

Chapter V

5. Foreign Relations

5.1 Institutions of Foreign Policy

The policy paper “New Foreign policy actors in China” published by SIPRI, states that while the highest body of the Communist Party of China (CPC)—the opaque Politburo Standing Committee (PSC)—retains the ultimate decision-making power, the number of actors vying to influence the top leadership’s decisions has expanded considerably. Several other official bodies—CPC organs, government agencies and departments of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—all mould foreign policy thinking and behaviour. Within the Chinese Government bureaucracy, for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is today merely one actor in the realm of foreign policy and not necessarily the most important one. Many of these official actors have diverse perceptions of China’s national interests. Furthermore, China’s foreign policy is also today shaped to some extent by new actors who are not part of the CPC, the central government or the PLA. Experts from universities, research organizations and military academies, chief executives of oil companies and other enterprises, bank directors, local government officials and leading media representatives operate on the margins, outside the traditional centralized confines of the CPC and government. Categorizing foreign policy actors in China is a challenge because of the non-transparent nature of the state. In addition, the distinction between shaping and implementing foreign policy is sometimes elusive.³⁸¹

The Central Organizations of the CPC³⁸²

1. The National Party Congress

The CPC's organ of supreme power, the National Party Congress, held once every five years, is convened by the Central Committee. Its functions and powers are to hear and examine the report of the Central Committee, to hear and examine the report of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, to discuss and decide on major issues of the Party, to revise the Party constitution and to elect the Central Committee and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.

2. The Central Committee

It is elected by the National Party Congress. When the National Party Congress is not in session, the Central Committee leads all the work of the Party and represents the CPC outside the Party. It is elected for a term of five years.

3. The Political Bureau, Its Standing Committee and the General Secretary

³⁸¹ Excerpts from policy paper titled, “New Foreign policy actors in China” published by SIPRI on September 26, 2010, available online at URL: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/120962/SIPRIIPP26.pdf>

³⁸² <https://web.archive.org/web/20160321003554/http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188419.html>

Note: Detailed Information on the organs of the CPC is dealt in Chapter IV of the Compendium, titled ‘Politics’.

They are all elected by the plenary session of the Central Committee. When the plenum of the Central Committee is not in session, the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee exercise the functions and powers of the Central Committee. The Secretariat of the Central Committee is the administrative body of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee. The general secretary of the Central Committee is responsible for calling sessions of both the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee, and is in charge of the work of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Members of the Central Military Commission of the CPC are decided on by the Central Committee.³⁸³

Under the Central Committee of the CPC are such offices and departments as the General Affairs Office, the Organization Department, the Publicity Department, the International Liaison Department, the United Front Work Department and the Policy Research Office.³⁸⁴

Local organizations of the CPC include congresses of various provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government, cities with districts, autonomous prefectures, counties (banners), autonomous counties and cities without districts as well as districts of cities which are held once every five years. The committees elected by the congresses listed above serve a term of five years. Grassroots organizations of the Party, where there are more than three full members of the Party, are set up in enterprises, rural villages, organizations, schools, research institutes, neighbourhoods, the People's Liberation Army companies and other basic units.

Discipline inspection commissions are also set up at various levels of the CPC. Their major tasks are to maintain CPC's constitution and other inner Party rules and regulations, assist Party committees to strengthen the Party style, examine the implementation of the lines, policies, principles and decisions of the Party. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection works under the Party Central Committee. The local discipline inspection commissions work under the dual leadership of the Party committees at the same level and discipline inspection commissions at the next higher level. The term of office of discipline inspection commissions is the same as that of the Party committees.

As of June 2002, the CPC had a total membership of 66.355 million belonging to about 3.5 million grassroots organizations. The People's Daily is the paper of the CPC Central Committee while Seeking Truth is the Party's magazine.³⁸⁵

The Central Committee

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is the highest organ of authority of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during periods when the National Congress of the CCP is not in session. The Central Committee's membership is comprised of the senior-

³⁸³<https://web.archive.org/web/20160321003554/http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188419.htm>

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³⁸⁴<https://web.archive.org/web/20160528050309/http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188420.htm>

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³⁸⁵ Ibid.

General Office of the CPC Central Committee	Director: Li Zhanshu
Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee	Minister: Zhao Leji
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee	Minister: Liu Qibao (Concurrently)
United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee	Minister: Sun Chunlan
International Department of the CPC Central Committee	Minister: Song Tao
Committee of Political and Legal Affairs of the CPC Central Committee (Central Committee for Comprehensive Social Management)	Secretary: Meng Jianzhu
Central Policy Research Office of the CPC Central Committee	Director: Wang Huning (Concurrently)
Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee (Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council)	Director: Zhang Zhijun
International Communication Office of the CPC Central Committee (Information Office of the State Council)	Director: Wang Chen
Office of the Central Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs	Director: Liu He
Office of the Foreign Affairs Leading Group of the CPC Central Committee	Director: Yang Jiechi
Office of Central Institutional Organization Commission	Director: Zhang Jinan
Working Committee of Organs Directly Under the State Council	Secretary: Yang Jing (Concurrently)
Work Committee for Departments Directly Under the CPC Central Committee	Secretary: Li Zhanshu (Concurrently)

Source: <https://web.archive.org/web/20160725155757/http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8223996.html>

Institutions directly under the CPC central committee (as on Oct.2019)

Party School of the CPC Central Committee	Principal: Liu Yunshan
Party Literature Research Centre of the CPC Central Committee	Director: Leng Rong
Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee	Director: Qu Qingshan
Central Compilation and Translation Bureau	Director: Jia Gaojian
People's Daily	President: Yang Zhenwu
Qiushi Magazine	President: Li Jie

Guangming Daily	
China Executive Leadership Academy, Pudong	President: Zhao Leji
China Executive Leadership Academy, Jingtangshan	President: Zhao Leji
China Executive Leadership Academy, Yan'an	President: Zhao Leji

Source: <https://web.archive.org/web/20160725155757/http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8223996.html>

In article published in Xinhua titled “CPC releases plan on deepening reform of Party and state institutions”³⁸⁸ maintains that the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee has released a plan on deepening reform of Party and state institutions and issued a circular asking all regions and departments to implement the plan, according to a document unveiled. Following are details of the plan:

Deepen reform of CPC Central Committee institutions

- Form a national supervisory commission;
- Form a central committee for comprehensive law-based governance;
- Form a central auditing committee;
- The central leading groups for deepening overall reform, cyberspace affairs, financial and economic affairs, and foreign affairs are transformed to be central committees for deepening overall reform, cyberspace affairs, financial and economic affairs, and foreign affairs;
- Form a central leading group for education;
- Form a working committee for central and state organs;
- Form a new Party school of CPC Central Committee (Chinese Academy of Governance);
- Form an institution for Party history and literature research;
- The state commission office of public sectors reform and the work on civil servants will be under the administration of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee;
- The Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee administrates press and publication sector;
- The Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee administrates film sector;
- The United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee exercises unified leadership over the State Ethnic Affairs Commission;
- The United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee administrates religious affairs;
- The United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee administrates overseas Chinese affairs;
- Optimize the functions of the office of the central committee for cyberspace affairs;
- Abolish the Central Leading Group for Safeguarding Maritime Rights and Interests;

³⁸⁸ Excerpts from article titled, “CPC releases plan on deepening reform of Party and state institutions”, published on March 28, 2018, in Xinhuanet, available online at URL: <http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/0322/c90000-9440252.html>

- Abolish the Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security and its office;
- Abolish the Central Leading Group for maintaining stability and its office;
- Transfer the duties of the central leading group for preventing and handling cult issues and its office to the Committee for Political and Legal Affairs of the CPC Central Committee and the Ministry of Public Security;³⁸⁹

The Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group

The policy paper “New Foreign policy actors in China” published by SIPRI, states that major policy decisions in China are deliberated in the Leading Small Groups (LSGs), which are comprised of Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) members and other leading CPC officials. As with the PSC, the agendas and deliberations of the LSGs are not publicized. In addition to the FALSG, decisions affecting foreign policy are deliberated in, among others, the Taiwan Affairs LSG (TALSG) and the Financial and Economic Affairs LSG. Attached to each LSG is an office that conducts research, proposes policies and coordinates activities. The Foreign Affairs Office and the Financial and Economic Affairs Office are exclusively under the CPC, whereas the Taiwan Work Office also reports to the State Council. The Taiwan Work Office oversees all Taiwan-related affairs, including the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, the semi-official organization that holds negotiations on behalf of China with its counterpart in Taiwan.³⁹⁰

In the article titled, “In Xi’s China, the Center Takes Control of Foreign Affairs: Exploring China’s new Central Foreign Affairs Commission”³⁹¹ published by the Diplomat illustrates the change in role of Central Foreign Affairs Commission, it states that on March 21, 2018, during this year’s National People’s Congress, Beijing announced a major reshuffle of government and party institutions. As part of this reform, four leading small groups, including the Leading Small Group (LSG) on Foreign Affairs, were upgraded to Commissions. The Central Foreign Affairs Commission replaces the former Central Leading Small Group on Foreign Affairs as the central institution in charge of coordinating China’s foreign policy. As with the other three commissions, the goal of this change is to strengthen the authority of the Communist Party and improve policy coordination across departments. While the precise difference between a LSG and a commission is unclear, commissions are most likely higher-ranking, more formalized bodies with more bureaucratic power to guide policy.

The establishment of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission appears to strengthen the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China’s foreign policymaking. The new body will likely have a higher standing than the former Foreign Affairs LSG and further side-line the government agencies in charge of foreign policy. Since they were first introduced in the 1950s, the task of Leading Small Groups (LSGs) has been to advise the Party on policies and to coordinate their implementation among all the relevant ministries and departments. The Foreign Affairs LSG, one of the most important among all the groups, was set up in the last shape it took in 1981 and its goal – like that of other LSGs – was to coordinate China’s often disjointed foreign policy. The Foreign Affairs LSG’s

³⁸⁹ <http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/0322/c90000-9440252.html>

³⁹⁰ Excerpts from policy paper titled, “New Foreign policy actors in China” published by SIPRI on September 26, 2010, available online at URL: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/120962/SIPRI26.pdf>

³⁹¹ <https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/in-xis-china-the-center-takes-control-of-foreign-affairs/>

general office, which was likely located inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was reportedly often bypassed by some government agencies because it was seen as low-ranking and ineffective. The group therefore seems to have been incapable of coordinating China’s foreign policy, possibly prompting the upgrade to a Commission. The symbolic value of the upgrade to a commission will most likely improve the group’s standing within the system and signal that disjointed efforts will no longer be tolerated.³⁹²

Information about the group is sparse, however, and there are no historical parallels to draw upon. Observers are likely to lack detailed information regarding possible changes in the functioning, staffing, membership, or budget. The new commission held its first meeting on May 15, 2018, when Xi Jinping was revealed as its head. During the meeting, Xi called for enhancing the party’s centralized and unified leadership over foreign affairs and he pledged to continue promoting the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Official media reports also mentioned that Premier Li Keqiang as deputy head of the Commission and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi as its director of the general office. Vice President Wang Qishan was also identified as a member of the commission. However, it is unclear to what extent this is a major change in terms of membership and ranking, or whether these officials were also members of the Foreign Affairs LSG. This upgrade will further tighten the Party’s control over China’s foreign policy, as presumably all foreign policy decisions will now have to be made or approved by the commission. This will further reduce the limited leeway that ministries had in the past to implement their own initiatives and make their own policy decisions. This recentralization of power could make the foreign policymaking process in China even more inefficient by adding additional layers of bureaucracy.³⁹³

Current Membership (as on 2020)

Leader	Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, President of the People's Republic of China, Chairman of the Central Military Commission
Deputy leader	Li Keqiang, Premier of the People's Republic of China, Politburo Standing Committee member
Chief of General Office and Secretary-General	Yang Jiechi, Politburo member
Group members	Wang Qishan, Vice-President of the People's Republic of China

³⁹² <https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/in-xis-china-the-center-takes-control-of-foreign-affairs/>

³⁹³ <https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/in-xis-china-the-center-takes-control-of-foreign-affairs/>

Other Central Committee organs

Besides the LSGs, at least three other bodies associated with the CPC Central Committee are important in any assessment of the official foreign policy-related actors that Chinese interest groups strive to influence: the Policy Research Office, the General Office and the International Department. The Policy Research Office conducts research, provides advice and drafts policy documents ahead of major decisions. The General Office provides administrative and logistical support to the Politburo. Despite the seemingly mundane nature of its mandate, the General Office is significant because it controls flow of information to decision makers and manages their schedules.³⁹⁴

At least three other CPC departments have limited influence over foreign policy: the Publicity Department, the International Communications Office and the Organization Department. The Publicity Department, formerly known as the Propaganda Department, is tasked with overseeing domestic media and thereby contributes to shaping public perceptions of Chinese foreign policy. It coordinates the Party's message on foreign policy to the media together with the CPC's main newspaper, Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), and Xinhua News Agency. The International Communications Office (better known by its government title, the State Council Information Office) strives to improve the international community's understanding and perception of China. The Organization Department prepares Politburo decisions on appointments and promotions throughout the political system.³⁹⁵

The International Department,³⁹⁶ formerly the International Liaison Department, has broadened its initial focus of liaising with communist and socialist parties and now manages the CPC's ties to virtually all foreign political parties and movements, including the Democratic and Republican parties in the USA. In Europe the International Department has for more than two decades invested substantial effort into building relations with a wide spectrum of political parties. It is also a foreign policy actor because of its instrumental role in formulating China's policy towards North Korea and, to a certain extent, Iran and Myanmar. The long-standing ties between the International Department and the Korean Workers' Party as well as the relationships that Dai Bingguo built with North Korean officials when head of the department (1997–2003) have contributed to the department's special role in China–North Korean relations.³⁹⁷

The CIA Intelligence report titled "The International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party" published in December 1971, released in May 2007, states the following:³⁹⁸

³⁹⁴ Excerpts from policy paper titled, "New Foreign policy actors in China" published by SIPRI on September 26,2010, available online at URL:<https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/120962/SIPRIIPP26.pdf>

³⁹⁵ Excerpts from policy paper titled, "New Foreign policy actors in China" published by SIPRI on September 26,2010, available online at URL:<https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/120962/SIPRIIPP26.pdf>

³⁹⁶ The official name given to the department by the 9th Central Committee is Chung Yang Tui Wai Lien Lo Pu, which more accurately translates as "Central Foreign Liaison Department." However, NCNA and FBIS translate the term as International Liaison Department.

³⁹⁷ Excerpts from policy paper titled, "New Foreign policy actors in China" published by SIPRI on September 26,2010, available online at URL:<https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/120962/SIPRIIPP26.pdf>

³⁹⁸ <https://web.archive.org/web/20120531113802/http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/POLO/polo-33.pdf>

The International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was probably formed in the early 1950s, possibly after a reallocation of the responsibilities of the United Front Department. Throughout the 1950s and the early 1960s, it remained behind the scenes, responsible for contacts, communications, and coordination with other Communist Parties, around the world. It began to be more active with the development of the Sino-Soviet split, when its delegates to foreign Party meetings began to be more vociferous in advancing the CCP cause, searching out independent supporters of their position, the ILD's activities became more important. Organized geographically and working hand-in-hand with Chinese embassies in various countries, the ILD performed the task of finding, investigating and eventually supporting pro-Chinese splinter groups and malcontents, encouraging them to form so-called "Marxist - Leninist" parties in opposition to pro-Soviet "revisionist" parties. In this task the ILD pursued a patient, soft-sell policy, providing funds to keep the promising groups active, and offering political and organizational training on Chinese soil where it was deemed profitable. The ILD appeared to receive high-level supervision from the two ranking members of the Party Secretariat, Tang Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen, and on occasion from Liu Shao-chi, then Mao's designated successor.

The purges of the Cultural Revolution had a tremendous impact on the ILD, both organizationally and operationally. Its top-level leaders and supervisors were wiped out very early in the Revolution, and those who replaced them under the guidance of Kang Sheng and a group of PLA officers, were obliged to implement a counterproductive policy of ideological militancy and organizational interference until this "Revolution Diplomacy" was replaced by a new, more flexible line. In 1968 and much of 1969, the ILD remained ideologically and organizationally incoherent, gradually retreating from policy of giving explicit directions to splinter parties, and trying instead to improve strained relations with ruling Parties in selected countries. Although the department's leadership seemed to be generally in the hands of the PLA under the overall direction of the civilian Kang Sheng.

Prior to 1971, the existence of the ILD was not officially acknowledged. Before the Cultural Revolution, the ILD was reported by different sources to have between 1000 and 1100 members, many of them engaged in research activities. After the Cultural Revolution, Kang Sheng reportedly put the number remaining at 200-300. Formerly, the ILD was organized hierarchically, and geographically, and to a degree, functionally, with the majority of the work being done in the geographic bureaus, of which there were nine. These bureaus were:

- Soviet Union & East Europe
- Korea & Vietnam
- India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Nepal, Indonesia, Malaya
- Japan, Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos
- US, Canada
- Australia, New Zealand
- West Europe
- Africa
- Latin America

It is presumed that this organizational structure was entirely destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. Other events, such as the heightened importance of the Vietnam

conflict, and increasing hostility with the Soviet Union, have probably also brought about changes in the organization.³⁹⁹

In the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping, the ILD expanded its mission to include cultivating relations with non-communist parties, and shed its overtly revolutionary objectives. In this era, the department sought to forge ties with "any foreign political party that was willing to meet with it."⁴⁰⁰ With the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, the ILD's expanded mission of engaging with parties across the political spectrum became more important.⁴⁰¹

There is some disagreement as to present and past responsibilities of the ILD. Basic policies are of course formulated in the Politburo standing committee. Below that level, it is possible to argue, as some observers have – that the ILD as a Part organ is responsible-for the next level of formulation of foreign policy, superior in power to the Ministry of foreign affairs, which is subordinate to the State Council. In other words, it is conceivable that the ILD is the focal point of supervision of the entire foreign affairs apparatus, including the MFA, the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, and other departments.⁴⁰²

Directors of the ILD:⁴⁰³

<u>Wang Jiexiang</u>	1951 – March 1966
<u>Liu Ningyi</u>	June 1966 – April 1968
<u>Geng Biao</u>	January 1971 – January 1979
<u>Ji Pengfei</u>	January 1979 – April 1982
<u>Qiao Shi</u>	April 1982 – July 1983
<u>Qian Liren</u>	July 1983 – December 1985
<u>Zhu Liang</u>	December 1985 – March 1993
<u>Li Shuzheng</u>	March 1993 – August 1997
<u>Dai Bingguo</u>	August 1997 – March 2003
<u>Wang Jiarui</u>	March 2003 – November 2015

³⁹⁹ <https://web.archive.org/web/20120531113802/http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/POLO/polo-33.pdf>

⁴⁰⁰ Brady, Anne-Marie (2003). *Making the foreign serve China: managing foreigners in the People's Republic*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

⁴⁰¹ Sutter, Robert (2011). *Historical Dictionary of Chinese Foreign Policy*. Plymouth, United Kingdom: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group. p. 128.

⁴⁰² <https://web.archive.org/web/20120531113802/http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/POLO/polo-33.pdf>

⁴⁰³ https://web.archive.org/web/20151127102901/http://news.xinhuanet.com/renshi/2015-11/26/c_128471797_2.htm

<u>Song Tao</u>	November 2015 – present
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Source: https://web.archive.org/web/20151127102901/http://news.xinhuanet.com/renshi/2015-11/26/c_128471797_2.htm

Yang Jiechi's role in Foreign Policy

Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in charge of Affairs of North America, Oceania, and Latin America

Born in Shanghai in May 1950, Yang Jiechi is a college graduate. From 1973 to 1975, he pursued study in the London School of Economics and Politics of the UK. From 1975 to 1983, he served in the Department of Translation and Interpretation as section member and Second Secretary. From 1983 to 1987, he was posted in the Chinese Embassy in the US as Second Secretary, First Secretary, and Counsellor. From 1987 to 1990, he served as Counsellor and Division Chief in the Department of Translation and Interpretation. From 1990 to 1993, he served as Counsellor and Director concurrently, and Deputy Director General. From 1993 to 1995, he was posted in the Chinese Embassy in the US as Minister. From 1995 to 1998, he was Assistant Foreign Minister. In 1998, he was appointed Vice-Foreign Minister. In 2001, he was designated Ambassador to the US.⁴⁰⁴

Role of Yang Jiechi in Foreign Policy of China.⁴⁰⁵

- On the morning of April 27, 2007, the 27th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People's Congress voted to appoint Yang Jiechi as the 10th Foreign Minister of New China.
- Yang Jiechi is a representative of China's new generation of diplomats. During his decades of diplomat career, Yang Jiechi set several records in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: In 1998, at the age of 48, he became the youngest deputy minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that time; 2001 In February 2015, he succeeded Li Zhaoxing as China's seventh ambassador to the United States, the youngest ambassador since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States.
- During Yang Jiechi's diplomatic career for many years, he was sent to work overseas three times, and was sent to the same place three times: the Chinese Embassy in the United States. Yang Jiechi is a veritable "American Pass".
- On the morning of May 19, 2007, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held the first "Public Open Day" in 2007. Yang Jiechi gave a presentation to more than 180 visitors from all over the country about his current diplomatic work: "Current China's National Power Strengthen, more Chinese citizens go abroad, we must emphasize 'diplomacy for the people', and emphasize mutual benefit, win-win, and common development, our path will be wider and wider! "Harmonious world is used to promote China's peaceful development, but also China Peaceful development to promote a more harmonious world. "Peaceful development" and "harmonious world" is a dream that Yang Jiechi and all Chinese people are striving

⁴⁰⁴ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/wjrw_665549/lrfbjbztl_665553/t40510.shtml

⁴⁰⁵ <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64172/85037/85038/6751600.html>

for. Today, Yang Jiechi is confidently and freely showing the unique style and charm of a rising power on the world diplomatic stage.⁴⁰⁶

- In the new leadership line-up following the 19th Party Congress, Yang Jiechi deserves special attention as the new arbiter of China's foreign affairs. His promotion to the Politburo, with the prospect of becoming Vice-Premier taking overall charge of foreign affairs across multiple portfolios, restores the top diplomat's status to the level once enjoyed by his former mentor Qian Qichen. Yang also paved the way for a more dynamic and open public diplomacy that has been used to great effect, particularly by Xi Jinping.⁴⁰⁷
- **Fixer of Sino-US relations.** His skills proved particularly useful at critical junctures of Sino-US relations, such as in April 2001, when a US EP-3 spy plane collided with a Chinese J-8 interceptor fighter jet over international waters off China's southern coast. The mid-air collision, occurring only three months after Yang commenced his ambassadorship in Washington, resulted in the death of the Chinese pilot and forced the U.S. plane to land on Hainan Island, with its 24-crew members detained by the Chinese authorities. Washington demanded the immediate release of the crew, but Beijing wanted a formal apology first. Washington refused to apologize, insisting it had done nothing wrong. The standoff became so intense that waves of public antagonism and nationalistic sentiments swept across China and parts of the United States. According to Chinese sources, in the days following the incident, Yang Jieshi made multiple visits to the State Department and Congress to lobby key individuals and became a frequenter of the White House, then occupied by George W. Bush. Yang took credit for the good rapport developed between Xi and Donald Trump at recent summits (SCMP, October 25, 2017). In February 2018, he visited the US and met with President Donald Trump during rising trade tensions between the two countries.⁴⁰⁸ He was active in the lead-up to the party congress, and took credit for establishing a personal rapport between Xi and US President Donald Trump, and bringing an end to China's 10-week border stand-off with India.⁴⁰⁹
- During Yang's tenure as Foreign Minister (2007-2013) Beijing began to promote its public diplomacy in a big way. Veteran diplomats and distinguished scholars were enlisted to form the Public Diplomacy Advisory Panel and the second-track Public Diplomacy Association was also established. The MFA's public diplomacy unit was upgraded, with its name changed, first from Gongzhong to Gonggong Waijiaochu and then to Gonggong Waijiao Bangongshi to reflect its expanded focus (MFA, December 26, 2012). Yang also opened the Foreign Ministry's doors to the public through such activities as Open Days and the Blue Room Forums.⁴¹⁰
- **Back in His Element?** Having now consolidated his power, Xi is vigorously pushing ahead with his mega-projects like the Belt and Road Initiative and "a new

⁴⁰⁶ <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64172/85037/85038/6751600.html>

⁴⁰⁷ A report titled, "Yang Jiechi: Xi Jinping's Top Diplomat Back in His Element" published in China Brief <https://jamestown.org/program/yang-jiechi-xis-top-diplomat-back-element/>

⁴⁰⁸ <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1094795.shtml>

⁴⁰⁹ <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2116978/its-good-day-chinas-diplomats-foreign-policy-chief>

Note: More information on Yang Jiechi's role in India-China Border talks can be accessed here:

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/yang-jiechi-may-continue-as-chinas-special-representative-on-border-talks-with-india/articleshow/61594149.cms?from=mdr>

⁴¹⁰ <https://jamestown.org/program/yang-jiechi-xis-top-diplomat-back-element/>

type of major power relations”, a catchphrase reportedly coined by Yang with his brother Jiemian, a noted strategic analyst.

- The State councillor and head of China’s foreign policy establishment was promoted to the 25-member Politburo, making him the most powerful foreign affairs official since Qian Qichen, a vice-premier and foreign policy guru under Jiang Zemin, who retired in 2003. The move not only recognises Yang’s ability and personal contribution to implementing Xi Jinping’s assertive foreign policy, but also provides a boost to China’s diplomatic establishment as the country seeks to expand its interests and influence in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Although he has spent the past 10 years as a member of the Central Committee, Yang has not had access to the highest ranks of power. And while he is not generally viewed as part of Xi Jinping’s inner circle, having a seat on the Politburo will undoubtedly give him more influence and better access to the president’s ear.⁴¹¹

Sino-Soviet Relations

I. Developments on the Diplomatic front

In the early years after its birth, New China established diplomatic relations with the USSR, other socialist countries and some friendly countries. China publicly declared that it stood on the side of socialism. Following the establishment of Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, an important question calling for prompt solution in Sino-Soviet relations was how to handle the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed by Old China and the Soviet Union so as to set forth a new the guiding principles and legal basis for the new Sino-Soviet relations in a changed situation. During his visit to the Soviet Union in the winter of 1949, Mao Zedong suggested to Stalin that a new treaty be signed by the two countries to replace the outdated Sino-Soviet Treaty. To this the Soviet side agreed. Subsequently, Premier Zhou Enlai led a Chinese Government Delegation to the Soviet Union for the negotiations. On 14 February 1950, the two sides signed the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance" and other agreements. The Foreign Ministers of the two countries exchanged three notes, declaring null and void the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and the other agreements which were signed by the Soviet Government and the Kuomintang Government of China on 14 August 1945. The "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance" consisted of a preface and six articles and remained in force for a term of thirty years.⁴¹²

China Daily published (June 7, 2019) “A timeline of China-Russia relations”. Marking 2019 as the 70th anniversary of the establishment of China-Russia diplomatic ties. Chronology of **Diplomacy** major moments between the two countries mentioned :

- **Oct. 2, 1949** China established diplomatic relations with the former Soviet Union, whose international role was succeeded by Russia in 1991 after the former's disintegration.

⁴¹¹“It’s a good day for China’s diplomats as foreign policy chief lands seat on Politburo”
<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2116978/its-good-day-chinas-diplomats-foreign-policy-chief>

⁴¹²https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18011.shtml

- **July 16, 2001** China and Russia signed a good-neighbour treaty of friendship and cooperation to ensure long-term development of bilateral relations.⁴¹³

The following is a translation of Part I, General Remarks, of the 1971 Diplomatic Bluebook, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, covering the one year period from April 1971 to March 1972.

Relations between China and the Soviet Union

Sino-Soviet relations since September 1969 have had two aspects-one being the continuation of the confrontation over ideology and party relations and the other being the intentions to improve State relations. However, since the violent exchange of mutual criticisms within and outside the United Nations in and after November 1971 and also during the Indo-Pakistan War, their relations appear to have deteriorated a little recently.

1. Between the latter half of 1969 and the summer of 1971

It seems that Sino-Soviet relations had two aspects -confrontation over party relations and ideology and moves toward the normalization of State relations.

2. Between Nixon's announcement of his visit to China (July 15, 1971) and mid-September

The Soviet Union assumed a cautious attitude toward moves of the People's Republic of China, including President Nixon's announcement of his visit to China, and took steps that seems designed to counter them. Such Soviet moves included the following:

- Holding of a conference of the COMECON members, except Romania, in the Crimea on August 20;
- Publication of a critical theoretical thesis in Pravda dated September 4;
- Distribution of the above-mentioned thesis at the United Nations; and
- Intensification of the Soviet Union's diplomacy of exchanging visits, including General Secretary Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia and France.

3. Between mid-September and mid-November

An abnormal phenomenon was seen in the field of domestic politics in the People's Republic of China in early and mid-September, and the Soviet Union again relaxed a little the frequency and intensity of its criticism toward China. The People's Republic of China also showed moves that can be taken as reflecting a flexible attitude toward the Soviet Union, such as sending a congratulatory telegram to the Soviet Union on November 7 on the anniversary of the October Revolution, which was more friendly in tone than its telegram sent the previous year.

4. Between December and Nixon's visit to China

Sino-Soviet relations showed signs of deterioration, with the exchange of mutual criticisms in the United Nations and also during the **Indo-Pakistan War which seems to have been a turning point**. For example:

⁴¹³ http://www.china.org.cn/world/2019-06/07/content_74864122.htm

- The Soviet Union severely criticized the People's Republic of China in Pravda and Izvestia, and Pravda, dated December 22, criticized Premier Chou En-lai by name.
- The People's Republic of China, in the joint New Year's Day editorial of its three major newspapers, also criticized the Soviet Union in the most violent language ever used in their New Year editorials in recent years.
- Tension was reported on the Sino-Soviet border where the situation reportedly had been quiet since the autumn of 1969. It was also reported that Chinese from Sin-kiang Province sought refuge in the Soviet Union.
- During Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Japan, the People's Republic of China showed to a mission from Japan, which included members of the General Council of Trade Unions (Sohyo), a listing of 11 items showing that the Soviet Union was responsible for the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations.

5. After Nixon's visit to China

In connection with Nixon's visit to China, the Soviet Union severely attacked the "Sino-American rapprochement." Later, in a speech on March 20, General Secretary Brezhnev stated to the effect that the Soviet Union had no objections to the establishment of Sino-Soviet relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence. In view of the fact that the principles had been espoused by the People's Republic of China ever since October 1969 as a fundamental rule to govern Sino-Soviet relations, the move on the part of the Soviet Union to recognize them, even provisionally, is regarded as a new development in Sino-Soviet relations.⁴¹⁴

In April 1979, China notified the Soviet Union that it would not renew the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty, but at the same time it proposed negotiations for improvement of relations between the two countries.⁴¹⁵

During the Sino-Soviet dispute in the late 1960s and 1970s, the leaders of the USSR seriously contemplated a nuclear strike against China in response to fighting on the border. Mao responded to overtures from President Nixon and turned towards the US for hard balancing against the Soviet Union. Over the next decade relations stabilized in implacable confrontation. There was always a danger of renewed border clashes over disputed territory escalating into more serious conflict. The Soviet army massively expanded its forces in Siberia and the Far East, posing a continuous threat to Beijing. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan exacerbated Chinese concerns about possible Soviet expansion in Asia and kept them on high alert. Until at least the mid-1980s the official line in Beijing remained the inevitability of war, probably nuclear, with the Soviet Union seen as the most likely adversary. Since then relations have gradually improved. Gorbachev was the first to seek détente. He proposed mutual withdrawals of troops from the border, and this quite quickly evolved into relieved reconciliation. This process was disrupted by the collapse of the Soviet Union, but as early as 1992 China and Russia

⁴¹⁴ <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1971/1971-1-3.htm>

⁴¹⁵ Excerpts from Chapter One: Major International Developments in 1979 available online at URL: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1980/1980-1.htm>

signed an agreement on friendly relations, and this was consolidated with a Treaty for Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation in 2001.⁴¹⁶

6. Friendship Pact: a New Stage in Sino-Russian Relations⁴¹⁷

China and Russia signed 'The Treaty of Good-neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation' and issued joint statement during Chinese President Jiang Zemin's state-visit to Russia from July 15-18, 2001. The new treaty is a "milestone" in Sino-Russian relations, providing both a legal and political basis for the two countries to develop stable bilateral relations in the new century.

i) The new treaty has far-reaching significance.

