF is seeking to achieve big development strides in key areas and accelerate the integrated development of new-type combat forces, so as to build a strong and modernized strategic support force.

The PLAJLSF, as the main force for joint logistics as well as strategic and campaign level support, is an important component of the modern military force with Chinese characteristics. It comprises the support forces for inventory and warehousing, medical services, transport, force projection, oil pipelines, engineering and construction management, reserve assets management, and procurement. Under the PLAJLSF, there are 5 joint logistic support centers located respectively in Wuxi (Jiangsu Province), Guilin (Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region), Xining (Qinghai Province), Shenyang (Liaoning Province), and Zhengzhou (Henan Province), as well as the PLA General Hospital and the PLA Center for Disease Prevention and Control. In line with the requirements of joint support for joint operations and joint training, the PLAJLSF is being integrated into the joint operations system to enhance the capabilities of integrated joint logistics, so as to build a strong and modernized joint logistic support force.

The People's Liberation Police (PAP) shoulders important responsibilities in safeguarding national security, social stability and public wellbeing. China has adopted a CMC-PAP-Troops leadership and command system with the basic duties and nature of the PAP unchanged. The PAP is not in the force structure of the PLA. The PAP border defense, firefighting and security guard forces have been decommissioned. The coast guard under the leadership of State Oceanic Administration has been transferred to the PAP. PAP goldmine, forest and hydroelectricity forces have been reorganized into specialized forces of non-active service under corresponding state authorities. Meanwhile, the PAP customs guard forces have been withdrawn. In this way, the leadership, management, command and employment of the PAP has become more coherent. Following adjustment and reorganization, the PAP is mainly composed of the internal security corps, the mobile corps, and the coast guard. In line with the strategic requirements of performing multiple functions and effectively maintaining social stability, the PAP is enhancing capacity in guard duties, emergency response, counter-terrorism, maritime rights protection, administrative enforcement and disaster relief, so as to build a strong and modernized armed police force.

Promoting Defense and Military Development in All Respects

Placing theoretical and political buildup at the top of the agenda of the armed forces:

China's armed forces unswervingly take Xi Jinping's thinking on strengthening the military as the guidance, firmly uphold General Secretary Xi Jinping as the core of the CPC and the whole Party, firmly uphold the authority of the CPC and its centralized and unified leadership, and follow the CMC Chairman responsibility system, in an effort to further strengthen the consciousness of the need to maintain political integrity, think in big-picture terms, follow the leadership core and keep in alignment. In accordance with the *Decision on Issues Relating to the Military Political Work in the New Era* issued in December 2014, China's armed forces have improved their political work and embarked on a new journey of development. In order to fully strengthen the Party leadership and Party building of the military in the new era, a CMC meeting on party building was held in August, 2018. Great efforts are being made to cultivate revolutionary officers and soldiers of the new era with faith, ability, courage and integrity, and build troops with iron-like faith, conviction, discipline and commitment.

Promoting innovation in defense S&T and military theory:

China's armed forces are accelerating the implementation of the strategy to develop the military through S&T in a bid to maintain and enhance the strength of the areas where they lead, and intensify innovation in emerging areas. They have made great progress in independent innovation in some strategic, cutting-edge and disruptive technologies, and succeeded in developing strategic hi-tech products such as the Tianhe-2 supercomputer. Focusing on war and fighting wars, China's armed forces have innovated in military doctrines and delivered outcomes in military strategy, joint operations and informationization, which have provided a theoretical support to defense and military development.

Establishing a modernized weaponry and equipment system:

China's armed forces are optimizing the overall composition of weaponry and equipment, coordinating the efforts of all services and arms in this regard, promoting the balanced development of main battle equipment, information systems, and support equipment, with a view to comprehensively raising standardization, serial development and interoperability. Old equipment is being phased out, and a system created that mainly comprises new and high-tech weaponry and equipment. Type 15 tanks, type 052D destroyers, J-20 fighters, and DF-26 intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles have been commissioned.

Building a combat-oriented modern logistics system:

China's armed forces are putting in place a support mechanism combining centralized and decentralized support, as well as general and special-purpose supplies, with PLA JLSF as the backbone force and service logistics units as supplements. They are also building a joint, lean and efficient logistic support system with the strategic and campaign level forces as the main force, the affiliated forces as the support, and the civil sectors as supplements. Logistics units have been incorporated into TC-level joint training, trans-theater training by services and arms, and joint exercises and training with foreign

militaries to strengthen the integrated training of logistical and operational forces. China's armed forces have acquired a rapid, multi-dimensional and precise support capability.

Strengthening strategic management:

Adopting demand-oriented planning and planning-led resource allocation, China's armed forces have established and improved the strategic management procedures of demand-planning-budgeting-execution-evaluation. They have completed a system of strategic plans and programs composed of the development strategies of the military as a whole, and its key areas, branches, and the PAP. They have regulated military strategic planning, promulgated and implemented the *Outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan for Military Development*, and optimized the mechanisms for evaluation, supervision and control.

Governing the military with strict discipline and in accordance with the law:

China's armed forces are building a military legal system with Chinese characteristics and pressing ahead with a fundamental transformation in how the military is run. They are strengthening oversight and supervision in military training and combat readiness to uproot peacetime ills. They are promoting legal awareness through public communication and education campaigns, establishing and improving the support mechanism of legal consultation and service, and advancing law-based management in the military. China's armed forces are striving to manage the troops more strictly in all respects. They have fully implemented military rules and regulations, restored and improved the traditional mechanism of using bugles to communicate and command, carried out safety inspections to identify and tackle potential problems, stepped up garrison military policing, strengthened the management of military vehicles by targeted measures, and set up a mechanism of regular notification on garrison military policing. These efforts have contributed to maintaining the positive image of the armed forces.

Improving Party conduct, upholding integrity and continuing the fight against corruption:

China's armed forces are tightening political discipline and rules, investigating and dealing strictly with grave violations of CPC discipline and state laws as in the cases of Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, Fang Fenghui, and Zhang Yang. China's armed forces punish corruption in strict accordance with CPC discipline and relevant laws, and rectify any malpractice in key construction projects and the procurement of equipment and material. Points-of-contact for discipline supervision have been designated at the small-unit level to investigate and combat "micro corruption" and misconduct in all its forms among service members. China's armed forces have intensified political inspection by completing disciplinary inspections and re-inspections over all CMC functional organs, the TCs, services, AMS, NDU, NUDT and the PAP. They have worked to implement full-spectrum audit, intensify the audit of major fields, projects and funds, and perform strict audits over the economic liabilities of officers in positions of leadership. Active efforts have been made to monitor the cost-effectiveness of applied funds, conduct whole-process audit, and combine civil and military efforts in auditing. Since 2012, they have carried out audits over 39,000 units and 13,000 PLA and PAP officers in positions of leadership at and above regiment level. As a result, notable achievements have been made in the fight against

corruption in China's armed forces, and a healthy political atmosphere of integrity has formed.

Modernizing national defense mobilization:

China has refined the system of national defense mobilization to enhance the development of its defense reserves. China is streamlining the number of primary militia nationwide, driving deeper reform of militia and reserve forces in their size, structure and composition, promoting integrated development and employment of the reserve and active forces, and extending the function of national defense mobilization from mainly supporting the land force to supporting all branches at a faster pace.

In the process of deepening the reform of the CPC and governmental institutions, the Ministry of Veterans Affairs of the PRC has been set up. Through a series of preferential measures, the veteran support system is progressing at provincial, prefectural, county, town and township (sub-district), and village (community) levels. Substantial steps have been taken to enhance the government's efforts to support the military and their families, and to strengthen the military's support to the government and the people. China's armed forces play an active role in poverty alleviation. The relationships between the military and the government and between the military and the people are getting even closer. There is a growing consensus across communities to respect and give preferential treatment to all service members.¹⁰²⁴

China to speed up full military IT application:

Hu Jintao said November 8, 2012 that China will strive to basically complete military mechanization and make major progress in full military IT application by 2020. "We should unswervingly pursue full IT application as the goal in achieving military modernization and step up this effort," Hu told more than 2,200 delegates gathered in Beijing's Great Hall of the People for the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). China should strengthen the development of new- and high-technology weapons and equipment, speed up the complete development of modern logistics, train a new type of high-caliber military personnel in large numbers, intensively carry out military training under computerized conditions, and enhance integrated combat capability based on extensive IT application, Hu said.

Hu said China should implement the military strategy of active defense for the new period, and enhance military strategic guidance as the times so require. "We should attach great importance to maritime, space and cyberspace security. We should make active planning for the use of military forces in peacetime, expand and intensify military preparedness, and enhance the capability to accomplish a wide range of military tasks, the most important of which is to win local war in an information age," he said.

Building strong national defense and powerful armed forces that are commensurate with China's international standing and meet the needs of its security and development interests is a strategic task of China's modernization drive, Hu said. China should follow

¹⁰²⁴ Excerpts from China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled "China's National Defense in the New Era", published in July 2019, Pg 16 available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

the guideline of strengthening national defense and the armed forces in a scientific way, take faster change of the way of raising military combat effectiveness as a major task, fully enhance the revolutionary nature of the armed forces and ensure that they are modern and standardized in all respects, Hu said.

“We must unwaveringly adhere to the principle of the Party’s absolute leadership over the armed forces and continue to educate them in the system of theories of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” he said. Hu emphasized that China pursues a national defense policy that is defensive in nature. “Our endeavors to strengthen national defense aim to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity and ensure its peaceful development,” he said. China’s armed forces have always been a staunch force upholding world peace and will continue to increase cooperation and mutual trust with the armed forces of other countries, participate in regional and international security affairs, and thus play an active role in international political and security fields, he said.¹⁰²⁵

6.3.5 Theater Commands

In early 2016, the previous seven military regions were consolidated into five new theatre commands.¹⁰²⁶ The Chinese People’s Liberation Army has five Theater Commands, namely the Eastern Theater Command, the Southern Theater Command, the Western Theater Command, the Northern Theater Command and the Central Theater Command.¹⁰²⁷ China continues to implement reforms associated with the establishment of the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, which are organized based on China’s perception of peripheral threats. Under the direction of the Central Military Commission (CMC), each Theater Command has authority over the services and conventional forces within the theater.

6.3.5.1 Eastern Theater Command¹⁰²⁸

The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea. The Eastern Theater Command (ETC) likely executes operational control over national defense matters related to Japan and Taiwan, including contingencies in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands. In 2018, the ETC focused on a series of training and exercises to improve joint operations and combat readiness, organizing almost 20 exercises and drills consisting of long-distance sea training, aerial combat, and live-fire training. Located within the ETC are three group armies, a naval fleet, two marine brigades, two Air Force bases, and one missile base.

¹⁰²⁵ Xinhua News Item Dated November 8, 2012 titled “China to speed up full military IT application”, available online at URL: http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/08/content_27045032.htm

¹⁰²⁶ The MILITARY BALANCE 2019: THE ANNUAL ASSESEMENT OF GLOBAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND DEFENCE ECONOMICS, Internation Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Pg 262.

¹⁰²⁷ <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/theater-commands/index.htm>

¹⁰²⁸ Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924 Pg. 69, Available online at URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

In May 2018, the ETC Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC) organized a closely coordinated PLAAF exercise between the Eastern Theater and Southern Theater Commands. In addition, the PLAAF flew fighter aircraft and long-range cruise missile capable bombers around Taiwan. The PLAAF also employed a KJ-2000 early warning aircraft for command, control, and escort to support Su-35 fighters and J-11 fighter flights to the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel.

In the East China Sea, the ETC conducted combat drills throughout the year focused on naval operations. In October 2018, a PLAN flotilla conducted a series of drills, including anti-submarine warfare training by employing destroyers and frigates in formations simulating encirclement of underwater targets. They further completed more than ten training objectives in auxiliary gun firing, visit board-search-and-seizure drills, and nuclear and chemical defense drills.



Source: Annual Report to Congress, Pg. 72 Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

During 2018, China maintained a presence in the Senkaku Islands with typically four China Coast Guard ships in the territorial waters (within 12 nm) around the islands. In January 2018, a PLAN Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) sailed underwater in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands. Separately, the PLAN frequently advances into the Pacific Ocean by passing between Japan's Okinawa and Miyako Islands. The PLAN East Sea Fleet regularly conducts military exercises in the Sea of Japan to prepare for potential conflicts. However, during Premier Li Keqiang's visit to Japan in May 2018, China and Japan signed the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism, designed to avoid accidental encounters.

6.3.5.2 Southern Theater Command¹⁰²⁹

The Southern Theater Command is oriented toward the South China Sea, Southeast Asia border security, and territorial and maritime disputes. The area of responsibility of the Southern Theater Command (STC) covers mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, including the South China Sea. This geographic area implies that the STC is responsible for securing the South China Sea, supporting the ETC in any invasion of Taiwan, responding to territorial disputes, and assuring the security of SLOCs vital to China's global ambitions. Located within the STC are two group armies, a naval fleet, two marine brigades, one Air Force base, and two Rocket Force bases.

South China Sea


Though China has ceased South China Sea land reclamation and completed major military infrastructure at three outposts, it has continued militarization by deploying anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems to its Spratly Islands outposts. Outposts are capable of supporting military operations since China deployed advanced weapon systems to its outposts in early 2018; however, no large-scale air presence has been observed in the Spratly Islands.

Developments in the Security Situation:

In July 2016, a tribunal under the Law of the Sea Convention ruled in the case brought by the Philippines that China's claims to "historic rights" over the South China Sea encompassed by the "nine-dash line" could not exceed its maritime rights under the Law of the Sea Convention. Despite the decision, China continues to use coercive tactics, including the employment of PLA naval and paramilitary vessels, to enforce its claims and advance its interests. China does so in ways calculated to be below the threshold of provoking conflict. In the South China Sea, China has continued militarization. Anti-ship cruise missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles have been deployed to Spratly Islands outposts, and China's strategic bombers have conducted take-off and landing drills on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands.

¹⁰²⁹ Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924 Pg. 73, Available online at URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

China states that international military presence within the South China Sea is a challenge to its sovereignty. China has continued to escalate coercive tactics to enforce its claims within the South China Sea. This escalation culminated in an unsafe encounter with the USS Decatur in September 2018 that led to criticism against China from some U.S. international partners. Tensions have continued during negotiations between ASEAN countries and China on a code of conduct agreement. China has reportedly proposed that the code of conduct require unanimous approval by all parties for military exercises involving countries outside of China or ASEAN in the South China Sea. In August 2018, China mounted wave-monitoring devices on Woody Island and conducted scientific surveys in contested regions despite negative reactions from Vietnam.



Source: Annual Report to Congress, Pg. 74, available at : https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

Outposts Capable of Supporting Military Operations:

In early 2018, China continued its gradual deployment of military jamming equipment as well as advanced anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems to its Spratly Islands outposts. The missile systems are the most capable land-based weapons systems deployed by China in the disputed South China Sea. China completed shore-based infrastructure on four small outposts in the Spratly Islands in early 2016. Facilities on

Johnson, Gaven, Hughes, and Cuarteron Reefs include administrative buildings, weapons stations, and sensor emplacements.



Source: Annual Report to Congress, Pg. 76, available at: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf


By early 2018, China had completed more extensive military infrastructure on three larger outposts in the Spratly Islands at Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs. These installations now include aviation facilities, port facilities, fixed-weapons positions, barracks, administration buildings, and communications facilities. No substantial land has been reclaimed at any of the outposts since China completed its artificial island creation in the Spratly Islands in late 2015, after adding over 3,200 acres of land to the seven features it occupies in the Spratlys. China has stated these projects are mainly to improve marine research, safety of navigation, and the living and working conditions of personnel stationed on the outposts. However, the outposts provide airfields, berthing areas, and resupply facilities that will allow China to maintain a more flexible and persistent military and paramilitary presence in the area. This improves China's ability to detect and challenge activities by rival claimants or third parties, widen the range of capabilities available to China, and reduce the time required to deploy them.

6.3.5.3 Western Theater Command¹⁰³⁰

The Western Theater Command is oriented toward India and counterterrorism missions. The Western Theater Command (WTC) is geographically the largest theater command within China and is likely responsible for responding to conflict with India and managing terrorism in western China. Located within the WTC are two group armies, three Air Force bases, one Rocket Force base, and PAP units that conduct internal security operations. Counterterrorism is a key issue within the WTC, which includes the Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions where China is focused on perceived threats of separatism and terrorism. China's campaign is characterized as combating terror and separatist forces before they enter China, particularly from Afghanistan, while employing an internal "re-education" campaign for any individuals suspected of having sympathies for anti-government elements.

Indo-China Border

In this regard please see India's position on page 10 (6.1.1 Safeguarding National Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests).



Source: Annual Report to Congress, Pg. 78, available at: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

¹⁰³⁰ Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924 Pg. 77, Available online at URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

In April 2018, President Xi and Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi held an informal meeting and expressed support for a resolution on the border. In November 2018, India and China resumed their annual defense dialogue, which was followed by a special representative meeting on the border co-chaired by Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese State Councilor Wang Yi.

6.3.5.4 Northern Theater Command¹⁰³¹

The Northern Theater Command is oriented toward the Korean Peninsula and Russian border security. The area of responsibility of the Northern Theater Command (NTC) covers the majority of its Mongolian and Russian border areas, North Korea, and the Yellow Sea. It is responsible for operations along China's northern periphery, as well as counterterrorism operations. Located within the NTC are three group armies, a naval fleet, two marine brigades, two Air Force bases, one Rocket Force base, and PAP units that conduct internal security operations.

Relations with North Korea

China's relationship with North Korea has taken a positive turn from a strained period during 2017. The PLA continues to conduct military exercises in preparation for a contingency on the Korean Peninsula. China's relationship with North Korea has taken a positive turn from a strained period after China increased implementation of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions in 2017. China has largely enforced the UNSC resolution sanctions against North Korea. Xi had three meetings with Kim Jong Un in 2018, along with numerous lower-level official exchanges in both North Korea and China. China's objectives for the Korean Peninsula include stability, denuclearization, and the absence of U.S. forces near China's border. China's focus on maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula includes preventing North Korea's collapse and preventing a military conflict on the Peninsula. China continues to advocate for a dual-track approach towards North Korea that embraces both dialogue and pressure, and has claimed credit for the suspension of U.S.-South Korean military exercises in exchange for the suspension of North Korean nuclear and missile activity.

China has long been concerned about stability along its border with North Korea. The PLA conducts military exercises in preparation for a contingency on the Korean Peninsula including air, land, sea, and chemical defense training events. Should a crisis or conflict occur on the Peninsula, China's leaders could order the NTC to engage in a range of operations. These could include securing the China-North Korea border to prevent the flow of refugees or a military intervention into North Korea. China could also cite the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance it signed with North Korea in July 1961 as a justification to cross the border into North Korea.

¹⁰³¹ Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924 Pg. 79, Available online at URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf



Source: Annual Report to Congress, Pg. 80
https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

6.3.5.5 Central Theater Command¹⁰³²

The Central Theater Command is oriented toward capital defense and providing surge support to other theaters. The area of responsibility of the Central Theater Command (CTC) stretches from the Bohai Gulf into the interior of China, connecting the other four theater commands. The CTC is responsible for the defense of the Beijing capital region, providing security for the leadership, and serving as a strategic reserve to the other theater commands. Units within the CTC area of responsibility are three group armies, two Air Force bases, and one Rocket Force base. Although the theater command has coastal responsibilities, it does not have a subordinate naval fleet.

¹⁰³² Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924 Pg. 79, Available online at URL:
https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

Central Theater



Source: Annual Report to Congress, Pg. 82
https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

6.4 Service Branches

The Service Branches in PLA are PLA Army (PLAA), the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), and the PLA Joint Logistic Support Force (PLAJLSF).

China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) remains the world's largest armed force, with an increasingly modern, advanced equipment inventory. Its operational effectiveness, however, remains hampered by training and doctrine issues. China's most recent, 2015 defence white paper outlined the importance of power-projection capabilities, emphasizing the requirements for offensive and defensive air operations and 'open seas protection'. A major restructuring process is now mostly in effect and will probably be complete by 2020. The establishment of the Strategic Support Force underscores the importance placed upon the further development of China's cyber, space and information-dominance capabilities. China does not maintain any formal alliances, but it does have a number of key defence relationships with regional states and through its membership of the SCO. It also boosted defence ties in Africa in 2018. Improving readiness for combat operations is a key objective of the current reforms; the PLA currently lacks any significant recent combat experience and its training has traditionally suffered from over-scripted and unrealistic exercises. Though these weaknesses are acknowledged and possibly being addressed, it is unclear how effective the newly established structures will be at generating and controlling high-intensity combined-arms capabilities. In the short term, changes to roles and requirements for officers may have had a detrimental effect on morale within the PLA, as well as on its overall level of readiness. The requirement for out-of-area operations is relatively new for the PLA; the navy is the only service to have experience in extended deployments, assisted by its new support base in Djibouti. Major platform inventories in all the services comprise a heterogeneous mix of modern, older and obsolescent designs. The reduction in overall force size as part of the restructuring process has seen some older equipment designs finally withdrawn from service. China has an extensive defence-industrial base, capable of indigenously producing advanced equipment across all domains, although questions persist over quality and reliability.¹⁰³³

Strength of Chinese Military

ACTIVE: 2,035,000

(PLA/Ground Forces: 975,000; Navy: 250,000; Air Force: 395,000; Strategic Missile Forces: 120,000; Strategic Support Force: 145,000; Other: 150,000) and Paramilitary: 660,000.

Conscript liability Selective conscription; all services 24 months 256

RESERVE: Estimated 510,000¹⁰³⁴

¹⁰³³ The MILITARY BALANCE 2019: THE ANNUAL ASSESEMENT OF GLOBAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND DEFENCE ECONOMICS, International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Pg 256.

¹⁰³⁴ Ibid, Pg 256.

6.4.1 Ground Force /PLA Army (PLAA)

Estimated strength of Ground Force of China is 975,000.¹⁰³⁵

In late 2015, a single, separate headquarters was established for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) ground forces, in place of the four general departments.¹⁰³⁶

The PLAA took the unusual step of testing all 13 group army commanders and their staffs on their knowledge of their unit's missions and assigned tasks and required them to answer questions on operational scenarios.

The PLAA conducted the annual STRIDE and FIREPOWER exercises in 2018 but also introduced the "QIBING" ("Unconventional Troops") skills-based competition for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), special operations forces, information support, electronic countermeasures, and Army Aviation forces. These competitions took place at various sites, one for each specialty, and used lessons learned from joint training and competitions with other countries to establish the grading criteria. The PLA also conducted a joint amphibious exercise in the Eastern Theater in the early fall as well as numerous smaller force-on-force exercises, including an exercise between two newly reformed amphibious mechanized infantry brigades in the Southern Theater.

The PLAA continued to adapt to structural and command changes in 2018.

Each group army is standardized and includes six combined-arms brigades that serve as the PLAA's primary maneuver force, and controls six combat support and combat service support brigades.

The PLAA has staffed and restructured the combined-arms brigades' subordinate combined-arms battalions to enable them to conduct independent operations. These battalions have become the PLAA's basic tactical unit for joint operations.

Throughout 2018, the PLAA continued to adapt to structural and command changes which occurred in 2017. Each group army (roughly a U.S. corps-level equivalent) is now standardized and includes six combined-arms brigades that serve as the PLAA's primary manoeuvre force. Each group army also controls six other brigades responsible for combat and combat support functions: an artillery brigade, an air defense brigade, an army aviation (or air assault) brigade, a special operations forces (SOF) brigade, an engineer and chemical defense brigade, and a service support brigade.