Sino-Russian relations have long been fruitful, benefiting the two countries and the two peoples and contributing to the world peace and security. To sum up valued experience into a legalized document will help instruct the future bilateral relations of the two countries.

The new treaty is the first new friendship treaty since the Sino-Soviet pact in 1950. The new treaty will set up a new-type of interstate relations, different from those agreed to in the 1950s. It is "not directed against any third country" nor does it impose any obligations to each other. The only goal of the treaty is to enhance the strategic relations between China and Russia and to provide a basis for world peace and stability. The two sides also agreed not to aim their strategic nuclear weapons at each other and said they would work to solve any dispute peacefully. "If a threat of aggression arises," the treaty states, the two sides "will immediately make contact with each other and hold consultations in order to eliminate the emerging threat."⁴¹⁸

The two countries also reaffirmed their faith in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and advocated the reduction of strategic offensive weapons according to the ABM treaty. A multi-polar world is suggested in the treaty to help establish a fair and just new international order. The new treaty was described by Russian President Vladimir Putin as an instructive documents oriented to the "new era". Chinese President Jiang Zemin said that the treaty will "enhance mutual trust politically, deepen traditional friendship of the two countries, enlarge bilateral cooperation, promote co-development, open up a new chapter for the Sino-Russian relations." The signing of the treaty is of landmark significance in China-Russian relations. The two countries will "remain friends forever and never become enemies," which conveys the wishes of the two peoples.

ii) With the signing of the treaty, Sino-Russian relations have stepped into a new stage of all-around cooperation.⁴¹⁹

Politically, the Sino-Russian good-neighbourly treaty of friendship and cooperation will put the strategic and synergic partnership between China and Russia into a more vigorous phase. The ideal of "good neighbour, good partner and good friend" has been

⁴¹⁶ Excerpts from FIIA REPORT 30 ISBN 978-951-769-315-8 ISSN 1458-994X www.fiaa.fi *Russia-China relations Current state, alternative futures, and implications for the West*, Arkady Moshes & Matti Nojonen (eds.) https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/132874/FIIA_Report_30_web.pdf

⁴¹⁷ <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Jul/16355.htm>

⁴¹⁸ <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Jul/16355.htm>

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

accepted by the Russian administration and has become a common view of Russian people. A poll on June 21 indicated that 22.9 percent of Russians believe that China is the second “steady ally and partner” of Russia, next to Belarus. The friendly civil trust between two countries lays a solid foundation for the further development of the bilateral relations.

As far as security goes, a new type of inter-state relationship has been set up. This is not a military or political alliance and never aims at a third country or country group. A peaceful environment is vital for both China and Russia to implement their domestic reforms and economic development. Sino-Russian good-neighbourly and friendly relations are good for the peace and security of world and Asia-Pacific regions and will become crucial to maintain world peace and security. To strengthen this new type of international relations conforms to the essential interests of both countries’ people, and it is good for world and regional peace, stability and development and promotes the world multi-polarization process, and paves the way to the new international political and economic order of justice and rationality.

In economics, substantial progress is constantly being made between the two countries. The Sino-Russia trade volume in the first quarter hit US\$3.1 billion or 51 percent higher than last year when it totalled US\$8 billion. Both sides upgraded their military collaboration in stealth technology and super computers. Based on the achievement of the new treaty, the contact of the two countries’ premiers in the second half-year will hasten the step of Sino-Russia economic and trade cooperation.⁴²⁰

iii) The new treaty between China and Russia will lead to better international understanding.

Both countries are willing to strengthen their all-round cooperation on the model of non-alliances to meet the challenge of multi-polarization and economic globalization. In helping to establish a multi-polar world, China and Russia reached a common agreement. Both of them agree on the principle of a multi-polar world and oppose solar-polarism and hegemonism to safeguard world peace and stability. When meeting Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan this April, President Putin reiterated that promoting multi-polarisation would benefit a stable “international safety pattern.” Not long ago, Putin emphasized again during a summit with his French counterpart that he will do his utmost to establish a multi-polar world. In regard to missile defence, both Russia and China firmly advocate keeping the ABM treaty signed in 1972. Both oppose the National Missile Defence system as well as any other form which might harm the current international strategic stability.

As for democracy and human rights, both sides are against external interference. Russia and China are able to solve their own problems and do not need any outside help: as the Chechen issue is an internal affair of Russia, so Taiwan and Tibet are internal affairs of China. Russia and China also will maintain close contact with and involvement in the United Nations. Currently some Western countries are trying to lessen the importance of the UN so as to weaken the influence of Russia and China in international affairs. Russia

⁴²⁰ <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Jul/16355.htm>

and China intend to fight back by working together to uphold the UN's involvement in international security and to work to reform the UN from within.

In regional cooperation, Russia plans to improve its relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States while Jiang's visit to the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova will further promote China's cooperation with this region. In Europe, recently, the relations between Russia and Europe have achieved overall progress, and China and Europe are also moving closer. In South Asia, Russia is furthering bilateral ties with India and modifying its relations with Pakistan. The relations between China and Pakistan are still strengthening, while Sino-Indian relations are also gradually improving. In Northeast Asia, Russia and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) have resumed their relations, while China and the DPRK continue their good relations. Both China and Russia are working actively for peace on the Korean Peninsula. In addition, the two sides also share many common views on such sensitive issues as the Middle East, the Balkan Peninsula and Afghanistan.

On economic globalization, both countries maintain that a new international order of justice and rationality should be established, and both have actively participated in the process. At present, both countries are bidding for entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO). China's rounds of negotiations are drawing to an end, and Russia's are proceeding smoothly. Both countries share a common concern about how to protect their national interests after their entry into the WTO. The signing of the new treaty means that China and Russia will push their bilateral cooperation further in both politics and trade. The two sides will carry out more collaboration in large projects, such as the transportation of oil, gas and electricity, the construction of nuclear power plants in east China and the cooperation in military technology. It is expected that the friendly and cooperative Sino-Russian relations can boost the common prosperity of the two countries in the new century and set a model for new international relations.⁴²¹

7. The United States in the cause and consequence of the Sino-Soviet split.⁴²²

The United States had been one of the principal causes of the Sino-Soviet dissension dating back to Nikita Khrushchev's promotion of peaceful coexistence in the mid-1950s (Griffith 1964; Luthi 2008a; Radchenko 2009; Zagoria 1964). In 1962-1963, when the Soviet Union and the United States found a "community of interest" in jointly thwarting the Chinese nuclear program and China defined it as a "Soviet-American alliance" (Chang 1990) was the disagreements about the intentions and capabilities of the United States that irrevocably drove the two allies apart (Westad 1996, 180). In particular, the Sino-Soviet contention over peaceful coexistence following the Soviet launch of the Sputnik in 1957, the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, and the Khrushchev-Eisenhower summit in 1959 amidst Soviet-American discussions toward a moratorium on nuclear testing made the relationship between Mao Zedong and Khrushchev particularly acrimonious (Chang 1988; Gobarev 1999; Jacobson 1996; Shen and Xia 2012). During this time, however, their tensions were basically confined to ideological polemics and involved no critical turn around in their primary enemy designation neither toward each other nor the United States. Both China and the Soviet Union wished to avoid being the first one to break, and they continued to pay lip service to the imperative of a fraternal ideological alliance. China's radicalism and inward focus during the Great Leap Forward precluded

⁴²¹ <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Jul/16355.htm>

⁴²² http://www.kjjs.org/journal/view.html?uid=133&page=&sort=&scale=10&all_k=&s_t=&s_a=&s_k=&s_v=12&s_n=1&spage=&pn=search&year=&vmd=Full

any likelihood of change toward the United States and Khrushchev continued to vacillate between provoking and placating the United States (Zubok 1996). Thus during this time, common ideology basically served to “limit the dispute and prevent it from erupting into an open split” (Zbigniew 1961, 434).

But after the summer of 1962, the Sino-Soviet split began to effect changes in their respective positions toward the United States. This involved different protagonists and issues over time. First, from the second half of 1962, against the backdrop of a significant radicalization of Chinese foreign policy and increasing Soviet-American perception of a community of interests in checking Chinese militancy, the Soviet Union began to seek accommodations with the United States over the issue of nuclear non-proliferation and test ban treaty. Punctuated by the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet action in this direction eventually culminated in the conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) with the United States and the United Kingdom in the July 1963. Denounced as a Soviet-American “alliance” against China by Mao Zedong and his associates, this represented a significant turning point in the long history of the Sino-Soviet conflict because it resulted in an unprecedented level of cooperation between Washington and Moscow over an issue that had antagonized Sino-Soviet relations since the 1950s (Amardeep 2004; Clemens 1968; Burr and Richelson 2000; Mastny 2008; Li 2011; Niu 2006; See 2002). Second, from 1965-1966, China began to redefine the United States as a limited threat (Connolly 2005; Hershberg and Chen 2006; Akira 1968; Lumbers 2004; Lawson 1984; Rogers 1976; Zagoria 1967; Zhai 2001), but in contrast hyperbolized the danger of Soviet revisionism against the backdrop of the Vietnam War and the Cultural Revolution. The Soviet Union returned to advancing detente with the United States starting in late 1966. From 1967-1968, both China and the Soviet Union regarded each other as the primary adversary, effectively replacing each other with the United States in this designation. During this time, China continued to be regarded as a cautious revolutionary by the United States.⁴ The Soviet Union displayed a stronger willingness to achieve cooperation with the United States on a limited number of issues and became deeply anxious about the possibility of Sino-American rapprochement. Through this process, it became impossible for China and the Soviet Union to be bound by a common ideological foundation built on an agreement of the United States as the primary adversary (Westad 1996). This in turn predisposed them to rapprochement with the United States.

Therefore the Sino-Soviet conflict since the summer of 1962 represented a qualitatively different phase, one that began to involve changes toward the United States on the part of either one of the two protagonists or both; this in turn signalled the incorporation of strategic dimensions in their rivalry, in addition to the ideological contest. The consequences the Sino-Soviet split had on their respective positions toward the United States shows why the Cold War from 1962 can be described as a “multilateral permanent truce” rather than “bipolar brinkmanship” (Zubok and Pleshakov 1996, 7-8). The periodic focus of the present study falls within this period of a “multilateral permanent truce,” because both Moscow and Beijing began to redefine their positions toward Washington. Once their conflict began to result in change toward the United States, the Sino-Soviet split reached the point where ideology could no longer hold them together, confirming Walt’s earlier argument that “an ideology that directs its adherents to form a single centralized movement is more likely to be divisive than unifying” (Walt 1997, 157). After this point on, both as strategic and/or ideological threats, the antagonism toward each other became the predominant feature of Soviet and Chinese policy. In contrast, their

contradictions with the United States receded in the order of priorities. To substantiate the analytic and conceptual validity of highlighting the role of the United States in the consequence of the Sino-Soviet split, the following sections will elaborate on the Chinese and Soviet understatement of anti-American imperialism and eventual move toward a search for a constructive relationship from 1965-1968.⁴²³

8. The Making of a Cold War Turning Point: The Sino-Soviet Split

In the middle of the nineteenth century, Russia began a process of eastward expansion that established the context of Sino-Russian relations for the next 150 years. Between 1858 and 1860, Russia joined Britain and France in imposing a series of “unequal treaties” on China. In addition to trade concessions, Russia also took over a million square kilometres of territory including portions of China’s western border near Xinjiang and the Maritime Province to the east that included the modern day city of Vladivostok. Later in 1898, Russia seized the southern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula securing the ice free port at Lushun (Port Arthur). Throughout their history, China and Russia maintained tense relations but forged alliances in response to common threats. In addition, the two countries shaped relations with each other in response to the larger geo-political situation in Asia. Therefore, one cannot completely understand Chinese or Russian foreign policy without surveying the interaction of the two. Russia continued this expansion during the twentieth century. In the final days of the Second World War, 1.5 million Soviet troops occupied Manchuria and North Korea. On August 14, 1945, the same day that Japan surrendered, Joseph Stalin signed a treaty with Chiang Kaishek giving Russia control of key railroads and ports in Manchuria.⁹ Stalin also occupied Outer Mongolia with 100,000 men as Soviet advisors took over the government in Ulan Bator. Engineered by the Soviets, Outer Mongolia held a referendum on October 25, 1945 in which 98.4 percent of eligible voters favoured independence from China. The Nationalist government formally recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia in January of the following year.

In 1950, as Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin initiated a Sino-Soviet alliance, Stalin forced territorial concessions on Mao under the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. Later in 1969, the Soviet Union and China came to the brink of major war along the border contributing to the Sino-Soviet split. After the Cold War, China and Russia settled their border dispute in July 2008. However, Russia still occupies a vast amount of Chinese territory, and the potential for conflict still remains. China and Russia developed their relationship in an environment of tension and mistrust, but when necessary, the two formed strategic alliances in response to common threats. As Japan expanded onto the Asian mainland, China and Russia joined forces to counter Japanese expansion. In 1896, the two nations entered a short lived alliance after Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Later in 1931, the Soviet Union and Nationalist China signed a non-aggression pact as Japanese forces invaded Manchuria. During the Japanese occupation of China, the Soviet Union provided military assistance to both the Guomindang (GMD) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who had

⁴²³Excerpts from report titled “The Making of a Cold War Turning Point: The Sino-Soviet Split and the Prelude to Detente with the United States, 1965-1968” published by The Korean Journal of International Studies, available online at URL:

http://www.kjis.org/journal/view.html?uid=133&page=&sort=&scale=10&all_k=&s_t=&s_a=&s_k=&s_v=12&s_n=1&spage=&pn=search&year=&vmd=Full

joined forces forming the Second United Front. After World War II, the United States replaced Japan as the binding element of a Sino-Soviet partnership. The Chinese Civil War resumed in 1947 as GMD and CCP forces dissolved the Second United Front. The United States backed the Nationalists, and the Soviet Union supported the CCP. Following the communist victory in 1949, Mao Zedong leaned towards the Soviet Union based on common interests and ideology. Thereafter, the US faced the combined weight of the Sino-Soviet alliance in Asia for twenty years. In those two decades, the PRC and 5 Soviet Union supported North Korea and North Vietnam in two major wars against the United States. China and Russia calculated their alliance based on national interests, but also adjusted their relationship in response to broader geopolitics. At the turn of the twentieth century, Russia joined China opposing Japanese expansion into East Asia. However, Russia later allied with Japan in 1914 allowing Russian military forces to shift from Asia to Europe during the First World War. During World War II, the Soviet Union signed a neutrality pact with Japan in 1941 for the same motive. China also responded to changing geopolitics. In the middle of the Cold War, Beijing dissolved its alliance with the Soviet Union after the United States redefined US-China relations.⁴²⁴

The CIA Intelligence report titled "The International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party" published in December 1971, released in May 2007, states the following:⁴²⁵

With the decline in "revolutionary diplomacy" after mid-1967 and the perceived military threat from the **Soviet Union** after autumn 1968, ILD policy began to reflect the change in the thinking of the CCP leadership. In late 1969, the ILD, although still in a state of organizational disorder, began to implement a policy-of reconciliation with the CCP's various potential allies. This included a gradual warming of Party relations with North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, North Korea, the Laotian Patriotic Front, and Rumania. As the ILD has itself consolidated, it has continued to play a major role in maintaining these good relations.

Relations with Communist Government/Parties

By 1963, the **Sino-Soviet split** and its world-wide repercussions in the Communist movement had significantly cut down the number and frequency of the CCP's party contacts and functions with other Bloc countries. Not that the ILD was out of work, but there was probably much less overt work for it to do in this field than in earlier periods of international Communist amicability.

With the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, China's Party relations decreased even more. Like most capitalist and neutral nations, China's few Communist 'allies' generally reacted very coldly to Maoist "Red Guard diplomacy," with the result that both Party and state relations with other socialist countries declined steadily.

Relations with the **CPSU** and with the strongly **pro-Soviet Parties of East Europe** and the Mongolian People's Republic were totally ruptured, and reflected open hostility.

⁴²⁴ http://www.kjis.org/journal/download_pdf.php?doi=10.14731/kjis.2014.06.12.1.113

⁴²⁵ <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010043-9.pdf>

Mao ordered a pullback from "revolutionary diplomacy" in August 1967, but it was only gradually that this policy began to be reflected in improved relations with various Communist regimes.

The CCP's posture toward Cuba's party, however, appeared to remain cool and distant. The **Soviet Union** continued, of course, to be an object of scorn, while its East European allies were only slightly less disparaged. The few delegations from these latter countries that did visit Peking received quiet, unheralded receptions, strictly in accordance with formal protocol, and attended only by a few government and military personnel.

It would appear, then, that pragmatism began to take precedence over ideology during the post-Cultural Revolution period, and particularly since the **Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia** in August 1968 and the bloody **Sino-Soviet clashes of early 1969**, China needed allies, if only to exert opinion-pressure on the Soviets to dissuade them from what the Chinese may have considered as impending military action.

Outside of Asia, the Chinese have seemed particularly concerned with maintaining good Party relations with Rumania. **Rumania's anti-Soviet tendency** has provided sufficient assurance for the Chinese to develop Party relations.

There has been considerable speculation that China is developing relations with Rumania and Yugoslavia with the intent of consolidating an **anti-Soviet bloc** in Eastern Europe consisting of these two new friends and Albania.

Relations with Opposition and Splinter Communist Parties: The more important of the ILD's tasks in the Cultural Revolution period and for a short time thereafter (as it had been ever since the emergence of Sino-Soviet rivalry) was the identification, instruction, and support of Communist Party groups favourable to Peking in foreign countries. This function, although certainly less important now than is the ILD's participation in the maintenance of state/Party relations with certain countries, is still-actively carried-out by the ILD today.⁴²⁶

II. Developments on the Political Front

i) Background.

The term "Sino-Soviet Split" refers to the gradual worsening of relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and between their respective Communist Parties. While discomfiture between them had long roots, reaching back to civil wars in China prior to the establishment of the People's Republic, the disagreements gained momentum in the decades after China's liberation and would eventually lead to the Soviets referring to the Chinese as "splittists", "left-wing adventurists", "anti-Marxist" enemies of Socialism "in league with Imperialism", while the Chinese came to regard the Soviets as "revisionists" and "social-imperialists", or "socialist in words, imperialists in deeds", and as "the principal danger in the world today." Graduating from words to deeds, the conflict was expanded from an ideological one between two political parties to a conflict between nation states as relations between the USSR and the PRC were severed and, in 1969, their troops clashed across their common border.⁴²⁷

⁴²⁶ <https://web.archive.org/web/20120531113802/http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/POLO/polo-33.pdf>

⁴²⁷ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/index.htm>

Though various authors place emphases differently, it's pretty generally agreed that the main issues separating the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) revolved around the questions of evaluation of Stalin, "Peaceful Coexistence", "Peaceful Transition to Socialism", and War and Imperialism. Briefly:

1. On Stalin: The CPC objected to the CPSU de-Stalinization campaign, arguing that the general line of the International Communist Movement (ICM) had been correct during Stalin's tenure, that he was not just a Russian or Soviet leader, but a leader of world stature with a world-wide legacy which could not be swept aside by the CPSU leadership, and that overall, his successes outweighed his failings.

2. On War: Whereas the CPSU recognized the power of the imperialist coalition arrayed against the socialist bloc and saw disastrous consequences for the world as a whole from nuclear war, the CPC tended to disparage the imperialists, a sentiment echoes in Mao's famous aphorism that "Imperialists are paper tigers", and instead spoke of turning world war into revolutionary war.

3. On Peaceful Coexistence: Deriving from its views on the dangers of nuclear war, the CPSU saw coexistence with the West as in the mutual interest of both systems. The Chinese saw this as capitulation.

4. Peaceful Transition: The CPSU and its allied parties advocated using democratic and peaceful means to advance the struggles of the working class and toward winning state power wherever those means were available. The CPC, on the other hand, disparaged such methods and proposed that the need for revolutionary war in order to seize power was a universal law of class struggle.

The conflict wound down after the death of Mao Zedong and the end of the Cultural Revolution in China. In the 1980s, relations between the two countries were normalized, and any remaining conflicts were more or less rendered moot by the dissolution of the USSR. Nonetheless, thanks in part to the Chinese flooding the world with pamphlets outlining their views, and mainly to the importance of the two countries and the issues they brought up, for a large portion of the latter half of the Twentieth Century whether one was "Pekingese" or "Muscovite" was pretty much the question for the world's non-Trotskyist Left.

ii) Points of Departure

In 1956, at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Nikita Khrushchev delivered a report criticizing Stalin. This report caused quite a stir internationally when it's text was released. The CPC quickly expressed its disagreement with Khrushchev's report. As part of these exchanges, the CPC published "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (April, 1956) and "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (December, 1956), seeking to refute several points made in Khrushchev's report.

- **Speech by Nikita Khrushchev to the 20th Congress of the CPSU** (February 24, 1956)⁴²⁸
- **On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat** (April 5, 1956) by the Editorial Department of Renmin Ribao⁴²⁹
- **More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat** (December 29, 1956) by the Editorial Department of Renmin Ribao.⁴³⁰

In this context of growing dissent, a series of meetings of the world's Communist Parties were staged. The two principal such meetings were those held in Moscow in 1957 and 1960. Though ostensibly to build the unity of the Communist Movement, they were dominated by the widening rift between the CPSU and the CPC, and at each both sides fought to have their views incorporated into the final documents. Although China could count on the unqualified support of only the Albanian delegation, it reportedly managed to have some important amendments included in the documents issued from the conferences. The documents of those meetings were among the last efforts made to compromise on several major issues between the two parties and themselves became reference points in the polemic that followed.

- Declaration of the Twelve Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries Meeting in Moscow, USSR, 1957⁴³¹
- Statement of the 81 Communist and Workers' Parties Meeting in Moscow, USSR, 1960⁴³²

iii) Rival Views Propounded

Up to this time the CPC and the CPSU took care to not criticize each other openly by name, instead referring obliquely to "revisionists" (from the Chinese side), or to "splittists" (from the Soviet side), in the International Communist Movement (ICM), or using the issue of Titoism and Yugoslavia as a stand-in for the larger issue of conduction of the ICM. Nonetheless, tensions were often high. In June 1960, Chinese officials -including Zhou Enlai- had pointedly criticized Soviet policies in front of the Soviet delegates (some would say "attacked" the Soviet delegation). The Soviets attempted to bring the CPC to heel by suspending distribution of Chinese periodicals in the USSR, and in July of that year, all Soviet technical assistants -some 3,000 in all- were withdrawn from China. Nonetheless, later in 1960 things were still cool enough that the CPC could proclaim "Eternal, Unbreakable Sino-Soviet Friendship" (Peking Review, No. 49/50 of 1960).

- **Long Live Leninism!** (April 16, 1960) by the Editorial Board of Hongqi⁴³³
- **Workers of All Countries Unite, Oppose Our Common Enemy** (December 15, 1962), editorial in Renmin Ribao⁴³⁴

⁴²⁸ <https://www.marxists.org/archive/khrushchev/1956/02/24.htm>

⁴²⁹ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/hedp.htm>

⁴³⁰ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/mhedp.htm>

⁴³¹ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/other/1957declaration.htm>

⁴³² <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/other/1960statement.htm>

⁴³³ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/leninism.htm>

⁴³⁴ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/oppose.htm>

- **The Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us** (December 31, 1962), editorial in Renmin Ribao⁴³⁵
- **A Comment on the Statement of the CPUSA** (March 8, 1963), editorial in Renmin Ribao⁴³⁶
- **Let Us Unite on the Basis of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement** (January 27, 1963), editorial in Renmin Ribao⁴³⁷
- **Whence the Differences? - A Reply to Thorez and Other Comrades** (February 27, 1963), editorial in Renmin Ribao⁴³⁸
- **Leninism and Modern Revisionism** (1963) by the Editorial Department of Hongqi⁴³⁹
- **Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. to the Central Committee of the C.P.C.** (February 21, 1963)⁴⁴⁰
- **Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.** (March 9, 1963)⁴⁴¹
- **Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. to the Central Committee of the C.P.C.** (March 30, 1963)⁴⁴²

iv) The Chinese Proposal Concerning the General Line of the ICM

In June of 1963 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party sent a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in response to its letter of March 30, 1963. In it, the CPC took the offensive and, reasserting that "revisionism" was the main danger within the socialist camp, spelled out its differences with the leadership of the CPSU and made a number of proposals. The Chinese quickly translated it into several languages and published it, along with the texts of the CPSU letters of February 21 and March 30, 1963, and the CPC letter of March 9, 1963, as *A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement*.

- **A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement. The Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of March 30, 1963.** (*June 14, 1963*)⁴⁴³

v) Soviet Response to the Chinese Proposal

The CPSU responded to the publication of the CPC's Proposal by publishing an Open Letter detailing its position on the matter and holding the CPC responsible for the divisions in the ICM. Having made its point, the CPSU followed by proposing -e.g. in a letter to the CPC, dated November 29, 1963- that the polemic be taken out of public view,

⁴³⁵ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/togliatti.htm>

⁴³⁶ <https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/cpusa.htm>

⁴³⁷ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/unite.htm>

⁴³⁸ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/replytothorez.htm>

⁴³⁹ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/lamr.htm>

⁴⁴⁰ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpsu/21february1963.htm>

⁴⁴¹ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/09march1963.htm>

⁴⁴² <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpsu/30march1963.htm>

⁴⁴³ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/proposal.htm>

as well as advancing a set of counterproposals which, it claimed, would "normalize" relations.

- **Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to all Party Organisations, to all Communists of the Soviet Union** (July 14, 1963)⁴⁴⁴
- **Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the CPC** (November 29, 1963)⁴⁴⁵

vi) Chinese Commentaries on the Soviet Open Letter

- **The Origins and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves** (September 6, 1963) by the Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao and Hongqi⁴⁴⁶
- **On the Question of Stalin** (September 13, 1963) by the Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao and Hongqi⁴⁴⁷
- **Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?** (September 26, 1963) by the Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao and Hongqi⁴⁴⁸
- **Apologists of Neo-Colonialism** (October 22, 1963) by the Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao and Hongqi⁴⁴⁹
- **Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace** (November 19, 1963) by the Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao and Hongqi⁴⁵⁰
- **Peaceful Coexistence - Two Diametrically Opposed Policies** (December 12, 1963) by the Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao and Hongqi⁴⁵¹
- **The Leaders of the CPSU are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times** (February 4, 1964) by the Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao and Hongqi⁴⁵²
- **The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchov's Revisionism** (March 31, 1964) by the Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao and Hongqi⁴⁵³
- **On Khrushchov's Phoney Communism and its Historical Lessons for the World** (July 14, 1964) by the Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao and Hongqi⁴⁵⁴

vii) Further Commentaries

- **Fidelity to Principles of Marxism-Leninism** (April 3, 1964), Pravda leading editorial⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁴⁴ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpsu/openletter.htm>

⁴⁴⁵ <https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/sevenlet.htm#15>

⁴⁴⁶ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpsu/21february1963.htm>

⁴⁴⁷ <https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/qstalin.htm>

⁴⁴⁸ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/yugoslavia.htm>

⁴⁴⁹ <https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/neocolon.htm>

⁴⁵⁰ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/2-lines.htm>

⁴⁵¹ <https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/peaceful.htm>

⁴⁵² <https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/splitters.htm>

⁴⁵³ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/prolrev.htm>

⁴⁵⁴ <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1964/phnycom.htm>

⁴⁵⁵ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpsu/pravda-03iv1964.htm>

- **Certain Aspects of the Inner Life of the Communist Party of China** (1964), by the Novosti Press Agency⁴⁵⁶
- **Why Khrushchov Fell** (November 21, 1964), editorial in Hongqi⁴⁵⁷
- **The Leaders of the CPSU are Betrayers of the Declaration and the Statement** (December 30, 1965) by the Editorial Department of Renmin Ribao⁴⁵⁸
- **The Anti-Soviet Policy of Mao-Tsetung and His Group** (February 16, 1967), editorial in Pravda⁴⁵⁹

viii) Letters Between the Central Committees of the CPSU and the CPC

- **Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the CPC** (February 21, 1963)⁴⁶⁰
- **Letter of the Central Committee of the CPC in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU of February 21, 1963** (March 9, 1963)⁴⁶¹
- **Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the CPC** (March 30, 1963)⁴⁶²
- **Letter of the Central Committee of the CPC in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU of March 30, 1963** (June 14, 1963)⁴⁶³
- **Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the CPC** (November 29, 1963)⁴⁶⁴
- **Letter of the Central Committee of the CPC in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU of November 29, 1963** (February 29, 1964)⁴⁶⁵
- **Letter of the Central Committee of the CPC to the Central Committee of the CPSU** (February 20, 1964)⁴⁶⁶
- **Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU in reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the CPC of February 20, 1964** (February 22, 1964)⁴⁶⁷
- **Letter of the Central Committee of the CPC in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU of February 22, 1964** (February 27, 1964)⁴⁶⁸
- **Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the CPC of February 27, 1964** (March 7, 1964)⁴⁶⁹
- **Letter of the Central Committee of the CPC in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU of March 7, 1964** (May 7, 1964)⁴⁷⁰
- **Letter of the Central Committee of the CPC in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU of July 30, 1964** (August 30, 1964)⁴⁷¹

⁴⁵⁶ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpsu/certain-aspects.htm>

⁴⁵⁷ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/nkfall.htm>

⁴⁵⁸ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/betrayers.htm>

⁴⁵⁹ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpsu/pravda-02171967.htm>

⁴⁶⁰ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpsu/21february1963.htm>

⁴⁶¹ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/09march1963.htm>

⁴⁶² <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpsu/30march1963.htm>

⁴⁶³ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/proposal.htm>

⁴⁶⁴ <https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/sevenlet.htm#l5>

⁴⁶⁵ <https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/sevenlet.htm#l4>

⁴⁶⁶ <https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/sevenlet.htm#l2>

⁴⁶⁷ <https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/sevenlet.htm#l6>

⁴⁶⁸ <https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/sevenlet.htm#l3>

⁴⁶⁹ <https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/sevenlet.htm#l7>

⁴⁷⁰ <https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/sevenlet.htm#l1>

⁴⁷¹ https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/cc_letter.htm

- **Letter of the Central Committee of the CPC in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU of February 24, 1966** (March 22, 1966)⁴⁷²

ix) Some Reactions Abroad

- **The Revolutionary Communists Expect China to Come Out Openly Against Krushchevite Revisionism** (3 April, 1962), Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania⁴⁷³
- **Statement on the Sino-Soviet Dispute** (22 April, 1964), statement of the Romanian Workers' Party⁴⁷⁴
- **The Sino-Soviet Conflict and the Crisis of the International Communist Movement** (1965), statement of the 8th World Congress of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International⁴⁷⁵
- **Documents of the CPI and CPC: Role of Stalin as the CPI(M) Views It** (1970s), pamphlet by the Communist Party of India (Marxist)⁴⁷⁶

iii) Development Military front

The military disputes are dealt with in part **5.9.1** Territorial Disputes of the Compendium.

5.1.1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China

Since the early 1970s, the foreign affairs establishment has been rebuilt, and by the late 1980s, foreign affairs personnel were recruited from such specialized training programs as the ministry's Foreign Affairs College, College of International Relations, Beijing Foreign Languages Institute, and international studies departments at major universities. Foreign language study still was considered an important requirement, but it was increasingly supplemented by substantive training in foreign relations. Foreign affairs personnel benefited from expanded opportunities for education, travel, and exchange of information with the rest of the world. In addition, specialists from other ministries served in China's many embassies and consulates; for example, the Ministry of National Defence provided military attaches, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade provided commercial officers, and the Ministry of Culture and the State Education Commission provided personnel in charge of cultural affairs.⁴⁷⁷

Main Responsibilities⁴⁷⁸

1. To implement the state's diplomatic principles and policies and related laws and regulations; safeguard national sovereignty, security and interests on behalf of the state;

⁴⁷² <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/22march1966.htm>

⁴⁷³ <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hoxha/works/1962/04/03.htm>

⁴⁷⁴ <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/other/rwp1964.htm>

⁴⁷⁵ <https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/document/fi/1963-1985/usfi/8thWC/usfi04.htm>

⁴⁷⁶ [https://www.marxists.org/subject/india/cpi\(m\)/cpim-1970s.pdf](https://www.marxists.org/subject/india/cpi(m)/cpim-1970s.pdf)

⁴⁷⁷ Robert L. Worden, Andrea Matles Savada and Ronald E. Dolan, editors. *China: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987. <http://countrystudies.us/china/126.htm>

⁴⁷⁸ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zyzz_663306/

run diplomatic affairs on behalf of the state and the government; and handle diplomatic activities between leaders of the CPC and the state with foreign leaders.

2. To study overarching and strategic issues in international situation and international relations; analyse major issues concerning diplomatic work in such areas as politics, economy, culture and security; and advise the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on adopting diplomatic strategies, principles and policies.

3. To coordinate with relevant government departments according to the overall diplomatic planning, and report and give suggestions to the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on major issues including foreign trade, economic cooperation and assistance, culture, military aid, arms trade, Chinese nationals abroad, education, science and technology, and public diplomacy.

4. To draft laws, regulations and policy plans concerning diplomatic work.

5. To handle global and regional security, political, economic, human rights, social, refugee and other diplomatic affairs in the United Nations and other multilateral fora.

6. To deal with matters in international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation; research international security issues; and organize negotiations on treaties and agreements related to arms control.

7. To conclude bilateral and multilateral treaties, handle international judicial cooperation, oversee or participate in dealing with major foreign-related legal cases that involve the state or the government, assist in examining foreign-related draft laws and regulations, and organize and coordinate the work of fulfilling international conventions and agreements.

8. To lead or participate in efforts to formulate policies related to land and maritime boundaries; guide and coordinate foreign-related maritime work; organize the work of border delimitation, boundary demarcation and joint inspections, and handle relevant foreign-related cases; and conduct diplomatic negotiations on maritime delimitation and joint development.

9. To release information about important diplomatic activities, elaborate on foreign policies, conduct information-related work about important diplomatic activities, organize public diplomacy activities, and take charge of the affairs related to foreign journalists in China and resident foreign news agencies.

10. To oversee the state's foreign-related protocol and ceremonial affairs; oversee the protocol arrangements of important diplomatic activities of the state; and oversee the courteous reception, diplomatic privileges and immunities accorded to foreign diplomatic missions in China.

11. To oversee consular work. To regulate the activities of foreign diplomatic and consular missions in China; oversee work related to consular affairs of Chinese nationals abroad; conduct or participate in handling representations regarding foreign-related cases in China; oversee consular protection and assistance, coordinate relevant

government departments, local authorities and guide Chinese diplomatic missions abroad in handling cases requiring consular protection and assistance, and release warning information for consular protection and assistance.

12. To coordinate efforts to handle urgent incidents abroad concerning Chinese interests, safeguard the lawful rights and interests of Chinese citizens and institutions abroad, and take part in efforts to handle urgent incidents in China which involve foreigners.

13. To handle, in accordance with law, diplomatic and consular affairs in Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions, and handle foreign affairs related to Taiwan.

14. To guide and coordinate foreign affairs work of local government and State Council departments, examine important foreign affairs regulations of local government and State Council departments as well as the requests to the State Council for instructions concerning foreign affairs, and put forward recommendations together with relevant government departments on the handling of major incidents involving violations of laws and regulations governing foreign affairs.

15. To handle and coordinate foreign affairs concerning national security.

16. To provide interpretation for important diplomatic activities of the state and translation of diplomatic documents and correspondence.

17. To lead Chinese diplomatic missions abroad and the offices of Commissioners in Hong Kong and Macao; oversee the personnel and organizational work of diplomatic missions abroad; provide directions to Chinese diplomatic missions abroad and offices of Commissioners in Hong Kong and Macao on the use of information technology, financial management and premises construction; and regulate the use of real property by foreign diplomatic missions in China.

18. To oversee the work of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, and oversee the foreign affairs work of the Red Cross Society of China and China Soong Ching Ling Foundation. To perform other tasks given by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council.

5.1.2. The Minister



Wang Yi, male, Han ethnicity, a native of Beijing, was born in October 1953. He began his first job in September 1969 and joined the Communist Party of China (CPC) in May 1981. Wang graduated from the Department of Asian and African Languages of Beijing Second Foreign Languages Institute where he completed an undergraduate program in Japanese. He also holds a Master of Economics degree. Wang is a member of the 19th CPC Central Committee, State Councillor, a member of the Leading CPC Members Group of the State Council, and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

1969-1977 Worker, company messenger, battalion correspondent, acting publicity secretary, Heilongjiang Production and Construction Corps

1977-1978 Awaiting assignment in Beijing; employee, Intelligence Research Institute, Ministry of Post and Telecommunications

1978-1982 Japanese major, Department of Asian and African Languages, Beijing Second Foreign Languages Institute

1982-1989 Staff member, attaché, Deputy Director, Director, Department of Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

1989-1994 Counselor (elevated to Deputy Director General-level in May 1992), Minister Counselor (since April 1993), Chinese Embassy in Japan

1994-1995 Deputy Director General, Department of Asian Affairs, MFA

1995-1998 Director General, Department of Asian Affairs, MFA (June 1997-January 1998: visiting scholar, Georgetown University, United States of America)

1998-2001 Assistant Minister, CPC Committee member, and Director General of Department of Policy Research, MFA(1996-1998: Attended an in-service graduate program in world economy at the APEC Study Center of Nankai University and was awarded a Master of Economics degree; March-May 2000: attended a continuing studies course for provincial- and ministerial-level officials at Central Party School)

2001-2004 Vice Minister and CPC Committee member, MFA

2004-2007 Ambassador of China to Japan

2007-2008 Secretary of CPC Committee and Vice Minister, MFA

2008-2013 Director, Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and Minister, Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council

2013-2018 Minister and Deputy Secretary of CPC Committee, MFA

Since 2018 State Councillor, member of the Leading CPC Members Group of the State Council, and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Wang has been a member of the 17th through 19th CPC Central Committees.⁴⁷⁹

⁴⁷⁹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/

5.1.3. The Principle Officials⁴⁸⁰



Qi Yu⁴⁸¹

Le Yucheng⁴⁸²

Zheng Zeguang⁴⁸³

Ma Zhaoxu⁴⁸⁴



Luo Zhaohui⁴⁸⁵

Zhang Ji⁴⁸⁶

Qin Gang⁴⁸⁷

Chen Xiaodong⁴⁸⁸



Liu Xianfa⁴⁸⁹

⁴⁸⁰ For more details on the activities of the departments, access here:

⁴⁸¹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zygy_663314/gyjl_663316/qy/

⁴⁸² https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zygy_663314/gyjl_663316/LYC/

⁴⁸³ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zygy_663314/gyjl_663316/zg_663334/

⁴⁸⁴ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zygy_663314/gyjl_663316/mzx/

⁴⁸⁵ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zygy_663314/gyjl_663316/lzh/

⁴⁸⁶ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zygy_663314/gyjl_663316/zj/

⁴⁸⁷ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zygy_663314/gyjl_663316/qg/

⁴⁸⁸ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zygy_663314/gyjl_663316/cxd/

⁴⁸⁹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zygy_663314/gyjl_663316/lxf/

5.1.4. The Departments

1. The General Office



Director-General: Han Zhiqiang

Deputy Director-Generals: Zhang Jiming, Chen Chuandong, Cui Chun

Main functions: The General Office coordinates the work in the Ministry. It is responsible for the circulation of documents and telegrams in the Ministry and the management of information technology application in the Ministry and China's overseas diplomatic missions. It coordinates the handling of emergencies involving foreign country or party.⁴⁹⁰

2. Policy Planning Department



Director-General: Liu Jinsong

Deputy Directors-General: Miao Deyu, Zheng Liqiao, Jiang Xuebin

Main Functions: The Department of Policy Planning studies and analyses issues of overall and strategic importance related to global situation and international relations. It formulates policies and plans for diplomatic work, drafts and submits important diplomatic documents and speeches, conducts foreign policy pronouncements, and coordinates research and analytical work. It also undertakes the work related to the studies of the diplomatic history of the People's Republic of China.⁴⁹¹

⁴⁹⁰ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/bgt_663342/

⁴⁹¹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/zcyjs_663346/

3. The Department of Asian Affairs



Director-General: Wu Jianguo

Deputy Director-Generals: Mao Ning, Yao Wen, Shen Minjuan, Xue Jian

Main functions: The Department implements China's foreign policy and principles. It reports and works on China's bilateral relations with countries and regions concerned, manages diplomatic contacts with and makes representations to relevant countries and regions, oversees and coordinates policies on and cooperation and exchanges with relevant countries and regions and guides the operation of China's overseas diplomatic missions within its regional jurisdiction. It is responsible for translation and interpretation for important diplomatic functions, documents and instruments in relevant languages.⁴⁹²

4. The Department of West Asian and North African Affairs



Director-General: Wang Di

Deputy Director-Generals: Qian Minjian, Jiang Feng

Main Functions: The Department implements China's foreign policy and principles. It reports and works on China's bilateral relations with countries and regions concerned, manages diplomatic contacts with and makes representations to relevant countries and regions, oversees and coordinates policies on and cooperation and exchanges with relevant countries and regions and guides the operation of China's overseas diplomatic missions within its regional jurisdiction. It is responsible for translation and

⁴⁹² https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/

interpretation for important diplomatic functions, documents and instruments in relevant languages.⁴⁹³

5. The Department of African Affairs



Director-General: Dai Bing

Deputy Director-Generals: Xiao Han, Guo Haiyan, Li Chong

Main functions: The Department implements China's foreign policy and principles. It reports and works on China's bilateral relations with countries and regions concerned, manages diplomatic contacts with and makes representations to relevant countries and regions, oversees and coordinates policies on and cooperation and exchanges with relevant countries and regions and guides the operation of China's overseas diplomatic missions within its regional jurisdiction. It is responsible for translation and interpretation for important diplomatic functions, documents and instruments in relevant languages.⁴⁹⁴

6. The Department of European-Central Asian Affairs



Director-General: Sun Linjiang

Deputy Director-Generals: Sun Lijie, Ji Shumin

Main Functions: The Department implements China's foreign policy and principles. It reports and works on China's bilateral relations with countries and regions concerned, manages diplomatic contacts with and makes representations to relevant countries and regions, oversees and coordinates policies on and cooperation and exchanges with

⁴⁹³ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/

⁴⁹⁴ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/2913_665441/

relevant countries and regions and guides the operation of China's overseas diplomatic missions within its regional jurisdiction. It is responsible for translation and interpretation for important diplomatic functions, documents and instruments in relevant languages⁴⁹⁵

7. The Department of European Affairs



Director-General: Wang Lutong

Deputy Director-Generals: Zeng Fanhua, Lu Shan, Qi Han

Main functions: The Department implements China's foreign policy and principles. It reports and works on China's bilateral relations with countries and regions concerned, manages diplomatic contacts with and makes representations to relevant countries and regions, oversees and coordinates policies on and cooperation and exchanges with relevant countries and regions and guides the operation of China's overseas diplomatic missions within its regional jurisdiction. It is responsible for translation and interpretation for important diplomatic functions, documents and instruments in relevant languages⁴⁹⁶

8. The Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs



Director-General: Lu Kang

Deputy Director-Generals: Jing Quan, Li Ming

⁴⁹⁵ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/3124_665443/

⁴⁹⁶ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/

Main functions: The Department implements China's foreign policy and principles. It reports and works on China's bilateral relations with countries and regions concerned, manages diplomatic contacts with and makes representations to relevant countries and regions, oversees and coordinates policies on and cooperation and exchanges with relevant countries and regions and guides the operation of China's overseas diplomatic missions within its regional jurisdiction. It is responsible for translation and interpretation for important diplomatic functions, documents and instruments in relevant languages.⁴⁹⁷

9. The Department of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs



Director-General: Zhao Bentang

Deputy Director-Generals: Han Jing, Chen Luning

Main functions: The Department implements China's foreign policy and principles. It reports and works on China's bilateral relations with countries and regions concerned, manages diplomatic contacts with and makes representations to relevant countries and regions, oversees and coordinates policies on and cooperation and exchanges with relevant countries and regions and guides the operation of China's overseas diplomatic missions within its regional jurisdiction. It is responsible for translation and interpretation for important diplomatic functions, documents and instruments in relevant languages.⁴⁹⁸

10. The Department of International Organizations and Conferences



Director-General: Yang Tao

⁴⁹⁷ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/3265_665445/

⁴⁹⁸ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/3376_665447/

Deputy Directors-General: Liu Hua, Shen Bo

Main Functions: The Department of International Organizations and Conferences studies the developments and trends in multilateral diplomacy, deals with multilateral diplomatic affairs in political, human rights, social, refugee and other fields and gives guidance to China's overseas diplomatic missions on the relevant work.⁴⁹⁹

11. The Department of International Economic Affairs



Director-General: Yang Tao

Deputy Directors-General: Liu Hua, Shen Bo

Main Functions: The Department of International Organizations and Conferences studies the developments and trends in multilateral diplomacy, deals with multilateral diplomatic affairs in political, human rights, social, refugee and other fields and gives guidance to China's overseas diplomatic missions on the relevant work.⁵⁰⁰

12. The Department of Arms Control



Director-General: Fu Cong

Deputy Director-Generals: Zhang Jun'an, Ma Shengkun

Main functions: The Department of Arms Control reports on issues such as international arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, export control and global and regional

⁴⁹⁹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/3447_665449/

⁵⁰⁰ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/ggjjs_665228/

security. It organizes the development of relevant policies, works with other departments to manage related cases and organizes negotiations on relevant international treaties and agreements. It cooperates with other departments for compliance of international treaties and agreements. It also guides China's overseas diplomatic missions on relevant issues.⁵⁰¹

13. The Department of Treaty and Law



Director-General: Jia Guide

Deputy Director-Generals: Guo Xiaomei, Hu Bin

Main functions: The Department of Treaty and Law reports on legal issues concerning foreign affairs and international law developments. It is responsible for concluding bilateral and multilateral treaties and conducting international judicial cooperation between China and other countries. It handles legal cases involving foreign country or party, coordinates the compliance of international treaties, and organizes the participation in diplomatic negotiations on climate change and environmental treaties.⁵⁰²

14. The Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs



Director-General: Hong Liang

Deputy Director-Generals: Wang Wenli, He Xiangqi

⁵⁰¹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/jks_665232/

⁵⁰² https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/tyfls_665260/

Main functions: The Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs develops policies concerning land and maritime boundaries, guides and coordinates external work concerning oceans and seas, manages land boundary delimitation and demarcation and joint inspections with neighbouring countries, handles external boundary matters and cases concerning territories, maps and place names, and engages in diplomatic negotiations on maritime delimitation and joint development.⁵⁰³

15. The Information Department



Director-General: Hua Chunying(female)

Deputy Director-Generals: Geng Shuang, Yu Dunhai, Zhao Lijian

Main functions: The Information Department is responsible for releasing information on China's major diplomatic events and stating China's foreign policy. It manages press coverage on major diplomatic events. It guides China's overseas diplomatic missions on information work and provides service to permanent offices of foreign media organizations and foreign journalists in China. It also covers public diplomacy and information collection and processing.⁵⁰⁴

16. The Protocol Department



Director-General: Hong Lei

Deputy Director-Generals: Fan Yong, He Rulong, Li Xiang, Li Anrong

Main functions: The Protocol Department is responsible for state protocol matters and ceremonial events. It organizes and coordinates protocol affairs for major state diplomatic functions and manages matters related to courteous reception and diplomatic

⁵⁰³ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/bianhaisi_eng_665278/

⁵⁰⁴ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xws_665282/

privileges and immunities of foreign diplomatic missions and relevant personnel in China. It also develops protocol rules.⁵⁰⁵

17. The Department of Consular Affairs (Centre for Consular Assistance and Protection)



Director-General: Cui Aimin

Deputy Director-Generals: Chen Xiongfeng, Zhou Limin, Wei Xiaodong, Tong Defa, Chen Jianjiao

Main functions: The Department of Consular Affairs is responsible for a full range of consular affairs, including managing China's consular relations with foreign countries; issuing diplomatic passports, service passports and passports for public affairs; providing consular-related notary and authentication services; processing visas; administering foreign consular institutions in China; coordinating the handling of criminal and civil cases involving foreign nationals in China and making representations; protecting overseas Chinese; managing immigration affairs in cooperation with other departments; providing consular protection and assistance, developing policies and regulations and issuing early warnings and information on consular protection and assistance; and guiding the consular operation of China's overseas diplomatic missions and foreign affairs offices of local governments.

18. The Department of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Affairs

Director-General:

Deputy Director-Generals: Hou Yue, Chen Haiping, Ying Xiuli

Main functions: The Department of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Affairs develops diplomatic policies concerning the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), Macao SAR and Taiwan, reports on and coordinates related diplomatic affairs, guides the operation of the Offices of the Commissioners of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China in the Hong Kong SAR and Macao SAR and manages the participation of unofficial mainland organizations in international conferences and activities in Taiwan.⁵⁰⁶

⁵⁰⁵ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/lbs_665286/

⁵⁰⁶ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/lss_665290/

19. The Department of Translation and Interpretation



Director-General: Xu Hui

Deputy Director-General: Dai Qingli, Zhou Jingxing

Main functions: The Department of Translation and Interpretation is responsible for providing English, French, Spanish and Portuguese translation of important state diplomatic events and diplomatic documents and instruments, as well as simultaneous interpretation and coordination of interpretation in multi-languages for major international conferences. It offers professional training to high-level English, French, Spanish and Portuguese translators and interpreters of the Ministry⁵⁰⁷

20. The Department of Foreign Affairs Management



Director-General: Wang Tongqing

Deputy Director-General: Tang Songgen, Lin Xianjiang

Main functions: The Department of Foreign Affairs Management drafts laws and regulations concerning foreign affairs management and reviews major foreign affairs regulations of local governments, State Council ministries and agencies and central state-owned enterprises and foreign affairs documents to be submitted to the State Council for approval. It coordinates the foreign affairs work of local and central government departments and consults with other foreign affairs departments to advice on the handling of serious violations of foreign affairs laws and regulations.⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰⁷ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/fys_665298/

⁵⁰⁸ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/fys_665298/

21. The Department of External Security Affairs



Director-General: Liu Shaobin

Deputy Director-Generals: Cao Xiaolin, Wang Lixin

Main function: The Department of External Security reports on external security issues and makes policy recommendations, coordinates and manages relevant work, guides the related operation of China's overseas diplomatic missions, and coordinates the administration of activities of foreign non-governmental organizations in China.

22. The Department of Personnel



Director-General: Sun Xianghua

Deputy Director-Generals: Fang Qiu, Lin Dong, Zheng Huiyu

Main functions: The Department of Personnel is in charge of personnel management of the Ministry and China's overseas diplomatic missions. It appoints and removes senior officials at overseas missions and the Offices of the Commissioners of the MFA in the Hong Kong SAR and Macao SAR. It is responsible for research on and improving personnel management regulations of overseas missions by working with other departments, and developing and guiding the implementation of educational and training plans for diplomatic personnel.⁵⁰⁹

⁵⁰⁹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/gbs_665308/

23. The Bureau for Retired Personnel



Director-General: Zhou Wenzhi

Deputy Director-Generals: Qiao Yunhuan, Li Qinfeng

Main functions: The Bureau for Retired Personnel serves the retired personnel of the Ministry and guides the retired personnel work in agencies directly affiliated to the MFA.⁵¹⁰

24. The Administrative Department



Director-General: Guo Wu

Deputy Director-General: Zhou Bin, Xu Wei, Chen Chuang

Main functions: Major Responsibilities: planning, construction and management of the premises of China's diplomatic missions overseas; policy-related management of the real estate of foreign diplomatic missions in China; handling of bilateral matters concerning diplomatic premises; real estate management and housing reform of the Ministry; planning, organization and implementation of infrastructure projects of the Ministry; management of the infrastructure development planning of the Ministry and its affiliated agencies; management of the antiques, precious artefacts and part of the tangible assets of the Ministry and China's diplomatic missions overseas; and selection and appointment of management staff for infrastructure development and support staff of China's diplomatic missions and personnel management of support staff of the Ministry⁵¹¹

⁵¹⁰ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/ltxgbj_665312/

⁵¹¹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xzs_665316/

25. The Department of Finance



Director-General: Hu Yinquan

Deputy Director-Generals: Zhou Baifu, Dong Bin

Main functions: The Department of Finance prepares budget and final account for the Ministry and manages the collection and hand-over of administrative charges. It develops financial regulations for China's overseas diplomatic missions, participates in the development of national diplomatic and foreign-related financial regulations, and audits and guides the financial operation of the Ministry and its directly affiliated agencies and overseas diplomatic missions. It also manages MFA's government procurement affairs⁵¹²

26. Department for Party-related Affairs/ Department for Diplomatic Missions Abroad



Executive Deputy Secretary (Director-General): Shi Zhongjun

Deputy Secretaries (Deputy Directors-General): Cai Ge, Chen Lan, Wang Yong

Main Functions: The Department is responsible for Party-related affairs and mass work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its affiliated agencies in Beijing; it is also responsible for the relevant work concerning Chinese diplomatic missions abroad.⁵¹³

⁵¹² https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/cws_665320/

⁵¹³ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/jgdw_665328/

27. Office of Leading Group for Conducting Inspections in the Foreign Ministry



Director-General: Bian Lixin

Main Functions: The Office initiates, coordinates and participates in the work of the inspection team of the Foreign Ministry. It is responsible for undertaking policy research on inspections in the Ministry and adopting related practices. It also performs other duties stipulated in the *Regulations of the Communist Party of China on Conducting Inspections*.⁵¹⁴

28. The Bureau of Archives



Chief Archivist: Dong Qiang

Deputy Chief Archivists: Wan Yinghong, Tang Jun

Brief Introduction: The Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a departmental archives and a base for permanent preservation of the diplomatic records accumulated since the founding of the People's Republic of China. Its main functions are to: collect and permanently manage records accumulated in the Ministry and its subordinate units; guide and supervise the archival work of the departments and subordinate units of the Ministry, Chinese diplomatic and consular missions overseas and offices of the commissioners of the Ministry in the Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions; procure, select, distribute and manage diplomacy-related books, periodicals, newspapers and reference books for departments of the Ministry and overseas missions and provide access to them. The Archives assumes the administrative functions over its own archival work⁵¹⁵

⁵¹⁴ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/jcj_665330/

⁵¹⁵ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/dag_665324/

29. Department of Services for Foreign Ministry Home and Overseas Offices



Director-General: Xu Feihong

Deputy Directors-General: Zhang Taoping, Zhu Xingbao

Secretary of the Commission for Discipline Inspection: Zhou Qian

Assistant Director: Dai Yining, Li Yong, Zheng Zhuo

Introduction: Department of Services for Foreign Ministry Home and Overseas Offices was established in January, 1994. It is a public institution as legal persons directly affiliated to the Foreign Ministry. Its main responsibility is to provide logistical services for agencies subordinated to the Foreign Ministry, and Chinese embassies and consulates (missions and offices) overseas.⁵¹⁶

5.1.5 Related Agencies

1. **Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region**⁵¹⁷



Commissioner: Xie Feng

According to Article 13 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established a special commissioner's office in Hong Kong to handle foreign affairs managed by the Central People's Government and related to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

⁵¹⁶ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/fwj_665338/

⁵¹⁷ <http://www.fmcoprc.gov.hk/chn/zjgs/tpyzc/>

Over the 22 years since Hong Kong's return to the motherland and the establishment of the SAR, Hong Kong has always been breathing and sharing the same fate with the motherland. The majority of Hong Kong compatriots are concerned about national rejuvenation, affect the development of the motherland, and travel with the country's diplomacy to add glory to the country's diplomacy.⁵¹⁸

We use diplomatic resources to be an active promoter of the SAR's foreign exchanges. Combining the strengths of all parties, taking the responsibility of serving the SAR to expand cooperation with foreign exchanges, it has created a new model of tripartite cooperation of "Mainland, Hong Kong, Belt and Road "and relevant countries" to help the SAR participate in the "Belt and Road" and the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Construction and integration into the overall situation of national development.⁵¹⁹

We practice "diplomacy for the people" and be loyal defenders of Hong Kong compatriots' legitimate overseas rights and interests. In-depth SAR government departments, schools, industries, and communities launched preventive insurance announcements, released animated animation videos, and handled more than 13 thousand consular protection cases involving Hong Kong. Where Hong Kong compatriots go, so does the country's consular protection.⁵²⁰

We take Hong Kong youths as friends, carefully create the "Hong Kong Cup" diplomatic knowledge contest, hold a special office open day for young students in Hong Kong, carry out "Diplomatic Into Campus", "International Law Into Campus", and "Friends of Diplomacy" summer camp activities to assist Hong Kong youths visit and exchange in countries along the "Belt and Road".⁵²¹

2. Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China in the Macao Special Administrative Region



Commissioner Shen Beili

⁵¹⁸ <http://www.fmcofprc.gov.hk/chn/zjgs/tpyzc/>

⁵¹⁹ <http://www.fmcofprc.gov.hk/chn/zjgs/tpyzc/>

⁵²⁰ <http://www.fmcofprc.gov.hk/chn/zjgs/tpyzc/>

⁵²¹ Ibid.

Main responsibilities ⁵²²

The Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China stipulates that the Central People's Government is responsible for the management of foreign affairs related to the Macao Special Administrative Region, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established an institution in Macao to handle foreign affairs. The Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Macao Special Administrative Region is an institution established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China in the Macao Special Administrative Region in accordance with the above provisions. Its purpose is to implement the principles of "one country, two systems", "Australians govern Macao" and a high degree of autonomy, act strictly in accordance with the Basic Law, implement the foreign policy of the Central People's Government, safeguard national sovereignty and interests, protect the legitimate rights and interests of Macao compatriots, and promote the Macao Special Administrative Region. Long-term prosperity, stability and development.

The duties of the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Macao Special Administrative Region are:

1. Handling foreign affairs related to the Macao Special Administrative Region managed by the Central People's Government.
2. Coordinate and handle the participation of the Macao Special Administrative Region in relevant international organizations and conferences; coordinate the handling of the establishment of offices by international organizations and institutions in the Macao Special Administrative Region; coordinate the handling of the holding of international government conferences in the Macao Special Administrative Region.
3. To deal with the application of relevant international conventions in the Macao Special Administrative Region; assist in handling matters that the Central People's Government authorizes the Macao Special Administrative Region to negotiate and conclude related bilateral agreements with foreign countries.
4. Coordinating and handling matters related to the establishment of consular agencies or other official and semi-official agencies in the Macao Special Administrative Region, and handling related consular affairs.
5. Handle other related affairs assigned by the Central People's Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Macao Special Administrative Region has five departments: the Policy Research Office, the Comprehensive Operations Department, the Consular Department, the Ministry of Information and Public Foreign Affairs, and the Office.⁵²³

⁵²² <http://www.fmco-prc.gov.mo/eng/office/mfco/>

⁵²³ <http://www.fmco-prc.gov.mo/chn/gsjj/gszn/>

Information on China's embassies is available online at URL:

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/2490_665344/

5.1.6 The International Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee (IDCP)

It is an agency under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in charge of conducting its foreign relations with other political parties. Since its founding in 1951, the International Department, under the direct care and leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), has seen a continuous expansion of its international exchanges and communications serving the key tasks of the Party in different periods.⁵²⁴

In particular, for the last 25 years since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee held in 1978, it has been engaged in full implementation of the Party's guidelines governing its external relations in the new period. Based on the four principles of inter-party relations, namely, independence, complete equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, the International Department actively conducts new types of party-to-party exchanges and cooperation in an effort to promote the development of state-to-state relations. The aims of its work are to serve China's reform and open-up policy and the socialist modernization drive as well as the overall strategy of the state diplomacy, help consolidate the Party's position in office and contribute to the building of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The CPC associates with not only the communist parties and other left-wing parties of the world as it originally did but also national democratic parties of the developing countries and political parties and statesmen of various ideologies and natures such as socialist, labour and conservative parties in the developed countries as well as their international organizations as it later expanded.⁵²⁵

Up till now, the CPC has established contacts and exchanges with more than 400 political parties and organizations in over 140 countries, most of which are either parties in office or parties participating in government. A new pattern in the Party's international relations has emerged characterized by all-round, multi-channel, wide-scope and in-depth party-to-party exchanges and cooperation. Gratifying results have been achieved which can be described as "making bosom friends in the four corners of the earth and finding kith and kin across the oceans". As the scope of the Party's international exchanges has been further enlarged, their contents are getting richer and forms more diversified. High level contacts, working visits, study trips, theoretical discussions, leadership training, economic cooperation, cultural exchanges and the like have enriched the contents of the new-type party-to-party relations. Direct guidance and personal involvement of the Party and State leaders have given a powerful push to the development of the Party's external work.