Combined-arms brigades' subordinate combined-arms battalions have become the PLAA's basic tactical unit for joint operations. The PLAA has also staffed and restructured these new battalions to enable them to conduct independent operations. Combined-arms battalion commanders now have staff officers who assist in the development and implementation of plans and orders in addition to new reconnaissance and service support assets. The PLAA delineates its combined arms battalions into three types: heavy (tracked armoured vehicles), medium (wheeled armoured vehicles), and light (high-mobility, mountain/jungle, air assault and motorized battalions). This variety of combat

¹⁰³⁵ The MILITARY BALANCE 2019: THE ANNUAL ASSESEMENT OF GLOBAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND DEFENCE ECONOMICS, International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Pg 257.

¹⁰³⁶ Ibid, Pg 257

units provides the PLAA flexibility to structure future force deployments without needing to task organize units that may not have sufficiently trained together.

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Two air-assault brigades established in 2017 replaced their respective group army subordinate army aviation brigades: one in the 83rd Group Army (Central Theater) and one in the 75th Group Army (Southern Theater). These "new-type" combat units received a large amount of press coverage in 2018 and have been described in Chinese news sources as a highly mobile force that can be used for "three-dimensional combat operations." The air assault brigades enable the PLAA to perform force projection and air insertion missions, and can be used to supplement the newly modularized People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) Airborne Corps' combined-arms airborne brigades.

Additional force restructuring and modularization has occurred across the remainder of the PLAA. Border and coastal defense regiments have been reorganized as brigades in most theaters, except the Western Theater. A new army-subordinate intelligence and reconnaissance brigade has been established in the Southern Theater. Lower level changes are also simultaneously occurring within the PLAA, including an ongoing increase in the size of tank platoons from three to four tanks and the reported doubling of the time PLAA recruits spend completing initial training.

For the second consecutive year, the PLAA participated in only a small number of named exercises during 2018. In July, one iteration of the annual STRIDE 2018 exercise occurred at the Zhurihe Training Base, and it involved two heavy combined-arms brigades from the 81st Group Army, one of which served as the permanent opposing force (OPFOR). The PLAA "red force" portraying Chinese forces focused on operating in a realistic combat environment, though each brigade took turns portraying the aggressor and defender. At least one iteration of the annual FIREPOWER exercise series took place in 2018 at the Weibei Training Base in Shandong involving the air defense brigade of the 79th Group Army.

Although PLAA-led exercises were limited, the PLAA deployed two combined-arms battalions, supporting artillery elements, engineering assets, and C2 units from the Northern Theater Command to participate in VOSTOK 2018, Russia's annual strategic military exercise. While the PLAA has deployed forces to Russia for previous PEACE MISSION exercises conducted under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, VOSTOK 2018 represented the PLAA's largest deployment of forces to a foreign exercise.

In 2018, the SSF conducted joint communications and reconnaissance training with the PLAA and the PLAAF to improve operational support capabilities and joint operations in advanced electromagnetic environments.

In 2018, the Strategic Support Force increased joint communications and reconnaissance training with the PLAA and the PLAAF to improve operational support capabilities and joint operations in advanced electromagnetic environments. Included in this training was the LUOYANG-2018 series of force-on-force exercises in which an SSF base challenged a PLA group army brigade's communications with hostile jamming and interruptions to their operational electromagnetic environment.

The PLA's Current Posture For A Taiwan Conflict

PLA Army (PLAA): The PLAA is improving and increasing its options for a Taiwan invasion. It is converting the bulk of its manoeuvre units to combined arms brigades, including the former amphibious divisions and amphibious armour brigades. As part of this change, the PLAA has increased the types of arms and combat support functions organic to these brigades, which should eventually create more capable, modular brigades and battalions. The expansion of army aviation and the creation of two new air assault brigades also provides more attack, air assault and close air support options for a Taiwan invasion. Additionally, the PLAA's ongoing fielding of advanced air defense, electronic warfare, and C2 systems enhances the combat power, force protection, and sustainment capabilities of its brigades. Improved communications networks provide real-time data transmissions within and between units, enabling better C2 during operations, including between services. The PLAA continues to conduct company-level amphibious landing training, including during difficult weather and at night, but will need increased training at larger echelons to fully integrate their new structure and three dimensional capabilities. As these new systems proliferate, the PLAA will increase its ability to establish, defend, and exploit a beachhead lodgement.

The PLA continues to make modest gains in amphibious warfare by developing additional capabilities to conduct amphibious landings and seize and defend small islands. The PLA has 12 units organized and equipped to conduct amphibious operations. During the last five years, the PLAA and the PLANMC have fielded new equipment designed specifically for amphibious operations such as the ZBD-05 amphibious infantry fighting vehicle and the PLZ-07B amphibious self-propelled howitzer. The PLA has also made efforts to improve its ability to insert forces by air, restructuring the Airborne Corps and establishing Army Air assault units, which would be charged with aerial insertion and seizing key terrain. Both PLAA and PLANMC units equipped for amphibious operations conduct regular company- to battalion-level amphibious training exercises, and the PLA continues to integrate aerial insertion training into larger exercises, including dropping airborne forces from the Y-20 heavy-lift aircraft for the first time. However, the PLA rarely conducts amphibious exercises involving echelons above a battalion, though both PLAA and PLANMC units have emphasized the development of combined arms battalion formations since 2012.¹⁰³⁷

¹⁰³⁷ Excerpts from Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924, Available online at URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

6.4.2 Navy

Navy Strength: Estimated 250,000¹⁰³⁸

The PLA Navy is organized into five service arms: submarine, surface, naval aviation, coastal defence and Marine Corps, as well as other specialized units. There are three fleets, one each in the Northern, Eastern and Southern theatre commands.¹⁰³⁹

According to the Annual Report to Congress “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019”, issued by Office of the Secretary of Defense, USA in May 2, 2019, the PLA Navy conducted significant training events throughout the year, highlighted by its largest ever fleet review and a large-scale live fire exercise. In April 2018, President Xi Jinping oversaw the PLAN’s fleet review of approximately 50 ships and submarines, including the aircraft carrier Liaoning, and more than 75 aircraft, which took place just south of Hainan Island in the South China Sea. Following the fleet review, the Liaoning and its escorts conducted exercises in the Philippine Sea, where Liaoning embarked J-15 fighters conducted flight operations for the first time outside the First Island Chain. In mid-July 2018, the PLAN conducted a large-scale, multi fleet live-fire exercise in the East China Sea, north of Taiwan. The exercise likely was part of an effort to deter Taiwan independence sentiment and U.S. cooperation with Taiwan.

The PLAN Marine Corps conducted a long distance manoeuvre exercise from March to June 2018, deploying approximately 10,000 personnel to training areas in Yunnan and the Shandong Peninsula. This exercise was likely aimed at improving the PLAN Marine Corps’ expeditionary warfare capabilities.

The PLAN is the largest navy in the region with more than 300 ships and continues to undergo rapid modernization to multi-role platforms.

The PLAN is the region’s largest navy, with more than 300 surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, patrol craft, and specialized types. It is also an increasingly modern and flexible force. The PLAN is rapidly replacing obsolescent, generally single-purpose platforms in favour of larger, multi-role combatants featuring advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors. This modernization aligns with China’s growing emphasis on the maritime domain and increasing demands on the PLAN to conduct operational tasks at expanding distances from the Chinese mainland using multi-mission, long-range, sustainable naval platforms possessing robust self-defense capabilities.

In 2018, the PLAN continued to implement structural reforms which began in late 2015 and early 2016. These new arrangements focus the service on organizing, manning, training, and equipping naval forces rather than conducting operations. The PLAN also appears to be converting some of its units to a base-operational unit structure, similar to the Air Force.

¹⁰³⁸ The MILITARY BALANCE 2019: THE ANNUAL ASSESEMENT OF GLOBAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND DEFENCE ECONOMICS, Internation Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Pg 258.

¹⁰³⁹ Ibid, Pg 258.

The PLAN has continued expanding the PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) force structure. The PLANMC previously consisted of two brigades and approximately 10,000 personnel, and it was limited in geography and mission to amphibious assault and defense of South China Sea outposts. By 2020, the PLANMC will consist of seven brigades, may have more than 30,000 personnel, and it will expand its mission to include expeditionary operations beyond China's borders. A newly established PLANMC headquarters is now responsible for manning, training, and equipping PLANMC forces. For the first time, the PLANMC also has its own commander, although it remains subordinate to the PLAN. The PLANMC may also establish an aviation brigade, which could provide an organic helicopter transport and attack capability, increasing its amphibious and expeditionary warfare capabilities.

Submarines: Modernization of China's submarine force remains a high priority for the PLAN. The PLAN currently operates four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and 50 conventionally powered attack submarines (SS). The speed of growth of the submarine force has slowed and will likely grow to between 65 and 70 submarines by 2020.

China continues to increase its inventory of advanced anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM)-capable conventional submarines. Since the mid-1990s, the PLAN has purchased 12 Russian-built KIL0-class SS units, eight capable of launching ASCMs. During these years, Chinese shipyards have delivered 13 SONG-class SS units (Type 039) and 17 YUAN-class diesel-electric air-independent power attack submarines (SSP) (Type 039A) with a total of 20 YUANs projected for production by 2020.

Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has constructed twelve nuclear submarines – two SHANG I-class SSNs (Type 093), four SHANG II-class SSNs (Type 093A), and six JIN-class SSBNs (Type 094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), China's four operational JIN-class SSBNs represent China's first credible, sea-based nuclear deterrent. China's next-generation Type 096 SSBN reportedly will be armed with the follow-on JL3 SLBM, which will likely begin construction in the early-2020s.

By the mid-2020s, China will likely build the Type 093B guided-missile nuclear attack submarine. This new SHANG-class variant will enhance the PLAN's anti-surface warfare capability and could provide a more clandestine land-attack option.

Surface Combatants: The PLAN also remains engaged in a robust surface combatant construction program, producing new guided missile cruisers (CG), guided-missile destroyers (DDG), and guided-missile frigates (FFG) which will significantly upgrade the PLAN's air defense, anti-ship, and anti-submarine capabilities. These assets will be critical as the PLAN expands operations into distant seas beyond the range of shore-based air defense systems. In 2017-2018, China launched its first four RENHAI-class (Type 055) CGs, with several more under construction. The RENHAI will enter operational service in 2019 and carry a large load out of ASCMs, SAMs, and anti-submarine weapons. In 2018, at least three more LUYANG III-class DDGs (Type 052D) entered service, bringing the operational total to nine units with at least four more of this DDG and a new, enlarged variant in various stages of construction or outfitting. The LUYANG III-class DDG has a multipurpose vertical launch system capable of launching cruise missiles, SAMs, and antisubmarine missiles. China continues to produce the

JIANGKAI II-class FFG (Type 054A) with 27 or more ships currently in the fleet and several more in various stages of construction. The PLAN is augmenting its littoral warfare capabilities, especially in the South China Sea and East China Sea, with high-rate production of the JIANGDAO-class corvettes (FFL) (Type 056). More than 40 of these corvettes entered service by the end of 2018, and more than a dozen more are currently under construction or outfitting. The latest FFLs are ASW variants with towed array sonar. China also has 60 HOUBEI-class wave-piercing catamaran guided-missile patrol boats (Type 022) built for operations in China's "near seas."

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The PLAN is augmenting its littoral warfare capabilities, especially in the South China Sea and East China Sea, with high-rate production of the JIANGDAO-class corvettes (FFL) (Type 056).

The PLAN continues to emphasize anti-surface warfare. Frigates and corvettes, as well as modernized older combatants, carry variants of the YJ-83 ASCM (65 nm, 120 km), while newer surface combatants such as the LUYANG II-class DDGs are fitted with the YJ-62 (120 nm, 222 km). The LUYANG III class DDG and the RENHAI-class CG will be fitted with a variant of China's newest ASCM, the YJ-18 (290 nm, 537 km).

The PLAN recognizes that long-range ASCMs require a robust, over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability to realize their full potential.

Amphibious Warfare Ships: China's investments in its amphibious ship force signal its intent to develop expeditionary warfare capabilities. The PLAN has five large YUZHAO-class (Type 071) amphibious transport docks (LPD), with three more under construction or outfitting during 2018. The YUZHAO LPD provides a greater and more flexible capability for long-range operations than the PLAN's older landing ships. It can carry several of the new YUYI-class air cushion medium landing craft and four or more helicopters, as well as armored vehicles and PLAN Marines for long-distance deployments. The PLAN probably will continue constructing YUZHAO LPDs even as it pursues a follow-on amphibious assault ship that is not only larger but also incorporates a full flight deck for helicopters.

Auxiliary Ships: The PLAN continues to build a large number of seagoing auxiliary and support ships, including intelligence collection ships (AGIs), acoustic collection ships (AGOS), fleet replenishment oilers, submarine rescue and salvage ships, and various other specialized units. Additionally China launched its first domestically built polar icebreaker Xuelong 2 in 2018.

PLAN AVIATION

PLAN Aviation continues to work toward achieving long-range power projection capability.

The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation are the largest aviation forces in the region and the third largest in the world, with more than 2,700 total aircraft (not including trainer variants or

UAVs) and approximately 2,000 combat aircraft (including fighters, strategic bombers, tactical bombers, multi-mission tactical, and attack aircraft).

Changes included establishing at least six new air bases, and restructuring previously subordinate regiments into brigades under the newly established bases by disbanding its fighter and fighter-bomber divisions. Reform may have similarly affected PLAN Aviation, as at least one PLAN Aviation fighter regiment was restructured into a brigade like its PLAAF counterparts.

Bombers: PLAN Aviation fields the H-6G with systems and four weapons pylons for ASCMs to support maritime missions. In addition, the PLAAF is seeking to extend its reach with the development of a new, stealth strategic bomber. Former PLAAF Commander General Ma Xiaotian publicly announced the program in 2016, and commentators anticipate the new platform will debut sometime around 2025.

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (3,000-5,500 km): The PLA's DF-26 is a road-mobile, nuclear and conventional capable IRBM capable of near-precision strike capability as far away from China as the second island chain. The PLAN is also expanding its network of sky wave and surface wave OTH radars. In conjunction with reconnaissance satellites, these OTH systems provide targeting capabilities at extended distances from China to support long-range precision strikes, including employment of ASBMs.

Land-Attack Cruise Missiles: The PLA fields approximately 270-540 ground-launched LACMs for standoff precision strikes. The PLA continues to develop additional LACM-variants for deployment with the PLAN and PLAAF.

China Coast Guard (CCG): The CCG is responsible for a wide range of missions under the umbrella of maritime rights protection, including enforcement of China's sovereignty claims, surveillance, and protection of fisheries' resources, anti-smuggling, and general law enforcement. As of July 2018, the CCG completed its merger into the military command structure through its subordination to the PAP, which could facilitate closer coordination between the CCG and the PLAN. China primarily uses paramilitary maritime law enforcement agencies in maritime disputes, selectively using the PLAN to provide overwatch in case of escalation. Days after the administrative transfer of the CCG to the PAP, the CCG conducted a patrol mission near the contested Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.

People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM): A large number of PAFMM vessels train with and assist the PLAN and CCG in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and reconnaissance, fisheries protection, logistic support, and search and rescue. The government subsidizes various local and provincial commercial organizations to operate militia vessels to perform "official" missions on an ad hoc basis outside of their regular civilian commercial activities.

Surface and Undersea Operations: China continues to construct an array of offensive and defensive capabilities to enable the PLA to gain maritime superiority within the first island chain – the islands running from the Kurils, through Taiwan, to Borneo, roughly encompassing the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea – and grow toward

projecting limited combat power at longer ranges. China's broad range of ASCMs and launch platforms as well as submarine launched torpedoes and naval mines allow the PLAN to create an increasingly lethal, multi access threat against an adversary approaching Chinese waters and operating areas.

The PLAN continues to develop into a global force, gradually extending its operational reach beyond East Asia into a sustained ability to operate at increasingly longer ranges. The PLAN's latest surface and subsurface platforms enable combat operations beyond the reach of China's land based defenses. In particular, China's aircraft carrier and planned follow-on carriers, once operational, will extend air defense coverage beyond the range of coastal and shipboard missile systems and will enable task group operations at increasingly longer ranges. The PLAN's emerging requirement for sea-based land-attack systems will also enhance China's ability to project power. Furthermore, the PLAN now has a sizable force of high capability logistical replenishment ships to support long-distance, long-duration deployments, including two new ships being built specifically to support aircraft carrier operations. The expansion of naval operations beyond China's immediate region will also facilitate non-war uses of military force.

The PLAN's force structure continues to evolve, incorporating more platforms with the versatility for both offshore and long distance power projection. China is engaged in series production of the RENHAI-class CG, the LUYANG III class DDG, the JIANGKAI II-class FFG, and the JIANGDAO-class FFL. The RENHAI CG is a 10,000-ton vessel that can carry an array of long-range ASCMs and SAMs. It will likely be able to launch ASBMs and LACMs once these weapons are available. The RENHAI CG will be China's premier carrier escort for blue water operations. Four units are currently outfitting with several more under construction.

The PLAN continues to extend its strike range with more domestically produced ship-, submarine-, and aircraft-deployed ASCMs with the exception of a few legacy missiles imported from Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s.

The PLAN continues to build multiple new, large ships that can support force projection operations, including LPDs, large logistical support ships, and specialized blue-water auxiliary ships – including high-capability intelligence collection ships (AGIs/AGOS).

China sustained its counter piracy task groups in the Gulf of Aden in 2018, a ten year effort that is the first enduring Chinese naval operation beyond the Indo-Pacific region. The PLAN also continued submarine deployments to the Indian Ocean, demonstrating its increasing familiarity with operating in that region and underscoring China's interest in protecting SLOCs beyond the South China Sea.

PLAN Marine Corps: Ultimately, the PLANMC will be capable of operating from land, sea, and air as the PLA's global military force, but this goal will likely not be realized by China's stated goal to complete PLA reforms by 2020. Four new brigades have been established, bringing the total number of combat brigades to six, but only the original two brigades are fully mission-capable. There is no evidence to indicate the new brigades are manned, trained, and equipped to perform expeditionary missions yet. Additionally, the PLANMC may establish an aviation brigade, but there is no evidence this unit exists yet.

The PLANMC is employing new equipment to perform an expeditionary mission, but the equipment is not arriving in sufficient numbers to meet the 2020 goal. Fifteen wheeled armoured combat vehicles, more effective for land-based operations than amphibious operations, have been deployed with the PLANMC unit currently in Djibouti; they are the first-observed wheeled armoured vehicles in the PLANMC. China lacks a sufficient inventory of wheeled armoured vehicles to support multiple PLANMC expeditionary deployments adequately. Fully operational brigades are equipped exclusively with amphibious armoured vehicles. The PLANMC has not received the helicopters required for an air assault capability, and it will likely need a minimum of 120 attack and medium-lift helicopters to be fully mission capable. Achieving this level of capability would include basing helicopters overseas to support PLANMC units and operating from amphibious ships.

In 2018, PLANMC out-of-garrison exercises increased in frequency and size. In one exercise, likely the largest PLANMC exercise on record, more than 10,000 marines participated in a series of very simplistic training. This surge in training likely served to indoctrinate new PLAN marines into the service, but it lacked the complexity needed to allow these units to become proficient in expeditionary warfare.

PLA Air Force and PLA Navy Aviation: The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation continued to improve their capabilities to conduct offensive and defensive offshore operations such as strike, air and missile defense, strategic mobility, and early warning and reconnaissance missions. Although they currently have limited power projection capability, both the PLAAF and PLAN Aviation are seeking to extend their reach. The PLAAF, in particular, has received repeated calls from its leadership to become a truly “strategic” air force, able to project power at long distances and support Chinese national interests wherever they extend.

In the East China Sea, the ETC conducted combat drills throughout the year focused on naval operations. In October 2018, a PLAN flotilla conducted a series of drills, including anti-submarine warfare training by employing destroyers and frigates in formations simulating encirclement of underwater targets. They further completed more than ten training objectives in auxiliary gun firing, visit board-search-and-seizure drills, and nuclear and chemical defense drills.

EAST CHINA SEA: During 2018, China maintained a presence in the Senkaku Islands with typically four China Coast Guard ships in the territorial waters (within 12 nm) around the islands. In January 2018, a PLAN Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) sailed underwater in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands. Separately, the PLAN frequently advances into the Pacific Ocean by passing between Japan’s Okinawa and Miyako Islands. The PLAN East Sea Fleet regularly conducts military exercises in the Sea of Japan to prepare for potential conflicts. However, during Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Japan in May 2018, China and Japan signed the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism, designed to avoid accidental encounters.

The PLAN is improving anti-air and anti-surface warfare capabilities, developing an at-sea nuclear deterrent, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of striking Taiwan in a cross-Strait conflict as well as conducting diverse missions in other contingency operations. New attack submarines, modern surface combatants with anti-

air capability, and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the first island chain as well as to deter and counter any potential third party intervention in a Taiwan conflict. China's amphibious ship fleet, however, has in recent years focused on acquiring a small number of LPDs, indicating a near term focus on smaller scale expeditionary missions rather than a large number of LSTs and medium landing craft that would be necessary for a large-scale direct beach assault. There is also no indication China is significantly expanding its landing ship force at this time – suggesting a direct beach-assault operation requiring extensive lift is less likely in planning.

In May 2018, the United States disinvited the PLAN from the 2018 RIM OF THE PACIFIC (RIMPAC) exercise as a result of China's continued militarization of disputed features in the South China Sea, violating a pledge by Chinese President Xi Jinping not to militarize the Spratly Islands.¹⁰⁴⁰

6.4.3 Air Force

Air Force Strength: 395,000¹⁰⁴¹

The PLA Air Force continued its signature BLUE SHIELD and RED SWORD exercises in 2018, with an emphasis on the capabilities and functions of its reorganized air defense bases. In the BLUE SHIELD-2018 air defense exercise, the Air Force incorporated air defense units from the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force under the command of an air defense base for the first time, working to forge a multi-service, joint integrated air defense. The RED SWORD-2018 force-on force exercise consisted of fighters, bombers, special mission aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and electronic warfare units in a base versus-base scenario. RED SWORD-2018 was based on actual combat plans, featured an intervening third-party "orange force" for the first time, and included long-range raid and airborne operations for the first time as well. The PLAAF Airborne Corps conducted a series of exercises aimed at realistic combat training and improving its command and command staff capabilities.

Two air-assault brigades established in 2017 replaced their respective group army subordinate army aviation brigades: one in the 83rd Group Army (Central Theater) and one in the 75th Group Army (Southern Theater). These "new-type" combat units received a large amount of press coverage in 2018 and have been described in Chinese news sources as a highly mobile force that can be used for "three-dimensional combat operations." The air assault brigades enable the PLAA to perform force projection and air insertion missions, and can be used to supplement the newly modularized People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) Airborne Corps' combined-arms airborne brigades.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Excerpts from Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924, Available online at URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

¹⁰⁴¹ The MILITARY BALANCE 2019: THE ANNUAL ASSESEMENT OF GLOBAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND DEFENCE ECONOMICS, Internation Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Pg 261.

People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) And Plan Aviation

The largest aviation forces in the region, the PLAAF and PLAN Aviation continue to work toward achieving long-range power projection capability. The PLAAF continues to modernize with the delivery of indigenous manned aircraft and a wide range of UAVs.