Entering the new century, the International Department will keep forging ahead in a more resolute way. It will strive to establish itself as a research institution of international studies, influential with distinct characters both at home and abroad,

⁵²⁴ <https://cpcchina.chinadaily.com.cn/>

⁵²⁵ <https://cpcchina.chinadaily.com.cn/>

providing policy recommendations to the central committee for its foreign policy decision making and running of the party and state.⁵²⁶

It will serve as an important window for our Party to get to know the world better, understand it well and reach out to it more confidently. So that the Party's international activities will play an even more vital role in ensuring the state comprehensive security, propelling the overall state diplomacy and realizing the reunification cause of the motherland. The Department will strive for a peaceful and stable international environment favourable to China's development in the new century, thus making fresh contributions to safeguarding world peace, promoting common prosperity and advancing the cause of progress of mankind. **The International Department is a functional organ of the Central Committee of the CPC responsible for the Party's international work. Its main responsibilities are threefold: to implement the principles and policies of the Central Committee over its external work follow closely in its research work the developments and changes of the world situation and key global issues and provide briefing and policy proposals to the Central Committee; to carry out the Party's exchanges and communications with foreign political parties and organizations entrusted by the Central Committee; to coordinate in administering international exchanges of departments directly under the Central Committee and Party committees of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities under direct jurisdiction of the central government.**⁵²⁷

List of Heads of the Department

- Wang Jiarui (April 2003–present)
- Dai Bingguo (August 1997–April 2003)
- Li Shuzheng (March 1993–August 1997)
- Zhu Liang (December 1985–March 1993)
- Qian Liren (July 1983–December 1985)
- Qiao Shi (April 1982–June 1983)
- Ji Pengfei (January 1979–April 1982)
- Geng Biao (January 1971–January 1979)
- Liu Ningyi (June 1966–March 1968)
- Wang Jiexiang (January 1951–March 1966)⁵²⁸

5.2 Global Perceptions

According to a report of public opinion on the state of society released by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) in November 2018, Chinese respondents were optimistic about the future of their country, with 91.4 percent believing that China will make progress towards being a better society in the coming decade, scoring the highest degree of satisfaction among all countries covered by the survey, which covered 3,221 people in 50 countries and regions around the globe. China's international image is improving. According to the results of a survey jointly released by German non-profit association

⁵²⁶ Detailed information on the IDCP is available online here at URL:

<http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/>

⁵²⁷ <https://cpcchina.chinadaily.com.cn/>

⁵²⁸ Ibid


Atlantik-Brücke and German polling company Civey in March 2019, 42.3 percent of respondents believed that China is a more reliable partner for Germany than the US. According to “China National Image Global Survey 2018”, a report covering 11,000 people from 22 countries on 5 continents, released by the Academy of Contemporary China and World Studies (ACCWS) under China International Publishing Group in August 2019, overseas respondents gave China’s overall image a score of 6.2 from 10, praising China’s domestic and foreign policies, with significant recognition of China’s domestic governance. The report reveals that China’s image as a contributor to global development is becoming prominent, acknowledged by 48 percent of foreign respondents.⁵²⁹

Chinese scholars, political leaders and media tried to assuage the fear of the international community that its quick and consistent rise would not lead to irrational actions. For instance, Zheng Bijian, a Chinese thinker, argued that Beijing’s participation in international institutions increased along with its conformity to international norms in the post-Mao period.⁵³⁰In a similar vein, some Chinese scholars maintained that China was bound to face problems like scarcity of resources, the deterioration of the environment and economic imbalances in its rise, and it needed cooperation from the international community to overcome these problems. Attempts were made to explain how China’s rise was beneficial to the international community as it could contribute to their trade benefits along with its own, and could also contribute more toward international peace Guoli Liu, a Chinese scholar, maintained that there has been a symbiotic relationship between China’s internal socio-economic reforms and a peaceful international environment, and therefore successful reforms needed peaceful diplomacy. The western perception, as well as the perception of many neighbouring countries, changed following an era of internal reforms and the cultivation of friendly ties with state actors led by the paramount communist leader Deng Xiaoping. China’s quick economic progress and military modernization were viewed sceptically, and its assertion of indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea at the expense of the territorial claims of Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines was seen as an attempt at gaining control over strategic sea routes. Chinese President Xi Jinping not only clearly articulated Beijing’s desire for a larger role in global affairs in his announcement that he was going to turn China into a leading nation in terms of national power and global impact by 2050 at the 19th National Congress of the Communist party, his government’s swift implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) caused serious concern in the West as well as among neighbours and was considered a geopolitical coup. But all these Chinese achievements appeared bleaker compared to the perception of China as a threat. In this larger context, Beijing may have to build on the existing arguments regarding its peaceful rise and dispel the concerns of neighbours as well as countries with stakes in the Indo-Pacific region.⁵³¹

⁵²⁹ The report is mentioned in China’s State Council Information Office White paper, titled “China and the World in the New Era” published on September 27, 2019 available online at URL:http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201909/27/content_WS5d8d80f9c6d0bcf8c4c142ef.html

⁵³⁰ <https://asiatimes.com/2018/12/global-perceptions-of-an-ascendant-china/>

⁵³¹ <https://asiatimes.com/2018/12/global-perceptions-of-an-ascendant-china/>



SOURCE: Pewresearch.org

Available here:

<https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/12/05/chinas-economic-growth-mostly-welcomed-in-emerging-markets-but-neighbors-wary-of-its-influence/>

In CSIS report titled ‘How are global views on China trending?’ presents the following view of China from around the World:⁵³²

China’s rise has elicited a range of reactions from around the world. Some countries remain sceptical of China’s growing international influence, while others see China as a source of economic opportunity. This question surveys China’s favourability in three key regions: Africa, Europe, and Latin America.

- **Africa**

According to Pew, views of China across Africa are generally positive – with the 4 countries surveyed averaging 62 percent favourability in 2018. This positivity corresponds to a larger trend over the last decade that has witnessed an average favourability of 66 percent among the African states that were polled. Of the African countries surveyed in 2018, Tunisia (70 percent), Kenya (67 percent), and Nigeria (61 percent) held not only the most favourable views of China in Africa, but some of the most positive views of China globally. Chinese investments across the continent might in part account for this generally positive opinion. Over the last decade, China has poured more money into Africa than any other country. According to official government figures China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) flow in Africa rose from 317 million in 2004 to 4.1 billion in 2017 – but the actual tally may very well surpass official figures. When asked by the 2016 Afrobarometer whether Chinese influence was positive or negative, an overwhelmingly majority of Africans pegged China’s growing influence in their country as a positive. This influence commonly takes the form of investment projects, and for some countries, there appears to be a loose correlation between Chinese investment and perceptions of China.

- **Europe**

Both Pew and BBC polling data show perception towards China across Europe to be generally negative. Pew data shows that views have slightly worsened as of late, with an average favourability of 43 percent across 11 countries — a 1 percent declined from 2017. This slight decrease in the favourability toward China was accompanied by a sharp decline in perceptions of America. Between 2016 and 2017, America’s favourability dropped in 8 out of the 11 European countries polled, which may reflect worries across the continent of declining U.S. leadership on key transnational issues, such as its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. In the 2018 survey, the UK held the highest opinion of China in the region (49 percent), which could be a consequence of growing economic ties between the two countries. Chinese investment into the UK more than doubled from \$9.2 billion in 2016 to \$20.8 billion in 2017. UK and China have further discussed the possibility of negotiating a trade deal should UK leave the European Union.

China has also invested heavily in Greece, which held the third highest opinion of China (43 percent) in 2018. In June 2017, the State Grid Corporation of China purchased 24 percent of Greece’s power grid operator ADMIE. The continuing inflow of Chinese capital

⁵³² Excerpts from report titled ‘How are global views on China trending?’ available online at the URL: <https://chinapower.csis.org/global-views/>

may be earning China political gains — in 2017 Greece vetoed a unified statement that was to be issued by the E.U. to condemn China's human right abuses.

According to 2017 BBC polling data, Spain (15 percent), Germany (20 percent), and France (35 percent) have the lowest opinions of China in Europe. Pew observed similarly low favourability toward China from those three countries.

- **Latin America**

While China's growing FDI into Latin America may have improved its perception in the past, these investments may no longer appear to be yielding dividends. The three Latin American countries surveyed by Pew in 2018 — Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina — all reported negative views of China. Although Brazil has been the top regional destination for China's FDI since 2005, only 49 percent of the Brazilian respondents held a positive opinion of China, which marked the most positive views among the countries surveyed. With the exception of Brazil, the 2018 Pew data reveals that views of China across Latin America are more favourable than those of the US. This shift may as much be a result of China's push to increase its influence in the region as it is the absence of American leadership.

Views of China Across the Asia-Pacific

A 2018 Pew Research Center study that surveyed 26 countries asked participants if they had a favourable or unfavourable view of China. Views of China within Asia varied considerably. On one end of the spectrum, regional powers such as Russia held high levels of favourability toward China (65 percent). Conversely, Japan held one of the least-positive views of China, with only 17 percent of the public viewing China favourably.


Recent history helps explain this variance. Since 2002, Russia has consistently held a positive view of China – averaging 64 percent between 2002 and 2018. Likewise, China has historically maintained a positive view of Russia. The economic and political dimensions of Sino-Russian relations may play a role in these favourability ratings. China was Russia's largest trade partner in 2017, with Russia importing \$43.8 billion in Chinese goods, almost doubled that of Germany (\$27.2 billion) – Russia's second largest source of imports. Sino-Russian trade is expected to surpass \$200 billion by 2020. The two countries also have mutually beneficial energy and security needs. As permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, both countries have demonstrated shared political interests on contentious security issues, such as Iraq (2002), Iran (2006), Sudan (2012), Zimbabwe (2008), Libya (2011), and Syria (2011–2017). Japan maintains negative views of China despite a high level of economic interconnectedness. Friction over trade, such as China's restrictions on the export of rare earth materials to Japan in 2012, territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and lingering historical animosity are key areas that have contributed to Japan's negative views toward China.

Pew data reveals a sharp decline in Japanese views toward China over the last decade and half. In 2002, more than fifty percent of Japanese felt favourably toward China, but by 2013, this number dropped to 5 percent. Despite several recent high-level dialogues between Chinese and Japanese political leaders, Japan's view of China only warmed to 17 percent in 2018. This trend was confirmed by Genron NPO, which observed that Japanese

favourability toward China bottomed out in 2014 at 6.8 percent, before improving marginally to 13.1 percent in 2018.

Perceptions of Chinese influence play a significant role in how China is viewed. In the case of the US, China’s economic strength has been cited as a source of concern, especially as trade frictions between the two countries have intensified in recent years. In 2018, only 38 percent of Americans had a favourable view of China, down from 44 percent in 2017. Additionally, 58 percent of those surveyed by Pew believed that China’s economic power is a greater threat than its military strength, up from 52 percent in the previous year. According to Gallup, 40 percent of Americans regard China’s economic power as a critical threat to US vital interests.⁵³³ Following charts show the global perception of China from 2005-2018.


Annual Projection of global perception of China(2005)



Source: <https://chinapower.csis.org/global-views/>


⁵³³ <https://chinapower.csis.org/global-views/>

Annual Projection of global perception of China (2006)




Source: <https://chinapower.csis.org/global-views/>

Annual Projection of global perception of China (2007)




Source: <https://chinapower.csis.org/global-views/>

Annual Projection of global perception of China(2008)




Source: <https://chinapower.csis.org/global-views/>

Annual Projection of global perception of China(2009)




Source: <https://chinapower.csis.org/global-views/>

Annual Projection of global perception of China(2010)



CSIS China Power Project | Source: Pew Research Center © Natural Earth




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
CSIS China Power Project | Source: Pew Research Center

Source: <https://chinapower.csis.org/global-views/>

Annual Projection of global perception of China(2011)



CSIS China Power Project | Source: Pew Research Center © Natural Earth




na-view/#

CSIS China Power Project | Source: Pew Research Center


Source: <https://chinapower.csis.org/global-views/>

Annual Projection of global perception of China(2012)




Source: <https://chinapower.csis.org/global-views/>

Annual Projection of global perception of China(2013)




Source: <https://chinapower.csis.org/global-views/>

Annual Projection of global perception of China (2014)



CSIS China Power Project | Source: Pew Research Center © Natural Earth




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
CSIS China Power Project | Source: Pew Research Center

Source: <https://chinapower.csis.org/global-views/>

Annual Projection of global perception of China (2015)



CSIS China Power Project | Source: Pew Research Center © Natural Earth




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CSIS China Power Project | Source: Pew Research Center

Source: <https://chinapower.csis.org/global-views/>



Annual Projection of global perception of China(2016)



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Source: <https://chinapower.csis.org/global-views/>


Annual Projection of global perception of China(2017)



info-view/#

Source: <https://chinapower.csis.org/global-views/>

Annual Projection of global perception of China(2018)



Source: <https://chinapower.csis.org/global-views/>

A PEW Research Centre report titled ‘People around the globe are divided in their opinions of China’ published in 2019, maintains the following on countries opinion of China:⁵³⁴

A median of 40% across the 34 countries surveyed have a favourable opinion of China, compared with a median of 41% who have an unfavourable opinion. Opinion of China across most of Western Europe is, on balance, negative. While 51% in Greece have a positive view of China, pluralities or majorities in all other Western European countries have an unfavourable view, ranging from 53% in Spain to 70% in Sweden. The share of people who evaluate China positively have also dropped by double-digits in nearly half of the Western European countries surveyed, including Sweden (down 17 percentage points), the Netherlands (-11 points) and the UK (-11). Only in Greece and Italy has opinion improved. Central and Eastern Europeans are somewhat more divided in their assessments. More Bulgarians, Poles and Lithuanians have favourable than unfavourable views of China, and Hungarians are nearly evenly divided. Conversely, a plurality of Slovaks and a majority of Czechs have unfavourable views of China. Negative views of China predominate in both the United States⁵³⁵ and Canada, where 60% and 67% respectively see the country unfavourably. In both countries, this is the highest

⁵³⁴ <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/05/people-around-the-globe-are-divided-in-their-opinions-of-china/>

⁵³⁵ For more on U.S. opinion, see “U.S. Views of China Turn Sharply Negative Amid Trade Tensions.” Available online at <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/08/13/u-s-views-of-china-turn-sharply-negative-amid-trade-tensions/>

unfavourable opinion of China recorded in the Centre's polling history. It also reflects the largest year-on-year change in either country. China also receives unfavourable marks from most of its neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region. In Japan, 85% say they have an unfavourable opinion of China – the most negative among all countries surveyed. More than half in South Korea (63%), Australia (57%) and the Philippines (54%) share this sentiment. Opinion of China has also fallen across the region over the course of Pew Research Center's polling and is now hovering at or near historic lows in each of the countries surveyed. In Indonesia, the change over the past year has been particularly stark, falling 17 percentage points.⁵³⁶


Russians stand out for having the most positive view of China across all countries surveyed (71% favourable). A majority in Ukraine, too, share these views (57%). Majorities or pluralities in almost all the Middle Eastern, Latin American and sub-Saharan African countries surveyed have a favourable view of China.⁵³⁷

⁵³⁶ <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/05/people-around-the-globe-are-divided-in-their-opinions-of-china/>

⁵³⁷ <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/05/people-around-the-globe-are-divided-in-their-opinions-of-china/>

International opinions of China divided

% who have a ___ opinion of China



Note: Don't know responses not shown.

Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey, Q8b.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

SOURCE: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/05/people-around-the-globe-are-divided-in-their-opinions-of-china/>

Compared with 2018, fewer in North America, parts of Western Europe and Asia-Pacific view China favorably

% who have a favorable opinion of China

	2018 %	2019 %	Change
Indonesia	53	36	▼ 17
Canada	44	27	▼ 17
Sweden	42	25	▼ 17
Australia	48	36	▼ 12
U.S.	38	26	▼ 12
Philippines	53	42	▼ 11
UK	49	38	▼ 11
Netherlands	47	36	▼ 11
Kenya	67	58	▼ 9
France	41	33	▼ 8
Tunisia	70	63	▼ 7
Germany	39	34	▼ 5
South Korea	38	34	▼ 4
South Africa	49	46	▼ 3
Hungary	43	40	▼ 3
Spain	42	39	▼ 3
Japan	17	14	▼ 3
Brazil	49	51	▲ 2
Mexico	45	50	▲ 5
Russia	65	71	▲ 6
Argentina	41	47	▲ 6
Greece	43	51	▲ 8
Italy	29	37	▲ 8
Nigeria	61	70	▲ 9
Israel	55	66	▲ 11
Poland	36	47	▲ 11

Note: Statistically significant changes in **bold**.
Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey, Q8b.


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Source: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/05/people-around-the-globe-are-divided-in-their-opinions-of-china/>

Negative views of China up sharply in Canada, U.S.

% who have an *unfavorable* view of China

100%



Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey, Q8b.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


Source: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/05/people-around-the-globe-are-divided-in-their-opinions-of-china/>

A PEW Research Centre report titled 'U.S. Views of China Increasingly Negative Amid Coronavirus Outbreak' published in 2020, maintains the following:⁵³⁸

Negative views of China continue to grow in U.S.

% who say they have a ___ opinion of China

100%



Note: Don't know responses not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 3-29, 2020, Q5b.

"U.S. Views of China Increasingly Negative Amid Coronavirus Outbreak"


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Source: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/04/21/u-s-views-of-china-increasingly-negative-amid-coronavirus-outbreak/>

⁵³⁸ <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/04/21/u-s-views-of-china-increasingly-negative-amid-coronavirus-outbreak/>

Americans see U.S. as a global leader, have major doubts about China

% who say ...



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 3-29, 2020. Q5b, Q12a, Q14-16, Q17b.
 "U.S. Views of China Increasingly Negative Amid Coronavirus Outbreak"


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Source: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/04/21/u-s-views-of-china-increasingly-negative-amid-coronavirus-outbreak/>

Republicans consistently more negative than Democrats toward China

% who say they have an *unfavorable* opinion of China

100%




Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 3-29, 2020. Q5b.
 "U.S. Views of China Increasingly Negative Amid Coronavirus Outbreak"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Source: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/04/21/u-s-views-of-china-increasingly-negative-amid-coronavirus-outbreak/>

American concerns about China's impact on environment and human rights on the rise; economic concerns level off

% who say ___ is a *very* serious problem for the U.S.



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 3-29, 2020. Q31a-e.
 "U.S. Views of China Increasingly Negative Amid Coronavirus Outbreak"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Source: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/04/21/u-s-views-of-china-increasingly-negative-amid-coronavirus-outbreak/>

5.3 Foreign Policy-21st Century

China is an important impetus in the transition. Since the 21st century, the china's economic rise has been drastically changing the world's economic balance, and China's "great power" strategy is fundamentally reshaping the world's political landscape. China's "great power" strategy and its implementation will determine the country's power and the global balance in the 21st century.⁵³⁹

China's "great power" strategy is reflected in geographical and psychological objectives. Geographically, China should actively promote development in both land and sea, based on its geopolitical strategy and geo-economic environment. On land, China should strengthen economic ties with Eurasia via the **Belt and Road** initiative, and, while

⁵³⁹ <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1061667.shtml>

deepening cooperation with developed economies in Western Europe, actively tap the potential of Central Asia, South Asia, East Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. At sea, China should intensify economic connections with Pacific Rim countries, especially the US and Japan, via the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific and other bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Interactions with the US and Japan are of vital importance for China's economic transformation. The strategy is based on economics, but will generate tremendous political effects. If it is successful, Eurasia and the Pacific will become a broad and stable platform for China's rise, and the geopolitical and geo-economic basis for China's power. Psychologically, China should as a major power take on responsibilities for development, global governance, peace and security. After the Cold War, the US attempted to build a unipolar world and wanted to act as the only leader in the world.⁵⁴⁰

Building a community with a shared future for humanity was first proposed to the world by Chinese President Xi Jinping in March 2013 during his visit to Moscow. In the following years, Xi continuously refined his vision of global governance. A community with a shared future pursues an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity. According to the idea, countries should respect one another, discuss issues as equals, and resolutely reject the Cold War mentality and power politics. Countries should take a new approach to developing international relations with communication, rather than confrontation, and partnerships, rather than alliances. In his report made at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) last October, Xi reiterated the concept and laid out a roadmap⁵⁴¹ for China's foreign policy that connects the country's future to that of the whole world. The notion was thereafter written into the Party's Constitution as an integral aspect of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. "Building a new type of international relations" and building a community with a shared future for humanity are the overall goals of China's diplomacy, according to Wang Yi, Chinese foreign minister. "The goals originate from 5,000 years of tradition that the Chinese nation sees the world as equally shared by all, from China's diplomatic values with peace at the core, and from the CPC world view that well-being of people from all countries is intertwined," Wang said. In January of 2018, the CPC Central Committee at a plenary session stressed that, "Following the path of peaceful development, pursuing a mutually beneficial strategy of opening up, and promoting the building of a community with a shared future for mankind are of great significance to the cause of peaceful development for humanity."⁵⁴²

During the past few years, China has been pursuing win-win cooperation with the world while following its own path of peaceful development. The Belt and Road Initiative, as the

⁵⁴⁰ <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1061667.shtml>

⁵⁴¹ Xi Jinping on Wednesday unveiled a two-stage plan of the Communist Party of China (CPC) to make China a "great modern socialist country" by mid-21st century. This is the first time that the CPC has set forth a post-2020 strategic plan to make China a "great" country. The two-stage development plan is the CPC's "strategic vision for developing socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era, China has become a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence. "The two-stage plan is an important component of the "Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era," a long-term guide to action that the Party must adhere to and develop. The Thought builds on and further enriches Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents, and the Scientific Outlook on Development. It represents the latest achievement in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context.

⁵⁴² http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/02/c_137011860.htm

epitome of the concept, has become a huge cooperation platform for countries concerned to realize their common development. Also proposed by Xi in 2013, the initiative comprises the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road and aims to build a trade, investment and infrastructure network connecting Asia with Europe and Africa along and beyond ancient Silk Road trade routes. As a supporter of the Belt and Road Initiative, the China-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has extensive support from international community as its membership has expanded. By hosting or participating in such international events as the G20, BRICS, APEC, and Boao Forum for Asia meetings as well as the World Economic Forum in Davos, China demonstrates a strong preference for an open world economy. At the WEF meeting in 2017, Xi's vision of building a community with a shared future for humanity gained resonance worldwide.⁵⁴³

The Chapter I titled “China Has Found a Development Path Suited to Its Actual Conditions” of the White Paper China and the World in the New Era (September 2019) spells out China’s Foreign Policy in the 21st century. It states that China established its independent foreign policy of peace. In the 1950s, China, India and Myanmar jointly proposed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence). These have become basic norms for international relations and fundamental principles of international law. In recent years, China has proposed a raft of significant international concepts and initiatives, including a global community of shared future, a new model of international relations, the Belt and Road Initiative, the principle of upholding the greater good and pursuing shared interests, a vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security, the principles of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits in global governance, and the principles of equality, mutual learning, dialogue and inclusiveness between civilizations. These proposals have contributed Chinese wisdom and solutions to protecting world peace and promoting common development.⁵⁴⁴

Since reform and opening up in 1978, China has cut its armed forces by over 4 million. China has been an active participant of international arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation, opposing any arms race and safeguarding global strategic balance and stability. China has signed or joined more than 20 treaties on multilateral arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. China has become the second largest contributor to both the regular and peacekeeping budgets of the UN, and the largest troop contributor among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. In 2015 China announced that it would set up a ten-year, US\$1 billion China-UN Peace and Development Fund, which was officially put into operation in 2016. China has achieved full resolution of land border delimitation problems with 12 of its 14 neighboring countries, and delineated the China-Vietnam maritime boundary in the Beibu Gulf. China has played a constructive role in settling major international and regional issues.⁵⁴⁵

⁵⁴³ http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/02/c_137011860.htm

⁵⁴⁴ Excerpts from China’s State Council Information Office White paper, titled “China and the World in the New Era” published on September 27, 2019 available online at URL:http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201909/27/content_WS5d8d80f9c6d0bcf8c4c142ef.html

⁵⁴⁵ Excerpts from China’s State Council Information Office White paper, titled “China and the World in the New Era” published on September 27, 2019 available online at URL:http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201909/27/content_WS5d8d80f9c6d0bcf8c4c142ef.html

Building a new model of international relations

In addition to development issues, the world is beset by serious crises of trust and threats to the international rules and order. Some long-standing international norms and ethics that have been widely recognized and observed are now abandoned and betrayed. Some international treaties and agreements with a bearing on global stability and wellbeing are ignored, torn up or damaged. In defiance of international truth certain countries overtly infringe the sovereignty and interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries, and abuse the small and weak. A new model of international relations should be built on the principles of mutual respect, equity and justice, and mutually beneficial cooperation. Mutual respect is based on equality among all countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor. Each country should respect other countries' political systems, their right to choose their own development paths, and their interests and concerns. All should oppose power politics, hegemony, and interference in other countries' domestic affairs.⁵⁴⁶

Promoting a new model of economic globalization

Some countries have ascribed domestic governance problems to economic globalization or other countries, and resorted to unilateral, protectionist, and hegemonic actions. This approach has damaged the global value, supply and consumption chains, and caused turbulence and conflict in the current international trade order, driving the world economy towards the "recession trap".

A new model of economic globalization should be developed and shaped by all countries. It should make innovations and improvements based on those rules and institutions that have proven effective in practice, such as trade liberalization and multilateral trade. It should eliminate hegemonism, power politics, the law of the jungle, and zero-sum games, uphold the principles of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits, and realize democracy, equality, fairness and equity. It should help to build an open world economy, promote world peace and stability, and bring common development and prosperity. The ongoing fourth technological revolution will have immeasurable impact on a new wave of economic globalization and on the development of human society, bringing unprecedented opportunities for development as well as serious challenges.⁵⁴⁷

Upholding the international system with the UN at its core

The international order underpinned by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter has accommodated the interests of the majority of countries and promoted world peace and development. Blatant violations of international law and the basic norms of international relations in pursuit of self-interest will plunge the world into a precarious situation characterized by chaos, confrontation and conflict. Hegemony will put justice in peril. The international community should work resolutely together to develop

⁵⁴⁶ Excerpts from China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled "China and the World in the New Era" published on September 27, 2019 available online at

URL:http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201909/27/content_WS5d8d80f9c6d0bcf8c4c142ef.html

⁵⁴⁷ Excerpts from China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled "China and the World in the New Era" published on September 27, 2019 available online at

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democratic international relations, safeguard the ethical and legal norms that are vital to human survival and development, and uphold international equity and justice.

The UN is at the core of the global governance system. The UN Charter is the fundamental cornerstone for maintaining stability of the international system and regulating relations among countries. The world is experiencing confrontation and injustice in many different forms, not because the purposes and principles of the UN Charter are outdated, but because they have not been effectively fulfilled. Upholding the authority and role of the UN is key to protecting the common interests of the international community and the legitimate interests of individual countries, and to shaping a bright future for humanity. Therefore, all countries should uphold the international system centered on the UN, international law and the basic norms of international relations underpinned by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and the central role of the UN in international affairs.⁵⁴⁸

The multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core is the cornerstone of international trade. It has played a crucial role in promoting global trade, building an open world economy, and improving the wellbeing of the peoples of all countries. Unilateral and protectionist trade policies, which run counter to the laws of the market, international rules, and the basic principles of the WTO, will lead to shrinking global trade and may even trigger global economic crises. All countries should join together in support of multilateralism while firmly opposing unilateralism and protectionism. In building an open world economy, we should safeguard the WTO's core role and basic principles and the multilateral trading system characterized by free trade, openness and non-discrimination, and protect the legitimate rights and development space of developing member states.

The Paris Agreement on climate change, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and other international treaties and agreements are based on the consensus of all parties and in accord with the interests of all countries. All signatories have the obligation to fulfill their commitments fully rather than selectively. Willful withdrawal from international organizations and treaties goes against the spirit of contract and international ethics. The rules should be observed in fairness and be mutually binding, and must not be compromised by "pragmatism" and double standards.

Promoting world peace and development through our own development

Guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, China will continue to forge ahead on its socialist path. We have committed to a people-centered approach and given top priority to development. We have implemented the five-sphere integrated plan to advance economic, political, cultural, social and ecological development, and the four-pronged comprehensive strategy to complete a moderately prosperous society in all respects, further reform, advance the rule of law and strengthen Party discipline. We should strive to build China into a strong, modern socialist country and march towards national rejuvenation. China places economic development at the

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center of its national rejuvenation, promotes high-quality development and pursues with firmness of purpose the new vision of innovative, coordinated, green, open and inclusive development. We will accelerate the modernization of our economy to better meet people's ever-growing needs for a better life.

China actively follows the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, remains firm in its commitment to promoting green development, and speeds up the application of eco-friendly growth models and ways of life. It takes a leading role in international cooperation in response to climate change, advances green, low-carbon, circular and sustainable development all over the world, and endeavors to protect the common homeland of humanity. The Chinese military is a resolute defender of world peace. In the new era, China continues to pursue a defense policy that is defensive in nature, and stays committed to building a strong military with Chinese features, and solid national defense and armed forces that are commensurate with China's international status and in compliance with national security and development interests.⁵⁴⁹

What China's Peaceful Development means to the Rest of the World

Promoting the building of a harmonious world

China's foreign policy aims to uphold world peace and promote common development. China advocates the building of a harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity and works with other countries in pursuing this goal. To China, it is both a long-term objective and a current task. To build a harmonious world, we should make the following efforts:

Politically, countries should respect each other and treat each other as equals, and work together to promote democracy in international relations. All the countries in the world, whether big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal members of the international community and should receive due respect of the international community. Countries should also safeguard the UN's core role in handling global affairs, adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, abide by international law and the generally-accepted principles governing international relations, and promote democracy, harmony, coordination and win-win spirit in international relations. The internal affairs of a country should be decided by its own people, international affairs should be decided by all countries through consultation on an equal footing, and every country's right to equally participate in international affairs should be respected and upheld.⁵⁵⁰

Economically, countries should cooperate with each other, draw on each other's strengths and make economic globalization a balanced and win-win process that benefits all countries. Countries should also seek to establish an international multilateral trading system that is fair, open, equitable and nondiscriminatory so that the benefit of economic globalization will cover all countries. All countries should work together to fulfill the UN

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⁵⁵⁰ Excerpts from China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled "China's Foreign Polies for Pursuing Peaceful Development", published in September 6, 2011 available online at
URL:http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7126562.htm

Millennium Development Goals and enable everyone to enjoy the benefit of development in the 21st century.

Culturally, countries should draw on each other's strengths, seek common ground while putting aside differences, respect the diversity of the world, and promote progress in human civilization. Dialogues and exchanges among civilizations should be encouraged to do away with ideological prejudice and distrust, and make human society more harmonious and the world more colorful.

In terms of security, countries should trust each other and strengthen cooperation, settle international disputes and conflicts peacefully rather than resorting to war and jointly safeguard world peace and stability. Consultation and dialogue should be carried out to enhance mutual trust, reduce differences and settle disputes. Use or threat of use of military force should be avoided.

In terms of the environment, all countries should help each other and make concerted efforts to better protect our only home -- the Earth. Countries should develop new modes of development, take the path of sustainable development and promote the harmonious development of man and nature. We should follow the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and enhance international cooperation in environmental protection and in addressing climate change.⁵⁵¹

Pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace

The Chinese people adhere to the social system and path of development chosen by themselves and will never allow any external forces to interfere in China's internal affairs. China promotes friendly and cooperative relations with all the other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It does not form alliance with any other country or group of countries, nor does it use social system or ideology as a yardstick to determine what kind of relations it should have with other countries. China respects the right of the people of other countries to independently choose their own social system and path of development, and does not interfere in other countries' internal affairs. It is opposed to the practices of the big bullying the small and the strong oppressing the weak, and to hegemonism and power politics. China calls for settling disputes and conflicts through talks and consultation and by seeking common ground while putting aside differences. It does not impose its own will upon others and acts in the fundamental interests of the Chinese people and the common interests of all peoples throughout the world. China bases its decision on a particular issue according to its merits. Upholding justice, China plays an active and constructive role in international affairs.⁵⁵²

China is firm in upholding its core interests which include the following: state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, China's

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⁵⁵² Excerpts from China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled "China's Foreign Polies for Pursuing Peaceful Development", published in September 6,2011 available online at
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political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development.

China fully respects other countries' legitimate rights to protect their interests. While developing itself, it fully accommodates other countries' legitimate concerns and interests and never makes gains at others' expense or shifts its own troubles onto others. China aligns its own interests with the common interests of the people of the world and seeks to expand common interests of all the parties. It works to establish and expand community of common interests in various fields and at various levels with other countries and regions. China is committed to promoting the common interests of all humanity and bringing the benefit of human civilization to everyone.

Promoting new thinking on security featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination.