The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation are the largest aviation forces in the region and the third largest in the world, with more than 2,700 total aircraft (not including trainer variants or UAVs) and approximately 2,000 combat aircraft (including fighters, strategic bombers, tactical bombers, multi-mission tactical, and attack aircraft). In 2017, Lieutenant General Ding Laihang assumed the post of PLAAF commander and exhorted the service to build a truly "strategic" air force capable of projecting airpower at a long range. The PLAAF continues to modernize and is rapidly closing the gap with Western air forces across a broad spectrum of capabilities.

PLA reorganization significantly affected the force structure of the PLAAF. Changes included establishing at least six new air bases, and restructuring previously subordinate regiments into brigades under the newly established bases by disbanding its fighter and fighter-bomber divisions. Reform may have similarly affected PLAN Aviation, as at least one PLAN Aviation fighter regiment was restructured into a brigade like its PLAAF counterparts.

Airborne: In 2018, reorganization in the 15th Airborne Corps divided the Corps into five combined arms brigades that receive support from an air assault brigade. Prior to the reorganization, the 15th Airborne Corps was a traditional motorized force that primarily focused on parachuting operations. After the reforms, its air assault brigade is now one of three air assault units PLA-wide and the only assault brigade in the PLAAF. This unit is acquiring additional skills, such as conducting air landing assaults (air assaults) from helicopters and transport aircraft with an emphasis on rapid reaction. The Airborne Corps is equivalent to one PLA group army in the overall structure.

Fighters: The PLAAF continues to field fourth-generation aircraft (now about 600) and probably will become a majority fourth-generation force within the next several years. The PLAAF is still developing fifth-generation fighters, including the J-20 and FC-31, and, in late 2016, began importing 24 Su-35 advanced fourth-generation fighters from Russia. During the PLA's 90th anniversary parade in July 2017, the PLAAF publicly conducted high-profile flybys of its J-20 fifth-generation fighters and debuted its J-16 and J-10C advanced fourth-generation fighters armed with the latest weapons. At the Zhuhai Air Show in November 2018, the PLAAF's J-10C demonstration featured thrust vectoring technology, and the PLAAF also conducted a demonstration with the J-20.

Bombers: China's bomber force is comprised of H-6 BADGER variants and it has worked to maintain and enhance the operational effectiveness of these aircraft. The latest H-6 variant, the H-6K, is being fielded in greater numbers and integrates standoff weapons and features more efficient, turbofan engines. This extended-range aircraft has the capability to carry six LACMs, giving the PLA a long-range standoff precision strike capability which can range Guam. Since at least 2016, Chinese media have been referring to the H-6K as a dual nuclear-conventional bomber. PLAN Aviation fields the H-6G with systems and four weapons pylons for ASCMs to support maritime missions. In addition,

the PLAAF is seeking to extend its reach with the development of a new, stealth strategic bomber. Former PLAAF Commander General Ma Xiaotian publicly announced the program in 2016, and commentators anticipate the new platform will debut sometime around 2025.

Special Mission Aircraft:

The service is also integrating airborne early warning and control aircraft – such as KJ-2000 MAINRING, KJ-200 MOTH, and KJ-500 – amplifying PLAAF capabilities to detect, track, and target threats in varying conditions, in larger volumes, and at greater distances. These aircraft help to extend the range of China’s integrated air defense system (IADS) network.

Air and Missile Defense: The PLAAF possesses one of the largest forces of advanced long-range SAM systems in the world, consisting of a combination of Russian-sourced SA-20 (S-300 PMU1/2) battalions and domestically produced CSA-9 battalions. China has contracted with Russia for the S400/Triumpf SAM system, as a follow-on to the SA-20 and CSA-9, to improve strategic long-range air defenses; China conducted its first S400 test fires in December 2018. China is also developing its indigenous HQ-19, which will likely have a ballistic missile defense capability.

Land-Attack Cruise Missiles: The PLA fields approximately 270-540 ground-launched LACMs for standoff precision strikes. The PLA continues to develop additional LACM-variants for deployment with the PLAN and PLAAF.

Ground Attack Munitions: The PLAAF has a small number of tactical air-to-surface missiles (ASM) as well as precision munitions; guidance options include satellite positioning, laser, electro-optic, and imaging infrared. China is developing or adapting a range of smaller ASMs and guided bombs for use on its increasing range of armed UAVs.

STRATEGIC SUPPORT FORCE (SSF): In 2018, the SSF conducted joint communications and reconnaissance training with the PLAA and the PLAAF to improve operational support capabilities and joint operations in advanced electromagnetic environments. In 2018, the Strategic Support Force increased joint communications and reconnaissance training with the PLAA and the PLAAF to improve operational support capabilities and joint operations in advanced electromagnetic environments. Included in this training was the LUOYANG-2018 series of force-on-force exercises in which an SSF base challenged a PLA group army brigade’s communications with hostile jamming and interruptions to their operational electromagnetic environment.

Integrated Air Defense System (IADS):

PLAAF airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft such as the KJ-2000 and KJ-500 can further extend China’s radar coverage well past the range of its ground-based radars.

Air Operations: The PLAAF employs the medium-range H-6K bomber, which can carry up to six precision-guided CJ-20 ALCMs each, giving it the ability to engage U.S. forces as far away as Guam. Since 2016, the PLAAF has steadily increased H-6K operating areas

into the western Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea. China's acquisition of three IL-78 MIDAS aerial refuelling tankers from Ukraine probably allowed the PLAAF to extend the range of Su-30 fighter aircraft beyond the first island chain when supporting H-6K bombers.

PLA Air Force and PLA Navy Aviation:

The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation continued to improve their capabilities to conduct offensive and defensive offshore operations such as strike, air and missile defense, strategic mobility, and early warning and reconnaissance missions. Although they currently have limited power projection capability, both the PLAAF and PLAN Aviation are seeking to extend their reach. The PLAAF, in particular, has received repeated calls from its leadership to become a truly "strategic" air force, able to project power at long distances and support Chinese national interests wherever they extend.

In 2018, major training events for PLAAF airborne units included the first drop of personnel and heavy equipment from the PLAAF's newest transport aircraft, the Y-20, in June, and participation in the AVIADARTS International Games-2018, an event that is part of the International Army Games, in Russia in August. During the event, PLAAF IL-76 and Y-9 transport aircraft airdropped forces and equipment from low altitudes.

China continues to produce the Y-20 heavy lift transport aircraft to correct a strategic airlift deficiency that limits its force projection capabilities. The Y-20s will augment China's current strategic lift units in the PLAAF's 13th Transport Division, which fly IL-76s. The Y-20 could also acquire additional missions, such as serving as an airborne early warning and control system (AEW&C) and as an aerial refueling tanker. China also continues to develop the AG-600 large amphibious seaplane with an anticipated range of 4,500 km and the ability to take off from water to support operations far from the mainland. The AG-600 completed its first flight in December 2017 and its first water-based test flight in October 2018. The Chinese government has already ordered 17 aircraft.

The PLARF fields multiple missiles capable of conducting strikes beyond the first island chain. Among these are the CSS-5 Mod 5 ASBM with a range of 1,500 km and a MaRV to challenge ballistic missile defenses. China also deploys the land-attack CSS-5 Mod 4 and the ground-launched CJ-10 LACM, placing targets on Okinawa and the main Japanese islands at risk. The DF-26 IRBM has a maximum range of 4,000 km and is capable of conducting precision strikes against ground and ship targets, potentially threatening U.S. land and sea-based forces as far away as Guam.

In May 2018, the ETC Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC) organized a closely coordinated PLAAF exercise between the Eastern Theater and Southern Theater Commands. In addition, the PLAAF flew fighter aircraft and long-range cruise missile capable bombers around Taiwan. The PLAAF also employed a KJ-2000 early warning aircraft for command, control, and escort to support Su-35 fighters and J-11 fighter flights to the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel.

The PLA continues to prepare for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait to deter, and if necessary, compel Taiwan to abandon moves toward independence. The PLA also is likely

preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the mainland by force, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention on Taiwan's behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai Administration, China has increased military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan, including circumnavigation flights by the PLAAF and naval exercises in the East China Sea.

In 2018, the PLAAF Airborne Corps conducted training exercises involving long-range raid and airborne operations based on actual war plans. The airborne corps underwent major changes in 2017, reorganizing its previous units into airborne infantry brigades, a special operations brigade, an aviation brigade, and a support brigade. Since 2017, ongoing PLA Army reforms have reduced the number of group armies from 18 to 13, retired or downsized army divisions into combined arms brigades, and reorganized the Army's two amphibious mechanized infantry divisions into amphibious brigades.

PLA Air Force (PLAAF): The PLAAF has maintained a force posture that provides a variety of capabilities for a Taiwan contingency. It has stationed a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air-superiority and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense of China's mainland against counterattack. In addition, China's development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations in a contingency.

In May 2018, the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) Working Group met in Honolulu to improve maritime safety through open communication between U.S. and Chinese naval and air forces. In December 2018, the MMCA Working Group and MMCA Plenary convened in Qingdao. Major General Joaquin Malavet, Director for Strategic Planning and Policy, U.S. Indo Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), and representatives from U.S. Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) met with a PLAN and PLAAF delegation led by Rear Admiral Wang Zhongcai, PLAN Deputy Chief of Staff. Both sides reviewed unsafe incidents over the last year and discussed implementation and assessment of the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters Memorandum of Understanding.¹⁰⁴²

6.4.4 Rocket Force

The PLARF continued its annual HEAVEN'S SWORD series of exercises in 2018 and incorporated a new type of "blue force" unit, comprised of ISR, electronic warfare, and special operations units into its launch training and force-on-force exercises.

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY ROCKET FORCE (PLARF)

In 2018, the PLARF advanced long-term modernization plans to enhance its "strategic deterrence." The PLARF continues to grow its IRBM inventories, including that of the DF-26, which it first fielded in 2016.

¹⁰⁴² Excerpts from Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924, Available online at URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

The PLARF trains, equips, and operates China's land-based nuclear and conventional missiles. In 2018, it advanced long-term modernization plans to enhance its "strategic deterrence capability," a theme President Xi Jinping echoed during a visit to PLARF headquarters in September 2016 where he called for accelerating the PLARF's pace of development and "breakthroughs . . . in strategic deterrence capability."

The PLARF is developing and testing several new variants of missiles and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses. China's conventional missile force includes the CSS-6 SRBM (range 725-850 km); the CSS-7 SRBM (600 km); the CSS-11 SRBM (over 700 km); land-attack and anti-ship variants of the CSS-5 MRBM (approximately 1,500 km); the DF-26 IRBM (approximately 4,000 km); and the CJ-10 ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) (approximately 1,500 km). China's conventionally armed CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) variant gives the PLA the capability to attack ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km, is fitted with a maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MaRV) warhead, and is claimed to be capable of rapidly reloading in the field. The PLARF continues to grow its IRBM inventories, including that of the DF-26, which it first fielded in 2016. The DF-26 is capable of conducting conventional and nuclear precision strikes against ground targets as well as conventional strikes against naval targets in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans and the South China Sea.

PLA Rocket Force: The PLARF fields multiple missiles capable of conducting strikes beyond the first island chain. Among these are the CSS-5 Mod 5 ASBM with a range of 1,500 km and a MaRV to challenge ballistic missile defenses. China also deploys the land-attack CSS-5 Mod 4 and the ground-launched CJ-10 LACM, placing targets on Okinawa and the main Japanese islands at risk. The DF-26 IRBM has a maximum range of 4,000 km and is capable of conducting precision strikes against ground and ship targets, potentially threatening U.S. land and sea-based forces as far away as Guam.

PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan's command and control facilities, air bases, radar sites, and others in an attempt to degrade Taiwan's defenses, neutralize Taiwan's leadership, or break the public's will to fight.¹⁰⁴³

6.4.5 Strategic Support Force

Estimated Strategic Support Force Strength: 175,000¹⁰⁴⁴

At the end of 2015, a new Strategic Support Force was established by drawing upon capabilities previously exercised by the PLA's 3rd and 4th departments and other central functions. It reports to the Central Military Commission and is believed to be responsible for the PLA's space and cyber capabilities.¹⁰⁴⁵

¹⁰⁴³ Excerpts from Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924, Available online at URL:

https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

¹⁰⁴⁴ The MILITARY BALANCE 2019: THE ANNUAL ASSESEMENT OF GLOBAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND DEFENCE ECONOMICS, Internation Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Pg 262.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Ibid, Pg 262.

According to the Annual Report to Congress “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019”, issued by Office of the Secretary of Defense, USA in May 2, 2019, the Strategic Support Force (SSF) conducted the LUOYANG 2018 series of force-on-force exercises with a SSF base pitted against five PLA Army, Air Force, and Rocket Force units training in a complex electronic warfare environment.

The PLA created the SSF in 2016 as a theater command-level organization to centralize strategic space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare missions. The creation of the SSF highlights China’s understanding of information as a strategic resource in modern warfare. China’s leadership believes that achieving information dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum and denying its use to adversaries is necessary to seize and maintain the strategic initiative in a conflict. The SSF was formed from organizations formerly subordinate to the PLA services and General Staff Departments (GSD) with the goal of creating operational synergies between formerly disparate information warfare capabilities to enable the information dominance that China believes will be decisive in future wars.

The SSF oversees two deputy theater command-level departments: the Space Systems Department responsible for military space operations, and the Network Systems Department responsible for information operations (IO). At the headquarters level, the SSF has a four-department administrative structure that includes the Staff, Equipment Political Work, and Logistics Departments. As a strategic organization, the SSF reports directly to the Central Military Commission (CMC) and not to the Theater Commands. The SSF Network Systems Department is responsible for information warfare with a mission set that includes cyberwarfare, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare. By placing these missions under the same organizational umbrella, China seeks to remedy the operational coordination challenges that hindered information sharing under the pre-reform organizational structure.

The SSF’s psychological warfare mission is performed by the former General Political Department’s 311 Base. This base is the only organization in the PLA that is publicly known to perform psychological warfare operations.

The SSF Space Systems Department is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations, including space launch and support, space information support, space telemetry, tracking, and space warfare. The formation of the Space Systems Department seeks to resolve the bureaucratic power struggles that existed over the PLA space mission, as elements of the mission had been dispersed across several national and service-subordinate organizations. China officially designated space as a new domain of warfare in its 2015 defense white paper, highlighting the importance of the space domain in strategic military competition. Notably, China expects space to play an important role in enabling long-range precision strikes and in denying other militaries the use of overhead C4ISR systems. Among the Space System Department’s core missions is the launch and operation of the satellites that are vital to China’s overhead C4ISR architecture.

The PLA’s ongoing structural reforms may further change how the PLA organizes and commands IO, particularly as the SSF evolves over time. In consolidating cyber and other IO-related elements, the SSF is likely generating synergies by combining national level cyber reconnaissance, attack, and defense capabilities in its organization.

The creation of the SSF likely improves the PLA's ability to execute and coordinate IO (particularly cyber, electronic warfare, and counterspace) in a Taiwan contingency. It may also improve the PLA's ability to manage and provide space-based reconnaissance to the CMC and the ETC, improving PLA command staffs' situational awareness of Taiwan's military units and facilities. The PLA is likely still exploring how to reform its joint command processes to integrate IO and ISR capabilities more fully at the theater-level, but structural reforms have removed the biggest barriers to integrating these strategic capabilities at the theater-level.

In 2018, the PLA continued to implement structural reforms, make progress on fielding indigenous systems, and strengthen the ability of the Strategic Support Force and the Joint Logistics Support Force to enable operational support capabilities and joint operations.

The SSF centralizes strategic space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare missions. In 2018, the SSF conducted joint communications and reconnaissance training with the PLAA and the PLAAF to improve operational support capabilities and joint operations in advanced electromagnetic environments.

In 2018, the Strategic Support Force increased joint communications and reconnaissance training with the PLAA and the PLAAF to improve operational support capabilities and joint operations in advanced electromagnetic environments. Included in this training was the LUOYANG-2018 series of force-on-force exercises in which an SSF base challenged a PLA group army brigade's communications with hostile jamming and interruptions to their operational electromagnetic environment.

Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for the use of electronic warfare and cyber operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is "seizing and maintaining battlefield information control in contemporary informatized warfare."¹⁰⁴⁶

6.4.6 People's Armed Police Force

According to the Annual Report to Congress "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019", issued by Office of the Secretary of Defense, USA in May 2, 2019, China's internal security forces consist primarily of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the People's Armed Police (PAP), and the PLA. In 2018, the Central Military Commission (CMC) assumed direct control of the PAP after the Party ended the PAP's previous CMC-State Council dual-command system, and the China Coast Guard (CCG) was subordinated to the PAP, codifying the PLA's enduring role in internal security and possibly increasing the PLA's oversight and interoperability with the paramilitary forces.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Excerpts from Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924, Available online at URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

People's Armed Police (PAP). The PAP is a paramilitary component of China's armed forces whose primary mission is internal security and domestic stability. As of 2018, the PAP now falls solely under the authority of the CMC and has authority over the CCG. The PAP is the primary force responsible for internal security.

China also tasks the PAP with emergency response and counterterrorism operations, with PAP forces training for these missions through 2018.

Professional military education exchanges are another tool of Chinese military diplomacy. For example, some Latin American, Caribbean, Southeast Asian, and Pacific Island countries send officers to China, including to the strategic-level College of Defense Studies at the National Defense University. The PAP Academy also hosts counterparts from many countries in programs related to peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations.

The CMC's acquisition of sole C2 over the PAP and the subordination of the China Coast Guard (CCG) to the PAP in 2018 could improve paramilitary forces' ability to provide support to PLA operations under the authority of the joint theater commands.

Increasing Interoperability With Paramilitary And Militia

As of 2018, the CMC assumed direct control of the PAP. As part of this reform, the PAP also assumed control of the China Coast Guard (CCG) from China's State Oceanic Administration.

People's Armed Police (PAP). The PAP is a paramilitary component of China's armed forces whose primary mission is internal security and domestic stability. In early 2018, the CMC assumed direct control of the PAP after the CCP ended the previous CMC-State Council dual-command system. As part of this reform, the PAP also assumed control of the CCG in July 2018 from China's State Oceanic Administration. Although the PAP has specialized units for a variety of functions, the most numerous are for internal security. Additionally, the PAP is undergoing its most extensive organizational transformation to date as part of broader military reforms. Previously, PAP internal security units were organized into contingents for each province, autonomous region, and centrally administered city, as well as a smaller number of mobile divisions available to deploy anywhere in the country in response to escalating internal crises. In 2018, the mobile divisions were disbanded. Some units went to the 31 provincial contingents, and other units were assigned to two new mobile contingents which do not have a fixed geographic area of responsibility. PAP reform could lead to further interoperability between the PLA and the PAP, but in 2018, examples of interoperability were more apparent in coordination between the PLAN, the CCG, and the PAFMM than between the PAP and the PLA.

The Western Theater Command (WTC) is geographically the largest theater command within China and is likely responsible for responding to conflict with India and managing terrorism in western China. Located within the WTC are two group armies, three Air Force bases, one Rocket Force base, and PAP units that conduct internal security operations.

The area of responsibility of the Northern Theater Command (NTC) covers the majority of its Mongolian and Russian border areas, North Korea, and the Yellow Sea. It is responsible for operations along China's northern periphery, as well as counterterrorism operations. Located within the NTC are three group armies, a naval fleet, two marine brigades, two Air Force bases, one Rocket Force base, and PAP units that conduct internal security operations.¹⁰⁴⁷

6.5 Conscription and Terms for Service

The People's Republic of China practices a military service system which combines conscripts with volunteers and a militia with a reserve service. **Military Service Law of the People's Republic of China** was enacted pursuant to Article 55 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China which stipulates, "it is the sacred duty of every citizen of the People's Republic of China to defend the motherland and resist aggression. It is the honourable duty of citizens of the People's Republic of China to perform military service and join the militia in accordance with the law," and in accordance with other relevant provisions of the Constitution. The law was adopted at the Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress on May 31 and promulgated by Order No.14 of the President of the People's Republic of China on May 31, 1984 and amended in accordance with the Decision on Revising the Military Service Law of the People's Republic of China adopted at the 6th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress on December 29, 1998. This Law is applicable since October 1, 1984. There are 12 chapters in this law covering Enlistment in Peacetime, the Militia, Military Training for Reservists, Mobilization of Troops in Wartime, Preferential Treatment for Active Servicemen and Placement of Ex-servicemen, Punishments and Supplementary Provisions. Chapter III and Chapter IV deal with the 'Active Service and Reserve Service of Soldiers' and 'Active Service and Reserve Service of Officers' respectfully. Chapter V covers 'Cadets Enrolled by Military Institutes and Academies from Among Student Youths'. Chapter VIII covers 'Military Training for Students of Institutions of Higher Learning and Students of Senior Middle Schools'

Chapter V: Cadets Enrolled by Military Institutes and Academies from Among Student Youths

Article 30 Military institutes and academies may, according to needs in building up the armed forces, enrol cadets from among student youths. The age limit for the cadets to be enrolled need not be subject to that for the active servicemen to be enlisted.

Article 31 A cadet who has completed his studies and passed the examinations shall be given a diploma by the institute or academy and shall be appointed officer or civilian cadre in active service according to relevant regulations.

Article 32 A cadet who has completed the required courses but has failed in the examinations shall be given a certificate of his completion of the courses by the institute or academy and return to the place of his residence where he was enrolled, and shall be

¹⁰⁴⁷ Excerpts from Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924, Available online at URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

placed by the people's government of the county, autonomous county, city or municipal district according to the regulations of the State on the placement for those who have completed their studies at other colleges and schools of similar levels.

Article 33 A cadet who is unfit for continuing his studies at a military institute or academy due to his suffering from chronic diseases or other reasons and is thus approved to leave school shall be given a certificate by the institute or academy of the amount of academic work he has done and shall be accepted for placement by the people's governments of the county, autonomous county, city or municipal district at the place of his residence where he was enrolled.

Article 34 A cadet dismissed from school shall be accepted by the people's government of the county, autonomous county, city or municipal district at the place of his residence where he was enrolled, and shall be treated according to the regulations of the State on the treatment of students dismissed from other colleges or schools of similar levels.

Article 35 The provisions of Articles 31, 32, 33 and 34 of this Law shall also apply to cadets enrolled from among soldiers in active service.

Chapter VIII: Military Training for Students of Institutions of Higher Learning and Students of Senior Middle Schools

Article 43 Students of institutions of higher learning must receive basic military training during the period of their schooling.

To meet the needs of national defence, additional short-term, concentrated training shall be given to students fit for the posts of officers', and those who are considered qualified after assessment shall serve in the officers' reserve upon approval by military organs.

Article 44 Offices in charge of military training shall be set up and military instructors provided in institutions of higher learning to organize and conduct the military training of the students. The short-term, concentrated training for students to become reserve officers as prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article 43 shall be organized and conducted jointly by officers in active service sent from military departments and the offices in charge of military training in the institutions of higher learning.

Article 45 Senior middle schools and schools equivalent to them shall be provided with military instructors to conduct military training for the students.

Article 46 The military training of students of institutions of higher learning and students of senior middle schools shall be under the charge of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of National Defence. Educational departments and military departments shall set up agencies or appoint full-time cadres to handle matters concerning the military training of students.¹⁰⁴⁸

¹⁰⁴⁸ Excerpts from "Military Service Law of the People's Republic of China" published in February 14, 2011, available online at URL: http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/14/content_21916676.htm

6.6 Military Intelligence

According to DIA Report (2019), in June 2017, China passed a National Intelligence Law specifying that “state intelligence work” would fall under the “central national security leadership body,” and military intelligence work would fall under the Central Military Commission. The central national security leadership body may refer to an intelligence committee structure subordinate to China’s Central National Security Commission. The PLA’s national-level intelligence system is still undergoing changes as part of broader military reform efforts.

Military Intelligence: The former PLA Second Department (2PLA) was a sub department of the GSD. Post reform, the 2PLA has been identified as the Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department under the Central Military Commission. This bureau carries out the military’s overt reporting and clandestine human intelligence collection operations, provides indications and warning and other analysis to the CMC leadership, runs the defense attaché network, and manages intelligence produced by dedicated PLA reconnaissance assets.¹⁰⁴⁹

Military Attaché Presence

According to the Annual Report to Congress “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019”, issued by Office of the Secretary of Defense, USA in May 2, 2019, China manages its day-to-day overseas military diplomacy work using PLA officers assigned as military attachés in over 110 offices worldwide. China’s military attaché presence has grown around the world, which reflects China’s increasing global interests. China’s military attachés serve as military advisors to the ambassador, support Ministry of Foreign Affairs and PLA foreign policy objectives, and perform a variety of duties tied to PLA military and security cooperation, including counterpart exchanges with host-nation and third-country personnel. Military attachés also conduct clandestine and overt intelligence collection on their countries or areas of assignment. Although the general function of an attaché office is the same worldwide, some attaché offices probably prioritize specific missions or diplomatic priorities due to close bilateral relations or other factors.

China’s military attaché offices vary in size, generally ranging from two to ten PLA officers. Most offices consist of just a few accredited officers; however, offices in countries considered important to China’s strategic interests are often considerably larger, potentially including multiple assistant attachés, dedicated naval or air force attachés, and support staff.¹⁰⁵⁰

¹⁰⁴⁹ Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report titled “China’s Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win” Published in 2019, Pg 99, available online at URL: https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

¹⁰⁵⁰ Excerpts from “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019”, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924, Pg 26, Available online at URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

6.6.1 Joint Staff Department (JSD)

According to DIA Report (2019), in late 2015, President Xi Jinping unveiled the most substantial PLA reforms in at least 30 years. The reforms were designed in part to make the PLA a leaner, more lethal force capable of conducting the types of joint operations that it believes it must master to compete with the U.S. military. Initial reforms established joint theater commands and a new Joint Staff Department while reorganizing the 4 general departments that previously ran the PLA into 15 Central Military Commission (CMC) departments and offices. These efforts aimed to clarify command authorities, integrate China's military services for joint operations, and facilitate Beijing's transition from peace to war.¹⁰⁵¹

CMC framework occasionally shifts; it was revised during the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, at which point the service chiefs were removed from the body, leaving the chairman, vice chair - men, minister of national defense, Joint Staff Department chief, Political Work Department director, and Discipline Inspection Commission secretary.^{20,21} These changes align the military's top body to its post reform structure and underscore key themes of jointness, party loyalty, and anticorruption.¹⁰⁵²

During PLA reforms, the CMC dissolved the former General Staff Department, establishing a number of CMC-subordinate departments from the former organization. According to the Ministry of National Defense, the Joint Staff Department (JSD) is responsible for combat planning, C2 support, and formulating strategy and requirements.⁵⁰ The formation of the CMC JSD is likely to result in more streamlined and efficient operational planning because other former General Staff Department functions, such as mobilization, training, and administration, have been assumed by separate departments. The JSD is purported to have greater representation from across the PLA's services, potentially enhancing joint operational planning and execution.¹⁰⁵³

The former PLA Second Department (2PLA), Military Intelligence was a sub-department of the GSD. Post reform, the 2PLA has been identified as the Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department under the Central Military Commission. This bureau carries out the military's overt reporting and clandestine human intelligence collection operations, provides indications and warning and other analysis to the CMC leadership, runs the defense attaché network, and manages intelligence produced by dedicated PLA reconnaissance assets.¹⁰⁵⁴

Joint Staff Department Chief Li Zuocheng oversees PLA operations, a narrowing of the wider responsibilities held by the former General Staff Department prior to reforms initiated in 2015. Li is one of few remaining active duty PLA officers with combat experience and is recognized as a combat hero for his service in China's border war with

¹⁰⁵¹ Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report titled "China's Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win" Published in 2019, Pg 5, available online at URL:

https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

¹⁰⁵² *ibid* Pg 14

¹⁰⁵³ *Ibid* Pg 26

¹⁰⁵⁴ Excerpts from Defence Intelligence Army (DIA) Report titled "China's Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win" Published in 2019, Pg 99, available online at URL:

https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

Vietnam. He was also the first Army commander after the PLA Army became a separate service in 2015. Li previously commanded the Chengdu Military Region, which was responsible for the sensitive area of Tibet.¹⁰⁵⁵

In January 2018, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford conducted a video teleconference through the Defense Telephone Link (DTL) with Chief of the Joint Staff Department General Li Zuocheng.¹⁰⁵⁶ In September 2018, China postponed a planned Joint Staff Dialogue Mechanism meeting after the United States announced sanctions against the Equipment Development Department (EDD).¹⁰⁵⁷ Regarding above sanctions, it is to be mentioned that Huang said, China will immediately recall Shen Jinlong, Chinese navy commander, who is currently participating in the 23rd International Sea power Symposium in the US, and postpone the second meeting of a communication mechanism for China and the US joint staff departments which is scheduled from September 25 to 27 in Beijing.

China demands the US immediately redress its wrongs and withdraw related sanctions. Huang also said that Chinese military reserves the right to take further countermeasures, read a CCTV report.

The US State Department said that it would impose sanctions on the Equipment Development Department of China's CMC and the department's director, accusing China had violated the "Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act." The sanctions are reported to be related to China's purchase of 10 SU-35 combat aircraft and S-400 surface-to-air missile system-related equipment from Russia, Reuters reported.¹⁰⁵⁸

6.6.2 Liaison Department

According to (DIA Report 2019), Political Work: The General Political Department Liaison Department, which probably was renamed the Political Work Department Liaison Bureau (PWD/LB) during recent reforms, is the PLA's principal organization responsible for political warfare and for collecting and analysing intelligence information regarding senior-level officers from the United States, Taiwan, Japan, and other defense establishments of interest. The PWD/LB functions as an interlocking directorate that operates at the nexus of politics, finance, military operations, and intelligence. The PWD/LB has few analogous counterparts in modern democratic societies.¹⁰⁵⁹

¹⁰⁵⁵ Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924 Pg. 20, Available online at URL:

https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-/1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

¹⁰⁵⁶ Ibid Pg 109

¹⁰⁵⁷ Ibid Pg 110

¹⁰⁵⁸ Excerpts from "China postpones military dialogue in protest against US 'sanctions'" dated September 25, 2018, available online at URL:

http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-09/25/content_9296957.htm

¹⁰⁵⁹ Excerpts from Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report titled "China's Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win" Published in 2019, Pg 99, available online at URL:

https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

6.6.3 Special Operations Forces (SOF)

Hong Kong based News Agency ANI dated January 30, 2020 in its article titled "How special are PLA special forces?" stated that an accurate and up-to-date order of battle of PLA SOF units is difficult to obtain, but the following units are believed to exist according to research by Peter Wood, a defense analyst at TextOre, a US-based open source intelligence company. The locations of each unit given below are approximate.

- Eastern Theater Command: 71st Corps ("Sharks" in Jiangsu); 72nd Corps ("Thunderbolts" in Zhejiang); and 73rd Corps ("Dragons of the East Sea" in Fujian);
- Southern Theater Command: 74th Corps (an unidentified unit in Guangdong); 75th Corps ("Sword of the South" in Guangdong); a battalion in the Hong Kong Garrison; and the "Lions" company in Macau;
- Western Theater Command: 76th Corps ("Sirius" in Ningxia); 77th Corps ("Cheetahs" in Sichuan); Tibet Military District ("Snow Leopards of the Plateau" in Lhasa); and Xinjiang Military District ("Snowy Owls" and "Sharp Blade of the Kunlun");
- Northern Theater Command: 78th Corps ("Tigers of the Northeast" in Jilin); 79th Corps ("Lions" in Liaoning); and 80th Corps ("Falcons" in Shandong); and
- Central Theater Command: 81st Corps ("Sacred Sword of the East" in Hebei); 82nd Corps ("Whistling Arrows" in Beijing); and 83rd Corps ("Ferocious Tigers of the Central Plain" in Henan).

Turning to the navy, it has a number of smaller SOF units amongst the PLAN Marine Corps, as follows:

- North Sea Fleet: the 5th and 6th Marine Brigades have a special forces element;
- East Sea Fleet: the 3rd and 4th Marine Brigades possess a special forces element;
- South Sea Fleet: the 1st and 2nd Marine Brigades have a Special Forces element, plus the PLAN itself boasts the "Sea Dragons" unit located on Hainan. Personnel from the "Sea Dragons" have deployed on every PLAN task force to the Gulf of Aden since 2008.

The PLAAF features the "Thunder Gods" SOF unit among the Airborne Corps based in Hubei, this unit only being created in 2011. The PLARF also has the "Sharp Blade" Special Forces unit located in Qinghai to protect Base 64 and to act as an enemy blue force for peacetime training.

A special forces brigade is estimated to have a strength of approximately 2,000 personnel, although one well-known American expert on the Chinese military, Dennis J. Blasko, a former defense attaché stationed in Beijing, commented: "Nonetheless, despite their growth in recent years, the number of SOF personnel also is relatively small for such a large army and their missions are mostly focused on commando-style operations."

In an estimate offered several years ago, Blasko believes Chinese special forces total 20,000-30,000 personnel. It is likely that that number has risen since then, though. Regardless, it will be considerably smaller than the close to 70,000 SOF troops contained within the US military's Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

For its part, the US Department of Defense notes: "China has prioritized development of these forces for the past 20 years and this has resulted in a special-purpose force that is equipped with advanced technology, contains highly trained personnel, and is capable of being mobilized in the early stages of conflict to attack key personnel and infrastructure targets and to secure air facilities for use by follow-on forces."

SOF units are increasingly important to the PLA, as they represent the "new type" units that were prioritized for development. Unlike the USSOCOM, the PLA has no equivalent unified national-level command overseeing their training, equipping and employment. Instead, Chinese SOF units are commanded by either operational or tactical headquarters. Certainly, this is one important factor that reduces the effectiveness of PLA SOF usage.

US SOF have the following core missions that they perform: civil affairs, counterinsurgency, direct action, counterterrorism, countering weapons of mass destruction, military information support operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, foreign internal defense, hostage rescue and recovery, security forces assistance, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare and preparation of the environment.

However, many of these mandated functions are beyond the mandate of PLA units. China would use its SOF units in quite a different way to the USA, and their closest counterpart is probably US Army Ranger units.

Blasko, writing for The Jamestown Foundation, assessed that Chinese troops would be "tasked with a limited number of strategic-level missions deep behind enemy lines", and that "the majority of PLA SOF operations would likely be conducted relatively close to and in support of larger conventional units in what most often resemble commando or reconnaissance missions".

Blasko also pointed out: "According to PLA doctrine, special operations are considered one link in system-of-systems operations to be integrated with the other important campaign activities of information warfare, firepower assault, maneuver and psychological warfare. Special operations seek to create favorable conditions for main force units by raiding vital enemy areas, paralyzing enemy operational systems, reducing enemy operational capabilities, as well as interfering, delaying and disrupting enemy operational activities. SOF units are tasked mainly to conduct special reconnaissance, raids, sabotage, harassment, hostage rescue and decapitation missions."

Chinese SOF units thus have a focus on battlefield-level operations where they would typically support division-and brigade-level formations, or at best theater commanders.

Another major difference is the experience level of troops, especially if one compares Chinese units to American ones. Flush with nonstop combat experience in places like Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, American operators are among the most battle-hardened in the world. The PLA lacks this kind of combat experience, even if they do train hard and are now regularly dispatched to places like Djibouti and the Gulf of Aden.

Oddly, some Chinese SOF personnel are merely two-year recruits or even lieutenants on their first assignments. This is very different to the USA, where significant levels of

experience are necessary before being accepted into a USSOCOM unit. For this reason, Blasko concluded: "With so many relatively inexperienced personnel assigned, most units are organized and trained to operate in squads, platoons and companies."

Nonetheless, chosen for their stamina, Chinese SOF troops are trained in many skills and can operate a wide range of Chinese and foreign weapons. They have been gaining growing exposure through international deployments such as the PLAN's continuing rotations of warships to the Gulf of Aden on counter-piracy missions. They also enjoy exchanges with foreign units. For example, in 2019 some Chinese forces cross-trained in Singapore.

Blasko claimed: "The major focus of much Chinese media coverage about SOF training is on the physical toughness of SOF personnel, insertion methods, weapons qualification and close combat skills." Units tend to do well in international competitions because they drill hard in such technical skills.

In addition, an Army Special Forces Academy is located in Guilin, this facility established only as recently as 2012. With this training academy being so young, China cannot have anything close to the institutional collective knowledge that USSOCOM has.

The Queshan Combined Arms Training Base located in Zhumadian, Henan Province, is designed specifically to rehearse SOF training. However, with China's SOF capabilities at still a relatively young stage, regular commanders may not always use them to their full potential, so the successful incorporation of SOF capabilities will represent a significant training challenge for the PLA in the near to midterm future.

Do PLA Special Forces have special equipment? Certainly, troops have advanced communications equipment, weapon sights, night vision devices, target designators and unmanned aerial vehicles. Otherwise, they tend to use many of the same weapons that regular infantrymen do.

The SOF battalion resident in the Hong Kong Garrison, for example, is armed primarily with 5.8mm QBZ95-1 assault rifles. They are also provided Mengshi 4x4 fast attack vehicles, and regularly train with helicopters such as the Z-9ZH and Z-8KH also based in Hong Kong. In public, they do not reveal all their special weapons, however, but it is known they have silenced weapons and round-corner firing devices at their disposal. A notable aspect is an all-female contingent of Special Forces in Hong Kong.

Not only do PLA Special Forces have no umbrella headquarters, but they lack dedicated platforms such as delivery and support aircraft and helicopters. In contrast, the USA, for instance, boasts the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. The Pentagon thus said in a report: "The PLA's special-purpose forces do not have the kind of air and naval assets available to US special operations forces and, as a result, [they have] limited range and sustainability."

Blasko echoed this same weakness, highlighting that Chinese SOF units are limited in how far they can operate behind enemy lines because of a lack of appropriate means of insertion via aircraft or helicopter. Nonetheless, this situation should begin to improve as Y-20 transport aircraft and Z-20 helicopters become more widespread.

At this point, it is pertinent to mention those SOF troops that appeared in the PLA's massive parade in Beijing on 1 October 2019. Many troops were seen ensconced in gyrocopters that can carry two soldiers each. These commercial-off-the-shelf aircraft are believed to be hunting Eagle gyrocopters manufactured by Shaanxi Baoji Special Vehicle Manufacturing.

The 290kg Hunting Eagle gyrocopter is powered by a 115hp Rotax 914 engine. Each gyrocopter can carry a payload of 230kg in the form of two people. The manufacturer lists its cruising speed as 100-120km/h, with a top speed of 160km/h. The Hunting Eagle can fly for four hours or 400km at a maximum ceiling of 4,500 m.

China can use these aircraft to unobtrusively land soldiers behind enemy lines, plus their low speeds mean they have a short take-off and landing performance (20-80m). The PLA is known to operate another gyrocopter type that accommodates three soldiers too. As well as gyrocopter, aircraft parachute and helicopter insertions, Chinese troops can also make use of submarines or surface vessels to land on an enemy coast.

In the Beijing parade in 2019, SOF troops also appeared aboard small 6x6 all-terrain vehicles manufactured by Norinco. These Lynx amphibious vehicles can be armed with a variety of different weapons (in the parade they fielded a 12.7mm QJZ89 machine gun and carried five soldiers. Units such as PLA marines, Special Forces and airborne troops are now widely using these types of ATVs.

There is no doubt that Chinese special forces are more elite than their regular infantry counterparts. Yet while their training is improving, they still lack real-world combat experience and the wherewithal and logistical support to perform long-distance operations. This is in sharp contrast to USSOCOM, which has a larger globally distributed force with manifold dedicated assets at its fingertips.

In any Taiwan invasion scenario, these PLA SOF units would doubtlessly be employed to sow confusion and destruction. Therein, Blasko also made another observation: "Such operations have a greater chance of success in Southeast Asia and East Asia where overseas Chinese populations are present."¹⁰⁶⁰

6.7 Weapon and Equipment

According to the details of Weapon and Equipment given in "The Military Balance: 2019".

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

A Strategic Missile Forces 120,000+¹⁰⁶¹

People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF)

The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (formerly the Second Artillery Force) organizes and commands its own troops to launch nuclear counter-attacks with strategic

¹⁰⁶⁰Excerpts from ANI News Item Dated January 30, 2020 titled "How special are PLA special forces?", available online at URL:

<https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/how-special-are-pla-special-forces20200130120235>

¹⁰⁶¹ The MILITARY BALANCE 2019: THE ANNUAL ASSESEMENT OF GLOBAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND DEFENCE ECONOMICS, Internation Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Pg 256.

missiles and to conduct operations with conventional missiles. Organised as launch bdes subordinate to 6 army-level msl bases. Org varies by msl type

FORCES BY ROLE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

- 1 ICBM bde with DF-4
- 2 ICBM bde with DF-5A
- 1 ICBM bde with DF-5B
- 1 ICBM bde with DF-31
- 2 ICBM bde with DF-31A/A(G)
- 2 IRBM bde with DF-26
- 2 MRBM bde with DF-16
- 6 MRBM bde with DF-21A/E
- 2 MRBM bde with DF-21C
- 2 MRBM bde with DF-21D
- 4 SRBM bde with DF-11A
- 2 SRBM bde with DF-15B
- 2 GLCM bde with CJ-10/CJ-10A
- 5+ SSM bde (forming)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

- ICBM • Nuclear** 70: ε10 DF-4 (CH-SS-3);
 - ε20 DF-5A/B(CH-SS-4 Mod 2/3);
 - ε8 DF-31 (CH-SS-10 Mod 1);
 - ε24 DF-31A (CH-SS-10 Mod 2);
 - ε8 DF-31A(G) (CH-SS-10 Mod 3)
- IRBM • Dual-capable** ε30 DF-26
- MRBM** 158:
 - Nuclear** ε80 DF-21A/DF-21E (CH-SS-5Mod 2/6);
 - Conventional** 78: ε24 DF-16 (CH-SS-11 Mod1/2);
 - ε24 DF-21C (CH-SS-5 Mod 4);
 - ε30 DF-21D (CHSS-5 Mod 5 – ASBM)
- SRBM • Conventional** 189: ε108 DF-11A (CH-SS-7Mod 2);
 - ε81 DF-15B (CH-SS-6 Mod 3)
- GLCM • Conventional** ε54 CJ-10/CJ-10A

Navy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 4:

4 *Jin* (Type-094) with up to 12 JL-2 (CH-SS-N-14) strategic SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with Yu-6 HWT

Defensive

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

RADAR • STRATEGIC: 4+ large phased array radars; some detection and tracking radars

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES 103

COMMUNICATIONS 6 *Zhongxing* (dual-use telecom satellites for civ/mil comms)

NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 33: 3 *Beidou-2*(M);

6 *Beidou-2*(G);

6 *Beidou-2*(IGSO);

1 *Beidou-3*(G);

16 *Beidou-3*(M);

1 *Beidou-3* (ISGO)

ISR 49: 2 *Haiyang* (remote sensing);

46 *Yaogan Weixing* (remote sensing);

1 *Ziyuan* (ZY-2 – remote sensing)

ELINT/SIGINT 15: 8 *Shijian* 6 (4 pairs – reported ELINT/SIGINT role);

7 *Shijian* 11 (reported ELINT/SIGINT role)

Ground Forces €975,000

In late 2015, a single, separate headquarters was established for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) ground forces, in place of the four general departments

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

13 (Group) army HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

15 spec ops bde

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

27 (cbd arms) armd bde

1 hy mech inf div (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

Mechanised

1 (high alt) mech inf div (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

23 (cbd arms) mech inf bde

Light

3 (high alt) mot inf div (1 armd regt, 2 mot inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

24 (cbd arms) inf bde

Air Manoeuvre

2 air aslt bde

Amphibious

6 amph aslt bde

Other

1 (OPFOR) mech inf bde

1 mech gd div (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty regt,

1 AD regt)

1 sy gd div (4 sy regt)

16 (border) sy bde

15 (border) sy regt

1 (border) sy gp

COMBAT SUPPORT

15 arty bde

13 engr/NBC bde

2 engr regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

13 spt bde

COASTAL DEFENCE

19 coastal arty/AShM bde

AVIATION

1 mixed avn bde

HELICOPTER

12 hel bde

TRAINING

4 hel trg regt

AIR DEFENCE

15 AD bde

Reserves

The People's Liberation Army Reserve Force is being restructured, and the army component reduced. As a result some of the units below may have been re-rolled or disbanded

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

2 armd regt

Light

18 inf div

4 inf bde

3 indep inf regt

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty div

7 arty bde

15 engr regt

1 ptn br bde

3 ptn br regt

10 chem regt

10 sigs regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

9 log bde

1 log regt

AIR DEFENCE

17 AD div

8 AD bde

8 AD regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 5,800: 600 ZTZ-59;
650 ZTZ-59-II;
600 ZTZ-59D;
200 ZTZ-79;
300 ZTZ-88A/B;
1,000 ZTZ-96;

1,500 ZTZ-96A;
600 ZTZ-99;
250 ZTZ-99A;
100 ZTQ-15
LT TK 450: 250 ZTD-05;
100 ZTQ-62;
100 ZTS-63A

ASLT 600 ZTL-11

IFV 5,000: 400 ZBD-04;
1,000 ZBD-04A;
1,200 ZBL-08;
600 ZBD-86;
650 ZBD-86A;
550 ZSL-92;
600 ZSL-92B

APC 3,950

APC (T) 2,700: 750 ZSD-63;
200 ZSD-63C;
1,750 ZSD-89

APC (W) 1,250: 700 ZSL-92A;
500 ZSL-10;
50 ZSL-93

AAV 300+ ZBD-05

AUV Dongfeng Mengshi; *Tiger* 4×4

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV Type-73;
Type-84;
Type-85;
Type-97;
Type-654

VLB KMM;
MTU;
TMM;
Type-84A

MW Type-74;
Type-79;
Type-81-II;
Type-84

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 1,000: 450 HJ-8 (veh mounted);
100 HJ-10; 450 ZSL-02B

MANPATS HJ-73D;
HJ-8A/C/E;
HJ-11

RCL 3,966: **75mm** PF-56;
82mm PF-65 (B-10);
PF-78;
105mm PF-75;

120mm PF-98

GUNS 1,788

SP 480: **100mm** 250 PTL-02;
120mm 230 PTZ-89

TOWED • 100mm 1,308 PT-73 (T-12)/PT-86

ARTILLERY 8,954+

SP 2,120: **122mm** 1,650: 500 PLZ-89;
350 PLZ-07A;
150 PLZ-07B;
300 PCL-09;
350 PLL-09;
152mm 150 PLZ-83A/B;
155mm 320 PLZ-05;
(400 in store: **122mm** 200 PLZ-89;
152mm 200 PLZ-83A)