China advocates a new thinking on security featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and pursues comprehensive security, common security and cooperative security. In terms of comprehensive security, the security issue has new dimensions as traditional and non-traditional security threats have become intertwined under the new historical conditions. The international community should appreciate the need of ensuring comprehensive security and adopt comprehensive measures to address security threats and their root causes and countries around the world should work together to meet various challenges to security.⁵⁵³

Assessment of China's Foreign Policy

China's foreign policy today has changed fundamentally since the nation's founding in 1949. Through the 1950s and 1960s, Chairman Mao Zedong's policy of "self-reliance" greatly constrained the nation's foreign contacts. Beijing's foreign policy goals then centred on promoting Maoist revolutionary parties around the world. A lingering dispute over the Chinese Communist government's legitimacy in the international community facilitated its international isolation. Although Mao's forces had won the civil war conflict on mainland China, many countries, including the United States, continued to recognize the previous Republic of China (ROC) government that had fled to Taiwan as the country's rightful government. While the PRC went unrepresented in much of the international community in its early decades, Taiwan continued to control China's Embassies around the world, to be China's signatory to international agreements, and to hold the Chinese seat in the United Nations and other multilateral organizations. All this began to change in the early 1970s when President Nixon initiated an opening to China and the United Nations voted to recognize the PRC as China's legitimate U.N. representative. Under economic and diplomatic reform policies initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, two years after Mao's death, China began openly to seek and receive substantial foreign investment, technology, and expertise. In the intervening years, the PRC has become an international export powerhouse; has expanded its membership and participation in international organizations; and increasingly has appeared willing to embrace many norms and rules

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of the global economic system of which the United States is the chief architect and dominant player. Since 2000 in particular, there has been a steady increase in the quantity and sophistication of PRC diplomacy. Beijing has courted foreign governments with high-level diplomatic exchanges, trade initiatives, investment agreements, and tourism and cultural understandings.⁵⁵⁴

China's "New Security Concept".

Although this report focuses on non-military aspects of China's foreign policy, no discussion of China's international rise would be complete without acknowledgment of equally important changes in China's security policy. Paralleling its foreign policy developments, changes in PRC security policy are thought to be based on Beijing's perceptions since the mid-1990's that the country was facing new security challenges. Among these new perceived challenges were the demise of the Soviet Union and international communism, the post-Cold War surge in U.S. global dominance — in particular the decisive demonstration of U.S. military supremacy in the Persian Gulf War — the increasing pro-independence activism on Taiwan, and the benefits and complications accompanying China's own rapid economic growth. As defined in a series of White Papers published by the State Council Information Office since 1995, China's new security concept states that the post-Cold War order requires a more pragmatic security policy based on "mutual trust, mutual equality, and cooperation." The new security concept seeks to assure that China's economic development and military growth is not a threat to its neighbours or the world. In keeping with its new international diplomacy, China's new security approach serves the multiple goals of trying to defuse international instabilities that could adversely affect China's own development; trying to expand China's own wealth and influence in ways seen as non-threatening to its neighbours; and trying to balance U.S. global power in a manner that serves China's interests. Unlike past security challenges to the United States, China's new security approach is difficult to categorize or define: it focuses neither on spreading a political ideology, nor establishing a global network of client states, nor aggressively seeking territorial gains. In tandem with its foreign policy diplomacy, China's new security concept presents a unique and subtle challenge to policymakers.

Framing the Debate on China's Growing Global Reach

A discussion of China's international engagement must begin with several caveats about the limits of what is known. First, there is little consensus within the U.S. and global China-watching communities on China's ultimate foreign policy goals or on what motivates and informs China's decisions — either decisions made in general terms or with regard to specific regions or countries.

⁵⁵⁴ Excerpts from Congressional Research Service Reports on Foreign Policy and Regional Affairs titled 'China's Foreign Policy: What Does It Mean for U.S. Global Interests?' published in July, 2008 available online at URL: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34588.pdf>

Lack of Transparency in Foreign Policy Decision Making.

Many have written on China's foreign policy decision making. Although China's foreign policymaking has become more regularized in recent years, few claim to be certain about how China's decisions are made, about who makes them, or about what long-term goals Chinese policies seek to attain. Some profess certainty; but they have not been able to demonstrate that their convictions lead to any sort of consistency in analysing or predicting China's foreign policy decisions.

The number of unknown variables that still animate China's foreign policy decision-making processes is simply too great. These variables include uncertainties about the clashes and respective strengths of internationalists and hardliners in Chinese politics, about whether and how the interests of various PRC bureaucracies compete and conflict on a given issue, and about the extent to which bureaucratic actors seek to undermine policies that they see as disadvantageous to them.

Presumed PRC Foreign Policy Goals.

Within the ongoing international debate about what China's ultimate intentions may be, there is broader consensus on some of the fundamental objectives that appear to be at least partial motivations for Beijing's current international outreach. However, adding to the uncertainty about PRC policies, these objectives at times are in contradiction. China's policy direction is that much harder to predict when some of these key policy objectives are seen to clash, and experience suggests that abrupt shifts in policy, shifts which remain unexplained in many cases, still occur with a fair degree of regularity in the PRC system. This may be the result of a fundamental incoherence in PRC policy goals. More likely, it reflects the internal disagreements and varying priorities of the various political and bureaucratic players in the PRC system.⁵⁵⁵

Enhancing Sustainable Economic Growth.

Strong economic development continues to be seen as the core primary objective for the PRC leadership for a host of reasons — not the least of which are to raise the living standards of its enormous population, to dampen social disaffection about economic and other inequities, and to sustain regime legitimacy after the erosion of Communist ideology as an acceptable organizing principle. China's annual economic growth rates routinely are in the double digits. China steadily and successfully has sought trade agreements, oil and gas contracts, scientific and technological cooperation, and de-facto multilateral security arrangements with countries both around its periphery and around the world. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where China is most active, access to energy resources and raw commodities to fuel China's domestic growth plays a dominant role in Beijing's activities. China has oil and gas exploration contracts with Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, and Cuba; oil contracts and pipeline deals are a major part of China's relations with Central Asian states such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan; and

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China's oil exploration interests extend to Burma, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Imports of crude oil constitute the bulk of China's imports from African states.

Maintaining Regional and International Stability.

In pursuit of its goal of sustainable economic development, China also has placed a high priority on maintaining a "peaceful international environment" both regionally and internationally. A White Paper issued by the State Council in December 2005 emphasized the point: "China's development needs a peaceful international environment. "To this end, PRC leaders have sought to reassure other countries that China's economic development is an opportunity for, rather than threat to, its neighbours. These reassurances have taken on many forms. Chinese leaders have characterized Chinese investments as a "win-win" situation, with benefits flowing to both China and to recipient countries. Beijing has sought to resolve outstanding border disputes, as with Russia and India, and to ease tensions with its neighbours over competing territorial claims in the South China Sea and elsewhere. The PRC also has more assertively cooperated on regional initiatives such as the Six Party Talks and joint anti-terror activities.

Increasing International Stature and Competing with U.S. Supremacy.

After decades of international isolation, PRC leaders are presumed to place a high priority on expanding and improving China's global stature and influence and, where they can, on limiting or constraining the ability of the United States to interfere with or adversely affect PRC interests. Having come late to the global economic development party, China is seeking multiple international partnerships and groupings that make it, if not an indispensable player in the global system, then at least one whose interests must regularly be taken into account.¹⁹ Having embraced the international system, Beijing is seen to be manoeuvring deftly for space and opportunities not already taken up by the United States — opportunities where it can have greater freedom of action. The PRC has not put into place a formal system of alliances like that of the United States. Some say this demonstrates Beijing's innate reluctance to assume the risks, costs, and commitments that come with world leadership.

Competitive Advantages of PRC "Soft Power"

Whether one is reading press accounts and scholarly treatises or traveling through the regions where Beijing is active, China seems to be everywhere. It is tempting for some to become alarmist, magnifying presumed PRC strengths as well as perceived U.S. weaknesses. Many concerned observers focus on the competitive strengths that PRC soft power has in relation to the United States, pointing out that the PRC international approach is particularly strong in areas where the U.S. political system and U.S. values make it less competitive. Some suggest that these PRC strengths have a brighter future in today's global economy, meaning that China will have increasing economic and political soft power clout internationally at the expense of the United States. Still, a closer look at some of the PRC's presumed assets suggests that they may have downsides as well.⁵⁵⁶

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“No Strings”.

The recipient governments of PRC trade and investment are particularly attracted to the fact that Chinese money generally comes with none of the good governance requirements, human rights conditions, approved-project restrictions, and environmental quality regulations that characterize Western government investments. With an authoritarian government that has few if any democratic imperatives, China has capitalized on its willingness to make such “unrestricted” international investments part of its “win-win” international strategy. (PRC leaders do not appear to define their demand that a country adopt a “one China” policy, nor their frequent insistence on use of Chinese companies, suppliers, and banks, as such restrictions.) In response to the December 2006 military coup in Fiji, for instance, Beijing promised to continue its aid programs on the grounds that the coup was Fiji’s “internal” affair. China markets this capacity internationally as a key competitive advantage to Western capital — one that is both more efficient and less intrusive for the recipients. And the unrestricted nature of PRC investments resonates with many foreign governments.

The World Bank and Western governments may be able to increase the efficiency of their international investment processes and reduce attending red tape to compete with these PRC advantages. But Beijing’s willingness to make unrestricted investments while holding the recipients to no standards can be seen as implicitly validating the policies of the often authoritarian recipient governments. Such a “hands-off” approach could have negative longer-term implications for how the PRC is viewed within the countries in which it is investing, particularly if the authoritarian leaders in question later fall to a more democratic government. On balance then, China’s “no strings” approach may have potential negative consequences that could counterbalance any soft power advantages.

The Benefits of State-Owned Assets.

The PRC is thought to reap soft power advantages by having much of its foreign investment carried out by its strong state-owned sector, given monopoly status by the Chinese government. These state corporations lack transparency, have deep pockets backed by government assets, and operate without the constraints that come with having to issue a corporate annual report. Unlike U.S. corporations investing overseas, who lack this close government patronage and in addition must answer to their shareholders, PRC state-owned companies have the luxury of being able to take a longer-term, strategic view — one more closely integrated with national priorities — without having to demonstrate short-term profits. There may be potential negative consequences. Some hold that there is a certain discipline in having to adhere to the bottom line. PRC state-owned companies, lacking this built-in discipline, sometimes are seen to have paid above market prices for their oil and gas contracts and to have entered into unprofitable initial arrangements in order to improve bilateral relations and facilitate future contracts. In addition, Chinese SOE’s have a high retained earnings rate and a notable aversion to paying dividends to their largely government-controlled shareholders. Concerned about this trend, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission in 2004 and 2005 enacted regulations

designed to force higher dividend pay-outs, targeting SOEs with positive profits but no dividend pay-outs over a three year period.⁵⁵⁷

Limitations on PRC Soft

Power Even if its international outreach is entirely benign and centred on economic growth, the PRC's potential to expand quickly to consumption and production levels comparable to those of the United States presents profound challenges to American and global interests. Other projections tend to minimize or overlook other limitations and complications that confront China's overseas activities. The "win-win" approach to international interactions is based on a self-interested approach that focuses only on those issues on which all sides supposedly can agree. Easy things are taken care of first, while inconvenient and difficult things are postponed, possibly indefinitely. Racking up trade and investment agreements in this way, while creating symbolically significant headlines, nevertheless leaves a lack of depth in China's overall relationships. Moreover, as already mentioned, China's lack of transparency raises consistent doubts about whether the levels of aid and investment triumphantly announced are the levels of aid and investment actually disbursed. To cite one example, China initially reported that it pledged \$63 million in assistance to Indonesia and other countries affected by the 2004 tsunami, a figure dwarfed by the \$405 million pledged by the United States. A later article in a PRC publication, however, put the actual amount of PRC tsunami assistance at \$22.6 million. PRC foreign policy achievements may be constrained if Beijing continues to short-change its intended recipient governments in this way. A "win-win" strategy may prove a slender reed for maximizing comprehensive soft power.

The Complications of an International Presence.

Even with a "win-win" strategy, acquiring and maintaining an enhanced international presence brings with it certain complications. Among other things, it provides almost innumerable opportunities for international misunderstanding, resentment, cultural backlash, kidnappings, hard feelings, murders, and other assorted repercussions. Cultural backlash and resentment may be heightened by the style that PRC overseas investments and construction projects have pursued to date — involving the substantial import of Chinese workers and supplies and the use of Chinese companies instead of using local companies or the indigenous population. Chinese overseas operations already have begun to experience fallout from their activities: PRC oil drilling sites and well-workers have been attacked, kidnapped, or killed in Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, and elsewhere in Africa. Some Central Asia countries have grown concerned about the level of energy assets that China has been accruing within their borders and have moved to limit such acquisitions. In some Asian countries with large ethnic Chinese populations, there has been push-back against perceived "Chinese" businesses and other interests. As China's international activities expand, confrontations along these lines are likely to increase, possibly garnering unfavourable publicity for the PRC and putting stress on the "win-win" approach. Foreign entanglements also could raise political problems at home for PRC policymakers. The increasing availability of Internet and cell phone use assures

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that growing numbers of Chinese citizens have more access to information, including information about China's international activities. Confirmation that China is investing millions of dollars in overseas projects, while at home unemployment rises and infrastructure development lags, may prove objectionable to the hundreds of millions of PRC citizens still living below the poverty line.⁵⁵⁸

5.4 Economic Policy

Prior to the initiation of economic reforms and trade liberalization nearly 40 years ago, China maintained policies that kept the economy very poor, stagnant, centrally controlled, vastly inefficient, and relatively isolated from the global economy. Since opening up to foreign trade and investment and implementing free-market reforms in 1979, China has been among the world's fastest-growing economies. Such growth has enabled China, on average, to double its GDP every eight years. The Chinese government has made innovation a top priority in its economic planning through a number of high-profile initiatives, such as "Made in China 2025," a plan announced in 2015 to upgrade and modernize China's manufacturing in 10 key sectors through extensive government assistance in order to make China a major global player in these sectors. However, such measures have increasingly raised concerns that China intends to use industrial policies to decrease the country's reliance on foreign technology (including by locking out foreign firms in China) and eventually dominate global markets.

5.4.1 New Initiatives

China has set up platforms for multilateral dialogue and cooperation in political, economic, security, cultural and other fields. To promote multilateral cooperation, it has established a number of global and regional multilateral platforms including:

- Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation,
- China International Import Expo,
- Hongqiao International Economic Forum,
- Forum on China-Africa Cooperation,
- China-Arab States Cooperation Forum,
- China-CELAC Forum,
- Boao Forum for Asia,
- China-ASEAN Expo,
- China-Arab States Expo,
- China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo,
- Conference on Dialogue of Asian Civilizations, and
- World Internet Conference.

China has hosted the CICA Summit in Shanghai, APEC Leaders' Informal Meeting in Beijing, G20 Hangzhou Summit, BRICS Summit in Xiamen, and SCO Qingdao Summit, marking a series of pioneering, leading and institutional achievements. We have initiated the establishment of international financial cooperation institutions such as the Asian

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Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, making a growing contribution to the inclusive development of the world. The China-initiated SCO has played an important role in safeguarding regional and world peace and stability.⁵⁵⁹

China's Belt and Road initiative (BRI)⁵⁶⁰, also called "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR), was launched in 2013 to boost economic integration and connectivity (such as infrastructure, trade, and investment) with its neighbours and various trading partners in Asia, Africa, Europe, and beyond.⁵⁶¹ Promoting high-quality development along the Belt and Road. The Belt and Road Initiative is a platform for building a global community of shared future, acting as a "boat" and "bridge" to promote world peace and development.⁵⁶²

At the APEC summit in November 2017, President Xi said the following:

The Belt and Road Initiative calls for joint contribution and it has a clear focus, which is to promote infrastructure construction and connectivity, strengthen coordination on economic policies, enhance complementarity of development strategies and boost interconnected development to achieve common prosperity. This initiative is from China, but it belongs to the world. It is rooted in history, but it is oriented toward the future. It focuses on the Asian, European and African continents, but it is open to all partners. I am confident that the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative will create a broader and more dynamic platform for Asia-Pacific cooperation.⁵⁶³

More and more countries and international organizations have signed intergovernmental cooperation agreements on the Belt and Road Initiative. By the end of March 2019, the Chinese government had signed 173 cooperation agreements with 125 countries and 29 international organizations. The Belt and Road has expanded from Asia and Europe to include more 7 new participants in Africa, Latin America and the South Pacific⁵⁶⁴

Coordination and cooperation in specific fields of the Belt and Road Initiative have progressed steadily. China has launched the "Belt and Road Digital Economy International Cooperation Initiative" with Egypt, Laos, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. It has signed cooperation agreements with 16 countries to strengthen the construction of the Digital Silk Road. China issued the "Action

⁵⁵⁹ Excerpts from China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled "China and the World in the New Era" published on September 27, 2019 available online at URL:http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201909/27/content_WS5d8d80f9c6d0bcf8c4c142ef.html

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid

⁵⁶⁰ http://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201904/23/WS5cbe871b498e079e6801ec1b/the-bri-progress-contributions-and-prospects_1.html

⁵⁶¹ It comprises the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.

⁵⁶² Excerpts from China's State Council Information Office White paper, titled "China and the World in the New Era" published on September 27, 2019 available online at URL:http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201909/27/content_WS5d8d80f9c6d0bcf8c4c142ef.html

⁵⁶³ http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/11/c_136743492.htm

⁵⁶⁴ http://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201904/23/WS5cbe871b498e079e6801ec1b/the-bri-progress-contributions-and-prospects_2.html

Plan on Belt and Road Standard Connectivity (2018-2020)". It has signed 85 standardization cooperation agreements with 49 countries and regions.⁵⁶⁵

Significant progress has been made in the construction of international economic cooperation corridors and passageways. The six major corridors for international economic cooperation – the New Eurasian Land Bridge, and the China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia, China-Indochina Peninsula, China-Pakistan, and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic corridors – connect the Asian economic circle with the European economic circle. They have played an important role in establishing and strengthening connectivity partnerships between participating countries and building an efficient and smooth Eurasian market.⁵⁶⁶

Railways

Major progress has been made in building inter-regional and intercontinental railway networks focusing on such cooperation projects as the China-Laos Railway, China Thailand Railway, Hungary-Serbia Railway, and Jakarta Bandung High-Speed Railway. Preliminary research has advanced on the eastern route of the Pan-Asia Railway Network, the upgrade of Pakistan's Karachi-Peshawar Railway Line (also referred to as Main Line 1 or ML-1), and the China-Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan Railway. A pre-feasibility study on a China Nepal cross-border railway has been completed. After preliminary work on China Railway Express cargo trains, an international railway operation mechanism with cooperation among multiple countries has been established. Railway companies of China, Belarus, Germany, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Poland, and Russia have signed an agreement on deeper cooperation in China-Europe rail service. By the end of 2018, China-Europe rail service had connected 108 cities in 16 countries in Asia and Europe. A total of 13,000 trains had carried more than 1.1 million TEUs.

Roads

Trial operations have been carried out on nonstop transport on the China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan, China-Russia (Dalian-Novosibirsk) and China-Viet Nam roads. In February 2018, regular operation began on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan highway. China-Vietnam-Beilun River Bridge II has been completed and opened to traffic. China formally joined the Convention on International 16 Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention). It has signed 18 bilateral and multilateral international transport facilitation agreements with 15 B&R countries, including the "Intergovernmental Agreement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States on the Facilitation of International Road Transport". Positive progress has been made in implementing the GMS "Agreement for the Facilitation of Cross-Border Transport of Goods and People".⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶⁵ http://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201904/23/WS5cbe871b498e079e6801ec1b/the-bri-progress-contributions-and-prospects_2.html

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁷ http://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201904/23/WS5cbe871b498e079e6801ec1b/the-bri-progress-contributions-and-prospects_2.html

Ports

In Pakistan's Gwadar Port, routes for regular container liners have been opened and supporting facilities in the starting area of the Gwadar Free Trade Zone completed, attracting more than 30 companies into the area. Preliminary work has been completed for Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port Special Economic Zone, including defining the zone's industrial functions and making conceptual plans. An important transit hub has been completed at the Port of Piraeus in Greece, and Phase III construction is to be completed. Khalifa Port Container Terminal Phase II in the United Arab Emirates officially opened in December 2018. China has signed 38 bilateral and regional shipping agreements with 47 B&R countries. China's Ningbo Shipping 17 Exchange has made constant efforts to improve the Maritime Silk Road Freight Index and released the China-CEEC Trade Index (CCTI) and the Ningbo Port Index.⁵⁶⁸

Air transport

China has signed bilateral intergovernmental air transport agreements with 126 countries and regions. It has expanded arrangements for air traffic rights with Luxembourg, Russia, Armenia, Indonesia, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Israel, Mongolia, Malaysia, and Egypt. Over the past five years or so, 1,239 new international routes have opened between China and other B&R countries, accounting for 69.1 percent of the total of China's new international routes over that period.⁵⁶⁹

Energy facilities

China has signed a large number of cooperation framework agreements and MoUs with other B&R countries, and has carried out extensive cooperation in the fields of electricity, oil and gas, nuclear power, new energy, and coal. It works with relevant countries to ensure the safe operation of oil and gas pipeline networks and optimize the configuration of energy resources between countries and regions. The China-Russia crude oil pipeline and the China Central Asia natural gas pipeline have maintained stable operation. Certain sections of the eastern route of the China-18 Russia natural gas pipeline will enter service in December 2019 and the entire eastern route will be completed and enter service in 2024. China-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines have been completed.⁵⁷⁰

Communication facilities

Significant progress has been made in the construction of China-Myanmar, China-Pakistan, China-Kyrgyzstan, and China-Russia cross-border fibre optic cables for information transmission. China and the International Telecommunication Union signed a "Letter of Intent to Strengthen Cooperation on Telecommunications and Information Networks Within the Framework of the Belt and Road Initiative". China has also signed cooperation agreements with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan on fibre optic cables, which represent the practical launch of the Silk Road Fiber Optic Cable project.

⁵⁶⁸ http://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201904/23/WS5cbe871b498e079e6801ec1b/the-bri-progress-contributions-and-prospects_2.html

⁵⁶⁹ http://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201904/23/WS5cbe871b498e079e6801ec1b/the-bri-progress-contributions-and-prospects_2.html

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid.

Unimpeded trade

Unimpeded trade is an important goal of the Belt and Road Initiative. The efforts invested in the initiative have liberalized and facilitated trade and investment in the participating countries and regions, lowered the costs of trade and business, and released growth potential, enabling the 19 participants to engage in broader and deeper economic globalization.

- **Greater liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment.** China has issued the "Initiative on Promoting Unimpeded Trade Cooperation Along the Belt and Road", to which 83 countries and international organizations have subscribed. Cooperation in border inspection and quarantine has deepened. Since the first Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in May 2017, China has signed more than 100 cooperation agreements with other B&R countries, granting access to some 50 types of agricultural products and food after inspection and quarantine. Express customs clearance services for agricultural products between China and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have reduced the clearance time by 90 percent. China has further expanded sectors accepting foreign investment to create a business environment of high international standards. It has opened 12 pilot free trade zones for global business and experimented with free trade ports to attract investment from participating countries of the Belt and Road Initiative. China's average tariffs have dropped from 15.3 percent when it joined the World Trade Organization to 7.5 percent today. China has signed or upgraded free trade agreements with ASEAN, Singapore, Pakistan, Georgia and other countries and regions, and signed an economic and trade cooperation agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union. A network of free trade areas involving China and other B&R countries has taken shape.
- **Expanding trade.** From 2013 to 2018 the value of trade between China and other B&R countries surpassed US\$6 trillion, accounting for 27.4 percent of China's total trade in goods and growing faster than the country's overall foreign trade. In 2018 the value of trade in goods between China and other B&R countries reached US\$1.3 trillion, growing by 16.4 percent year on year. Trade in services between China and other B&R countries has seen steady progress, growing by 18.4 percent from 2016 to reach US\$97.76 billion in 2017. The figure accounted for 14.1 percent of China's total trade in services, 1.6 percentage points higher than in 2016. According to a World Bank study that analyses the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative on trade in 71 potentially participating countries, the initiative increases trade flows among participating countries by up to 4.1 percent.⁵⁷¹

Closer cooperation between financial institutions.

In building the Belt and Road, policy-backed export credit insurance, which has wide coverage, plays a special role in supporting infrastructure and basic industries. The strengths of commercial banks lie in taking deposits from wider sources, corporate financing, financial products, trade agency, and trust services. By the end of 2018 the

⁵⁷¹ http://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201904/23/WS5cbe871b498e079e6801ec1b/the-bri-progress-contributions-and-prospects_3.html

China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation had endorsed US\$600 billion on export to and investment in the participating countries.

Deeper financial connectivity.

Eleven Chinese-funded banks have set up 76 first-grade institutions in 28 B&R countries, and 50 banks from 22 B&R countries have opened 7 corporate banks, 19 branches, and 34 representative offices in China. Two Chinese-funded securities firms have established joint ventures in Singapore and Laos. China has made bilateral currency swap arrangements with more than 20 B&R countries and Renminbi clearing arrangements with 7 B&R countries, and signed cooperation agreements with the financial supervision authorities of 35 B&R countries. The Renminbi's functions as a currency for international payment, investment, trade, and reserve have been strengthened. The 26 Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) now covers some 40 countries and regions involved in the Belt and Road Initiative. The China-IMF Capacity Development Center and the Research Center for the Belt and Road Financial and Economic Development have been founded.⁵⁷²

5.4.2 US-China Trade War

The **China-United States trade war** is an ongoing economic conflict between the world's two largest national economies, China and the United States. President Donald Trump in 2018 began setting tariffs and other trade barriers on China with the goal of forcing it to make changes to what the U.S. says are "unfair trade practices".⁵⁷³ Among those trade practices and their effects are the growing trade deficit, the theft of intellectual property, and the forced transfer of American technology to China.⁵⁷⁴ In China, there is a perception that America is trying to curb its rise as a global economic power.⁵⁷⁵

History of the trade war

Since mid-2018, the US and China have been locked in a trade confrontation that has resulted in several rounds of retaliatory tariffs. Over the course of 2018, the US administration started implementing a series of trade measures to curtail imports, first targeting specific products (steel, aluminium, solar panels and washing machines) and then specifically targeting imports from China. In the early summer 2018, US and China raised tariffs on about US\$50 billion worth of each other's goods. This escalated further in September 2018 when the US introduced an additional 10% to cover \$200 billion worth of Chinese imports, to which China retaliated by imposing tariffs on imports from the US worth an additional \$60 billion.

In June 2019, the US increased the tariffs further, to 25%. China responded by raising the tariffs on a subset of products that were already subject to tariffs. In September 2019, the


⁵⁷² http://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201904/23/WS5cbe871b498e079e6801ec1b/the-bri-progress-contributions-and-prospects_3.html

⁵⁷³ Swanson, Ana (July 5, 2018). "Trump's Trade War With China Is Officially Underway". *The New York Times*. Retrieved Mar. 26, 2020.

⁵⁷⁴ "Findings of the Investigation into China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974", Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, March 22, 2018

⁵⁷⁵ <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45899310>

US imposed 15% tariffs on a large subset of the remaining \$300 billion worth of imports from China not yet subject to tariffs.⁵⁷⁶



Source: UNCTAD, available at <https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2569>

How it affects China

US tariffs on China have resulted in a decline in imports of tariffed products by about 25% in the first half of 2019. While substantial, this figure also shows the competitiveness of Chinese firms, which despite the substantial tariffs, were still able to maintain 75% of their exports to the US.⁵⁷⁷ Even if the US and China agree on a deal that would end their on-again, off-again trade war, the economic and trade relationship between these two countries will be fraught for years to come. This is because the current dispute is not so much about trade, but rather about larger structural issues. The US and China are locked in a race for economic and technological dominance in the long-term. Resolving this new rivalry will require both sides to find a mutually acceptable middle ground.

US concerns in the trade war with China

The Trump administration has raised various concerns regarding trade with China. While some are legitimate, others are less valid.

US trade deficit with China

The one area that President Trump has often lamented is the large and persistent US trade deficit in goods with China. Standing at \$419 billion in 2018, it accounted for

⁵⁷⁶ Excerpts from UNCTAD Research Paper No. 37 titled “Trade and Trade Diversion Effects of United States Tariffs on China”, published on 6 Nov, 2019, available online at URL:

<https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2569>


⁵⁷⁷ Ibid.

approximately 48 per cent of the US's global goods trade deficit.⁵⁷⁸ However, the Trump administration's focus on this metric is misplaced for two reasons: first, it only takes into account the trade deficit in goods, while ignoring that the US had a \$40 billion surplus in trade in services with China in 2018.⁵⁷⁹ Second, while overall global trade imbalances matter (with China's structural trade surplus being a case in point), most economists believe that trade deficits are largely the result of macroeconomic forces (i.e. savings and investment) and not due to trade policy.

As US–China trade tensions intensified over the course of 2018, the US trade deficit in goods widened to the highest level ever recorded. Because of President Trump's fixation on the trade balance, the US and China have announced steps to adjust it – for instance in January 2019, when Beijing pledged to 'purchase a substantial amount of agricultural, energy, manufactured goods, and other products and services from the United States'.⁵⁸⁰

US trade with China

US trade deficit with China has soared since 1985



Source: US Census

BBC

Currency manipulation

On the 2016 US presidential election campaign trail, Trump vowed to label China a currency manipulator. Until recently, the Treasury Department kept China on the 'Monitoring List' of economies that 'merit close attention to their currency practices'.⁵⁸¹ But while most pundits still believe that China does not meet the criteria set

⁵⁷⁸ US Census Bureau (2019), 'Top Trading Partners – December 2018', <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1812yr.html> (accessed 8 April. 2020).

⁵⁷⁹ US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2018), 'U.S. Trade in Goods and Services by Selected Countries and Areas, 1999-present', <https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-12/trad-geo-time-series-1018.xlsx> (accessed 8 Mar. 2020).

⁵⁸⁰ Office of the United States Trade Representative (2019), 'Statement on the United States Trade Delegation's Meetings in Beijing', 9 January 2019, <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2019/january/statement- united-states-trade> (accessed 8 Mar. 2020).

⁵⁸¹ US Department of the Treasury, Office of International Affairs (2019), *Report to Congress: Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies*

for determining currency manipulation,⁵⁸² Treasury Secretary Mnuchin, under the auspices of President Trump, named China a currency manipulator in August 2019.⁵⁸³ China has manipulated the renminbi in the past, but direct interventions by the People's Bank of China have been limited in recent years. While the latest depreciation of the renminbi vis-à-vis the dollar helps China's exports, and thus widens the country's trade surplus with the US, the real driver is the strength of the US dollar as a result of President Trump's fiscal and trade policies.

In short, the issue of currencies has now become another front in the US–China trade war. But the currency feud is more a sideshow reflecting the reality that the trade war has economic consequences. Nonetheless, China's lack of currency transparency requires further scrutiny.

Market-distorting forces and overcapacity in the steel sector

The Trump administration has repeatedly criticized China for flooding global markets with cheap steel and aluminium. To tackle this trend, President Trump – at the recommendation of the US Department of Commerce – introduced near-blanket tariffs of 25 per cent on steel and 10 per cent on aluminium in March 2018, citing national security reasons. The recent US tariffs on steel and aluminium have affected \$2.8 billion of Chinese products (based on 2017 export values), and the retaliatory tariffs that China introduced in response, in April 2018, hit \$2.4 billion of US products (based on 2017 export values).⁵⁸⁴

However, while the current metal tariffs are aimed at China, they have little impact on the country and primarily hit US allies.⁵⁸⁵ While South Korea received a permanent exemption from the tariffs in May 2018 in exchange for quotas, Canada and Mexico only saw tariffs lifted in May 2019 to pave the way for ratification of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement. Steel and aluminium exports from the EU and Japan to the US are currently still subject to the tariffs.

The tariffs do little to address the real problem of China's market-distorting practices and policies such as subsidies and state-owned enterprises that fuel severe excess capacity in the steel sector.

of Major Trading Partners of the United States, 28 May 2019, <https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/2019-05-28-May-2019-FX-Report.pdf> (accessed 1 Apr. 2020).

⁵⁸² Horsley, S. (2019), 'U.S.-China Trade War Spreads From Tariffs To A Battle Over Currencies', NPR, 6 August 2019, <https://www.npr.org/2019/08/06/748775639/u-s-china-trade-war-spreads-from-tariffs-to-a-battle-over-currencies> (accessed 10 April. 2020).


⁵⁸³ US Department of the Treasury (2019), 'Treasury Designates China a Currency Manipulator', 5 August 2019, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm751> (accessed 12 April. 2020).

⁵⁸⁴ Lu, Z. and Schott, J. (2018), 'How Is China Retaliating for US National Security Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum?', Peterson Institute for International Economics, 9 April 2018, <https://piie.com/research/piie-charts/how-china-retaliating-us-national-security-tariffs-steel-and-aluminum> (accessed 8 Apr. 2020).


⁵⁸⁵ US steel imports come primarily from Canada, Brazil and South Korea – whereas China is not among the top 10 supplier countries (mostly because of the prior imposition of US antidumping and countervailing duties). See US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (2018), *The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National Security*, Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce, https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/the_effect_of_imports_of_steel_on_the_national_security_-_with_redactions_-_20180111.pdf (accessed 8 Apr. 2020).

How the trade war has played out

US tariffs on China



Chinese tariffs on US




Source: US Census Bureau, BBC research. Note: Data as of 8 May 2019



What could be hit by the new tariffs?

Top 10 US imports from China facing a tariff increase from 10% to 25%



Source: US International Trade Commission



Practices regarding technology transfer, intellectual property and innovation

China's policies and practices related to technology transfer, IP and innovation are at the heart of the ongoing tariff escalation, which overshadowed the US and Chinese – and indeed global – economies in 2018 and 2019. Following a Section 301 investigation and report by the Office of the US Trade Representative,⁵⁸⁶ the US subsequently imposed tariffs on approximately \$250 billions of Chinese imports over the course of three rounds in 2018. China retaliated by increasing tariffs on \$110 billion worth of imports from the US. In June 2019, the Trump administration raised tariffs from 10 per cent to 25 per cent on \$200 billions of imports from China that were previously targeted; and China in retaliation raised the tariff rate on \$60 billions of imports from the US that it had previously targeted.⁵⁸⁷ In August 2019, the tit-for-tat tariff trade dispute escalated further – with both sides announcing more tariffs.⁵⁸⁸ The Trump administration is also preparing to raise duties on an additional \$300 billion worth of goods, which would cover all remaining imports from China.⁵⁸⁹ The US and China are pursuing dispute settlements at the World Trade Organization (WTO) over those tariff measures imposed.

The US has raised four primary concerns regarding China's practices and policies – most prominently laid out in the Section 301 report:⁵⁹⁰

a) Foreign ownership restrictions

China's restrictions on foreign ownership, such as joint-venture stipulations and foreign equity limitations, are seen by the US as requiring – or at least pressuring – technology transfer from American to Chinese companies.

b) Regime of technology regulations

The US alleges that American companies that seek to license technologies often are forced to do so on terms that favour the Chinese recipient.

⁵⁸⁶ Office of the United States Trade Representative (2018), *Findings of the Investigation into China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974*, 22 March 2018, <https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF> (accessed 8 Mar. 2020).

⁵⁸⁷ Bown, C. and Kolb, M. (2019), 'Trump's Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide', The Peterson Institute for International Economics, <https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide> (accessed 9 Mar. 2020).

⁵⁸⁸ Bown, C. and Kolb, M. (2019), 'Trump's Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide', The Peterson Institute for International Economics, <https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide> (accessed 9 Mar. 2020).

⁵⁸⁹ Reuters (2019), 'Factbox: Tariff wars – duties imposed by Trump and U.S. trading partners', 13 May 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-tariffs-factbox/factbox-tariff-wars-duties-imposed-by-trump-and-us-trading-partners-idUSKCN1SJZJ> (accessed 9 Mar. 2020).

⁵⁹⁰ Office of the United States Trade Representative (2018), *Update Concerning China's Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation*, 20 November 2018, <https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/301%20Report%20Update.pdf> (accessed 8 Mar. 2020).

c) Cybertheft

According to the US Trade Representative, cyber intrusions into, and theft from, computer networks of US companies provide the Chinese government with unauthorized access to US trade secrets and sensitive commercial information.

d) Outbound investment

China's strategic investment in and acquisitions of US companies and assets in order to obtain cutting-edge technologies and IP is viewed with great concern in the US.

The current US administration believes that these four categories of policies and practices undermine the value of US investments and technology, and thus weaken US firms' global and long-term competitiveness.⁵⁹¹ The administration also contends that the Chinese government seeks to obtain cutting-edge US technologies and IP in order to advance its industrial policy goals.

The Tech-race and strategic competition – issues and US actions

Many of the US–China tensions in the area of technology transfer, IP and innovation arise because of American concerns over China's ambition to become a global leader in a wide range of technologies. In particular, the industrial policy 'Made in China 2025' – which is aimed at expanding the high-tech sector in such fields as aerospace, robotics, and information and communications technology – is seen as a threat to US technological leadership. The Trump administration has described such Chinese policies as 'economic aggression'.⁵⁹² Another reason for the Trump administration's increasingly confrontational approach to China is that many of the next generation technologies have both civilian and military applications. Thus, US apprehensions go beyond purely commercial issues.

In order to address concerns of Chinese outbound investment, the US has taken steps in recent years involving the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). This interagency committee reviews certain transactions involving foreign investment in the US that raise potential national security concerns. For instance, based on the recommendation by CFIUS in 2017, President Trump prevented a Chinese purchaser with alleged links to the Chinese government from acquiring the US firm Lattice Semiconductor.⁵⁹³ In 2018, President Trump blocked Singapore-based Broadcom

⁵⁹¹ Office of the United States Trade Representative (2018), *Update Concerning China's Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation*, 20 November 2018, <https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/301%20Report%20Update.pdf> (accessed 8 Mar. 2020).

⁵⁹² Office of the United States Trade Representative (2018), *Update Concerning China's Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation*, 20 November 2018, <https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/301%20Report%20Update.pdf> (accessed 8 Mar. 2020).

⁵⁹³ US Department of the Treasury (2017), 'Statement On The President's Decision Regarding Lattice Semiconductor Corporation', 13 September 2017, <https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0157.aspx> (accessed 8 Mar. 2020).

Limited from purchasing the US chipmaker Qualcomm in a hostile takeover, citing CFIUS concerns that the acquisition would weaken Qualcomm's technological leadership and give an edge to Chinese competitors.⁵⁹⁴

Moreover, President Trump signed the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) into law, which expands the jurisdiction of CFIUS. Although this recent legislation did not mention China directly as a target of the measures, it was driven by concerns over the risks to US technological leadership stemming from foreign investment by primarily Chinese firms in American high-tech companies.⁵⁹⁵

In May 2018, President Trump intervened to overturn a ban imposed by the US Department of Commerce that barred the Chinese telecommunications giant ZTE from buying American technology for seven years.⁵⁹⁶ In the case of Huawei, another Chinese multinational technology company, the US Department of Justice filed a number of criminal charges against the company and its chief financial officer in January 2019, including for the alleged evasion of sanctions on Iran and the alleged theft of robotic technology.⁵⁹⁷ Moreover, the Trump administration has asked US allies – including Germany, Italy, and Japan – not to use the company's 5G network equipment, citing espionage concerns.⁵⁹⁸ In May 2019, President Trump declared a national emergency and signed an Executive Order that prohibits US companies from using any information and communications technology and services from 'foreign adversaries' that are considered to pose 'an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States'.⁵⁹⁹ Though the Executive Order does not name any company, it has been widely seen as targeting

⁵⁹⁴ See US Department of the Treasury (2018), 'Statement by Secretary Mnuchin on the President's Decision Regarding Broadcom's Takeover Attempt of Qualcomm', 12 March 2018, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0309> (accessed 8 Mar. 2020); Rappeport, A. and Kang, C. (2018), 'U.S. Calls Broadcom's Bid for Qualcomm a National Security Risk', *New York Times*, 6 March 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/business/qualcomm-broadcom-cfius.html> (accessed 8 Mar. 2020).

⁵⁹⁵ Jackson, J. and Cimino-Isaacs, C. (2018), 'CFIUS Reform: Foreign Investment National Security Reviews, Congressional Research Service', <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF10952.pdf> (accessed 8 Mar. 2020).

⁵⁹⁶ Ballentine, C. (2018), 'U.S. Lifts Ban That Kept ZTE From Doing Business With American Suppliers', *New York Times*, 13 July 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/13/business/zte-ban-trump.html> (accessed 8 Mar. 2019); US Department of Commerce (2018), 'Commerce Department Lifts Ban After ZTE Deposits Final Tranche of \$1.4 Billion Penalty', 13 July 2018, <https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2018/07/commerce-department-lifts-ban-after-zte-deposits-final-tranche-14> (accessed 8 Mar. 2020).

⁵⁹⁷ US Department of Justice – Office of Public Affairs (2019), 'Chinese Telecommunications Conglomerate Huawei and Huawei CFO Wanzhou Meng Charged With Financial Fraud', 28 January 2019, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-telecommunications-conglomerate-huawei-and-huawei-cfo-wanzhou-meng-charged-financial> (accessed 8 Mar. 2019); US Department of Justice – Office of Public Affairs (2019), 'Chinese Telecommunications Device Manufacturer and its U.S. Affiliate Indicted for Theft of Trade Secrets, Wire Fraud, and Obstruction Of Justice', 28 January 2019, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-telecommunications-device-manufacturer-and-its-us-affiliate-indicted-theft-trade> (accessed 8 Mar. 2020).

⁵⁹⁸ Woo, S. and O'Keefe, K. (2018), 'Washington Asks Allies to Drop Huawei', *Wall Street Journal*, 23 November 2018, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/washington-asks-allies-to-drop-huawei-1542965105?tesla=y> (accessed 8 Mar. 2020).

⁵⁹⁹ The White House (2019), 'Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain', 15 May 2019, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-securing-information-communications-technology-services-supply-chain/> (accessed 29 Mar 2020).

Huawei.⁶⁰⁰ At the same time, the US Department of Commerce put Huawei and its affiliates on the so-called 'Entity List' – which forbids US individuals and companies from exporting goods, technology or services to the listed entities without a licence from the US government.⁶⁰¹ Despite the recent crackdown, the Commerce Department has extended a temporary reprieve for US companies to do business with Huawei.⁶⁰² President Trump has also raised the possibility of easing restrictions on Huawei as a bargaining chip in ongoing US–China trade talks.⁶⁰³

President Trump's willingness to use Huawei as leverage in the trade talks with China has blurred the lines between US legal processes, the US–China trade war, and the quest for technological leadership. Nonetheless, the export blacklisting of Huawei shows that the US's aim is not simply about reducing the trade deficit, but about decoupling from China. The concerns of the Trump administration make reaching an agreement between the US and China difficult, particularly regarding strategic and long-term considerations related to tech supremacy. President Trump's willingness to use Huawei as leverage in the trade talks with China has blurred the lines between US legal processes, the US–China trade war, and the quest for technological leadership. Nonetheless, the export blacklisting of Huawei shows that the US's aim is not simply about reducing the trade deficit, but about decoupling from China. The concerns of the Trump administration make reaching an agreement between the US and China difficult, particularly regarding strategic and long-term considerations related to tech supremacy. This line of thought, ceasing trade, capital and technology flows with China would make US IP and technology less vulnerable to theft and forced transfer. This, in turn, is thought to help limit China's challenge to the US's global technological leadership. However, as explored in the next section, the consequences of decoupling would be severe. Due to this perceived long-term strategic rivalry between the US and China, the Trump administration designated China a 'strategic competitor' and 'revisionist power' in the 2017 National Security Strategy.⁶⁰⁴

China's response and counter-allegations

US trade bullying harms the world

Economic globalization is a firmly-established trend of the times. Beggar-thy-neighbour unilateralism and protectionism are unpopular. The trade protectionist measures taken by the US go against the WTO rules, damage the multilateral trading system, seriously disrupt global industrial chains and supply chains, undermine market confidence, and

⁶⁰⁰ Stewart, E. (2019), 'The US government's battle with Chinese telecom giant Huawei, explained', Vox, 21 May 2019, <https://www.vox.com/technology/2018/12/11/18134440/huawei-executive-order-entity-list-china-trump> (accessed 29 Mar 2020).

⁶⁰¹ US Office of the Federal Register (2019), Addition of Entities to the Entity List, 16 May 2019, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/05/21/2019-10616/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list> (accessed 29 Mar 2020).

⁶⁰² Sonmez, F. (2019), 'Commerce Department will extend Huawei reprieve, Ross says', *Washington Post*, 19 August 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/commerce-department-will-extend-huawei-reprieve-ross-says/2019/08/19/82a11436-c275-11e9-9986-1fb3e4397be4_story.html (accessed 29 Mar. 2020).

⁶⁰³ Pham, S. and Phillip, A. (2019), 'Trump suggests using Huawei as a bargaining chip in US-China trade deal', CNN, 24 May 2019, <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/24/tech/donald-trump-huawei-ban/index.html> (accessed 29 Mar 2020).

⁶⁰⁴ The White House (2017), *National Security Strategy of the United States*, December 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf> (accessed 8 Mar. 2020).

pose a serious challenge to global economic recovery and a major threat to the trend of economic globalization.

First, the US measures are undermining the authority of the multilateral trading system.

The US has launched a series of unilateral investigations, including those under Sections 201, 232 and 301, and imposed tariff measures. These are a serious breach of the most fundamental and central WTO rules, including most-favoured-nation treatment and tariff binding. Such unilateralist and protectionist actions have harmed the interests of China and other WTO members. More importantly, they have undermined the authority of the WTO and its dispute settlement system, and exposed the multilateral trading system and international trade order to peril.

Second, the US measures threaten global economic growth.

With the shadow of the international financial crisis still lingering over the global economy, the US government has escalated economic and trade friction and hiked additional tariffs, provoking corresponding measures by the countries involved. This disrupts global economic and trade order, dampens world economic recovery, and undermines the development of companies and the well-being of people in all countries, plunging the world economy into the “recession trap”. Global Economic Prospects released by the World Bank in January 2019 revised its forecast for global economic growth down further to 2.9 percent, citing continuous trade friction as a major downward risk.⁶⁰⁵ The International Monetary Fund also marked down its projection of world economic growth for 2019 to 3.3 percent from the 2018 estimate of 3.6 percent in its World Economic Outlook report published in April 2019, suggesting that economic and trade friction could further depress global economic growth and weaken already anaemic investment.⁶⁰⁶

Third, the US moves disrupt global industrial and supply chains.

China and the US are both key links in global industrial and supply chains. Given the large volume of intermediary goods and components from other countries in Chinese end-products exported to the US, US tariff hikes will hurt all the multinationals – not least those from the US – that work with Chinese companies. The tariff measures artificially drive up the costs of supply chains, and undermine their stability and security. As a result, some businesses are forced to readjust their global supply chains at the expense of optimal resource allocation. It is foreseeable that the latest US tariff hikes on China, far from resolving issues, will only make things worse for all sides. China stands firm in opposition. Recently, the US administration imposed “long-arm jurisdiction” and sanctions against Huawei and other Chinese companies on the fabricated basis of national security, to which China is also firmly opposed.

The Chinese government has denied forced transfer of IP is a mandatory practice, and acknowledged the impact of domestic R&D performed in China. The Chinese government

⁶⁰⁵ World Bank: Global Economic Prospects, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects>, January 8, 2019.

⁶⁰⁶ IMF: World Economic Outlook, <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2019/03/28/world-economic-outlook-april-2019>, April 2, 2019.

has blamed the American government for starting the conflict and said that U.S. actions were making negotiations difficult. They say the trade war has had a negative effect on the world and that the U.S. government's real goal is to stifle China's growth. The US has backtracked on its commitments in the China-US economic and trade consultations and The State Council Information Office of The People's Republic of China, issued a white paper in June,2019 stating the following:⁶⁰⁷

(I) The first US backtracking

China had advocated resolving economic and trade friction through negotiation and consultation from the start. In early February 2018, the US government expressed the wish that China send a high-level delegation to the US to engage in economic and trade consultation. Demonstrating great goodwill and positive efforts, China held several rounds of high-level economic and trade consultations with the US, characterized by in-depth exchanges of views on trade imbalance among other major issues. The two sides made substantial progress as they reached preliminary consensus on expanding China's imports of agricultural and energy products from the US. However, on March 22, 2018, the US government unveiled the so-called report *on Section 301 investigation of China*, falsely accusing China of "IP theft" and "forced technology transfer", and subsequently announced an additional tariff of 25 percent on US\$50 billions of Chinese exports to the US.

(II) The second US backtracking

Taking a big-picture view of the bilateral relationship, the Chinese government sent a working team again to the US to engage in genuine consultations. On May 19, 2018, China and the US issued a joint statement, agreeing to refrain from fighting a trade war, to continue high-level communications, and to actively seek solutions to respective economic and trade concerns. The US publicly announced that it would suspend the plan for additional tariffs on Chinese goods. On May 29, 2018, despite the opposition of its domestic business community and the general public, the US administration tore up the consensus just ten days after the joint statement, gratuitously criticizing China's economic system and trade policy, while announcing the resumption of the tariff program. Starting from early July 2018, in three steps, the US imposed additional tariffs of 25 percent on Chinese exports worth US\$50 billion, and additional tariffs of 10 percent on US\$200 billions of Chinese exports, which, according to the US, would be raised to 25 percent on January 1, 2019. In addition, the US threatened further tariffs on all remaining Chinese exports, leading to quick escalation of the economic and trade friction between the two countries. In defence of its national dignity and its people's interests, China had to respond in kind and raised tariffs on imports worth US\$110 billion from the US.⁶⁰⁸

(III) The third US backtracking

On November 1, 2018, US President Donald Trump had a telephone conversation with Chinese President Xi Jinping and proposed a summit meeting. On December 1 the

⁶⁰⁷ Excerpts from China's White Paper on US-China Trade War. *China's Position on the China-US Economic and Trade Consultations*. Available here.

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/06/02/content_281476694892692.htm

⁶⁰⁸ The State Council Information Office of The People's Republic Of China, *China's Position on the China-US Economic and Trade Consultations*. White Paper on US-China Trade War.

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/06/02/content_281476694892692.htm

two presidents had a meeting on the margins of the G20 Summit in Argentina. In accordance with their important consensus on economic and trade issues, the two sides agreed to halt new additional tariffs for 90 days to allow for intensive talks geared toward the full elimination of all additional tariffs. In the ensuing 90 days, the working teams of China and the US held three rounds of high-level consultations in Beijing and Washington D.C., reaching preliminary consensus on many matters of principle for the China-US economic and trade deal. On February 25, 2019, the US announced the postponement of the additional tariffs scheduled for March 1 on US\$ 200 billions of Chinese exports to the US. From late March to early April, the working teams of the two countries held another three rounds of high-level consultations and made substantial progress. Following numerous rounds of consultations, the two countries had agreed on most of the issues. Regarding the remaining issues, the Chinese government urged mutual understanding and compromise for solutions to be found.

But the more the US government is offered, the more it wants. Resorting to intimidation and coercion, it persisted with exorbitant demands, maintained the additional tariffs imposed since the friction began, and insisted on including mandatory requirements concerning China's sovereign affairs in the deal, which only served to delay the resolution of remaining differences. On May 6, 2019, the US irresponsibly accused China of backtracking on its position to shift the blame for the inconclusive talks onto China. Despite China's fierce opposition, the US raised the additional tariffs on US\$200 billion of Chinese exports to the US from 10 percent to 25 percent, which represented a serious setback to the economic and trade consultations. On May 13 the US announced that it had launched procedures to slap additional tariffs on remaining Chinese goods, which are worth around US\$300 billion. These acts contradicted the agreement reached by the two presidents to ease friction through consultation – and the expectations of people around the world – casting a shadow over the bilateral economic and trade consultations and world economic growth. In defence of its own interests, China had to take tariff measures in response.⁶⁰⁹

The US government should bear the sole and entire responsibility for this severe setback to the China-US economic and trade consultations

The US government accusation of Chinese backtracking is totally groundless. It is common practice for both sides to make new proposals for adjustments to the text and language in ongoing consultations. In the previous more than ten rounds of negotiations, the US administration kept changing its demands. It is reckless to accuse China of “backtracking” while the talks are still under way. Historical experience has proved that any attempt to force a deal through tactics such as smears, undermining and maximum pressure will only spoil the cooperative relationship. Historic opportunities will be missed. A civilized country turns to forceful measures only when gentler approaches have failed. After the US issued the new tariff threat, the international community was widely concerned that China might cancel the consultation visit to the US. It kept a close watch on the future direction of the China-US trade negotiations. Bearing in mind the broader interests of trade and economic relations between the two countries, China remained cool-headed, exercised restraint, and sent a senior delegation to the US, as agreed, for the 11th round of economic and trade consultation from May 9 to 10. In doing


⁶⁰⁹ The State Council Information Office of The People's Republic Of China, *China's Position on the China-US Economic and Trade Consultations*. White Paper on US-China Trade War. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/06/02/content_281476694892692.htm

so, China demonstrated the greatest sincerity and a strong sense of responsibility for resolving trade disputes through dialogue. In the following candid and constructive discussions, the two sides agreed to manage differences and continue consultations. China expressed strong opposition to the unilateral tariff increase by the US and stated its firm position that it would have to take necessary countermeasures. China emphasized once again that trade deals must be based on equality and mutual benefit. China will never compromise on major principles concerning China's core interests. One prerequisite for a trade deal is that the US should remove all additional tariffs imposed on Chinese exports and China's purchase of US goods should be realistic while ensuring that a proper balance in the text of the agreement is achieved to serve the common interests of both sides.

China is committed to credible consultations based on equality and mutual benefit

Cooperation is the only correct choice for China and the US and win-win is the only path to a better future. As to where the China-US economic and trade consultations are heading, China is looking forward, not backward. Disputes and conflicts on the trade and economic front, at the end of the day, need to be solved through dialogue and consultation. Striking a mutually beneficial and win-win agreement serves the interests of China and the US and meets the expectations of the world.⁶¹⁰


How the US-China trade war has escalated



⁶¹⁰ The State Council Information Office of The People's Republic Of China, *China's Position on the China-US Economic and Trade Consultations*. White Paper on US-China Trade War. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/06/02/content_281476694892692.htm

Stock markets since US-China trade war began

Percentage change performance since January 2018



Source: Bloomberg

BBC

Phase-one Agreement.

On January 15, 2020, the United States and China signed an historic and enforceable agreement on a Phase One trade deal that requires structural reforms and other changes to China's economic and trade regime in the areas of intellectual property, technology transfer, agriculture, financial services, and currency and foreign exchange. The Phase One agreement also includes a commitment by China that it will make substantial additional purchases of U.S. goods and services in the coming years. Importantly, the agreement establishes a strong dispute resolution system that ensures prompt and effective implementation and enforcement. The United States has agreed to modify its Section 301 tariff actions in a significant way.

Information on specific chapters of the Phase One agreement is provided below:

- **Intellectual Property:** The Intellectual Property (IP) chapter addresses numerous longstanding concerns in the areas of trade secrets, pharmaceutical-related intellectual property, geographical indications, trademarks, and enforcement against pirated and counterfeit goods.
- **Technology Transfer:** The Technology Transfer chapter sets out binding and enforceable obligations to address several of the unfair technology transfer practices of China that were identified in USTR's Section 301 investigation. For the first time in any trade agreement, China has agreed to end its long-standing practice of forcing or pressuring foreign companies to transfer their technology to Chinese companies as a condition for obtaining market access, administrative approvals, or receiving advantages from the government. China also commits to provide transparency, fairness, and due process in administrative proceedings and to have technology transfer and licensing take place on market terms. Separately, China further commits to refrain from directing or supporting outbound investments aimed at acquiring foreign technology pursuant to industrial plans that create distortion.

- **Agriculture:** The Agriculture chapter addresses structural barriers to trade and will support a dramatic expansion of U.S. food, agriculture and seafood product exports, increasing American farm and fishery income, generating more rural economic activity, and promoting job growth. A multitude of non-tariff barriers to U.S. agriculture and seafood products are addressed, including for meat, poultry, seafood, rice, dairy, infant formula, horticultural products, animal feed and feed additives, pet food, and products of agriculture biotechnology.
- **Financial Services:** The Financial Services chapter addresses a number of longstanding trade and investment barriers to U.S. providers of a wide range of financial services, including banking, insurance, securities, and credit rating services, among others. These barriers include foreign equity limitations and discriminatory regulatory requirements.

Removal of these barriers should allow U.S. financial service providers to compete on a more level playing field and expand their services export offerings in the Chinese market.

- **Currency:** The chapter on Macroeconomic Policies and Exchange Rate Matters includes policy and transparency commitments related to currency issues. The chapter addresses unfair currency practices by requiring high-standard commitments to refrain from competitive devaluations and targeting of exchange rates, while promoting transparency and providing mechanisms for accountability and enforcement. This approach will help reinforce macroeconomic and exchange rate stability and help ensure that China cannot use currency practices to unfairly compete against U.S. exporters.
- **Expanding Trade:** The Expanding Trade chapter includes commitments from China to import various U.S. goods and services over the next two years in a total amount that exceeds China's annual level of imports for those goods and services in 2017 by no less than \$200 billion. China's commitments cover a variety of U.S. manufactured goods, food, agricultural and seafood products, energy products, and services. China's increased imports of U.S. goods and services are expected to continue on this same trajectory for several years after 2021 and should contribute significantly to the rebalancing of the U.S.-China trade relationship.
- **Dispute Resolution:** The Dispute Resolution chapter sets forth an arrangement to ensure the effective implementation of the agreement and to allow the parties to resolve disputes in a fair and expeditious manner. This arrangement creates regular bilateral consultations at both the principal level and the working level. It also establishes strong procedures for addressing disputes related to the agreement and allows each party to take proportionate responsive actions that it deems appropriate. The United States will vigilantly monitor China's progress in eliminating its unfair trade practices and implementing these obligations.⁶¹¹

The pact is intended to open Chinese markets to more American companies, increase farm and energy exports and provide greater protection for American technology and trade secrets. China has pledged to boost US imports by \$200bn above 2017 levels and strengthen intellectual property rules. In exchange, the US has agreed to halve some of

⁶¹¹ Excerpts from the document on phase one deal. Available here: <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china/phase-one-trade-agreement/text>

the new tariffs it has imposed on Chinese products. However the majority of the border taxes remain in place, which has prompted business groups to call for further talks.⁶¹²

- China has committed to increasing its US imports by at least \$200bn over 2017 levels, boosting purchases of agriculture by \$32bn, manufacturing by \$78bn, energy by \$52bn and services by \$38bn.
- China has agreed to take more action against counterfeiting and make it easier for companies to pursue legal action over trade secret theft
- The US will maintain up to 25% tariffs on an estimated \$360bn worth of Chinese goods; China, which has levied new tariffs on \$100bn worth of US products, is also expected to maintain the majority of them. The US agreed to halve some of the new tariffs it had imposed on China.⁶¹³

US-China Trade War and its Implications for India.

NITI Aayog Vice-Chairman Rajiv Kumar who had a meeting at the fifth Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) with his Chinese counterpart He Lifeng, the Chairman of China's top planning body the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), in Beijing on April 14, 2018 said: "India would not take sides in the ongoing trade spat between the US and China". He also said, "India has always taken an independent position on trade issues". In his address at the SED, Rajiv Kumar made a strong pitch for China to allow India's exports of soybean and sugar. Elaborating on his stand in asking China to import soybean and sugar from India, he said, "My hint was much more towards agricultural tariffs in China than anything else". China's agricultural tariffs are high and India's agricultural exports suffer as a result of it. According to a study by economists at Rabobank International, India's economy would be hit hard by a combination of a global tariff war and the US Federal Reserve's monetary tightening cycle. A tariff war would reduce exports and lead to imported inflation, which would hurt Indian purchasing power and investments. That could mean as much as 2.3 percent of missed GDP growth for India by 2022. "India could fall victim to adverse trade policies" of the US or China or both. This goes against the argument that India is relatively insulated from a trade war, given its low share of total world exports of just 1.7 percent. China, India's largest trade partner, can definitely help with buying more from India to cut down last year's trade surplus of \$51.7 billion. China is doing some of that. India's exports to China 2017's increased 39.1 per cent to \$16.3 billion. But, there is still a long way to go because China takes only about 4 percent of India's exports.⁶¹⁴

The study named 'Trade and Trade Diversion Effects of United States Tariffs on China' by UNCTAD, shows that US tariffs on China have made other players more competitive in the US market and led to a trade diversion effect. Of the \$35 billion Chinese export losses in the US market, about \$21 billion (or 63%) was diverted to other countries, while the remainder of \$14 billion was either lost or captured by US producers. Trade diversion benefits to Korea, Canada and India were smaller but still substantial, ranging from \$0.9

⁶¹² <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51114425>

⁶¹³ Ibid. The full document of the phase-one deal available here: <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china/phase-one-trade-agreement/text>

⁶¹⁴ "US-China Trade War: Analyses of Deeper Nuances and Wider Implications." *Vivekananda International Foundation*, 17 Sept. 2018, www.vifindia.org/paper/2018/september/us-china-trade-war.

billion to \$1.5 billion.⁶¹⁵ The US tariffs on China resulted in India gaining \$755 million in additional exports to the US in the first half of 2019 by selling more chemicals (\$243 million), metals and ore (\$181 million), electrical machinery (\$83 million) and various machinery (\$68 million) as well as increased exports in areas such as agri-food, furniture, office machinery, precision instruments, textiles and apparel and transport equipment, as reported in the study.⁶¹⁶

	OFFICE MACHINERY	MACHINERY VARIOUS	ELECTRICAL MACHINERY	CHEMICALS	COM. EQUIPMENT	METALS AND ORE	PRECISION INSTRUMENTS	AGRI-FOOD	TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT	FURNITURE	TEXTILES AND APPAREL	OTHERS	TOTAL
Taiwan (Province of China)	2830	122	287	5	491	205	183	6	14	55	8	11	4217
Mexico	420	407	876	127	0	373	166	599	456	99	47	0	3570
European Union	108	739	422	324	0	96	371	215	285	0	66	55	2681
Vietnam	60	8	400	134	1106	130	18	14	52	665	4	10	2601
Japan	63	997	0	342	10	62	0	21	1	0	12	32	1540
Canada	39	307	110	0	416	83	62	21	76	0	0	83	1197
Korea (Rep. of)	568	99	68	95	13	52	2	19	117	5	48	29	1115
India	18	68	83	243	0	181	23	23	6	27	41	42	755
Thailand	0	124	25	243	0	58	0	0	4	22	4	1	481
Brazil	0	191	27	129	9	71	7	4	11	0	4	0	451
Russian Federation	0	0	19	143	0	54	0	56	1	0	0	74	347
Malaysia	12	0	12	40	0	50	76	0	1	58	2	1	251
Turkey	0	23	12	17	31	89	9	13	5	11	14	1	226
Indonesia	0	29	27	0	42	25	4	0	1	0	2	0	129
Australia	0	5	0	23	13	0	4	16	2	26	3	3	95
Argentina	0	22	1	8	0	27	0	9	0	3	1	3	75
South Africa	0	3	3	30	0	0	4	13	0	5	2	0	60
Pakistan	0	0	0	5	0	0	1	3	0	2	25	0	37
Rest of the World	179	82	89	272	10	78	261	33	0	3	583	25	1616
Total Trade Diversion	4297	3226	2461	2179	2142	1635	1190	1065	1031	981	866	371	21443

Source: UNCTAD available at URL:

<https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2569>

⁶¹⁵ Excerpts from UNCTAD Research Paper No. 37 titled “Trade and Trade Diversion Effects of United States Tariffs on China”, published on 6 Nov,2019, available online at URL:

<https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2569>

⁶¹⁶ Ibid.