TOWED 1,234: **122mm** 500 PL-96 (D-30);

130mm 234 PL-59 (M-46)/PL-59-I;

152mm 500 PL-66 (D-20);

(4,400 in store: **122mm** 2,800 PL-54-1 (M-1938)/PL-83/PL-60 (D-74)/PL-96 (D-30);
152mm 1,600 PL-54 (D-1)/PL-66 (D-20))

GUN/MOR 120mm 1,250: 450 PLL-05;
800 PPZ-10

MRL 1,550+ **107mm** PH-63;

122mm 1,375: 550 PHL-81/PHL-90;
350 PHL-11;
375 PHZ-89;
100 PHZ-11;

300mm 175 PHL-03;

(700 in store: **122mm** 700 PHL-81)

MOR 2,800: **82mm** PP-53 (M-37)/PP-67/PP-82/PP-87;

SP **82mm** PCP-001;
100mm PP-89

COASTAL DEFENCE

AShM HY-1 (CH-SSC-2 *Silkworm*);
HY-2 (CH-SSC-3 *Seersucker*);
HY-4 (CH-SSC-7 *Sadsack*);
YJ-62

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25

PB 25: 9 *Huzong*;
16 *Shenyang*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 205: 3+ *Yugong*;
50+ *Yunnan II*;
100+ *Yupen*;
2+ *Yutu*;
50 *Yuwei*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 22

AK 6+ *Leizhuang*

AKR 1 *Yunsong* (capacity 1 MBT; 1 med hel)

ARC 1

AOT 11: 1 *Fuzhong*;

8 *Fubing*;

2 *Fulei*

ATF 2 *Huntao*

AX 1 *Haixun III*

AIRCRAFT • TPT 9: Medium 5: 4 Y-8;

1 Y-9;

Light 4 Y-7

HELICOPTERS

ATK 270+: 150 WZ-10;

120+ WZ-19

MRH 351: 22 Mi-17 *Hip H*;

3 Mi-17-1V *Hip H*;

38 Mi-17V-5 *Hip H*;

25 Mi-17V-7 *Hip H*;

8 SA342L *Gazelle*;

21 Z-9A; 31 Z-9W;

10 Z-9WA;

193 Z-9WZ

TPT 382: Heavy 105: 9 Z-8A;

96 Z-8B;

Medium 209: 50

Mi-8T *Hip*;

140 Mi-171;

19 S-70C2 (S-70C) *Black Hawk*;

Light 68: 53 AS350 *Ecureuil*;

15 H120 *Colibri*

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Heavy BZK-005;

BZK-009 (reported);

Medium

BZK-006 (incl variants);

BZK-007;

BZK-008;

Light *Harpy* (anti-radiation)

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Medium-range 168+: 150+ HQ-16A;

18 HQ-17

Short-range 254: 24 9K331 *Tor-M1* (SA-15 *Gauntlet*);

30 HQ-6D; 200 HQ-7A/B

Point-defence HN-5A/-5B;

FN-6;

QW-1;

QW-2

GUNS 7,396+

SP 396: 25mm 270 PGZ-04A;

35mm 120 PGZ-07;

37mm 6 PGZ-88

TOWED 7,000+: 25mm PG-87;

35mm PG-99 (GDF-002);

37mm PG-55 (M-1939)/PG-65/PG-74;

57mm PG-59 (S-60);

100mm PG-59 (KS-19)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR TY-90

ASM AKD-8;

AKD-9;

AKD-10

Navy €250,000

The PLA Navy is organized into five service arms: submarine, surface, naval aviation, coastal defence and Marine Corps, as well as other specialized units. There are three fleets, one each in the Northern, Eastern and Southern theatre commands

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 59

STRATEGIC • SSBN 4:

4 *Jin* (Type-094) with up to 12 JL-2 (CH-SS-N-14) strategic SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with Yu-6 HWT

TACTICAL 55

SSN 6:

2 *Shang I* (Type-093) with 6 single 533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT/YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM

4 *Shang II* (Type-093A) with 6 single 533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT/YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM

(3 *Han* (Type-091) in reserve with 6 single 533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM)

SSK 48:

2 *Kilo* (Project 877) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT

2 Improved *Kilo* (Project 636) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT

8 Improved *Kilo* (Project 636M) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT/3M54E *Klub-S* (SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) AShM

8 *Ming* (4 Type-035(G), 4 Type-035B) with 8 single 533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-4 HWT

12 *Song* (Type-039(G)) with 6 single 533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT/YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM

4 *Yuan* (Type-039A) with 6 533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT/YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM

12 *Yuan II* (Type-039B) with 6 533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT/YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM

(8 *Ming* (Type-035(G)) in reserve with 8 single 533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-4 HWT)

SSB 1 *Qing* (Type-032) (SLBM trials)

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 87

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1

- 1 *Liaoning* (RUS *Kuznetsov*) with 4 18-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 SAM, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 3 H/PJ- 11 CIWS (capacity 18–24 J-15 ac; 17 Ka-28/Ka-31/Z-8S/Z-8JH/Z-8AEW hel)

DESTROYERS 27

DDGHM 25:

2 *Hangzhou* (RUS *Sovremenny I* (Project 956E)) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80/3M82 *Moskit* (SS-N-22A/B *Sunburn*) AShM, 2 3K90 *Uragan* (SA-N-7 *Gadfly*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 1000 *Smerch* 3 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C/Ka-28 *Helix A* hel) (of which 1 in refit)

2 *Hangzhou* (RUS *Sovremenny II* (Project 956EM)) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80/3M82 *Moskit* (SS-N-22A/B *Sunburn*) AShM, 2 *Yezh* (SA-N-12 *Grizzly*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 1000 *Smerch* 3 A/S mor, 2 *Kortik* CIWS with 9M311E (SA-N-11 *Grison*) SAM, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C/Ka-28 *Helix A* hel)

1 *Luhai* (Type-051B) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-12A AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with HHQ-16 SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9C/Ka-28 *Helix A* hel)

2 *Luhu* (Type-052) with 4 quad Inchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 octuple Inchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 FQF 2500 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ- 12 CIWS, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9C hel)

2 *Luyang* (Type-052B) with 4 quad Inchr with YJ-83 AShM, 2 single Inchr with *Yezh* (SA-N-12 *Grizzly*) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 *Helix A* hel)

6 *Luyang II* (Type-052C) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-62 AShM, 8 sextuple VLS with HHQ-9 SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-28 *Helix A* hel)

10 *Luyang III* (Type-052D) with 8 octuple VLS with YJ-18A (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/HHQ-9ER SAM/ Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-12 CIWS (1 with H/PJ-11 CIWS), 1 130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-28 *Helix A* hel)

DDGM 2:

2 *Luzhou* (Type-051C) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 AShM; 6 sextuple VLS with S-300FM (SA-N-20 *Grumble*) SAM, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 100mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

FRIGATES 59

FFGHM 40:

2 *Jiangkai* (Type-054) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 octuple Inchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 *Helix A/Z-9C* hel)

16 *Jiangkai II* (Type-054A) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Yu-8 A/S msl/ HHQ-16 SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 FQF 2300 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 *Helix A/Z-9C* hel)

12 *Jiangkai II* (Type-054A) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Yu-8 A/S msl/ HHQ-16 SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 FQF 2300 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 *Helix A/Z-9C* hel)

7 Jiangwei II (Type-053H3) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9C hel)

3 Jiangwei II (Type-053H3) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 SAM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9C hel)

FFGM 4:

2 Luda IV (Type-051DT) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 FQF 2500 A/S mor, 2 130mm gun, 3 twin 57mm gun

2 Luda IV (Type-051G) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 FQF 2500 A/S mor, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 twin 100mm gun

FFG 15:

6 Jianghu I (Type-053H1) with 2 twin lnchr with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C hel)

1 Jianghu III (Type-053H2) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 2 RBU 1200, 2 twin 100mm gun

6 Jianghu I Upgrade (Type-053H1G) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 2 RBU 1200, 2 twin 100mm gun

2 Luda I (Type-051) with 2 triple lnchr with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2) AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 FQF 2500 A/S mor, 2 twin 130mm gun (minelaying capability)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS ε205

CORVETTES • FSGM 41:

21 Jiangdao I (Type-056) with 2 twin lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

20 Jiangdao II (Type-056A) with 2 twin lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PCFG ε60 Houbei (Type-022) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 H/PJ-13 CIWS

PCG 26

6 Houjian (Type-037-II) with 2 triple lnchr with YJ-8 (CH-SS-N-4) AShM, 1 76mm gun

20 Houxin (Type-037-IG) with 2 twin lnchr with YJ-8 (CH-SS-N-4) AShM

PCC 48

2 Haijiu (Type-037-I) with 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 57mm gun

30 Hainan (Type-037) with ε4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun

16 Haiqing (Type-037-IS) with 2 FQF-3200 A/S mor

PB ε30 Shanghai III (Type-062-1)

MINE WARFARE 42

MINE COUNTERMEASURES 50

MCO 16: 4 *Wochi* (Type-081);

6 *Wochi* mod (Type-081A);

6 *Wozang* (Type-082II)

MSC 16: 4 *Wosao I* (Type-082);

12 *Wosao II* (Type-082-II)

MSD 18 *Wonang* (Type-529) (operated by *Wozang* MCO)

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • **LPD** 5 *Yuzhao* (Type-071) with 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 4 *Yuyi* LCAC plus supporting vehicles; 800 troops; 60 armoured vehs; 4 hel)

LANDING SHIPS 49

LSM 21:

- 1 *Yudeng* (Type-073-II) (capacity 5 tk or 500 troops)
- 10 *Yuhai* (Type-074) (capacity 2 tk; 250 troops)
- 10 *Yunshu* (Type-073A) (capacity 6 tk)

LST 28:

- 4 *Yukan* (Type-072-II/G) (capacity 2 LCVP; 10 tk; 200 troops)
- 9 *Yuting* I (Type-072-II/III) (capacity 10 tk; 250 troops; 2 hel)
- 9 *Yuting* II (Type-072A) (capacity 4 LCVP; 10 tk; 250 troops)
- 6 *Yuting* II (Type-072B) (capacity 4 LCVP; 10 tk; 250 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 63

LCM ε30 *Yunnan*

LCU 11 *Yubei* (Type-074A) (capacity 10 tanks or 150 troops)

LCAC 14: 10 *Yuyi*;
4 *Zubr*

UCAC 12 *Payi* (Type-724)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 145

ABU 1 Type-744A

AFS 3: 2 *Dayun* (Type-904);

1 *Danyao* I (Type-904A)

AFSH 2 *Danyao* II (Type-904B)

AG 7: 6 *Kanhai*;
1 *Kanwu*

AGB 2 *Yanrao* (Type-272) with 1 hel landing platform

AGE 7: 2 *Dahua* (Type-909) with 1 hel landing platform (weapons test platform);

1 *Kantan*; 2 *Shupang* (Type-636);

1 *Yanqian* (Type-904I);

1 *Yuting* I (naval rail gun test ship)

AGI 15: 1 *Dadie*;

1 *Dongdiao* (Type-815) with 1 hel landing platform;

5 *Dongdiao* (Type-815A) with 1 hel landing platform; 8 FT-14

AGM 4 *Yuan Wang* (Type-718) (space and missile tracking)

AGOR 2 *Dahua*

AGS 4 *Shupang* (Type-636A) with 1 hel landing platform

AH 8: 5 *Ankang*;

1 *Anwei* (Type-920);

2 *Qiongsha* (hospital conversion)

AOEH 1 *Fuyu* (Type-901) with 2 H/PJ-13 CIWS

AOR 1 *Fuqing* (Type-905) with 1 hel landing platform

AORH 9: 2 *Fuchi* (Type-903); 6 *Fuchi* mod (Type-903A);

1 *Fusu*

AOT 22: 4 *Fubai*;

16 *Fujian* (Type-632);

2 *Fuxiao*

AP 4: 2 *Daguan*;
2 *Darong*
ARC 2 *Youlan*
ARS 14: 1 *Dadao*;
1 *Dadong*;
1 *Dalang* II (Type-922III);
3 *Dalang* III (Type-922IIIA);
3 *Dasan*;
2 *Dazhou*;
3 *Hai Jiu* 101 with 1 hel landing platform
ASR 6: 3 *Dalao* (Type-926);
3 *Dajiang* (Type-925) (capacity 2 Z-8)
ATF 14: ε11 *Hujiu*;
3 *Tuqiang*
AWT 8: 4 *Fujian*;
3 *Fushi*;
1 *Jinyou*

AX 4:
1 *Dashi* (Type-0891A) with 2 hel landing platforms
1 *Daxin* with 2 FQF 1200 A/S mor, 2 Type-69 CIWS, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
1 *Qi Ji Guang* (Type-927) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
1 *Yudao*
ESD 1 *Donghaidao*

COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM 72 YJ-12/YJ-62 (3 regt)

Naval Aviation 26,000

FORCES BY ROLE

Naval aviation fighter/ground-attack units adopted brigade structure in 2017

BOMBER

2 regt with H-6DU/G/J

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 bde with J-10A/S *Firebird*; Su-30MK2 *Flanker* G

1 bde with J-11B/BS *Flanker* L

1 bde with J-11B/BS *Flanker* L; JH-7A *Flounder*

1 bde with J-8F *Finback*; JH-7A *Flounder*

1 regt with J-15 *Flanker*

GROUND ATTACK

1 bde with JH-7 *Flounder*

ASW/AEW

3 regt with Y-8J; KJ-200; KJ-500; KQ-200

ELINT/ISR/AEW

1 regt with Y-8JB/X; Y-9JZ

TRANSPORT

1 regt with Y-7H; Y-8C; CRJ-200/700

TRAINING

1 regt with CJ-6A

1 regt with HY-7

2 regt with JL-8

1 regt with JL-9G
1 regt with JL-9
1 regt with JL-10
1 regt with Z-9C

HELICOPTER

1 regt with Ka-27PS; Ka-28; Ka-31
1 regt with SH-5; AS365N; Z-9C/D; Z-8J/JH
1 regt with Y-7G; Z-8; Z-8J; Z-8S; Z-9C/D

AIR DEFENCE

2 SAM bde with HQ-9

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 385 combat capable

BBR 31: 27 H-6G;

4 H-6J

FTR 24 J-8F *Finback*

FGA 139: 16 J-10A *Firebird*;
7 J-10S *Firebird*;
72 J-11B/BS *Flanker L*;
20 J-15 *Flanker*;
24 Su-30MK2 *Flanker G*

ATK 120: 48 JH-7;
72 JH-7A *Flounder*

ASW 8+: 3 SH-5;
5+ KQ-200

ELINT 13: 4 Y-8JB *High New 2*;
3 Y-8X;
6 Y-9JZ

AEW&C 16: 6 KJ-200 *Moth*;
6 KJ-500;
4 Y-8J *Mask*

TKR 5 H-6DU

TPT 38:
Medium 6 Y-8C;
Light 28: 20 Y-5;
2 Y-7G; 6

Y-7H; **PAX** 4: 2 CRJ-200;
2 CRJ-700

TRG 118: 38 CJ-6;
12 HY-7;
16 JL-8*;
28 JL-9*;
12 JL-9G*;
12 JL-10*

HELICOPTERS

ASW 28: 14 Ka-28 *Helix A*;
14 Z-9C

AEW 10+: 9 Ka-31;
1+ Z-18 AEW

MRH 18: 7 AS365N;

11 Z-9D

SAR 11: 3 Ka-27PS;
4 Z-8JH;
2 Z-8S;
2 Z-9S

TPT 38:

Heavy 30: 8 SA321 *Super Frelon*;
9 Z-8;
13 Z-8J;

Medium 8 Mi-8 *Hip*

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR Heavy BZK-005;

Medium BZK-007

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Long-range 32 HQ-9

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR PL-5;
PL-8;
PL-9;
R-73 (AA-11 *Archer*);
IR/ SARH R-27 (AA-10 *Alamo*);
SARH PL-11;
ARH R-77 (AA-12A *Adder*);
PL-12

ASM KD-88

AShM Kh-31A (AS-17B *Krypton*);

YJ-12;
YJ-61;
YJ-8K;
YJ-83K;
YJ-9

ARM Kh-31P (AS-17A *Krypton*);

YJ-91

BOMBS

Laser-guided: LS-500J

TV-guided: KAB-500KR;
KAB-1500KR

Marines €25,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops bde

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 mne bde

Light

3 mne bde

Amphibious

2 mne bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT some ZTQ-15

LT TK 73 ZTD-05

ASLT 30 ZTL-11

IFV 60 ZBL-08

AAV 152 ZBD-05

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS HJ-73; HJ-8

RCL 120mm Type-98

ARTILLERY 40+

SP 122mm 40+: 20+ PLZ-07; 20+ PLZ-89

MRL 107mm PH-63

MOR 82mm

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence HN-5

Air Force 395,000

FORCES BY ROLE

Fighter/ground-attack units adopted bde structure in 2017

BOMBER

1 regt with H-6M

2 regt with H-6H

5 regt with H-6K

FIGHTER

5 bde with J-7 *Fishcan*

5 bde with J-7E *Fishcan*

3 bde with J-7G *Fishcan*

4 bde with J-8F/H *Finback*

2 bde with J-11A/Su-27SK/Su-27UBK *Flanker*

4 bde with J-11A/J-11B/Su-27UBK *Flanker*

3 bde with J-11B/BS *Flanker L*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

8 bde with J-10A/J-10S *Firebird*

2 bde with J-10B/S *Firebird*

1 bde with J-10B/C/S *Firebird*

2 bde with J-10C/S *Firebird*

1 bde with Su-35 *Flanker*; Su-30MKK *Flanker*

3 bde with J-16 *Flanker*

3 bde with Su-30MKK *Flanker*

GROUND ATTACK

6 bde with JH-7A *Flounder*

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

2 regt with Y-8CB/G/XZ

ISR

1 regt with JZ-8F *Finback**

1 bde with JZ-8F *Finback**

1 regt with Y-8H1

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 regt with KJ-200 *Moth*; KJ-500; KJ-2000; Y-8T

COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE

4 bde with Y-5; Mi-171E; Z-8
1 regt with Y-5; Mi-171E; Z-8

TANKER

1 bde with H-6U

TRANSPORT

1 (VIP) regt with B-737; CRJ-200/700
1 (VIP) regt with B-737; Tu-154M; Tu-154M/D
1 regt with Il-76MD/TD *Candid*
1 regt with Il-76MD *Candid*; Il-78 *Midas*
1 regt with Mi-17V-5; Y-7
1 regt with Y-5/Y-7/Z-9
1 regt with Y-5/Y-7
3 regt with Y-7
1 regt with Y-8
1 regt with Y-8; Y-9

TRAINING

5 bde with CJ-6/6A/6B; Y-5
8 bde with J-7; JJ-7A
13 bde with JL-8; JL-9

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 regt with AS332 *Super Puma*; H225 (VIP)

ISR UAV

2 bde with GJ-1

AIR DEFENCE

1 SAM div
21 SAM bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 2,413 combat capable

BBR 172: ε12 H-6 (trg role);
ε60 H-6H/M;
ε100 H-6K

FTR 759: 200 J-7 *Fishcan*;
192 J-7E *Fishcan*;
120 J-7G *Fishcan*;
50 J-8F *Finback*;
50 J-8H *Finback*;
95 J-11;
20 Su-27SK *Flanker*;
32 Su-27UBK *Flanker*

FGA 702+: 78 J-10 *Firebird*;
142 J-10A *Firebird*;
55+ J-10B *Firebird*;
80+ J-10C *Firebird*;
48 J-10S *Firebird*;
130 J-11B/ BS *Flanker L*;
60+ J-16 *Flanker*;
12+ J-20A (in test);
73 Su-30MKK *Flanker*;
24 Su-35 *Flanker*

ATK 140 JH-7A Flounder
EW 14: 4 Y-8CB *High New 1*;
6 Y-8G *High New 3*;
2 Y-8XZ *High New 7*;
2 Y-9XZ

ELINT 4 Tu-154M/D Careless
ISR 51: 24 JZ-8 *Finback**;
24 JZ-8F *Finback**;
3 Y-8H1

AEW&C 13: 4 KJ-200 *Moth*;
5 KJ-500;
4 KJ-2000

C2 5: 2 B-737;
3 Y-8T *High New 4*

TKR 13: 10 H-6U;
3 Il-78 *Midas*

TPT 335+ Heavy 27: 20 Il-76MD/TD *Candid*;
7 Y-20;
Medium 42+: 30 Y-8C;
12+ Y-9;
Light 239: 170 Y-5;
41 Y-7/Y-7H;
20 Y-11;
8 Y-12;
PAX 27: 9 B-737 (VIP);
5 CRJ-200;
5 CRJ-700;
8 Tu-154M *Careless*

TRG 1,004+: 400 CJ-6/-6A/-6B;
12+ HY-7;
50 JJ-7*;
150 JJ-7A*;
350 JL-8*;
30 JL-9*;
12+ JL-10*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 22: 20 Z-9; 2 Mi-17V-5 *Hip H*

TPT 31+: **Heavy** 18+ Z-8;
Medium 13+: 6+ AS332 *Super Puma* (VIP);
3 H225 (VIP);
4+ Mi-171

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • Heavy 12+ GJ-1;
GJ-2
ISR • Heavy 7+ EA-03

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 754+

Long-range 356+: 180+ HQ-9/-9B;
 32 S-300PMU (SA-10 *Grumble*);
 64 S-300PMU1 (SA-20 *Gargoyle*);
 64 S-300PMU2 (SA-20 *Gargoyle*);
 16 S-400 (SA-21B *Growler*)

Medium-range 320+: 120+ HQ-2/-2A/-2B;
 150 HQ-12 (KS-1A);
 50+ HQ-22

Short-range 78+: 24+ HQ-6A;
 24 HQ-6D; ε30 HQ-7

GUNS 16,000 100mm/85mm

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR PL-5B/C;
 PL-8;
 R-73 (AA-11 *Archer*);
IIR PL-10;
IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 *Alamo*);
SARH PL-11;
ARH PL-12;
 PL-15 (entering service);
 R-77 (AA-12A *Adder*);
 R-77-1 (RVV-SD) (AA-12B *Adder*)
ASM AKD-9;
 AKD-10;
 KD-88;
 Kh-29 (AS-14 *Kedge*);
 Kh-59M (AS-18 *Kazoo*)
AShM Kh-31A (AS-17B *Krypton*)
ARM Kh-31P (AS-17A *Krypton*);
 YJ-91 (Domestically produced Kh-31P variant)

ALCM • Conventional CJ-20; YJ(KD)-63

BOMBS

Laser-guided: LS-500J; LT-2
TV-guided: KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR

Airborne Corps

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops bde

MANOEUVRE

Air Manoeuvre

6 AB bde

Aviation

1 hel regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 spt bde

TRANSPORT

1 bde with Y-7; Y-8

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

ABCV 180 ZBD-03

APC • APC (T) 4 ZZZ-03 (CP)

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

SP some HJ-9

ARTILLERY 162+

TOWED 122mm ε54 PL-96 (D-30)

MRL 107mm ε54 PH-63

MOR 54+: 82mm some; 100mm 54

AIRCRAFT • TPT 20: Medium 6 Y-8;

Light 14: 2 Y-7;

12 Y-12D

HELICOPTERS

ATK 8 WZ-10K

CSAR 8 Z-8KA

MRH 12 Z-9WZ

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence QW-1

GUNS • TOWED 25mm 54 PG-87

Strategic Support Force ε175,000

At the end of 2015, a new Strategic Support Force was established by drawing upon capabilities previously exercised by the PLA's 3rd and 4th departments and other central functions. It reports to the Central Military Commission and is believed to be responsible for the PLA's space and cyber capabilities.