US CHINA TRADE WAR

V/S

A TIMELINE



Jan 22
2018

Trump announced tariffs on solar panels and washing machines. About 8% of American solar panel imports in 2017 came from China. Imports of residential washing machines from China totaled about \$1.1 billion in 2015.

Mar 1
2018

Trump announced steel and aluminium tariffs on imports from all countries. The United States had imported about 3% of its steel from China.

Mar 22
2018

Trump asked USTR to investigate applying tariffs on US\$50–60 billion worth of Chinese goods. He relied on Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 for doing so, stating that the proposed tariffs were "a response to the unfair trade practices of China over the years", including theft of U.S. intellectual property. Over 1,300 categories of Chinese imports were listed for tariffs, including aircraft parts, batteries, flat-panel televisions, medical devices, satellites, and various weapons.

April 2
2018

Ministry of Commerce of China responded by imposing tariffs on 128 products it imports from America, including aluminum, airplanes, cars, pork, and soybeans (which have a 25% tariff), as well as fruit, nuts, and steel piping (15%). U.S. commerce secretary Wilbur Ross said that the planned Chinese tariffs only reflected 0.3% of U.S. gross domestic product, and Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders stated that the moves would have "short-term pain" but bring "long-term success". On April 5, 2018, Trump responded saying that he was considering another round of tariffs on an additional \$100 billion of Chinese imports as Beijing retaliates. The next day the World Trade Organization received request from China for consultations on new U.S. tariffs.

May 15
2018

Vice Premier and Politburo member Liu He, top economic adviser to president of China and General Secretary Xi Jinping, visited Washington for further trade talks.

Source: www.bbc.com



V/S



US CHINA TRADE WAR

A TIMELINE

May 20
2018

Chinese officials agreed to "substantially reduce" America's trade deficit with China by committing to "significantly increase" its purchases of American goods. As a result, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin announced that "We are putting the trade war on hold". White House National Trade Council director Peter Navarro, however, said that there was no "trade war," but that it was a "trade dispute, fair and simple. We lost the trade war long ago."

May 21
2018

Trump tweeted that "China has agreed to buy massive amounts of ADDITIONAL Farm/Agricultural Products," although he later clarified the purchases were contingent upon the closure of a "potential deal."

May 29
2018

The White House announced that it would impose a 25% tariff on \$50 billion of Chinese goods with "industrially significant technology;" the full list of products affected to be announced by June 15. It also planned to impose investment restrictions and enhanced export controls on certain Chinese individuals and organizations to prevent them from acquiring U.S. technology. China said it would discontinue trade talks with Washington if it imposed trade sanctions."

June 15
2018

Trump declared that the United States would impose a 25% tariff on \$50 billion of Chinese exports. \$34 billion would start July 6, 2018, with a further \$16 billion to begin at a later date. China's Commerce Ministry accused the United States of launching a trade war and said China would respond in kind with similar tariffs for US imports, starting on July 6. Three days later, the White House declared that the United States would impose an additional 10% tariffs on another \$200 billion worth of Chinese imports if China retaliated against these U.S. tariffs. The list of products included in this round of tariffs was released on July 11, 2018, and was set to be implemented within 60 days.

June 19
2018

China retaliates, threatening its own tariffs on \$50 billion of U.S. goods, and stating that the United States had launched a trade war. Import and export markets in a number of nations feared the tariffs would disrupt supply chains which could "ripple around the globe."

Source: www.bbc.com



V/S



US CHINA TRADE WAR

A TIMELINE

July 6
2018

US places 25 per cent duties on around US\$34 billion of imports from China, including cars, hard disks and aircraft parts. China retaliates by imposing a 25 per cent tariff on 545 goods originating from the US worth US\$34 billion, including agricultural products, automobiles and aquatic products.

Aug 23
2018

Washington imposes 25 per cent tariffs on another US\$18 billion of Chinese goods, including iron and steel products, electrical machinery, railway products, instruments and apparatus. China responds by applying 25 per cent tariffs on US\$18 billion of US goods, including Harley-Davidson motorcycles, bourbon and orange juice.

Sept 24
2018

US places 10 per cent taxes on US\$200 billion of Chinese imports. China responds by placing customs duties on US\$60 billion of US goods.

Dec 1
2018

Xi Jinping and US counterpart Donald Trump agree to a ceasefire at the G20 summit in Argentina, with the US suspending a tariff from 10 per cent to 25 per cent on US\$200 billion of Chinese goods that were due to come into force on January 1.

Dec 14
2018

China suspends tariffs on US-made cars and car parts for three months from January 1, and also resumes its purchase of US soybeans.

Source: www.bbc.com



US CHINA TRADE WAR

V/S

A TIMELINE



May 10
2019

After trade negotiations break down, the US increases tariffs on US\$200 billion worth of Chinese goods from 10 per cent to 25 per cent. China responds by announcing that it will increase tariffs on US\$60 billion worth of US goods from June 1.

May 15
2019

US Department of Commerce announces the addition of Huawei to its "entity list", which effectively bans US companies from selling to the Chinese telecommunications company without approval.

May 31
2019

China announces that it will establish its own unreliable entities list.

June 1
2019

China increases tariffs on US\$60 billion worth of US products.

June 29
2019

Xi Jinping and Donald Trump agree a trade war truce at the G20 summit in Japan, delaying the imposition of new US tariffs of up to 25 per cent on US\$300 billion worth of Chinese goods.

Source: www.bbc.com



V/S



US CHINA TRADE WAR

A TIMELINE

Aug 1
2019

Donald Trump announces plans to impose a 10 per cent tariff on US\$300 billion of Chinese goods from September 1

Aug 5
2019

US designates China as a "currency manipulator" after the yuan weakened to below 7 to the US dollar.

Aug 13
2019

Donald Trump announces that planned levies on many of the US\$300 billion of Chinese products threatened to start in September 2019 have either been delayed or removed. Levies of 10 per cent on US\$155 billion of products such as including phones, laptop computers and video game consoles will be delayed until December 15.

Aug 23
2019

China announces tariffs of 5 and 10 per cent on US\$75 billion of US goods from September 1 and December 15. China also confirms it will reinstate tariffs on US cars and car parts from December 15

Sept 1
2019

US tariffs on more than US\$125 billion worth of Chinese imports begins as expected.

Source: www.bbc.com



V/S



US CHINA TRADE WAR

A TIMELINE

Sept 11
2019

China announces that it will offer exemptions to 16 types of US imports from additional tariffs, which include products such as pesticides, animal feeds, lubricants, and cancer drugs. Donald Trump agrees to delay new tariffs on US\$250 billion worth of Chinese goods from October 1 to October 15 as a good will gesture to avoid the 70th anniversary of the People's Republic of China

Sept 13
2019

China announces it will exclude imports of US soybeans, pork, and other farm goods from additional trade war tariffs

Oct 11
2019

US announces that it will delay a planned tariff increase of 25 per cent to 30 per cent on US\$250 billion of Chinese goods set for October 15 following trade talks in Washington

Dec 13
2019

China and the US agree to a phase one trade deal days before a 15 per cent tariff was set to be imposed on around US\$180 billion of Chinese goods. The US agree to reduce tariffs on US\$120 billion of Chinese goods imposed in September. China suspended tariffs on US goods also due to come into force on December 15

Jan 15
2020

China and the US sign a phase one trade deal. As part of the deal, China agree to buy an additional US\$200 billion of American goods and services over the next two years. The deal results in the suspension of a planned December tariff on around US\$162 billion in Chinese goods, with an existing 15 per cent duty on imports worth around US\$110 billion halved.

Source: www.bbc.com

5.5 Dates of Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

Brief Date of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic of China and Countries⁶¹⁷(In order of Asia, Africa, Europe, America, and Oceania, the countries of the same continent are ordered by the English alphabet of their country names)(As of September 2019)(180 countries)

5.5.1 ASIA

Country names	Establishment of diplomatic relations
Afghanistan	1955.1.20
Armenia	1992.4.6
Azerbaijan	1992.4.2
Bahrain	1989.4.18
Bangladesh	1975.10.4
Brunei	1991.9.30
Cambodia	1958.7.19
Korea	1949.10.6
East Timor	2002.5.20
Georgia	1992.6.9
India	1950.4.1
Indonesia	1950.4.13
Iran	1971.8.16
Iraq	1958.8.25
Israel	1992.1.24
Japan	1972.9.29
Jordan	1977.4.7
Kazakhstan	1992.1.3
Kuwait	1971.3.22
Kyrgyzstan	1992.1.5
Laos	1961.4.25
Lebanon	1971.11.9
Malaysia	1974.5.31
Maldives	1972.10.14
Mongolia	1949.10.16
Myanmar	1950.6.8
Nepal	1955.8.1
Oman	1978.5.25
Pakistan	1951.5.21

⁶¹⁷ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/2193_674977/

Palestine	1988.11.20
Philippines	1975.6.9
Qatar	1988.7.9
Korea	1992.8.24
Saudi Arabia	1990.7.21
Singapore	1990.10.3
Sri Lanka	1957.2.7
Syria	1956.8.1
Tajikistan	1992.1.4
Thailand	1975.7.1
Turkey	1971.8.4
Turkmenistan	1992.1.6
United arab emirates	1984.11.1
Uzbekistan	1992.1.2
Vietnam	1950.1.18
Yemen	1956.9.24

5.5.2 AFRICA ⁶¹⁸

Country names	Establishment of diplomatic relations
Algeria	1958.12.20
Angola	1983.1.12
Benin	1964.11.12
Botswana	1975.1.6
Burkina Faso	1973.9.15
Burundi	1963.12.21
Cameroon	1971.3.26
Cape verde	1976.4.25
Central Africa	1964.9.29
Chad	1972.11.28
Comoros	1975.11.13
DRC	1961.2.20
Republic of Congo)	1964.2.22
Ivory Coast	1983.3.2
Djibouti	1979.1.8
Egypt	1956.5.30

⁶¹⁸ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/2193_674977/

Equatorial Guinea	1970.10.15
Eritrea	1993.5.24
Ethiopia	1970.11.24
Gabon	1974.4.20
Gambia	1974.12.14
Ghana	1960.7.5
Guinea	1959.10.4
Guinea-Bissau	1974.3.15
Kenya	1963.12.14
Lesotho	1983.4.30
Liberia	1977.2.17
Libya	1978.8.9
Madagascar	1972.11.6
Malawi	2007.12.28
Mali	1960.10.25
Mauritania	1965.7.19
Mauritius	1972.4.15
Morocco	1958.11.1
Mozambique	1975.6.25
Namibia	1990.3.22
Niger	1974.7.20
Nigeria	1971.2.10
Rwanda	1971.11.12
Sao Tome and Principe	1975.7.12
Senegal	1971.12.7
Seychelles	1976.6.30
Sierra Leone	1971.7.29
Somalia	1960.12.14
South Africa	1998.1.1
South Sudan	2011.7.9
Sudan	1959.2.4
Tanzania	1964.4.26
Togo	1972.9.19
Tunisia	1964.1.10
Uganda	1962.10.18
Zambia	1964.10.29
Zimbabwe	1980.4.18

5.5.3 EUROPE

Country names	Establishment of diplomatic relations
Albania	1949.11.23
Andorra	1994.6.29
Austria	1971.5.28
Belarus	1992.1.20
Belgium	1971.10.25
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1995.4.3
Bulgaria	1949.10.4
Croatia	1992.5.13
Cyprus	1971.12.14
Czech Republic	1949.10.6
Denmark	1950.5.11
Estonia	1991.9.11
Finland	1950.10.28
France	1964.1.27
Germany	1972.10.11
Greece	1972.6.5
Hungary	1949.10.6
Iceland	1971.12.8
Ireland	1979.6.22
Italy	1970.11.6
Latvia	1991.9.12
Liechtenstein	1950.9.14
Lithuania	1991.9.14
Luxembourg	1972.11.16
Malta	1972.1.31
Moldova	1992.1.30
Monaco	1995.1.16
Montenegro	2006.7.6
Netherlands	China and the Netherlands established ambassadorial diplomatic relations on May 18, 1972 (1954)
North Macedonia	1993.10.12
Norway	1954.10.5
Poland	1949.10.7
Portugal	1979.2.8
Romania	1949.10.5
Russia	1949.10.2
San Marino	1971.5.6

Serbia	See notes
Slovakia	1949.10.6
Slovenia	1992.5.12
Spain	1973.3.9
Sweden	1950.5.9
Switzerland	1950.9.14
Ukraine	1992.1.4
United Kingdom	China and Britain established diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level on March 13, 1972 (1954)

5.5.4. AMERICA

Country names	Establishment of diplomatic relations
Antigua and Barbuda	1983.1.1
Argentina	1972.2.19
Bahamas	1997.5.23
Barbados	1977.5.30
Bolivia	1985.7.9
Brazil	1974.8.15
Canada	1970.10.13
Chile	1970.12.15
Colombia	1980.2.7
Costa Rica	2007.6.1
Cuba	1960.9.28
Dominic	2004.3.23
Dominica	2018.5.1
Ecuador	1980.1.2
El Salvador	2018.8.21
Grenada	1985.10.1
Guyana	1972.6.27
Jamaica	1972.11.21
Mexico	1972.2.14
Panama	2017.6.13
Peru	1971.11.2
Suriname	1976.5.28
Trinidad and Tobago	1974.6.20
United States	1979.1.1
Uruguay	1988.2.3

5.5.5. OCEANIA

Country names	Establishment of diplomatic relations
Australia	1972.12.21
Island	1997.7.25
Fiji	1975.11.5
Kiribati	1980.6.25 (Resubmission date: 2019.9.27)
Micronesia	1989.9.11
new Zealand	1972.12.22
Niue	2007.12.12
Papua New Guinea	1976.10.12
Samoa	1975.11.6
Solomon Islands	2019.9.21
Tonga	1998.11.2
Vanuatu	1982.3.26

On January 2, 1955, PRC established diplomatic relations with the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (later renamed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). On April 27, 1992, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was announced. The Chinese ambassador to the former Yugoslavia was changed to the ambassador to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On February 4, 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro. On June 3, 2006, the Republic of Montenegro declared independence. On June 5, the Republic of Serbia announced its succession to Serbia and Herzegovina as the subject of international law. On February 12, 2019, the country name was changed from the Republic of Macedonia to the Republic of Northern Macedonia, referred to as Northern Macedonia.⁶¹⁹

5.6 Relations by Region and Country-Africa, America, Asia, Europe, Oceania

5.6.1. Africa

In 2006, the Chinese government issued its first policy document on Africa. In 2006, the Chinese government proposed that China and Africa establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership of political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation, and cultural exchanges and mutual learning. China has become Africa's largest trading partner since 2009. In 2014, China's trade volume with Africa increased to four times that of 2006. The humanities exchanges between China and Africa have grown rapidly, with nearly 3 million person-to-person exchanges between China and Africa each year, and the foundation of China-Africa friendly society and public opinion has further expanded. China is striving to realize the goal of "two hundred years" and the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in accordance with the strategic layout of building a well-off society in an all-round way, deepening reforms in an all-round way, ruling the country according to law, and ruling the party strictly. Africa

⁶¹⁹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/2193_674977/

is actively seeking to accelerate the process of industrialization and modernization, moving towards the beautiful dream depicted in the Agenda 2063.

China-Africa friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation to achieve new leap-forward development. The Chinese government appreciates that African countries adhere to the one-China principle, support China's great cause of reunification, and develop official relations and official exchanges with different Taiwan. Strengthening solidarity and cooperation with African countries has always been an important cornerstone of China's independent foreign policy of peace

1. Enhance political mutual trust

- Close high-level contacts. Mutual understanding, mutual support, safeguarding common interests, seeking common development, deepening cooperation, and providing strong political guarantee for the development of bilateral and China-Africa relations.
- Strengthen the exchange of experience in governance and governance. China is willing to actively carry out various forms of experience exchange activities with African countries.
- Improve the intergovernmental consultation and cooperation mechanism. Give full play to the coordinating and coordinating role of bilateral consultations between China and African countries, such as the Political Consultation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Joint (Combined) Committee on Economic and Trade Cooperation and the High-level Economic and Trade Cooperation Mechanism, the Mixed Committee on Science and Technology, and further enrich and improve the intergovernmental dialogue and consultation mechanism. Promote dialogue and cooperation between China and Africa.
- Promote exchanges in various fields such as legislative bodies, consultative bodies, political parties, the military, and local governments. Expand and strengthen exchanges between the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and African countries' parliaments, the Pan-African Parliament, the African Union's Economic, Social and Cultural Council, and African Economic and Social Councils and other relevant institutions.

2. Deepen cooperation in international affairs

Call on the international community to continue to promote global economic governance reform, especially to implement the IMF quota reform commitments as soon as possible, to increase the representation and voice of emerging market countries and developing countries. Call on the G20 to strengthen dialogue with Africa and support Africa's participation in the G20 affairs. Promote the international community to work together, share the power and responsibility, implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted by the United Nations Development Summit. Noting the positive progress of the United Nations Convention on Combating Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and / or Desertification, Especially in Africa, it agreed to

jointly safeguard the interests of developing countries and promote the full and effective implementation of the Convention.

3. Deepen economic and trade cooperation

- Boost Africa's industrialization. Adhering to the principle of "combining righteousness with benefit, win-win cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, and market operation", priority will be given to creating pilot areas for China-Africa capacity cooperation in African countries with suitable conditions.
- Help Africa's agricultural modernization. Encourage and promote China-Africa agricultural trade. Encourage and support Chinese enterprises to carry out investment cooperation in the fields of agricultural planting, grain storage, animal husbandry, fisheries fishing and agricultural products processing in African countries, increase local employment, product added value and earn foreign exchange, and promote the construction of agricultural modernization in Africa. Help African countries promote irrigation technology, effectively use water resources, and improve flood control and drought resistance.
- Fully participate in African infrastructure construction. Encourage and support Chinese enterprises and financial institutions to expand participation in African infrastructure construction, give full play to the role of policy finance, and innovate investment and financing cooperation models. Adhere to the principles of market operation, integration of points and planes, and focus on efficiency, encourage and support Chinese enterprises to adopt a variety of models to participate in the construction of African railways, highways, communications, power, regional aviation, ports, water resources development and protection, water conservancy, etc. Participate in project investment, operation and management. Both sides are encouraged to cooperate in project planning and design, engineering construction, technical standards, engineering supervision, large-scale equipment, management and operation, etc. Give priority to supporting the construction of special infrastructure systems such as special economic zones, industrial parks, and science and technology parks to create favourable conditions for African industrial development and China-Africa production capacity cooperation. Actively promote the interconnection of cross-border and cross-regional infrastructure, and promote the process of African integration.
- Strengthen China-Africa financial cooperation. Give full play to the role of investment and financing platforms such as preferential loans and other policy finance, China-Africa Development Fund, special loans for African SMEs, African Common Growth Fund, China-Africa Capacity Cooperation Fund, BRICS New Development Bank, and innovate China-Africa financial cooperation. Support Chinese financial institutions and African countries, regions, and international financial and development institutions to strengthen exchanges and discuss joint financing cooperation, and support Chinese and African financial institutions to establish joint venture banks in accordance with commercialization principles. Strengthen currency cooperation between central banks, discuss expansion of cross-border local currency settlement and swap arrangements, and

encourage companies of both sides to use local currency settlement in trade and investment. Support mutual financial institutions and increase financing and insurance support. Strengthen the coordination and cooperation between China and Africa in international financial organizations and mechanisms, improve and reform the international financial system, and improve the representation and voice of developing countries.

- Promote China-Africa trade and investment facilitation. Support more African products to enter the Chinese market, and continue to implement zero tariffs on 97% of the tax items originating in the least developed countries that have established diplomatic relations with China based on the implementation of bilateral exchange of letters. Encourage Chinese and African enterprises to use the advantages of ports to build regional logistics and commodity wholesale centres. Support the construction and integration of African free trade zones, and actively explore the establishment of institutional trade arrangements with African countries and regional organizations. Infrastructure, energy and other fields, and continue to provide preferential loans and export credit insurance support for eligible projects to appropriately increase the preferential loan concessions.
- Deepen cooperation in resources and energy. Based on the principle of win-win cooperation, green, low-carbon and sustainable development, China and Africa will expand and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of resources and energy, help African countries to strengthen the exploration and processing capacity of resources and energy, increase the added value of primary products, increase local employment Earn foreign exchange, transform resources and energy endowments into sustainable development and benefit people's livelihood. Innovate the China-Africa resource and energy cooperation model and expand cooperation in the entire industry chain in the field of energy and mining. Support African countries and regional power grid construction, promote the development cooperation of renewable energy such as wind energy, solar energy, hydropower and low-carbon green energy, promote the rational development and utilization of renewable energy in Africa, and serve African industrialization.
- Expand marine economic cooperation. Give full play to the rich marine resources and development potential of relevant African countries, and support African countries to strengthen marine fishing, offshore aquaculture, seafood processing, marine transportation, shipbuilding, port and port industrial zone construction, offshore oil and gas resource exploration and development, marine environmental management Capacity building and exchange of experience in planning, design, construction and operation, etc., actively support Chinese and African enterprises to carry out various forms of mutually beneficial cooperation.

4. Strengthen China-Africa development cooperation

- Continue to increase development assistance to Africa. As the largest developing country, China will and will continue to provide assistance to African countries within its ability. China is willing to continue to provide emergency and

emergency services to African countries Necessary aid and gradually increase the scale of aid, innovate aid models, optimize aid conditions, and focus on human resources development, infrastructure construction, health care, agriculture and food security, climate change, combating desertification, wildlife and environmental protection, and humanitarian Assistance in other areas, to help African countries reduce poverty, improve people 's livelihood, and enhance their independent development capabilities. China will earnestly implement the cancellation of its commitments on inter-governmental interest-free loan debt due to the least developed countries, landlocked developing countries, and small island developing countries in Africa that have not been repaid by the end of 2015.

- Support Africa to strengthen public health prevention and control system and capacity building. Summarize the experience of China-Africa cooperation in combating the Ebola epidemic and malaria, and deepen and expand China-Africa public health cooperation. Strengthen public health policy communication, support Africa to strengthen the public health prevention and control system and capacity building, actively participate in the preparation of the African Centres for Disease Control, assist African countries to improve laboratory technical capabilities and carry out health human resources training, focusing on helping prevent and control health problems Chronic non-communicable diseases, vector-borne diseases, and preventable infectious diseases and emerging diseases such as malaria, cholera, Ebola haemorrhagic fever, AIDS, and tuberculosis. Support cooperation with international and regional organizations such as the World Health Organization and the African Union, encourage Chinese pharmaceutical manufacturers to invest in Africa, reduce the cost of African pharmaceutical products, and improve the accessibility of African pharmaceutical products.
- Share and promote poverty reduction experience. Poverty is a common challenge facing China and Africa. China will earnestly honour the relevant commitments made to the international community in support of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, actively implement the "China and African Union Program for Strengthening China-Africa Cooperation in Poverty Reduction", strengthen cooperation in the field of poverty reduction between China and Africa, and leverage the joint establishment between China and the United Nations The role of China 's China International Poverty Alleviation Center and other international poverty reduction exchange platforms encourages and supports governments, academic institutions, enterprises, and non-governmental organizations to carry out various forms of poverty reduction experience exchange and practical cooperation. We will share the successful experience of China in achieving large-scale poverty reduction through rural poverty alleviation and development, strengthen project demonstration cooperation, and support African countries to enhance their independent poverty reduction and development capabilities.
- Strengthen scientific and technological cooperation and knowledge sharing. Continue to promote the implementation of the China-Africa Science and Technology Partnership Program, and encourage both sides to strengthen scientific and technological exchanges and cooperation in agriculture, water

resources, energy, aerospace, communications, environmental protection, desertification prevention, medical treatment, marine and other fields.

5. Deepen military cooperation

Further strengthen China-Africa military exchanges and cooperation, deepen cooperation in the field of military expertise, and actively carry out joint training of troops. According to the needs of the African side, we will expand the scale of training for military personnel of African countries and innovate training models. We will continue to support African countries in strengthening national defence and maintaining stability, and safeguarding their own security and regional peace.

Relations between China and African Regional Organizations

China values and firmly supports the African Union 's leading role in advancing the process of Africa 's self-reliance and integration, its leading role in maintaining peace and security in Africa, and its greater role in regional and international affairs. It appreciates and supports the adoption and implementation of the African Union The 2063 Agenda and its first 10-year plan. In 2014, China set up a mission to the African Union, marking a new stage in the development of relations between China and the African Union. China is willing to further strengthen high-level exchanges with the African Union, give full play to the role of the strategic dialogue mechanism between the two sides, strengthen political dialogue and mutual trust, and promote cooperation in development planning, poverty reduction experience sharing, public health, peace and security, and international affairs. China appreciates the positive role played by African sub-regional organizations in promoting peace, stability and development in their respective regions, and is willing to strengthen friendly exchanges and cooperation with various organizations and support the capacity building of African sub-regional organizations.⁶²⁰

5.6.1.1. Regional Organizations

China is willing to establish and improve various dialogue and cooperation mechanisms with the African Union and sub regional organizations, and strengthen cooperation in various fields such as politics, economy, trade, and humanities at the regional and sub-regional levels.

1.Organization Of African Unity (OAU)

The People's Republic of China has always maintained friendly cooperation with the Organization of African Unity. Since the establishment of the OAU, the Chinese Government, in the name of its Premier, sent messages of congratulation to all previous OAU Summits with the exception of the period from 1966 to 1969.⁶²¹

⁶²⁰ Excerpts from the Foreign Ministry of China's Policy paper titled 'China's African Policy Document' available online on URL:

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/zcwj_674915/t1321556.shtml

⁶²¹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15531.shtml

Other initiatives from the Chinese side include:

In January 1991, State Councillor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Qian Qichen met with Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim in Addis Ababa. In July 1993, Vice Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Qian Qichen send a message of congratulation to Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim for his re-election as the Secretary General of OAU. In September 1995, Vice Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Qian Qichen met with Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim, who came to Beijing for the 4th Conference on the Woman. In May 1996, in his speech at the OAU Headquarter during his visit to Africa, President Jiang Zemin put forward the Five-Point Proposal on developing a long-term and stable relationship of all-round cooperation between China and Africa for the 21st century. The main ideas of the proposal are sincere friendship, treatment of each other on an equal footing, solidarity and cooperation, common development and a future-oriented relationship. In June 1997, Vice Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Qian Qichen sent a message of congratulation to Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim for his re-election as the Secretary General of OAU.⁶²² In June 1998, a government representative from China attended the 34th OAU Summit as Invited Guest for the first time. In July 1999, the Chinese Government again sent a delegation to attend the 35th OAU Summit. In September 1999, President Jiang Zemin sent telegrams respectively to the OAU Chairman, His Excellency Mr. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria and His Excellency Colonel Muammar Al-Qathafi, Leader of the Great Fateh Revolution of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on the convening of the 4th Extraordinary Session of OAU Summit. In July 2000, the Chinese government delegation attended the 36th OAU Summit.

OAU Visits to China include:

- In 1974, OAU delegation led by Somali Foreign Minister Omar Galeb.
- In 1981, OAU delegation led by an Assistant Secretary General Peter Onu.
- In 1984, OAU delegation led by Angolan Deputy Foreign Minister.
- In October 1990, visit by OAU Secretary General, Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim.
- In January 1999, visit by OAU Assistant Secretary General, Mr. Ahmed Haggag, while attending the Grand Exhibition of African Arts in Beijing.
- In October 2000, OAU Secretary General Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim came to China to attend the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing 2000/Ministerial Conference.

China has donated financial and material assistance to the OAU.⁶²³

2.The Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS)⁶²⁴

China maintains good relations and cooperation with all the other 12 ECOWAS member states, except Burkina Faso, Gambia, Liberia and Senegal, and has provided assistance to these countries to the best of its ability through bilateral channels. Since early 1990s

⁶²²https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15531.shtml

⁶²³https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15531.shtml

⁶²⁴https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15537.shtml

when ECOMOG started its peacekeeping operation in West Africa, the Chinese Government has expressed its support at the international forums such as the United Nations for the efforts made by ECOWAS for the restoration of peace in the West African sub-region. China also participated in the UN peacekeeping operations by sending its military observers to Liberia and Sierra Leone.⁶²⁵

In July 1998, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Ji Peiding attended the UN High-Level Special Conference on Sierra Leone. In September of that year, at the 2nd Foreign Ministers' Meeting of the UN Security Council on Africa, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan appealed the international community to respect and further support the efforts made by the African regional organizations to prevent and resolve the conflicts. He also called on the international community provide necessary material and financial assistance for Africa's security and peacekeeping mechanism without any political preconditions. China appreciates the ECOWAS for its valuable contributions in the easing the crisis of Sierra Leone. In August 2000, China voted for the resolution on the establishment of special court on Sierra Leone in the UN Security Council at the request of the Sierra Leonean government. In October of the same year, Ambassador Wang Yingfan, China's permanent representative in the UN, visited Sierra Leone with other ambassadors.⁶²⁶

3. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

In April 1999, the China Import and Export Bank signed an export credit agreement with the Trade and Development Bank of Eastern and Southern Africa under COMESA. In May 2000, the People's Bank of China, on behalf of the Chinese government, joined the Trade and Development Bank of Eastern and Southern Africa, becoming the biggest shareholder outside this region, and with a director to participate in the Bank's board of directors.

From March to April 2001, the Ministerial Council chairman Anil Gayan at the head of a COMESA delegation visited China and discussed with their Chinese counterparts the cooperation in information industry between the two sides.⁶²⁷

5.6.1.2 Regional Issues

1. Pretoria Declaration on the Partnership Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa.⁶²⁸

China and Africa over many years have articulated 45 years ago at the Bandung Conference and also 4 years ago at the Headquarters of the Organization of African Unity, when the 5 principles of Sino-African relations were conceptualised as:

- Sincere Friendship
- Equality and Sovereignty

⁶²⁵[Ibid](#)

⁶²⁶https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15537.shtml

⁶²⁷https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2639_665461/t15592.shtml

⁶²⁸https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2639_665461/t15592.shtml

- Common Development on the Basis of Mutual Benefit
- Increased Consultation and Cooperation in International Affairs
- Cooperation in the Establishment of a New International Political and Economic Order
- Commit ourselves anew to the spirit of partnership and constructive dialogue between China and South Africa, and to the position that there is but one China in the world and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, as articulated in the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations⁶²⁹

Firstly, the Governments of China and South Africa will endeavour to further enhance the existing partnership between them through this Declaration, a high-level Bi-National Commission. This Bi-National Commission will meet regularly at mutually convenient times and levels. This Bi-National Commission will aim to guide and coordinate all government-to-government relations between China and South Africa, and to consult on matters of mutual interest in the bilateral and multilateral spheres. As such, due cognisance is taken of the existing agreements and arrangements on Bilateral Consultations and Joint Commissions and that this Bi-National Commission will, in principle, safeguard and incorporate those earlier agreements and arrangements.⁶³⁰

Secondly, the Governments of China and South Africa will, within the context of South-South Cooperation, endeavour to develop, strengthen and diversify their economic relationship to support closer cooperation between enterprises of the two countries in the development of natural resources, especially in the areas of mining and manufacturing.