Theatre Commands

In early 2016, the previous seven military regions were consolidated into five new theatre commands.

Eastern Theatre Command

Eastern Theatre Ground Forces

71st Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 3 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde regt, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

72nd Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

73rd Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

Eastern Theatre Navy

Coastal defence from south of Lianyungang to Dongshan (approx. 35°10'N to 23°30'N), and to seaward; HQ at Ningbo; support bases at Fujian, Zhoushan, Ningbo 17 SSK; 10 DDGHM; 18 FFGHM; 6 FFG; 19 FSGM; ε30 PCFG/PCG; ε22 MCMV; 2 LPD; ε22 LST/M

Eastern Theatre Navy Aviation

1st Naval Aviation Division

(1 bbr regt with H-6DU/G; 1 ASW regt with KQ-200; 1 hel regt with Ka-27PS; Ka-28; Ka-31)

Other Forces

(1 FGA bde with JH-7; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MK2; J-10A)

Eastern Theatre Air Force

10th Bomber Division

(1 bbr regt with H-6H; 1 bbr regt with H-6K; 1 bbr regt with H-6M)

26th Special Mission Division

(1 AEW&C regt with KJ-200/KJ-500/Y-8T; 1 AEW&C regt with KJ-2000/Y-8T)

Fuzhou Base

(1 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MKK; 2 SAM bde)

Shanghai Base

(1 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 ftr bde with J-8F; 1 ftr bde with J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MKK; 2 atk bde with JH-7A; 1 trg bde with J-7/JJ-7A; 2 SAM bde)

Other Forces

(1 ISR bde with JZ-8F; 1 CSAR bde; 1 Flight Instructor Training Base with CJ-6; JL-8; JL-9; JL-10)

Other Forces

Marines

(2 mne bde)

Southern Theatre Command

Southern Theatre Ground Forces

74th Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

75th Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 air aslt bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 AD bde)

Other Forces

(1 (composite) inf bde (Hong Kong); 1 hel sqn (Hong Kong), 1 AD bn (Hong Kong))

Southern Theatre Navy

Coastal defence from Dongshan (approx. 23°30'N) to VNM border, and to seaward (including Paracel and Spratly islands); HQ at Zhanjiang; support bases at Yulin, Guangzhou

4 SSBN; 2 SSN; 16 SSK; 10 DDGHM; 12 FFGHM; 2 FFGM; 7 FFG; 14 FSGM; ε38 PCFG/PCG; ε16MCMV; 3 LPD; ε21 LST/M

Southern Theatre Navy Aviation

3rd Naval Aviation Division

(1 ASW/AEW&C regt with KJ-500; KQ-200; 1 bbr regt with H-6DU/G/J; 1 tpt/hel regt with Y-7G; Z-8; Z-8J; Z-8S; Z-9C/D)

Other Forces

(1 FGA bde with J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-11B; JH-7A; 1 SAM bde)

Southern Theatre Air Force**8th Bomber Division**

(2 bbr regt with H-6K)

20th Special Mission Division

(3 EW regt with Y-8CB/G/XZ)

Kunming Base

(1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 trg bde with JJ-7A; 1 SAM bde)

Nanning Base

(2 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10B/C; 1 FGA bde with Su-35; 1 FGA bde with J-7; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MKK; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 2 trg bde with J-7/ JJ-7A; 1 SAM bde)

Other Forces

(1 tkr bde with H-6U; 1 CSAR bde)

Other Forces**Marines**

(2 mne bde)

Western Theatre Command**Western Theatre Ground Forces****76th Group Army**

(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 2 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

77th Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde; 3 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

Xinjiang Military District

(1 spec ops bde, 1 (high alt) mech div, 3 (high alt) mot div, 1 arty bde, 1 AD bde, 1 engr regt, 1 EW regt, 1 hel bde)

Xizang Military District

(1 spec ops bde; 1 (high alt) mech inf bde; 2 mtn inf bde; 1 arty bde, 1 AD bde, 1 engr bde, 1 EW regt, 1 hel bde)

Western Theatre Air Force**4th Transport Division**

(1 tpt regt with Y-8/Y-9; 1 tpt regt with Y-7; 1 tpt regt with Mi-17V-5/Y-7/Y-20)

Lanzhou Base

(1 ftr bde with J-11AB; 1 ftr bde with J-7; 1 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 SAM bde)

Urumqi Base

(1 ftr bde with J-8H; 1 ftr bde with J-11B; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 2 SAM bde)

Lhasa Base

(1 SAM bde)

Xi'an Flying Academy

(1 trg bde with JJ-7A; 1 trg bde with JL-9; 2 trg bde with JL-8; 1 trg bde with Y-7; Y-8)

Other Forces

(1 surv regt with Y-8H1; 1 CSAR regt)

Northern Theatre Command

Northern Theatre Ground Forces

78th Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

79th Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 3 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

80th Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde; 1 mech inf bde, 4 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

Northern Theatre Navy

Coastal defence from the DPRK border (Yalu River) to south of Lianyungang (approx 35°10'N), and to seaward; HQ at Qingdao; support bases at Lushun, Qingdao.

4 SSN; 15 SSK; 1 CV; 5 DDGHHM; 2 DDGM; 10 FFGHM; 2 FFGM; 4 FFG; 8 FSGM; ε18 PCFG/PCG; ε12 MCMV; ε7 LST/M

Northern Theatre Navy Aviation

2nd Naval Air Division

(2 EW/ISR/AEW regt with Y-8J/JB/W/X; Y-9JZ; 1 MP/ hel regt with SH-5; AS365N; Ka-28; SA321; Z-8J/JH; Z-9C/D)

Other Forces

(1 ftr regt with J-15; 1 FGA bde with JH-7A; J-8F; 1 tpt regt with Y-7H/Y-8C/CRJ-200/CRJ-700; 1 trg regt with CJ-6A; 2 trg regt with JL-8; 1 trg regt with HY-7; 1 trg regt with JL-9G; 1 trg regt with JL-9; 1 trg regt with JL-10)

Northern Theatre Air Force

16th Special Mission Division

(1 EW regt with Y-8/Y-8CB/Y-8G; 1 ISR regt with JZ-8F; 1 tpt regt with Y-5/Y-7)

Dalian Base

(2 ftr bde with J-7H; 1 ftr bde with J-8F; 2 ftr bde with J-11B; 2 FGA bde with J-7E; 1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10B; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 1 trg bde with JJ-7A; 3 SAM bde)

Jinan Base

(1 atk bde with JH-7A; 1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 ftr bde with J-8F/H; 1 ftr bde with J-7G; 2 SAM bde)

Harbin Flying Academy

(1 trg bde with CJ-6; Y-5; 1 trg bde with H-6; HY-7; 2 trg bde with JL-8; 1 trg bde with JL-9)

Other Forces

(1 CSAR bde)

Other Forces

Marines

(2 mne bde)

Central Theatre Command

Central Theatre Ground Forces

81st Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 (OPFOR) mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 avn bde, 1 AD bde)

82nd Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 2 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

83rd Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 5 mech inf bde, 1 air aslt bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 AD bde)

Other Forces

(1 hy mech inf div, 2 (Beijing) gd div)

Central Theatre Air Force

13th Transport Division

(1 tpt regt with Y-8C; 1 tpt regt with Il-76MD/TD; 1 tpt regt with Il-76MD; Il-78)

34th VIP Transport Division

(1 tpt regt with B-737; CRJ200/700; 1 tpt regt with B-737; Tu-154M; Tu-154M/D; 1 tpt regt with Y-7; 1 hel regt with AS332; H225)

36th Bomber Division

(2 bbr regt with H-6K; 1 bbr regt with H-6H)

Datong Base

(1 ftr bde with J-7; 1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 2 FGA bde with J-7E/G; 2 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 SAM div; 4 SAM bde)

Wuhan Base

(2 ftr bde with J-7; 1 ftr bde with Su-27SK/J-11A; 1 FGA bde with J-10B; 1 trg bde with J-7/JJ-7A; 2 SAM bde)

Shijiazhuang Flying Academy

(4 trg bde with JL-8)

Airborne Corps

(6 AB bde)

Other Forces

(1 CSAR bde)

Paramilitary 660,000+ active

People's Armed Police ε660,000

In 2018 the People's Armed Police (PAP) divested its border defence, firefighting, gold, forest, hydropower and security-guard units. In addition to the forces listed below, PAP also has 32 regional commands, each with one or more mobile units

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 (1st Mobile) paramilitary corps (3 SF regt; 9 (mobile) paramilitary units; 1 engr/CBRN unit; 1 hel unit)

1 (2nd Mobile) paramilitary corps (2 SF unit; 9 (mobile) paramilitary units; 1 engr/CBRN unit; 1 hel unit)

China Coast Guard (CCG)

In 2018 the CCG was moved from the authority of the SOA to that of the People's Armed Police

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 422

PSOH 41:

- 2 *Zhaotou* with 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 med hel)
- 6 *Zhaoduan* (Type-054 mod) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)
- 3 *Jiangwei* I (Type-053H2G) (capacity 1 med hel) (ex-PLAN)
- 4 *Shuoshi* II (capacity 1 med hel)
- 2 *Shucha* I (capacity 1 med hel)
- 10 *Shucha* II (capacity 1 med hel)
- 12 *Zhaoyu* (capacity 1 med hel)
- 1 *Zhoachang* (capacity 1 med hel)
- 1 *Zhongyang* (capacity 1 med hel)

PSO 45:

- 9 *Zhaojun* (Type-718B) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
- 1 *Dalang* I (Type-922) (ex-PLAN) 1 *Haixun* II with 1 hel landing platform
- 1 *Hai Yang* (Type-625C) (ex-PLAN)
- 1 *Jianghu* I (Type-053H) (ex-PLAN)
- 1 *Kanjie* (Type-636A) with 1 hel landing platform (ex-PLAN)
- 6 *Shusheng* with 1 hel landing platform
- 3 *Shuwu*
- 3 *Tuzhong* (ex-PLAN)
- 1 *Wolei* (Type-918) (ex-PLAN)
- 1 *Xiang Yang Hong* 9 (ex-PLAN)
- 4 *Zhaolai* with 1 hel landing platform
- 14 *Zhaotim*

PCO 33: 4 *Zhaogao* (Type-056 mod) with 1 hel landing platform;

- 1 *Shuke* I;
- 4 *Shuke* II;
- 14 *Shuke* III;
- 3 *Shuyou*;
- 4 *Zhaodai*;
- 3 *Zhaoming*

PCC 103: 25+ Type-618B-II;

- 45 *Hailin* I/II;
- 1 *Shuzao* II;
- 14 *Shuzao* III;
- 9 *Zhongeng*;
- 2 *Zhongmel*;
- 7 *Zhongsui*

PB/PBF ε200

AMPHIBIOUS • LST 2 *Yuting* I (Type-072-II) (Ex-PLAN; used as hospital vessels and island supply)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 28

AG 7: 5+ *Kaobo*; 2 *Shutu*

AGB 1 *Yanbing* (Type-071) (ex-PLAN)

AGOR 9: 4 *Haijian*;

3 *Shuguang* 04 (ex-PLAN);
2 *Xiang Yang Hong* 9

ATF 11

AIRCRAFT

MP 1+ MA60H

TPT • Light Y-12 (MP role)

HELICOPTERS

TPT • Light Z-9

Maritime Militia

Maritime Militia made up of full and part-time personnel. Reports to PLA command and trains to assist PLAN and CCG in a variety of military roles. These include ISR, maritime law enforcement, island supply, troop transport and supporting sovereignty claims. The Maritime Militia operates a variety of civilian vessels including fishing boats and oil tankers.

DEPLOYMENT

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:

UN • MONUSCO 223; 9 obs; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital

DJIBOUTI: 240; 1 mne coy(-); 1 med unit; 2 ZTL-11; 8 ZBL- 08; 1 LPD; 1 ESD

GULF OF ADEN: 1 DDGHM; 1 FFGHM; 1 AORH

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 418; 2 engr coy; 1 med coy

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 403; 1 sy coy; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 5 obs

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,040; 5 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital

SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 374; 1 engr coy

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 11 ob

6.7.1 Cyber Warfare

The PLA has devoted much attention to information warfare over the past decade, in terms of both battlefield electronic warfare (EW) and wider cyber-warfare capabilities. The main doctrine is the 'Integrated Network Electronic Warfare' (INEW) document, which guides PLA computer network operations. PLA thinking appears to have moved beyond INEW, towards a new concept of 'information confrontation' (xinxi duikang), which aims to integrate both electronic and non-electronic aspects of information warfare within a single command authority. PLA thinking sees warfare under informationised conditions as characterized by opposing sides using complete systems of ground, naval, air, space and electromagnetic forces. Since 2008, major PLA military exercises have had cyber and information-operations components that have been both offensive and defensive in nature. The PLA reorganized in 2015 and established three new support branches including the Strategic Support Force (SSF). Although precise responsibilities remain unclear, the SSF reportedly has three sections: the first dealing with intelligence and military operations in cyberspace (defensive and offensive); the second responsible for military space operations (surveillance and satellite); and the third in charge of defensive and offensive EW and electronic intelligence. In March 2017,

China released an International Strategy for Cooperation in Cyberspace, which stated that the PLA will play an ‘important role’ in cyberspace. The strategy also stated that the country would ‘expedite the development of a cyber force and enhance capabilities in terms of situational awareness, cyber defense, supporting state activities and participating in international cooperation, to prevent major cyber crisis, safeguard cyber security and maintain national security and social stability’. In 2017, China also announced the establishment of a Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development, which seeks to integrate civilian technologies, including in the fields of information and communications technologies and artificial intelligence, into the PLA. China is investing heavily in quantum technology and announced in September 2017 that it would build the largest quantum-research facility in the world to support technology developments that can be used by the armed forces, including codebreaking capabilities and covert navigational capacities for submarines.¹⁰⁶²

China’s State Council Information Office White paper (2019) titled “**China’s National Defense in the New Era**” mentioned that China’s national defense aims to safeguard China’s security interests in outer space, electromagnetic space and cyberspace.¹⁰⁶³ Cyberspace is a key area for national security, economic growth and social development. Cyber security remains a global challenge and poses a severe threat to China. China’s armed forces accelerate the building of their cyberspace capabilities, develop cyber security and defense means, and build cyber defense capabilities consistent with China’s international standing and its status as a major cyber country. They reinforce national cyber border defense, and promptly detect and counter network intrusions. They safeguard information and cyber security, and resolutely maintain national cyber sovereignty, information security and social stability.¹⁰⁶⁴

China has played a constructive role in the political settlement of regional hotspots such as the Korean Peninsula issue, the Iranian nuclear issue and Syrian issue. China opposes hegemony, unilateralism and double standards, promotes dialogues and consultations, and fully and earnestly implements UNSC resolutions. China has actively participated in multilateral dialogues and negotiations on cyberspace and outer space, and pushed for the formulation of widely accepted international rules that are fair and equitable.¹⁰⁶⁵

Defence Intelligence Agency (2019) reported that the world revolution in military affairs (RMA) is proceeding to a new stage. Long-range, precise, smart, stealthy, and unmanned weapons and equipment are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Outer space and cyberspace have become new commanding heights in strategic competition among all parties.¹⁰⁶⁶ The PLA uses the term “informatized warfare” to describe the process of acquiring, transmitting, processing, and using information to conduct joint

¹⁰⁶² The MILITARY BALANCE 2019: THE ANNUAL ASSESEMENT OF GLOBAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND DEFENCE ECONOMICS, Internation Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Pg 265.

¹⁰⁶³ Excerpts from China’s State Council Information Office White paper, titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era”, published in July 2019, Pg 6, available online at URL:

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

¹⁰⁶⁴ Ibid, Pg 13

¹⁰⁶⁵ Ibid, Pg 30

¹⁰⁶⁶ Excerpts from Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report titled “China’s Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win” Published in 2019, Pg 11, available online at URL:

https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

military operations across the domains of land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum during a conflict.¹⁰⁶⁷

The creation of a permanent joint C2 structure that places more emphasis on naval and aerospace forces, along with a dedicated Strategic Support Force responsible for electronic warfare and operations in the space and cyberspace domains, reflects an emerging PLA capacity to more effectively execute joint operations.¹⁰⁶⁸ Today's PLA is still far from being able to deploy large numbers of conventional forces globally, but China has developed nuclear, space, cyberspace, and other capabilities that can reach potential adversaries across the globe.¹⁰⁶⁹

Authoritative PLA writings identify controlling the "information domain" sometimes referred to as "information dominance" as a prerequisite for achieving victory in a modern war and as essential for countering outside intervention in a conflict. The PLA's broader concept of the information domain and of information operations encompasses the network, electromagnetic, psychological, and intelligence domains, with the "network domain" and corresponding "network warfare" roughly analogous to the current U.S. concept of the cyber domain and cyber warfare. The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) may be the first step in the development of a cyber - force by combining cyber reconnaissance, cyber-attack, and cyber defense capabilities into one organization to reduce bureaucratic hurdles and centralize command and control of PLA cyber units. Official pronouncements offer limited details on the organization's makeup or mission. President Xi simply said during the SSF founding ceremony on 31 December 2015 that the SSF is a "new-type combat force to maintain national security and [is] an important growth point for the PLA's combat capabilities." The SSF probably was formed to consolidate cyber elements of the former PLA General Staff Third (Technical Reconnaissance) and Fourth (Electronic Countermeasures and Radar) Departments and Informatization Department.¹⁰⁷⁰

Cyberspace has become a new pillar of economic and social development, and a new domain of national security. As international strategic competition in cyberspace has been turning increasingly fiercer, quite a few countries are developing their cyber military forces. Being one of the major victims of hacker attacks, China is confronted with grave security threats to its cyber infrastructure. As cyberspace weighs more in military security, China will expedite the development of a cyber force, and enhance its capabilities of cyberspace situation awareness, cyber defense, support for the country's endeavors in cyberspace and participation in international cyber cooperation, so as to stem major cyber crises, ensure national network and information security, and maintain national security and social stability. The PLA could use its cyber warfare capabilities to support military operations in three key areas. First, cyber reconnaissance allows the PLA to collect technical and operational data for intelligence and potential operational planning for cyber-attacks because the accesses and tactics, techniques, and procedures for cyber reconnaissance translate into those also necessary to conduct cyber-attacks. Second, the PLA could employ its cyber-attack capabilities to establish information dominance in the early stages of a conflict to constrain an adversary's actions or slow

¹⁰⁶⁷ Ibid, Pg 24

¹⁰⁶⁸ Ibid, Pg 28

¹⁰⁶⁹ Ibid, Pg 31

¹⁰⁷⁰ Ibid, Pg 45

mobilization and deployment by targeting network-based C2, C4ISR, logistics, and commercial activities. Third, cyber warfare capabilities can serve as a force multiplier when coupled with conventional capabilities during a conflict.¹⁰⁷¹

PLA military writings detail the effectiveness of information operations and cyber warfare in modern conflicts, and advocate targeting an adversary's C2 and logistics networks to affect the adversary's ability to operate during the early stages of conflict. One authoritative source identifies an adversary's C2 system as "the heart of information collection, control, and application on the battlefield. It is also the nerve center of the entire battlefield." China's cyber warfare could also focus on targeting links and nodes in an adversary's mobility system and identifying operational vulnerabilities in the mobilization and deployment phase. The PLA also plays a role in cyber theft. In May 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted five PLA officers on charges of hacking into the networks of U.S. companies for commercial gain. Beijing maintains that the Chinese government and military do not engage in cyber espionage and that the United States fabricated the charges.¹⁰⁷²

During the past decade alone, from counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden to an expanded military presence in the East and South China Seas, China has demonstrated a willingness to use the PLA as an instrument of national power in the execution of "historic missions" in the new century. Improvements in PLA equipment and capabilities that have focused on generating combat power across the PLA services present Beijing with additional response options as China faces increasing global security concerns. Expected advances in areas such as nuclear deterrence, power projection, and cyberspace, space, and electromagnetic spectrum operations will continue to be critical components of the PLA's developing capabilities. China also continues to develop capabilities for "non war" missions, such as HADR and counter piracy. In the coming years, the PLA is likely to grow even more technologically advanced, with equipment comparable to that of other modern militaries. The PLA will acquire advanced fighter aircraft, naval vessels, missile systems, and space and cyberspace assets as it organizes and trains to address 21st century threats farther from China's shores.¹⁰⁷³

6.7.2 Nuclear Weapons

Disarmament became a more urgent and complicated issue with the rapid development of nuclear weapons capable of mass destruction.

China had issued a first **White Paper** on subject **Arms Control and Disarmament in November 1995**.

According to the White Paper (2019) titled "**China's National Defense in the New Era**",

¹⁰⁷¹ Excerpts from Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report titled "China's Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win" Published in 2019, Pg 46, available online at URL: https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

¹⁰⁷² Ibid Pg 46

¹⁰⁷³ Excerpts from Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report titled "China's Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win" Published in 2019, Pg 52, available online at URL: https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

China had signed/acceded following treaties:

- Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof” acceded by China in February 1991.
- Subsequently, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons acceded in March, 1992.
- Convention on Nuclear Safety in 1994, signed in Sep. 1994, ratified in Apr. 1996.
- Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Signed in Sep. 1996.¹⁰⁷⁴

Table: Major Multilateral Treaties ¹⁰⁷⁵ on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Joined by China.

Category	Treaties	Time
Nuclear	Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia	Signed in May 2014, approved in Apr. 2015 by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress
	Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the People’s Republic of China and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in China	Signed in Dec. 1998, entered into force in Mar. 2002
	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	Signed in Sep. 1996
	Protocol I and II to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty	Signed in Apr. 1996, instrument of ratification deposited in Oct. 1997
	Convention on Nuclear Safety	Signed in Sep. 1994, ratified in Apr. 1996
	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	Acceded in Mar. 1992
	Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof	Acceded in Feb. 1991
	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material	Acceded in Feb. 1989
	Agreement Between the People’s Republic of China and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in China	Signed in Sep. 1988, entered into force in Sep. 1989

¹⁰⁷⁴ Excerpts from China’s State Council Information Office White paper, titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era”, published in July 2019, available online at URL:

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

¹⁰⁷⁵ Table from China’s State Council Information Office White paper, titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era”, published in July 2019, Pg 39, available online at URL:

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

	Additional Protocol II and III to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty	Signed in Feb. 1987, instrument of ratification deposited in Oct. 1988
	Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean	Signed in Aug. 1973, instrument of ratification deposited in Jun. 1974

Source: China's State Council Information Office White paper (2019), Pg 39

URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

As per Claims by China in the **White Paper (2019)** titled “**China’s National Defense in the New Era**” is always committed to a nuclear policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones unconditionally. China advocates the ultimate complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China does not engage in any nuclear arms race with any other country and keeps its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security. China pursues a nuclear strategy of self-defense, the goal of which is to maintain national strategic security by deterring other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China.¹⁰⁷⁶

Safeguarding Interests in Major Security Fields: Nuclear capability is the strategic cornerstone to safeguarding national sovereignty and security. China’s armed forces strengthen the safety management of nuclear weapons and facilities, maintain the appropriate level of readiness and enhance strategic deterrence capability to protect national strategic security and maintain international strategic stability.¹⁰⁷⁷

The PLARF plays a critical role in maintaining China’s national sovereignty and security. It comprises nuclear missile, conventional missile and support forces, and subordinate missile bases. In line with the strategic requirements of having both nuclear and conventional capabilities and deterring wars in all battle spaces, the PLARF is enhancing its credible and reliable capabilities of nuclear deterrence and counterattack, strengthening intermediate and long-range precision strike forces, and enhancing strategic counter-balance capability, so as to build a strong and modernized rocket force.¹⁰⁷⁸

China has played a constructive role in the political settlement of regional hotspots such as the Korean Peninsula issue, the Iranian nuclear issue and Syrian issue. China opposes hegemony, unilateralism and double standards, promotes dialogues and consultations, and fully and earnestly implements UNSC resolutions. China has actively participated in multilateral dialogues and negotiations on cyberspace and outer space, and pushed for the formulation of widely accepted international rules that are fair and equitable. China actively participates in international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. China objects to arms race and strives to protect global strategic balance and stability. To this end, China has signed or acceded to dozens of relevant multilateral treaties including the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In 2015 China announced the

¹⁰⁷⁶ Ibid, Pg 8

¹⁰⁷⁷ Ibid, Pg 12

¹⁰⁷⁸ Ibid, Pg 20

establishment of the USD 1 billion China-UN Peace and Development Fund in the following decade, which was officially put into operation in 2016.¹⁰⁷⁹

Defence Intelligence Agency (2019) reported that China's Military Strategy built on a series of biennial defense reviews that Beijing published beginning in 1998 to mitigate international concern about the lack of transparency of its military modernization. What differentiated the document from its predecessors was that it, for the first time, publicly clarified the PLA's role in protecting China's evolving national security interests and shed light on policies, such as the PLA's commitment to nuclear deterrence.¹⁰⁸⁰ Today's PLA is still far from being able to deploy large numbers of conventional forces globally, but China has developed nuclear, space, cyberspace, and other capabilities that can reach potential adversaries across the globe.¹⁰⁸¹

China invests considerable resources to maintain a limited, survivable nuclear force that can guarantee a damaging retaliatory strike. As part of this, China has long maintained a "no first use" (NFU) policy, stating it would use nuclear forces only in response to a nuclear strike against China. There is some ambiguity, however, over the conditions under which China's NFU policy would apply. Some PLA officers have written publicly of the need to spell out conditions under which China might need to use nuclear weapons first; for example, if an enemy's conventional attack threatened the survival of China's nuclear force or of the regime itself. Nevertheless, there has been no indication that national leaders are willing to attach such nuances and caveats to China's NFU doctrine. The nuclear force is a strategic cornerstone for safeguarding national sovereignty and security. China has always pursued the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and adhered to a self-defensive nuclear strategy. China unconditionally will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or in nuclear-weapons-free zones and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.¹⁰⁸²

China will optimize its nuclear force structure; improve strategic early warning, command and control, missile penetration, rapid reaction, and survivability and protection; and deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. China is enhancing peacetime readiness levels for these nuclear forces to ensure responsiveness. China maintains nuclear-capable delivery systems in its Rocket Force and Navy. As of 2017, the Air Force had been reassigned a nuclear mission, probably with a developmental strategic bomber. The bomber's deployment would provide China with its first credible nuclear triad of delivery systems dispersed across land, sea, and air a posture considered since the Cold War to improve survivability and strategic deterrence.¹⁰⁸³

¹⁰⁷⁹ Excerpts from China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled "China's National Defense in the New Era", published in July 2019, Pg 30, available online at URL:

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

¹⁰⁸⁰ Excerpts from Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report titled "China's Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win" Published in 2019, Pg 13, available online at URL:

https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

¹⁰⁸¹ Ibid, Pg 31

¹⁰⁸² Ibid, Pg 36

¹⁰⁸³ Excerpts from Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report titled "China's Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win" Published in 2019, Pg 37, available online at URL:

PLA writings express the value of a “launch on warning” nuclear posture, an approach to deterrence that uses heightened readiness, improved surveillance, and streamlined decision making processes to enable a more rapid response to enemy attack. These writings highlight the posture’s consistency with China’s NFU policy. China is working to develop a space-based early warning capability that could support this posture in the future. In addition, the PLA is likely to continue deploying more sophisticated C2 systems and refining C2 processes as growing numbers of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and future nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) deterrence patrols require the PLA to safeguard the integrity of nuclear release authority for a larger, more dispersed force.¹⁰⁸⁴

China Nuclear Weapon-Related Facilities



Source: Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) (2019), Pg 38

URL: https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

China maintains a stockpile of nuclear warheads and continues research on and development and production of new nuclear weapons. The PLA probably has multiple nuclear warhead designs that are decades old and require routine observation, maintenance, or refurbishment to maintain effectiveness. China’s nuclear weapon design and production organization the China Academy of Engineering Physics is the key organization in developing and maintaining China’s nuclear force. It employs tens of thousands of personnel, and its scientists are capable of conducting all aspects of nuclear

https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

¹⁰⁸⁴ Ibid, Pg 37

weapon design research, including nuclear physics, materials science, electronics, explosives, and computer modelling.¹⁰⁸⁵

China has the required industrial capacity to enrich uranium and produce plutonium for military needs. The China National Nuclear Corporation operates several uranium enrichment facilities organized under three plants. China probably intends the bulk of its enrichment capacity to support its burgeoning nuclear power industry but could devote some enrichment capacity to support military needs. China's plutonium production reactors probably ceased operation in the 1980s. However, China's reprocessing facilities can extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel.¹⁰⁸⁶

The use of underground facilities for war fighting protection and concealment enhances China's military capacity, with particular emphasis on protecting C4I functions and missile assets. The PLA maintains a robust, technologically advanced underground facility (UGF) program. Given its NFU nuclear policy, China assumes it might have to absorb an initial nuclear strike while ensuring that leadership and strategic assets survive.¹⁰⁸⁷

In 2017, China sustained its contributions to counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden through the deployment of its 28th naval escort task force to the region since 2008. During the same period, the PLAN continued to use sup - port for counter piracy to justify Chinese sub - marine patrols to the Indian Ocean. In 2016, a nuclear-powered attack submarine conducted a port call in Karachi, Pakistan, during an official visit by the PLAN commander, marking China's first port call in South Asia by a nuclear submarine. In 2017, Chinese attack submarines conducted port calls in Seppangar, Malaysia, and Karachi, but Sri Lanka denied a port call request in Colombo. These submarine patrols demonstrate the PLAN's emerging capability to protect China's SLOCs and to increase China's power projection into the Indian Ocean.¹⁰⁸⁸

Expected advances in areas such as nuclear deterrence, power projection, and cyberspace, space, and electromagnetic spectrum operations will continue to be critical components of the PLA's developing capabilities. China also continues to develop capabilities for "non war" missions, such as HADR and counter piracy.¹⁰⁸⁹

Every major PLAN surface combatant under construction is capable of embarking a helicopter to support over-the-horizon targeting, ASW, and search and rescue. Meanwhile, the PLAN's submarine force remains largely concentrated on ASUW, with Jin class SSBNs poised to contribute to China's nuclear deterrent once they begin strategic patrols in the near future. Naval aviation is expanding its mission set by incorporating modern multirole combat aircraft along with modern special mission aircraft, carrier aviation, and UAVs. As a whole, the PLAN is becoming a force able to execute a wide variety of missions near home and far away.¹⁰⁹⁰

¹⁰⁸⁵ Ibid, Pg 37

¹⁰⁸⁶ Excerpts from Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report titled "China's Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win" Published in 2019, Pg 39, available online at URL: https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

¹⁰⁸⁷ Ibid, Pg 50

¹⁰⁸⁸ Ibid, Pg 51

¹⁰⁸⁹ Ibid, Pg 52

¹⁰⁹⁰ Ibid, Pg 69

The submarine force comprises 6 nuclear attack submarines, 4 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and 50 diesel attack submarines. By 2020 the submarine force probably will increase to about 70 submarines.¹⁰⁹¹

China also continues to modernize its nuclear-powered attack submarine force, although these make up a small percentage of the total number of submarines. Two Shang nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) have been launched, one each in 2002 and 2003. After nearly 10 years, China is continuing production with four additional hulls of an improved Shang variant.¹⁰⁹²

The PLA Navy's Jin class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines, armed with the JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile, provide China its first viable sea-based nuclear deterrent and credible second-strike nuclear capability. The JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) has nearly three times the range of the Xia SSBN's JL-1 SLBM, which was able to reach targets only in China's immediate vicinity. The JL-2 SLBM underwent successful testing in 2012. The Jin/JL-2 weapon system will provide China with a capability to strike targets in the continental United States from some patrol areas. To maintain a continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent, the PLAN probably would require a minimum of five Jin SSBNs; four are in service.¹⁰⁹³

The PLARF operates China's strategic land based nuclear and conventional missiles and is a critical component of China's deterrence strategy and efforts to counter third-party intervention in regional conflicts. The PLARF also is charged with developing and testing several new classes and variants of long-range missiles, forming additional missile units, upgrading older missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses. China unveiled the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) during its September 2015 military parade in Beijing. The DF-26 is capable of conducting precision strikes against ground targets and contributes to China's counter intervention posture in the Asia-Pacific region. During the parade, official public statements also referenced a nuclear version of the DF-26, which, if it has the same guidance capabilities, would give China its first nuclear precision-strike capability against theatre targets.¹⁰⁹⁴

The PLARF also continues to enhance its nuclear deterrent, maintaining silo-based nuclear ICBMs and adding more survivable, mobile nuclear delivery systems. China currently has 75 to 100 ICBMs, including the silo based CSS-4 Mod 2/DF-5A and MIRV-equipped CSS-4 Mod 3/DF-5B; the solid-fuelled, road-mobile CSS-10 Mod 1/DF-31 and CSS-10 Mod 2/DF-31A; and the shorter range CSS-3/DF-4. The CSS-10 Mod 2/DF-31A has a range of more than 11,200 kilometres and can reach most locations within the continental United States. China also is developing a new MIRV-capable road-mobile ICBM, the CSS-X-10/DF-41.¹⁰⁹⁵

¹⁰⁹¹ Ibid, Pg 72

¹⁰⁹² Excerpts from Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report titled "China's Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win" Published in 2019, Pg 72, available online at URL: https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

¹⁰⁹³ Ibid, Pg 73

¹⁰⁹⁴ Ibid, Pg 91

¹⁰⁹⁵ Ibid, Pg 92

Nuclear in PLA Rocket Force System*

System	Type	Warheads	Propellant	Deployment Mode	Max Range km
CSS-3/DF-4	ICBM	Nuclear	Liquid	Rollout to Launch (ROTL)	5,500+
CSS-3/DF-5	ICBM	Nuclear	Liquid	Silo	12,000-13,000
CSS-5/DF-21	MRBM	Nuclear and Conventional Variants	Solid	Mobile	1,500-1,750+
DF-26	IRBM	Nuclear and Conventional Variants	Solid	Mobile	4,000
CSS-10/DF-31	ICBM	Nuclear	Solid	Mobile	7,200-11,200

* This chart does not include systems in development.

Source: Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) 2019, Pg 93,

URL: https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

The PLARF now regularly conducts training under extreme weather and geographical conditions and in complex electromagnetic and nuclear, biological, and chemical environments. The PLARF's goal is to train under actual combat conditions, which include contending with enemy Special Forces, satellite reconnaissance, electromagnetic jamming, and air attacks. To that end, the PLARF has worked to improve its training against a modern (informatized) "blue force" that portrays a superior adversary.¹⁰⁹⁶


China's 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) includes the establishment of focus areas for research, development, and innovation. Several of these have defense implications: aerospace engines including turbofan technology and gas turbines; quantum communications and computing; innovative electronics and software; automation and robotics; special materials and applications; nanotechnology; neuroscience, neural research, and artificial intelligence; and deep-space exploration and on-orbit servicing and maintenance systems. Other areas where China is concentrating significant R&D resources include nuclear fusion, hypersonic technology, and the deployment and "hardening" of an expanding constellation of multipurpose satellites. China's drive to expand civil-military integration and international economic activity supports these goals.¹⁰⁹⁷

¹⁰⁹⁶ Excerpts from Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report titled "China's Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win" Published in 2019, Pg 95, available online at URL:

https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

¹⁰⁹⁷ Ibid, Pg 105

China's Conventional and Nuclear Strike Range



Source: Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) (2019), Pg 94

URL: https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

Biological and Chemical Warfare

As per the Defence Intelligence Agency Report (2019), China has consistently claimed that it has never researched, produced, or possessed biological weapons and would never do so. Beijing says China has researched only defensive biological technology necessary for China's defense. China acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984. It declared the Academy of Military Science's Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology in Beijing as a bio defense research facility. China regularly and voluntarily submits to confidence-building measures under the BWC. Although China is not a member of the Australia Group, China's export control regulations have been in line with Australia Group guidelines and control lists since 2002. China's biotechnology infrastructure is sufficient to produce some biological agents or toxins on a large scale. The Australia Group (AG) is an informal forum of countries which, through the harmonization of export controls, seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons. Coordination of national export control measures assists Australia Group participants to fulfil their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to the fullest extent possible. Excerpt from the Australia Group's website China has declared that it once operated a small chemical weapons program for offensive purposes; however, Beijing has consistently maintained that the program was dismantled and all agents and munitions were used before China ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997. Beijing also has

declared two historical chemical warfare production facilities that may have produced mustard gas, phosgene, and lewisite. In 1998, Beijing published chemical export control regulations consistent with Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) standards. It also has consistently updated its chemical control list to reflect changes made to the Australia Group chemical control list. China continues to reaffirm its compliance with the CWC as well as its support for the activities conducted by the OPCW. Since acceding to the CWC, China has declared hundreds of dual-use facilities and has hosted hundreds of facility inspections and OPCW-led seminars. China's chemical infrastructure is sufficient to research, develop, and produce some chemical agents on a large scale.¹⁰⁹⁸

China probably has the technical expertise to weaponize chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents, and China's robust armaments industry and numerous conventional weapon systems, including missiles, rockets, and artillery, probably could be adapted to deliver CBW agents. China has the technical expertise, military units, and equipment necessary to detect CBW agents and to defend against a CBW attack.

Entities and individuals in China continue to supply countries of concern with technologies, components, and raw materials applicable to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs. Such material and technology transfers could assist countries in developing their own production capabilities.¹⁰⁹⁹

A news item "US Lawyer Files \$20 Trillion Lawsuit Against China For **Corona virus** Outbreak" published by ANI, March 24, 2020 points out that American lawyer Larry Klayman has filed a USD 20 trillion lawsuit against China for the creation and the release of the novel corona virus that has infected more than 334,000 people globally. Larry Klayman, his advocacy group Freedom Watch and Buzz Photos, a Texas company, filed the lawsuit in the US District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging that the novel **corona virus** was "designed by China to be a biological weapon of war", and that whether or not the country intended to release it, China violated "US law, international laws, treaties, and norms."¹¹⁰⁰

Another news item "U.S.-Chinese Distrust Is Inviting Dangerous Corona virus Conspiracy Theories And Undermining Efforts to Contain the Epidemic" dated March 5, 2020 written by Yanzhong Huang, published by FOREIGN AFFAIRS CURRENT ISSUE March/April 2020 stated that China and the United States are both parties to the BWC. The Chinese government's actions have lent credibility to the thesis that the corona virus accidentally escaped a laboratory. In February, China appointed Major General Chen Wei, China's top

¹⁰⁹⁸ Excerpts from Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report titled "China's Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win" Published in 2019, Pg 39, available online at URL:

https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

¹⁰⁹⁹ Excerpts from Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report titled "China's Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win" Published in 2019, Pg 40, available online at URL:

https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

¹¹⁰⁰ NDTV News Item dated March 24, 2020 titled "US Lawyer Files \$20 Trillion Lawsuit Against China For Coronavirus Outbreak", Available online at URL: <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/us-lawyer-files-20-trillion-lawsuit-against-china-for-coronavirus-outbreak-2199640>

bio warfare expert, as head of the BSL-4 laboratory at Wuhan Institute of Virology. Because of Chen's background, the appointment fuelled suspicions about the virus's possible connection to the BSL-4 lab. Then, on February 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping highlighted the need to incorporate *shengwu anquan* (which in Chinese could mean either "biosecurity" or "biosafety") into its national security regime.¹¹⁰¹

Another news item "Xi Focus: Xi stresses improving mechanism for major epidemic prevention, control" dated February 14, 2020 published by Xinhua mentioned that President Xi Jinping on February 14, 2020 stressed improving the mechanism for major epidemic prevention and control and the national public health emergency management system. The meeting was attended by Li Keqiang, Wang Huning and Han Zheng, who are members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and deputy heads of the central committee for deepening overall reform.¹¹⁰²

6.7.3 Space Based Warfare

China's State Council Information Office White Paper, titled "China's National Defense in the New Era", published in July 2019 mentions that in the new era, China's national defense aims to safeguard China's security interests in outer space. Outer space is a critical domain in international strategic competition. Outer space security provides strategic assurance for national and social development. In the interest of the peaceful use of outer space, China actively participates in international space cooperation, develops relevant technologies and capabilities, advances holistic management of space-based information resources, strengthens space situation awareness, safeguards space assets, and enhances the capacity to safely enter, exit and openly use outer space.¹¹⁰³

In line with the strategic requirements of integrating air and space capabilities as well as coordinating offensive and defensive operations, the PLAAF is accelerating the transition of its tasks from territorial air defense to both offensive and defensive operations, and improving its capabilities for strategic early warning, air strikes, air and missile defense, information countermeasures, airborne operations, strategic projection, and integrated support, so as to build a strong and modernized air force.¹¹⁰⁴ China has actively participated in multilateral dialogues and negotiations on cyberspace and outer space, and pushed for the formulation of widely accepted international rules that are fair and equitable.¹¹⁰⁵

¹¹⁰¹ Foreign Affairs News Item dated March 5, 2020 titled "U.S.-Chinese Distrust Is Inviting Dangerous Coronavirus Conspiracy Theories: And Undermining Efforts to Contain the Epidemic" written by Yanzhong Huang available online at URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-03-05/us-chinese-distrust-inviting-dangerous-coronavirus-conspiracy>

¹¹⁰² Xinhua News Item dated February 14, 2020 titled "Xi Focus: Xi stresses improving mechanism for major epidemic prevention, control", Available online at URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-02/14/c_138784606.htm

¹¹⁰³ Excerpts from China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled "China's National Defense in the New Era", published in July 2019, Pg 13, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

¹¹⁰⁴ Excerpts from China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled "China's National Defense in the New Era", published in July 2019, Pg 21, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

¹¹⁰⁵ Ibid, Pg 31

According to Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report titled “China’s Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win”, Outer space has become a commanding height in international strategic competition. Countries concerned are developing their space forces and instruments, and the first signs of weaponization of outer space have appeared. China has all along advocated the peaceful use of outer space, opposed the weaponization of and arms race in outer space, and taken an active part in international space cooperation. China will keep abreast of the dynamics of outer space, deal with security threats and challenges in that domain, and secure its space assets to serve its national economic and social development, and maintain outer space security.¹¹⁰⁶

The PLA historically has managed China’s space program and continues to invest in improving China’s capabilities in space-based ISR, satellite communication, satellite navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration. China uses its on-orbit and ground-based assets to support national civil, economic, political, and military goals and objectives. Strategists in the PLA regard the ability to use space-based systems and deny them to adversaries as central to enabling modern informatized warfare. As a result, the PLA continues to strengthen its military space capabilities despite its public stance against the militarization of space. Space operations probably will form an integral component of other PLA campaigns and serve a key role in enabling actions to counter third-party intervention during military conflicts.¹¹⁰⁷

China continues to develop a variety of counterspace capabilities designed to limit or prevent an adversary’s use of space-based assets during crisis or conflict. In addition to the research and possible development of satellite jammers and directed-energy weapons, China has probably made progress on kinetic energy weapons, including the anti-satellite missile system tested in July 2014. China is employing more sophisticated satellite operations and probably is testing on-orbit dual-use technologies that could be applied to counterspace missions.

The PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF), established in December 2015, has an important role in the management of China’s aero - space warfare capabilities. Consolidating the PLA’s space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities into the SSF enables cross-domain synergy in “strategic frontiers.” The SSF may also be responsible for research, development, testing, and fielding of certain “new concept” weapons, such as directed energy and kinetic energy weapons. The SSF’s space function is primarily focused on satellite launch and operation to support PLA reconnaissance, navigation, and communication requirements.

Space and counterspace capabilities- like missile forces, advanced air and seapower, and cyber capabilities are critical for China to fight and win modern military engagements. To support various requirements, China has built a vast ground and maritime infrastructure enabling spacecraft and space launch vehicle (SLV) manufacture, launch, C2, and data downlink.

¹¹⁰⁶ Excerpts from Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report titled “China’s Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win” Published in 2019, available online at URL: https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

¹¹⁰⁷ Ibid, Pg 40

Satellites

China employs a robust space-based ISR capability designed to enhance its worldwide situational awareness. Used for civil and military remote sensing and mapping, terrestrial and maritime surveillance, and military intelligence collection, China's ISR satellites are capable of providing electro-optical (EO) and synthetic aperture radar imagery, as well as electronic intelligence and signals intelligence data.

China pursues parallel programs for military and commercial communications satellites (COMSATs), and owns and operates about 30 COMSATs used for civil, commercial, and military satellite communications. The PLA operates a small number of dedicated military COMSATs. China's civil COMSATs incorporate turnkey off-the-shelf commercially manufactured components, and China produces its military-dedicated satellites domestically. China continues to launch new COMSATs to replace its aging satellites and increase its overall satellite communications bandwidth, capacity, availability, and reliability.

China uses its domestically produced Dongfanghong-4 (DFH-4) satellite bus—the structure that contains the components of the satellite for its military COMSATs. Even though early satellites suffered mission-ending or mission-degrading failures, the DFH-4 has become a reliable satellite bus. The PLA and government continue to vigorously support the program and have signed numerous contracts with domestic and international customers for future DFH-4 COMSATs. The DFH-4 bus has also allowed China to position itself as a competitor in the international COMSAT market, orchestrating many contracts with foreign countries to supply on-orbit satellites, ground-control systems, and training.¹¹⁰⁸

In 2008, China launched the first Tianlian data-relay satellite of its China Tracking and Data Relay Satellite constellation. As of December 2017, China had four Tianlian data-relay satellites on orbit, allowing China to relay commands and data to and from its satellites even when those satellites were not over Chinese territory. In 2000, China launched its first Beidou satellites to test the development of a regional satellite navigation system.

By 2012, China had established a regional satellite navigation constellation consisting of 10 Beidou satellites and had initiated testing of a global constellation similar to the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS). As Beidou satellites continue to be placed in orbit, by 2020 China will complete its global constellation of 27 Beidou satellites while maintaining a separate regional constellation providing redundant coverage over Asia. China owns and operates 10 domestically produced Fengyun and Yunhai meteorological satellites. The China Meteorological Administration supports civilian and military

¹¹⁰⁸ Excerpts from Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report titled “China’s Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win” Published in 2019, Pg 41, available online at URL: https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

customers with the delivery of meteorological data and detailed weather forecasts. The newer satellites house almost a dozen all-weather sensors concerning atmospheric conditions as well as maritime terrain data for military and civilian customers. China's membership in the World Meteorological Organization grants it free access to global meteorological data from the international organization's 191 members.¹¹⁰⁹

Counterspace

The PLA is acquiring a range of technologies to improve China's counterspace capabilities. China is developing antisatellite capabilities, including research and possible development of directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers, and probably has made progress on the antisatellite missile system that it tested in July 2014. China is employing more sophisticated satellite operations and probably is testing dual-use technologies that could be applied to counterspace missions.

China has not publicly acknowledged the existence of any new programs since it confirmed it used an antisatellite missile to destroy a weather satellite in 2007. PLA writings emphasize the necessity of "destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy's reconnaissance...and communications satellites," suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of attacks designed to "blind and deafen the enemy."

Human Spaceflight and Space-Exploration Probes

China became the third country to achieve independent human spaceflight in 2003, when it successfully orbited the crewed Shenzhou-5 spacecraft, followed by space laboratory Tiangong-1 and -2 launches in 2011 and 2016, respectively. China intends to assemble and operate a permanently inhabited, modular space station capable of hosting foreign payloads and astronauts by 2022.¹¹¹⁰

China is the third country to have soft-landed a rover on the Moon, deploying the rover Yutu as part of the Chang'e-3 mission in 2013. China's Lunar Exploration Program plans to launch the first mission to land a rover on the lunar far side in 2018 (Chang'e-4), followed by its first lunar sample-return mission in 2019 (Chang'e-5).¹¹¹¹

Space Launch

China has a robust fleet of launch vehicles to support its requirements. The Chang Zheng, or Long March, and Kuaizhou SLVs can launch Chinese spacecraft to any orbit.

¹¹⁰⁹ Excerpts from Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report titled "China's Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win" Published in 2019, Pg 42, available online at URL: https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

¹¹¹⁰ Ibid, Pg 43

¹¹¹¹ Excerpts from Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report titled "China's Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win" Published in 2019, Pg 44, available online at URL: https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

Space Launch Sites:



Source: Defence Intelligence Agency (2019), Pg 44

URL:

https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

Space Launch Fleet

Space Launch Fleet			
System	Propellant	Generation	Outlook
LM-2, LM-3, LM-4 series	Liquid	Legacy	Phase out by 2025
LM-5 series	Liquid	Next	Heavy-lift for the proposed space station and other payloads
LM-6	Liquid	Next	Light-lift for low Earth and sun-synchronous orbit
LM-7	Liquid	Next	Medium-lift for human spaceflight and resupply to the future space station
LM-11 and Kuaizhou series	Solid	Next	Lift for emergency response

Source: Defence Intelligence Agency (2019), Pg 45

URL: https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

6.8 Official Defence Budget & Other Military-Related Expenditure

As the exact Chinese Defence Budget figures are not available, the following figures have been highlighted from various sources including such as **Vivekananda International**

Foundation (VIF 2019); China's State Council Information Office White paper (2019) titled "China's National Defense in the New Era"; Military Balance 2019; Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019; and SIPRI Report 2019.

A. VIF: "China's Defence White Paper - An Analysis" (2019)


According to an analysis titled "China's Defence White Paper - An Analysis" written by Maj Gen PK Mallick, VSM (Retd) published by **Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF)** in August 2019, the annual defence expenditure of China has always remained a mystery. No authentic figure was made available by China. Vastly different figures were quoted by different agencies. For the first time this White Paper has given out some figures. According to the White Paper, from 2012 to 2017, China's defense expenditure increased from US\$98 billion to \$152 billion. Before 2017, its military spending accounted for 1.28 percent of its GDP. During the period, China's GDP and government expenditures grew at an average rates of 9.04 percent and 10.43 percent respectively while its defense expenditures increased by an average of 9.42 percent.

Meanwhile, China's defense expenditures accounted for 5.26 percent of government expenditures on average and 1.28 percent of its GDP, the latter of which compared to Russia's 4.4 percent, the U.S.'s 3.5 percent and India's 2.5 percent. Some of China's military spending are not reported accurately. The expenditure of Chinese state owned enterprises which engage in research and development or even products does not figure in the actual budget numbers. The White Paper lists the costs that are included in China's defence spending calculation but does not provide breakdowns further than personnel, training, and sustainment and equipment expenses. The statistics do not match the figures provided by China's Ministry of Finance, but instead are taken from the National Bureau of Statistics' Statistical Yearbooks.¹¹¹²

¹¹¹² Vivekananda International Foundation Analysis titled "China's Defence White Paper - An Analysis" written by Maj Gen PK Mallick, VSM (Retd) Published by VIF in August 2019 available online at URL: <https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/china-s-defence-white-paper-an-analysis.pdf>

Comparison with India

India and China Defence Expenditure (Nominal)¹¹¹³



Source: Firstpost.com


URL: <https://www.firstpost.com/india/chinas-white-paper-on-defence-should-worry-india-as-beijing-focuses-on-equipment-new-delhis-approach-remains-manpower-heavy-7057141.html>

¹¹¹³ Excerpts from “China's white paper on defence should worry India: As Beijing focuses on equipment, New Delhi's approach remains manpower-heavy” written by Abhijnan Rej, published in July 25, 2019, available online at URL: <https://www.firstpost.com/india/chinas-white-paper-on-defence-should-worry-india-as-beijing-focuses-on-equipment-new-delhis-approach-remains-manpower-heavy-7057141.html>

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The amount that China's spends on new defence equipment compared to India that is the source of the true alarm:

India and China Defence Capital Expenditure (Nominal)¹¹¹⁴



Source: Firstpost.com

URL: <https://www.firstpost.com/india/chinas-white-paper-on-defence-should-worry-india-as-beijing-focuses-on-equipment-new-delhis-approach-remains-manpower-heavy-7057141.html>

B. China's State Council Information Office White paper (2019)

The Chapter V titled “Reasonable and Appropriate Defense Expenditure” of the White Paper China's National Defense in the New Era (July 2019) points out that has provoked and intensified competition among major countries, significantly increased its defense expenditure, pushed for additional capacity in nuclear, outer space, cyber and missile defense, and undermined global strategic stability.¹¹¹⁵ China's armed forces are enhancing institutional innovation in strategic management, defense expenditure management, and the military judicial system.¹¹¹⁶

¹¹¹⁴ Excerpts from “China's white paper on defence should worry India: As Beijing focuses on equipment, New Delhi's approach remains manpower-heavy” written by Abhijnan Rej, published in July 25, 2019, available online at URL: <https://www.firstpost.com/india/chinas-white-paper-on-defence-should-worry-india-as-beijing-focuses-on-equipment-new-delhis-approach-remains-manpower-heavy-7057141.html>

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¹¹¹⁵ Excerpts from China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled “China's National Defense in the New Era”, published in July 2019, Pg 3, available online at URL:

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html


¹¹¹⁶ Ibid Pg 20

Strengthening strategic management: Adopting demand-oriented planning and planning-led resource allocation, China's armed forces have established and improved the strategic management procedures of demand-planning-budgeting-execution-evaluation.¹¹¹⁷

China attends to both development and security. It is making an integrated effort to build a prosperous country and a strong military, and striving for the coordinated development of national defense and the economy. Following the principle of building the armed forces through diligence and thrift, China takes into consideration the development of the economy and the demands of national defense, decides on the appropriate scale and composition of defense expenditure, and manages and applies these funds in accordance with law.¹¹¹⁸

Since reform and opening-up, China has increased its defense expenditure from a level of sustainability to moderate growth. On the whole, defense expenditure has grown in tandem with the growth of the national economy and government expenditure. Defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP has fallen from a peak of 5.43% in 1979 to 1.26% in 2017. It has remained below 2% for the past three decades. Defense expenditure as a percentage of government expenditure was 17.37% in 1979 and 5.14% in 2017, a drop of more than 12 percentage points. The figures are on a clear downward trend.¹¹¹⁹

China's Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of Its GDP (1979-2017)(%)



Source: White Paper (2019), Pg 26


URL:http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

¹¹¹⁷ Ibid Pg 24

¹¹¹⁸ Ibid Pg 25

¹¹¹⁹ Ibid Pg 26

China's Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of Its Government Expenditure (1979-2017) (%)



Source: White Paper (2019), Pg 26

URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

In the new era, to keep pace with the country's modernization, China is focusing on building a fortified national defense and a strong military commensurate with the country's international standing, and its national security and development interests. China is striving to narrow the gap between its military and the world's leading militaries, and make up the deficiencies in the military's capabilities in modern warfare. Defense expenditure is growing steadily and the breakdown of spending is being continuously optimized.

In terms of usage, China's defense expenditure is assigned to three sectors – personnel, training and sustainment, and equipment. Personnel expenses mainly cover the salaries, allowances, food, bedding, clothing, insurance, subsidies and pensions for officers, non-ranking officers, soldiers and contracted civilians, as well as retirees supported from the defense budget. Training and sustainment expenses mainly cover training of the troops, institutional education, construction and maintenance of installations and facilities, and other expenditure on routine consumables. Equipment expenses mainly cover R&D, testing, procurement, repairs, maintenance, transport and the storage of weaponry and equipment. In terms of scope, defense expenditure covers all active forces, reserve forces and militia.

Since 2012, the increase in defense expenditure has been primarily spent for the following purposes:

1. Adapting to national economic and social development, improving the wellbeing of service personnel, ensuring regular increases in military salaries, and bettering the working, training and living conditions of the troops;
2. Increasing input in weaponry and equipment development, phasing out the outdated, upgrading the old, and developing and procuring the new, such as aircraft carriers, fighters, missiles and main battle tanks, to steadily modernize weaponry and equipment;
3. Deepening national defense and military reform, supporting major reforms in military leadership and command systems, force structure and composition, and policies and institutions;
4. Supporting training in real combat conditions, enhancing strategic-level training, joint training at TCs' level and training of services and arms, and improving the conditions for simulated, networked and force-on-force training; and
5. Supporting diverse military tasks including the UNPKOs, vessel protection operations, humanitarian assistance operations and disaster relief efforts.

From 2012 to 2017, China's defense expenditure increased from RMB669.192 billion to RMB1, 043.237 billion. China's GDP and government expenditure grew at average rates of 9.04% and 10.43% respectively, calculated on the price of the indicated years, while its defense expenditure increased by an average of 9.42%.¹¹²⁰ Defense expenditure accounted for 1.28% of GDP and 5.26% of government expenditure on average. The percentage of China's defense expenditure in GDP remained stable and grew in coordination with the increase of government expenditure.

China applies strict mechanisms of fiscal allocation and budget management on its defense expenditure. It pursues a level of defense spending that is demand-oriented, planning-led and consistent with its capacity. It endeavors to strengthen unified management, coordinate existing and incremental expenditure, gradually practice cost-effectiveness management, and steadily press ahead with reform that is centered on efficacy and efficiency. To improve and strengthen budget management, China's armed forces are extending reform of the centralized collection and payment of military funds, accelerating standardization in relation to defense expenditure, and improving the management of assets and funds.


Comparison of Defense Expenditure in the International Context:

Among countries ranking high in defense expenditure in 2017, China's share of defense expenditure in GDP and government expenditure, as well as per capita and per-serviceperson defense spending, are all at a relatively low level. China has become the world's second largest economy. The fact that China's defense expenditure ranks second in the world is determined by the demands of its national defense, the size of its economy, and the defensive nature of its national defense policy. In terms of total spending, China's defense expenditure in 2017 was less than a quarter of that of the US. As a percentage of GDP, from 2012 to 2017, China's average defense expenditure was about 1.3%. Comparative figures were: the US about 3.5%, Russia 4.4%, India 2.5%, the UK

¹¹²⁰ Excerpts from China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled "China's National Defense in the New Era", published in July 2019, Pg 27, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

2.0%, France 2.3%, Japan 1.0%, and Germany 1.2%. China ranks 6th among these countries in terms of defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP on average and is the lowest among the permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC).¹¹²¹


Average Ratio of Defence Expenditure to GDP by Country (2012-017) (%)



Source: White Paper (2019), Pg 29

URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

Average Ratio of Defence Expenditure to Government Expenditure by Country (2012-2017) (%)



Source: White Paper (2019), Pg 29

URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

¹¹²¹ Excerpts from China’s State Council Information Office White paper, titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era”, published in July 2019, Pg 28, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

As a ratio of spending to government expenditure, from 2012 to 2017, China's average defense expenditure was 5.3%. Comparative figures were: the US about 9.8%, Russia 12.4%, India 9.1%, the UK 4.8%, France 4.0%, Japan 2.5%, and Germany 2.8%. China ranks 4th among these countries in terms of defense expenditure as a percentage of government expenditure on average.¹¹²²

China's per capita defense expenditure in 2017 was RMB750 – 5% of the US, 25% of Russia, 231% of India, 13% of the UK, 16% of France, 29% of Japan, and 20% of Germany. China's per-serviceperson defense expenditure was RMB521,600 – 15% of the US, 119% of Russia, 166% of India, 27% of the UK, 38% of France, 35% of Japan, and 30% of Germany. China's defense expenditure ranks 7th and 6th in per capita and per-serviceperson terms respectively among these countries.

China reports and releases its defense expenditure through various mechanisms. Since 1978, the Chinese government has submitted annual budget reports to the National People's Congress and released the total amount of defense budget. In 1995, the Chinese government issued a white paper, *China: Arms Control and Disarmament*, releasing data concerning its defense expenditure to the world. Since 2007, China has joined the *UN Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures* and has submitted annually to the UN the basic data on its defense expenditure for the latest fiscal year, reporting total spending as well as personnel expenses, training and sustainment expenses, and equipment expenses for the active force, reserve force and the militia respectively, along with an explanation of the application of China's defense expenditure and its ratio to GDP.

All in all, China's defense expenditure is open and transparent, and its spending is reasonable and appropriate. Compared to other major countries, the ratios of China's defense expenditure to GDP and to government expenditure, as well as the per capita defense expenditure of the country, remain at a relatively low level.

As the only major country yet to be completely reunified, and one of the countries with the most complex peripheral security environment, China faces serious challenges in safeguarding national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and maritime rights and interests. China is moving closer to the center of the world stage, and the international community expects more international public security goods from the Chinese military. In addition, China's armed forces are moving towards informationization and shouldering arduous tasks in following the trends of worldwide RMA and speeding up RMA with Chinese characteristics. There is still a wide gap between China's defense expenditure and the requirements for safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests, for fulfilling China's international responsibilities and obligations as a major country, and for China's development. In step with national economic development, defense expenditure of China will maintain a moderate and steady growth.¹¹²³

¹¹²² Excerpts from China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled "China's National Defense in the New Era", published in July 2019, Pg 29, available online at URL:

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

¹¹²³ Excerpts from China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled "China's National Defense in the New Era", published in July 2019, Pg 30, available online at URL:

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

Table: Breakdown of China's Defense Expenditure (2010-2017)
(in RMB billion Yuan)

Item Year	Personnel Expense		Training and Sustainment Expense		Equipment Expense		Total
	Amount	Percentage (%)	Amount	Percentage (%)	Amount	Percentage (%)	
2010	185.931	34.9	170.047	31.9	177.359	33.2	533.337
2011	206.506	34.3	189.943	31.5	206.342	34.2	602.791
2012	195.572	29.2	232.994	34.8	240.626	36.0	669.192
2013	200.231	27.0	269.971	36.4	270.860	36.6	741.062
2014	237.234	28.6	267.982	32.3	323.738	39.1	828.954
2015	281.863	31.0	261.538	28.8	365.383	40.2	908.784
2016	306.001	31.3	266.994	27.4	403.589	41.3	976.584
2017	321.052	30.8	293.350	28.1	428.835	41.1	1043.237

Sources: Data on China's defense expenditure submitted to the UN by the Chinese government

Source: White Paper (2019), Pg 39

URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

Table: China's Defense Expenditure Since 2012

Year	GDP (RMB billion)	Total Defense Expenditure (RMB billion)	CPI (Previous Year = 100)	Growth Rate of Government Expenditure (%)	Growth Rate of Defense Expenditure (%)	Defense Expenditure to GDP (%)	Defense Expenditure to Government Expenditure (%)	Real Defense Expenditure Growth Rate (Inflation-adjusted) (%)
2012	54036.74	669.192	102.6	15.29	11.02	1.24	5.31	8.42
2013	59524.44	741.062	102.6	11.32	10.74	1.24	5.29	8.14
2014	64397.44	828.954	102.0	8.25	11.86	1.29	5.46	9.86
2015	68905.21	908.784	101.4	15.87	9.63	1.32	5.17	8.23
2016	74358.55	976.584	102.0	6.75	7.46	1.31	5.20	5.46
2017	82712.17	1043.237	101.6	8.17	6.83	1.26	5.14	5.23

Sources: Statistical yearbooks and government documents released by the Chinese government and data on China's defense expenditure submitted to the UN by the Chinese government

Source: White Paper (2019), Pg 39

URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

C. The Military Balance 2019

Military Balance 2019 has given the following details of the comparative year wise Official defence budget & other military-related expenditure since the year 2017 and 2018.

Chinese Yuan Renminbi	Y	2017	2018
GDP	Y	81.2 trillion	8.86 trillion
	US\$	12.0 trillion	13.5 trillion
Per Capita	US\$	8,643	9,633
Growth	%	6.9	6.6
Inflation	%	1.6	2.2
Defence Expenditure [a]	Y	1.41 trillion	---
	US\$	209 billion	---
Defence Budget [b]	Y	1.02 trillion	1.11 trillion
	US\$	151 billion	168 billion
US\$1=Y		6.76	6.58
[a] official defence budget & other military-related expenditure			
[b] official defence budget			

Source: The Military Balance, Pg 256

D. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019

China's announced annual military budget increase continues more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases, sustaining China's position as the second largest military spender in the world. China has mobilized vast resources in support of defense modernization, including "Made in China 2025" and other industrial development plans, as well as espionage activities to acquire sensitive, dual-use, or military-grade equipment.

China has the political will and fiscal strength to sustain a steady increase in defense spending during the next decade, which will help support PLA modernization, develop an integrated military-civilian defense industry, and explore new technologies with defense applications. China draws from diverse sources to support PLA modernization, including domestic defense investments, domestic defense industrial development, a growing R&D and science and technology (S&T) base, dual-use technologies conveyed in part through civil military integration, and the acquisition of foreign technology and expertise.


China's long-term goal is creating a wholly domestic defense-industrial sector, augmented by a strong commercial sector, to meet the needs of PLA modernization and compete as a top-tier supplier in the global arms trade. However, the PLA still looks to foreign capabilities to fill some critical, near-term capability gaps and accelerate the rate of advancement. China leverages foreign investments, commercial joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), academic exchanges, the experience that Chinese students and researchers gain from studying in foreign nations, state-sponsored

industrial and technical espionage, and the manipulation of export controls for the illicit diversion of dual use technologies to increase the level of technologies and expertise available to support military research, development, and acquisition.

Military Expenditures Trends

China’s announced annual military budget increase sustains China’s position as the second-largest military spender in the world. China’s published military budget omits several major categories of expenditure; actual military-related spending is higher than its official budget.

In early 2018, China announced a 6.1-percent inflation-adjusted increase in its annual military budget, increasing it to \$170.4 billion, approximately 1.3 percent of GDP. This budget continues more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustains China’s position as the second-largest military spender in the world after the United States. China’s defense budget has nearly doubled during the past 10 years – data from 2009 through 2018 indicates that China’s official military budget grew at an annual average of 8 percent in inflation-adjusted terms during that period. China is positioned to support continued defense spending growth for at least the next 5 to 10 years, judging from economic data and growth projections.



Source: Annual Report to congress (2019), Pg. 94
URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

China's Estimated Military Expenditures:

China's published military budget omits several major categories of expenditures, including R&D and foreign weapons procurement. Actual military-related spending is higher than stated in the official budget, estimated at more than \$200 billion in 2018. It is difficult to calculate actual military expenses, largely because of China's poor accounting transparency.

China's Estimated Defense Budget Growth:

Over the next few years, China's official defense budget will likely increase by an annual average of 6 percent, growing to \$260 billion by 2022. This will allow the PLA to dedicate more money for training, operations, and modernization following China's 2015 reforms, which reduced the PLA's size by 300,000 personnel. Economic forecasters project that China's economic growth will slow during the next 10 years, falling from 6.6 percent in 2018 to 3 percent in 2030, which could slow future defense spending growth. Assuming accurate economic projections and a steady defense burden, China will remain the largest spender in the Indo-Pacific region besides the United States.¹¹²⁴

2018 Official Budget Comparison (adjusted for inflation to 2018 USD)

Country	Billion USD
China (Official Budget)	170.4
India	60.8
Japan	47.4
Russia (National Defence Budget)	43.8
South Korea	36.6
Taiwan	10.6

Source: Annual Report to Congress (2019), Pg. 95

URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

E. SIPRI Report

Military expenditure by China as percentage of gross domestic product, 1988-2018 © SIPRI 2019:¹¹²⁵

Year	Percent
1988	---
1989	2.5
1990	2.5
1991	2.3
1992	2.5

¹¹²⁴ Excerpts from Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, issued in May 2, 2019, RefID: E-1F4B924 Pg. 92-95, Available online at URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

¹¹²⁵ SIPRI Report 2019: Military expenditure by country as percentage of gross domestic product, 1988-2018 © SIPRI 2019, available online at URL: <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932018%20as%20a%20share%20of%20GDP%20%28pdf%29.pdf>

1993	2.0
1994	1.7
1995	1.7
1996	1.7
1997	1.7
1998	1.7
1999	1.9
2000	1.9
2001	2.1
2002	2.2
2003	2.1
2004	2.1
2005	2.0
2006	2.0
2007	1.9
2008	1.9
2009	2.1
2010	1.9
2011	1.8
2012	1.8
2013	1.9
2014	1.9
2015	1.9
2016	1.9
2017	1.9
2018	1.9

Source: SIPRI Report 2019

URL: <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932018%20as%20a%20share%20of%20GDP%20%28pdf%29.pdf>

6.9 Annual Work Report tabled at the third session of 13th National People's Congress.

Premier Li Keqiang delivered a government work report including '**a review of our work in 2019 and the first few months of 2020**' on May 22, 2020 on behalf of the State Council to the legislature for deliberation at the third session of the 13th National People's Congress (NPC). Premier Li Keqiang expressed the following points on Defense in his speech to the 13th NPC (3rd Session): ¹¹²⁶

I. Advancing the reform and development of social programs to safeguard and improve living standards

¹¹²⁶ Excerpts from work report including '**a review of our work in 2019 and the first few months of 2020**', available online at URL: <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-22/Full-text-Premier-Li-s-speech-at-the-third-session-of-the-13th-NPC-QHaP1FpB8k/index.html>

- Since last year, we have achieved important progress in strengthening national defense and the armed forces. The people's armed forces demonstrated fine conduct by reacting swiftly to the Party's commands and shouldering heavy responsibilities in COVID-19 control.
- We will thoroughly implement Xi Jinping's thinking on strengthening the armed forces and the military strategy for the new era. We will continue to enhance the political loyalty of the armed forces, strengthen them through reform, science and technology, and the training of capable personnel, and run the military in accordance with law.
- We will uphold the Party's absolute leadership over the people's armed forces and strictly implement the system of ultimate responsibility resting with the chair of the Central Military Commission. We will firmly safeguard China's sovereignty, security, and development interests.
- We will complete the crucial tasks laid down in the 13th Five-Year Plan for the development of the armed forces and draw up the 14th Five-Year Plan. We will deepen reforms in national defense and the military, increase our logistic and equipment support capacity, and promote innovative development of defense-related science and technology. We will improve the system of national defense mobilization and ensure that the unity between the military and the government and between the military and the people remains rock solid.