Thirdly, the Governments of China and South Africa will cooperate constructively and effectively in the promotion of a new Sino-African relationship by promoting the interests of Africa through multilateral fora such as the G-77 and China, and the structures of the United Nations.

Fourthly, the Governments of China and South Africa will support each other in efforts to create a new international political and economic order. The two sides maintain that in this future New Order, the diversity of the world should be respected; the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries should be upheld; no country should dominate others; the negative effects of globalization - especially on developing nations - should be reduced and restricted; and harmony, democracy, justice and equality in international relations should be actively pursued and fully promoted. This Declaration is signed at Pretoria, on this Twenty-Fifth Day of April in the Year Two Thousand, in the Chinese and English languages.⁶³¹

2.Conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea

⁶²⁹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15541.shtml

⁶³⁰ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15541.shtml

⁶³¹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2639_665461/t15595.shtml

Chinese Government has all along been taking a neutral and mediating position on the conflict, expressing wishes through various channels that the two countries should solve the conflict by peaceful means. China has played an active role in the process of supporting and promoting peaceful solution by UN Security Council. Chinese Government is pleased to see that positive development has been made in the peaceful solution process under the joint efforts of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the international community. Chinese Government is ready to work with the international community and make positive efforts for the realization of durable peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea⁶³²

3.Somali Question

The Chinese government has followed with concern the development of those peace process programs. China supports all the efforts intended to realize an early peace in Somali. China holds that the key to the solution of the Somali problem rests on the joint efforts of the whole Somali people, achieving a widely-based national reconciliation. The international community should coordinate their efforts to promote the solution of the problem. China sincerely wish all the parties in Somali could put the interests of the whole people in the first place, cast away past grievances and reach national reconciliation through dialogue and by peaceful means. China as a permanent member of the Security Council is ready, together with the international community, to continue to play a positive role in the peaceful solution of the Somali question.⁶³³

4. Angola Question

China always firmly supports the peace process of Angola. China generally does not advocate measures such as imposing sanction on any country in international affairs. However, to promote the peace process in Angola, China voted for the sanction resolutions on Angola problem in the Security Council. The Chinese government notes with concern the development of Angolan situation, supports the Angolan government in its efforts to realize internal peace in the country, and holds that the main reason for the repeated setbacks of the peace process is that UNITA did not fully implement the Lusaka Protocol and relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council. At present, the international community should strictly observe the relevant resolutions adopted in the Security Council, hence forcing UNITA back to the right track of the Lusaka Protocol. At the same time, the Chinese government holds that the final solution of the Angolan question rests on political dialogue between the parties involved. The Chinese government is ready to join hands with the international community to play a more positive role for an early realization of peace and national reconciliation in Angola.⁶³⁴

5.The Situation of Burundi

The Chinese Government has always followed closely the development of the Burundian situation. We are happy about the positive developments in the Burundian peace process and welcome the African countries' decision to suspend the economic sanctions against

⁶³²https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2639_665461/t15594.shtml

⁶³³Ibid

⁶³⁴https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2639_665461/t15594.shtml

Burundi. We hope that the parties in Burundi will iron out their differences and achieve substantive progress in peace negotiations at early time, so that the peace process can be carried on, the national reconciliation can be enhanced and the country can enjoy long-term peace and stability. Meanwhile we also hope that other countries involved, taking into full consideration of the positive efforts by the Burundian Government in promoting national reconciliation and proceeding from the overall interests of safeguarding African unity and good-neighbourly relations among the regional countries, will provide active support and assistance to the Burundian peace process.⁶³⁵

6.The Question of Congo(Kinshasa)

The Chinese Government maintains that the conflict should be brought to an early end, so that peace, stability and security in Congo (Kinshasa) as well in the region and the good-neighbourly relations among the countries can be restored, through negotiations and consultations on the basis of respecting the sovereign and territorial integrity of the country, and in accordance with the spirit of African unity and national reconciliation. China appreciates the international community, the UN, regional organizations and relevant countries in particular, for their efforts aiming at solving the Congolese question peacefully. The Chinese Government supports the UN to exercise its peacekeeping moves in Congo (Kinshasa) as early as possible. The Chinese Government has noticed that relevant sides have expressed to continue the peace process in line with the Lusaka Agreement; and that the Congolese government and the new President also expressed to maintain close cooperation with the UN peace-keeping mission to promote the political solution of the Congolese question, following the passing away of the former president. The Chinese Government wishes that the relevant sides should fulfil their commitments on cease-fire and troop withdrawing, and observe and implement the related resolutions adopted in the Security Council. They should earnestly conduct national dialogs and enhance mutual confidence to strive for new progress in the peace process. China, as a permanent member in the Security Council, will as always make her constructive contributions to an early solution to the Congolese question.⁶³⁶

7.The Issue of Western Sahara

China has always paid close attention to the Western Sahara Issue, expecting that the issue could come to a just and equitable settlement in the frame of United Nations relevant resolutions. China appreciates and supports the positive efforts that United Nations and all parties concerned have taken to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue. China expects all parties concerned to carry on positive and matter-of-fact attitude so as to ensure the on-time referendum through dialogue and cooperation. That will not only accelerate the solution of Western Sahara Issue, but also be conducive to the peace, stability and development of Western Sahara.⁶³⁷

⁶³⁵https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2639_665461/t15589.shtml

⁶³⁶https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2639_665461/t15589.shtml

⁶³⁷https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2639_665461/t15585.shtml

5.6.2. America

China-US Relations

Since 2015 the overall relationship between China and the United States has remained stable and even made new progress. The two countries have maintained close contacts at the leadership and other levels. President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to the US at the invitation of President Barack Obama in September 2015, and met him again during the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris in November of the same year. In late March 2016 the two presidents had a successful meeting during the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. In September they met again during the G20 Hangzhou Summit, and committed themselves to building a new model of a major-country relationship. Premier Li Keqiang met President Obama when attending high-level meetings of the 71st Session of the UN General Assembly. In June the same year the Eighth Round of the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the Seventh China-US High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchanges, and the Second China-US High-Level Joint Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues were held in Beijing, and achieved fruitful results. In addition, the two countries have made steady progress in practical cooperation in various fields, and maintained close communication and coordination on major regional and global issues like climate change, the Korean and Iranian nuclear issues, Syria, and Afghanistan.⁶³⁸

The two countries have maintained communication and coordination in the field of Asia-Pacific affairs through bilateral exchanges and relevant mechanisms at all levels, and agreed to build a bilateral relationship of positive interaction and inclusive cooperation in the region. The two countries have stayed in a state of communication and cooperation on regional and global affairs, including climate change, counter-terrorism, marine environmental protection, combating wild life smuggling, and disaster prevention and reduction within multilateral frameworks such as APEC, East Asia Summit (EAS), and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Moreover, the two sides have smoothly carried out trilateral personnel and agriculture training cooperation projects in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste.

China-US military relations have generally maintained a momentum of steady progress. Since 2015 the two militaries have continued to improve their two mutual-confidence-building mechanisms: the Mutual Notification of Major Military Activities and the Rules of Behavior for the Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters. In 2015 they held their Joint Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster-Relief Field Exercise and Disaster Management Exchanges in China and the US, respectively, and participated in Khaan Quest 2015 multinational peacekeeping military exercise and Exercise Kowari, a China-US-Australia trilateral military exercise. In January 2016 a working meeting of officials from the two ministries of defence was held in Beijing, and in May a video conference was held between the Chinese Chief of the Department of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Central Military Commission and the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From late June to early August 2016, Chinese Navy Fleet 153 participated in RIMPAC 2016, a joint military

⁶³⁸Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled 'China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation' published in 2017, available online at URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1429771.shtml

exercise in Hawaii. In July and August the same year, the US Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff of the Army each made a visit to China.⁶³⁹ From January 13 to 16, 2019, U.S. Naval Operations Secretary General Richardson was invited to visit China. General Li Zuocheng, member of the Central Military Commission and chief of staff of the Joint Staff Department of the Military Commission, and Admiral Shen Jinlong, commander of the Navy, met separately. On May 21, Ci Guowei, director of the Central Military Commission's Office of International Military Cooperation, held the third China-US Defense Asia Pacific Security Dialogue with Assistant US Secretary of Defense Xue Ruifu in Washington. On May 31, State Councilor and Secretary of Defense Wei Fenghe attended the 18th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore and met with the then acting US Secretary of Defense Shanahan. From October 21 to 22, Assistant US Secretary of Defense Shi Cande attended the 9th Xiangshan Forum. On November 5, State Councilor and Secretary of Defense Wei Fenghe spoke with US Secretary of Defense Esper. On November 18, State Councilor and Secretary of Defense Wei Fenghe met with US Secretary of Defense Esper during the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Expansion in Bangkok, Thailand. From November 14th to 24th, a joint exercise of humanitarian relief and mitigation by the Chinese and American armed forces was held in Hawaii, the United States.⁶⁴⁰

Since 2018, China-US economic and trade issues have become prominent. The United States has continuously adopted unilateral trade protectionist measures such as 201, 232, and 301 against China, imposed multiple rounds of tariffs on Chinese products exported to the United States, and listed China as a so-called "currency manipulator." . China has to take effective measures to resolutely defend the interests of the country and the people. At the same time, China has always insisted on properly solving Sino-US economic and trade issues through dialogue and consultation on the basis of equality and mutual respect. As of December 2019, China and the United States have held 13 rounds of high-level economic and trade consultations. On December 13, 2019, the two sides announced that they had reached agreement on the text of the first phase of the Sino-US economic and trade agreement.⁶⁴¹

Affected by the economic and trade frictions between the two countries, Sino-US bilateral trade and investment declined. From January to November 2019, China-US bilateral trade in goods was US \$ 494.45 billion, down 15.2% year-on-year, and China's surplus was US \$ 272.49 billion, down 7.2% year-on-year. From January to June 2019, Chinese companies invested US \$ 2.84 billion in non-financial direct investment in the United States, down 6.5% year-on-year.⁶⁴²

⁶³⁹ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled 'China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation' published in 2017, available online at URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1429771.shtml

Note: Databank on 30 years of diplomacy on US-China relations can be accessed here:

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3603_665545/

⁶⁴⁰ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/bmz_679954/1206_680528/sbgx_680532/

⁶⁴¹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/bmz_679954/1206_680528/sbgx_680532/

Note: Wang Yi's view on US-China can be accessed here:

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/bmdyzs_664814/gjlb_664818/3432_664920/

⁶⁴² https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/bmz_679954/1206_680528/sbgx_680532/

Detailed information of China's relation with other North American countries is available on PRC's Ministry of Foreign affairs website can be accessed online at URL:

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/bmz_679954/

China is willing to promote the sustainable, sound and stable advance of bilateral relations, and work with the new US administration to follow the principles of no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation, increase cooperation in bilateral, regional and global affairs, manage and control divergences in a constructive way, and further bilateral relations from a new starting point, so as to bring benefits to the two peoples and other peoples around the world.⁶⁴³

China-Latin America relations at a new stage of comprehensive cooperation

China is far away from Latin American and Caribbean countries, but the friendship between the people of China and Latin America has a long history. After the founding of New China in 1949, with the joint efforts of several generations, China-Latin America relations have steadily moved forward and have gone through an extraordinary journey.⁶⁴⁴

In 2008, the Chinese government issued its first policy document on Latin America, and proposed the phased goal of establishing a comprehensive and cooperative partnership based on equality, mutual benefit, and common development. In 2014, the leaders of China and Latin America held a meeting in Brasilia to jointly establish the above-mentioned relationship positioning, and thus Sino-Latin American relations entered a new stage of comprehensive cooperation. The high-level exchanges and political dialogues between the two sides are frequent, cooperation in trade, investment, finance and other fields has developed comprehensively and rapidly. Humanities exchanges have become increasingly close. They have supported and cooperated closely in international affairs. The China-Latin America and Caribbean Community Forum ") Provides a new platform for China-Latin America cooperation and forms a new situation in which overall cooperation and bilateral cooperation develop in parallel and promote each other.

International collaboration

(1) International political affairs

Promote China-Latin America to deepen exchanges and cooperation in international organizations such as the United Nations and other international occasions, maintain communication and coordination on major international and regional issues, promote multi-polarization and democratization of international relations, enhance the voice of developing countries in international affairs The common interests of both parties and developing countries.⁶⁴⁵

(2) Global economic governance

⁶⁴³ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled 'China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation' published in 2017, available online at URL:

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1429771.shtml

⁶⁴⁴ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "China's policy documents for Latin America and the Caribbean" published in November 2016, available online at URL:

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/zcwj_674915/t1418250.shtml

⁶⁴⁵ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "China's policy documents for Latin America and the Caribbean" published in November 2016, available online at URL:

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/zcwj_674915/t1418250.shtml

Strengthen coordination between China and Latin America in the G20, APEC, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, BIS, Financial Stability Board and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and other international economic and financial organizations and mechanisms to promote world trade. The multilateral trade negotiation process with the organization as the core promotes the establishment of a balanced, win-win and inclusive development of the multilateral trading system, and promotes economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. Appeal to the international community to continue to promote global economic governance reform, improve and improve global economic and financial rules, further promote the reform of the IMF's share and governance structure, and support the World Bank to advance equity review in accordance with the roadmap and timetable agreed by all parties and increase Representativeness of market countries and developing countries. Promote the construction of a global financial safety net, enhance the global ability to respond to systemic shocks, and strengthen the monitoring and prevention of global and regional systemic risks.⁶⁴⁶

(3) Implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

China is willing to work with Latin American and Caribbean countries to jointly promote the common prosperity and win-win cooperation of the international community and implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted by the UN Development Summit. Promote the international community to improve global partnerships, strengthen the status of the main channel for North-South cooperation, and urge developed countries to earnestly fulfill their official development assistance commitments, while playing an important role in South-South cooperation and tripartite cooperation. China is willing to provide support and assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to promote the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

(4) Response to climate change

Adhere to the main channel status of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in the international response to climate change, and adhere to the principles and provisions of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, especially the principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, Work together to promote the implementation of the Paris Agreement. Appeal to the international community to pay attention to the special concerns of Caribbean small island developing countries, promote the establishment of a fair and reasonable, win-win global climate governance system, and promote the comprehensive, effective and sustainable implementation of the Convention.

(5) Network security

The Chinese government is willing to work with Latin American and Caribbean countries to build a peaceful, secure, open, and cooperative cyberspace based on the principles of peace, sovereignty, co-governance, and inclusiveness, and establish a multilateral, democratic, and transparent Internet governance system to promote Under the

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid.

framework, formulate universally accepted international code of conduct for cyberspace and international legal instruments to combat cybercrime. Oppose the use of the Internet to engage in acts that undermine the political, economic and social stability of a country.⁶⁴⁷

Peace, security, and justice

(1) Military exchanges and cooperation

Actively carry out military exchanges and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries, expand friendly exchanges between the defense and military leaders of both sides, strengthen policy dialogues and establish working meeting mechanisms, carry out mutual visits of groups and ships, and deepen military training, personnel training, UN peacekeeping and other fields Professional exchanges, expand practical cooperation in non-traditional security fields such as humanitarian relief and counter-terrorism, and strengthen military trade and military technical cooperation.⁶⁴⁸

(2) Judicial police cooperation

Accelerate the process of signing treaties on criminal judicial assistance, and expand cooperation in the areas of combating crime and pursuing espionage. Actively carry out police and prosecution exchanges and cooperation, strengthen and expand the cooperation between the two parties in the areas of extradition, repatriation of criminal suspects and sentenced persons, and the seizure, seizure, confiscation, and return of illegal income, and coordinate their cooperation in the field of international multilateral judicial cooperation Take a stand to jointly combat non-traditional security threats, including corruption crimes, cybercrimes, drug crimes, economic crimes, transnational crimes, and terrorism. Strengthen the signing of civil and commercial judicial assistance treaties. Actively promote judicial exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and Latin American courts.

Overall cooperation

China is willing to work with Latin America to adhere to the spirit and main objectives of the "Beijing Declaration of the First Ministerial Conference of China-Latin America Forum", "China-Latin America Cooperation Plan (2015-2019)", and "Rules of China-Latin America Forum for Mechanism Setting and Operation" Respect, equality, pluralism, mutual benefit, cooperation, openness, tolerance and unconditional principles, and actively promote cooperation in various fields under the framework of the forum. Give full play to the mechanisms of the ministerial meeting of the Forum, the "Troika" Foreign Ministers' Dialogue between China and Latin America, the meeting of national coordinators, and organize political parties, laws, youth, think tanks, infrastructure, technological innovation, entrepreneurs, agriculture, civil society Organize sub-forum activities with local friendship and other fields, do a good job in the China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum, continuously improve the mechanism

⁶⁴⁷ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "China's policy documents for Latin America and the Caribbean" published in November 2016, available online at URL:

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/zcwj_674915/t1418250.shtml

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid.

construction of the China-Latin America Forum, and hold summits attended by leaders of China and Latin American Community member states when conditions are ripe. China welcomes the active participation of relevant regional organizations and multilateral institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean in the overall cooperation between China and Latin America. It will provide necessary assistance in the overall cooperation based on the needs of the least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Take care.⁶⁴⁹

Tripartite cooperation

China is willing to carry out tripartite development cooperation in Latin American and Caribbean countries with the relevant countries and international organizations under the principles proposed, agreed and led by the Latin American and Caribbean countries. The Chinese side encourages Chinese enterprises and relevant parties to carry out trilateral cooperation in the economic, social, cultural and other fields in Latin American and Caribbean countries based on commercial principles.⁶⁵⁰

5.6.2.1. Regional Organizations

1. The American States Organization (Organización de los Estados Americanos) (OEA)

Relations between China and the Organization: In February 1979, as invited by the Chinese Association of Diplomats, Alejandro Orifila, secretary of the America States Organization paid a visit to China in his own name and Premier Deng Xiaoping met him. During the period of 28 July to 17 August 1997, César Gaviria also paid a private visit to China and he was met respectively by Wang Guangying, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and Liu Huaqiu, Director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council. On 20 February 1997 Gaviria, secretary-general of the organization on behalf of the 34 countries of the America States Organization, sent a telegram to Premier Li Peng, expressing his deep condolence to the unfortunate passing-away of Comrade Deng Xiaoping.⁶⁵¹

2. The Rio Group

Relations between China and the Rio Group: In 1990, the Rio Group established the dialogue relationships with China. On 26 September of the same year, Qian Qichen, Chinese foreign minister had for the first time a dialogue in New York with the foreign ministers of the member countries of the Group. The two sides exchanged in an extensive way the views on the current international situation, the relations between China and the Latin America, and other questions of common interest, and decided to hold irregular talks between them in the future.⁶⁵²

⁶⁴⁹ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "China's policy documents for Latin America and the Caribbean" published in November 2016, available online at URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/zcwj_674915/t1418250.shtml

⁶⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁵¹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15543.shtml

⁶⁵² https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/

In September 1991, the 2nd dialogue was held between Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen and the foreign ministers of the Rio Group in New York. The two sides exchanged with breadth and depth their views on international questions of common interest, such as the present international situation, the situation in Latin America, the establishment of a new international political and economic order, and the further development and cooperation between China and the Latin America.⁶⁵³

In September 1993, Qian Qichen, Vice-premier and Foreign Minister held a third dialogue with the foreign ministers of the Rio Group while attending the 48th UN assembly. The two sides had a discussion, exchanging the views with breadth and depth over the questions of common interest such as international and regional situation, internal reform of the United Nations, the role and prospect of the APEC, the political, economic and trade cooperation between China and Latin America.⁶⁵⁴

During 16 - 17 August 1994, the "Symposium on Economy and Trade between China and the Rio Group" was held in Brasilia, the capital city of Brazil. A Chinese delegation headed by Wang Zhibao, Vice-minister of Forestry attended the meeting. In the meantime, the two sides had an earnest and down-to-earth probe into the problems as regards developing political and economic relations, promoting economic and trade, scientific and technological cooperation between China and Latin America. In September of the same year, Qian Qichen, Vice-premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs had a fourth dialogue with some of the Foreign Ministers of the Rio Group while attending the UN assembly. The two sides held an extensive and in-depth exchange of the views on the questions of common interest, such as the situation in Latin America, relationship between China and the Latin American countries, society and development as well as the 4th World Women's Congress, etc.⁶⁵⁵

In September 1995, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen had a fifth dialogue with some of the Foreign Ministers of the Rio Group while attending the UN assembly. The two sides had positive discussions on the further development of relations between China and Latin America, the expansion of mutual cooperation in the fields of economy, trade, and science and technology. Both sides also exchanged the views on regional situation and international issues of common interest. During 14 - 25 January 1996, the symposium on the scientific and technological cooperation between China and the Rio Group was held in Beijing. Present at the symposium were 12 members from the 8 countries of Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Uruguay and Ecuador. In September of the same year, Vice President and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen held a sixth dialogue with the Foreign Ministers of the Rio Group. In September 1997, Vice Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, held a seventh dialogue with the foreign ministers of the Rio Group, present at which were the foreign minister of Paraguay, the rotating presidency of the presiding-over country and ministers of other member

⁶⁵³Ibid.

⁶⁵⁴https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2639_665461/t15585.shtml

⁶⁵⁵https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2639_665461/t15585.shtml

countries of the Rio Group. The two sides exchanged their views on the issues of common interest.⁶⁵⁶

In September 1998, the 8th political dialogue took place between Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and the Foreign Ministers of the Rio Group while attending the UN conference. Present at the meeting for dialogue were the Foreign Minister of Panama, the rotating presidency of the presiding-over country and the Foreign Ministers of other countries. The two sides expressed their willingness to work together to continuously enrich the contents and ways for the dialogue so as to establish a long and stable friendly cooperative relationships between the two sides. On September 22, 1999, the ninth political dialogue was held in New York between Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and the Foreign Ministers of the member countries of the Rio Group. Present at the meeting was the Foreign Minister of Brazil, the country on duty by turn, and the Foreign Ministers of other member countries. The two sides expressed the willingness to further their cooperation in the fields of politics, economy and trade so as to establish and develop a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship.

The year 2000 marked the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the dialogue mechanism between China and the Rio Group. At the invitation of Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, the Foreign Ministers Filnandes, Green and Solada, respectively from Colombia, Mexico and Chile, "the Tripartite Coach", collectively visited China from July 31 to August 3. Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji, and State Councilor Wu Yi received the foreign guests respectively. Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan also held talks with the three Foreign Ministers. During the meetings, China spoke highly of the positive role the Rio Group had played in the regional and international affairs, and expressed the willingness to further strengthen mutual dialogue and cooperation. The three Foreign Ministers of the Rio Group delivered speeches at the meeting, during which Colombian Foreign Minister gave a lecture entitled "Relations between Latin American and Caribbean Region and China - Common Wishes for Integration and Cooperation".

In September 2000, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan held the tenth political dialogue in New York with the Foreign Ministers of the Rio Group. Present at the dialogue were the Foreign Minister Filnandes of Colombia, the rotating presidency of the presiding-over country, and the Foreign Ministers or representatives of other member countries of the Rio Group. The two sides expressed their willingness to further strengthen bilateral dialogue and coordinate mutual cooperation, and work together in an effort to raise the relationship between China and the Rio Group to a new height. In Sept. 2002, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan held the 12th political dialogue with the foreign ministers of member states of the Group of Rio during the 57th General Assembly of the UN. Costa Rican foreign minister, chairman in rotation of the Group of Rio, and foreign ministers or representatives of other members of this group participated in the dialogue. Both sides exchanged views on Sino-Latin American relations and international issues of common concern.⁶⁵⁷

⁶⁵⁶https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15539.shtml

⁶⁵⁷https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15539.shtml

3.The Andes Community

In January 1999, China reached agreement on establishing the mutual consultative mechanism with the Comunidad Andina. In May 1999, President Jiang Zemin sent a congratulatory telegram to Head of the Andes Group, to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Comunidad Andina, and also appointed Chinese ambassador in Colombia to attend the meeting on behalf.

On March 30, 2000, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, with Dterasagnes, Peruvian Foreign Minister and President of Foreign Minister Council of the Andes Group, signed in Beijing the Agreement on the establishment of political consultative and cooperative mechanism between the People's Republic of China and the Andes Group. The agreement will take effect on the date of signature and last indefinitely. On Oct. 21, 2002, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan held the first political consultation with the foreign ministers of 5 member of the Andes Community in Bogota, capital city of Columbia. Both sides exchanged views on relations between China and the Andes Community and cooperation over major international issues.⁶⁵⁸

4.The South Common Market

In November 1996, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen sent a telegram to foreign minister Lanpulia of Brazil, the rotating presidency of the presiding-over country, proposing to establish a dialogue mechanism between China and the Mercosur, which received an active response and support from the Mercosur. In October 1997, the Mercosur Delegation headed by ambassador Aispirosa of Uruguay, the rotating presidency of the presiding-over country, paid a visit to China and held the first dialogue with the Chinese side. The foreign delegation held respective talks with Deputy Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxin and Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Sun Zhenyu on bilateral political and economic relations and international issues of common interest. Vice-premier Qian Qichen and Assistant Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, met with the delegation respectively, and the two sides signed for the first time the minutes of the dialogue.⁶⁵⁹

On 9 October 1998, the 2nd dialogue between China and the Mercosur occurred in Brasilia, Capital of Brazil. The dialogue was held between the Chinese delegation jointly headed by Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and Assistant Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Gao Hucheng, and the Mercosur Delegation headed by Renato Marques, President on duty by turns and Brazilian Foreign Minister. The two sides stressed unanimously to further strengthen the economic and trade cooperation and cooperation between the enterprises, and also held consultations over technical cooperation. The two sides signed the minutes of the second dialogue and held the entrepreneur forum. On October 18, 2000, invited by Chinese Foreign Minister, Deputy Foreign Minister of Brazil, on duty by turns, headed a delegation to China and held the third dialogue with China in Beijing. Vice Premier Wen Jiabao received the delegation. Deputy Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Thou Keren held the working talks with the delegation respectively.

⁶⁵⁸https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15534.shtm

⁶⁵⁹https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/

President of China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) gave a banquet for the delegation. Deputy Foreign Minister Yang and President of the delegation and Brazilian Deputy Foreign Minister Lima signed the minutes of the dialogue third.⁶⁶⁰

5.Latin America Economic System

China gives a high appraisal to the Latin America Economic System, considering that it has made great efforts and gained achievements in promoting the regional cooperation, pushing ahead economic integration, and maintaining the lawful rights and interests of the countries in Latin America, and so China is willing to develop friendly and cooperative relations on the basis of equality, mutual benefits with the Latin America Economic System. In 1995, Liu Huaqiu, director of the Foreign Affairs Office under the State Council headed a delegation to attend the summit conference of the nonaligned countries held in Colombia, during which he met with Carlos Moneta, permanent secretary of the Latin America Economic System. On 14 November 1996, invited by the Latin America Economic System, Li Peng, Premier of the State Council during his visit to Venezuela, made an important speech at its headquarters, entitled "Compose jointly a new chapter of friendly cooperation between China and Latin America", elucidating China's five principles for developing the relations, and four major points for expanding economic cooperation and trade with Latin America. Premier Li Peng also met Moneta, permanent secretary of the Latin America Economic System. On 20 February 1997, Moneta, the permanent secretary of the Latin America Economic System sent a telegram to Li Peng, expressing his profound condolences for the unfortunate passing away of Comrade Deng Xiaoping. During the period of 24 June to 4 July 1997, Moneta, the permanent secretary of the Latin America Economic System, invited by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, paid a visit to China and Liu Huaqiu, Director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council, Li Zhaoxing, vice-minister and Yang Jiechi, assistant to minister, of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs met him on respective occasions. From 18 to 26 June 1999, the delegation of the Latin America Economic System paid a visit to China and attended the Symposium on Economy and Trade between China and Latin America, during which Wang Zhongyu, council member of the State Council and Yang Jiechi, vice-minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs met the delegation on respective occasions.⁶⁶¹

6.Latin America Parliament

Relations between China and the Latin America Parliament: In March 1993, Qian Qichen, state council member and concurrently minister of foreign affairs, was invited to visit the headquarters of the Latin America Parliament during his visit to Brazil and met the assemblymen and members of the Leaders' Committee there. In September 1996, headed by??., the first alternate president of the Latin America Parliament and Mexican senator the delegation of the Latin America Parliament attended the 96th Conference of the All Countries Parliament Union held in Beijing. In September 1996, the standing committee of the Chinese People's Representatives Congress sent in an official letter to the Latin America Parliament, applying for becoming an observer in the organization. On 25

⁶⁶⁰https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15533.shtml

⁶⁶¹https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15526.shtml

February 1997, Singer, the executive president wrote a letter to Qiao Shi, Chairman of the Chinese People's Representatives Congress expressed on behalf of the Latin America Parliament the profound condolences to the passing away of Deng Xiaoping. In March and April 1997, invited by the Chinese People's Representatives Congress, the delegations of the Latin America Parliament headed by Singer, the executive president and by Ney López Secretary general, paid a respective visit to China. Qiao Shi, Chairman of the Chinese People's Congress, Rong Yiren, Vice-chairman of the People's Republic of China, Chen Muhua, Vice-chairwoman of the Chinese People's Representative Congress and Zhu Liang, Deputy director of the Foreign Affairs Committee met and held banquets for the delegations. In May 1998, Tian Jiyun, Vice-chairman of the Chinese People's Representatives Congress, met López, the secretary general at the headquarters of the Latin America Parliament during his visit to Latin America.⁶⁶²

6. Inter-American Development Bank

China attaches much importance to developing its relations with the American Development Bank. In September 1993, Zhu Rongji, Vice Premier and President of the People's Bank of China, on behalf of the Chinese Government, sent an official application to the executive authority of the bank for the membership of the American Development Bank, which won the support from some of the Latin American countries. The move is to open up a new channel for the economic and trade cooperation with the Latin America, and strengthen the bilateral friendly cooperation. At present, China has reached an agreement with the America Development Bank on establishing a cooperative fund worth of two million US dollars. But due to some difficulties in sharing out stocks, it is still necessary to do a lot of work before China joins the American Development Bank.

In April 1991, the Chinese delegation, with Bai Wenqing, Vice-president of the People's Bank of China as the head, attended as an observer the 32nd annual meeting, and up to 2000, at the invitation China has attended the meetings for nine consecutive years in the name of an observer. Since the year 1991, Taiwan has also attended as an observer for consecutive ten years the 32nd-the 41st meetings in the name of "Taibei, China". In 1996, Taiwan sent an application for its membership of the America Development Bank. In December 1998, Taiwan, in the capacity of an observer, attended the "International Donors Meeting" held by the American Development Bank to help reconstruct the Central America. Zheng Bojiu, Deputy representative of Taiwan to the USA, and Luo Pingzhang, Secretary General of the "International Cooperation Development Fund", attended the meeting. They, on behalf of Taiwan authority, declared that they would not any more accept the name of "Taibei, China" to attend any activity of the America Development Bank. In February 1994, E. Iglesias, president of the American Development Bank, was invited to pay a visit to China. Rong Yiren, Vice-President of the People's Republic of China and Vice-premier Zhu Rongji met with him respectively. In September 1995, Mrs Bodesai, the executive vice president of the bank to attended the 4th World Women's Congress in Beijing as head of the delegation and held talks with leading personnel from the People's Bank of China.⁶⁶³

⁶⁶²https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15528.shtm

⁶⁶³https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15525.shtm

7.Iberian American Summit Meeting

Yang Shangkun, President of the People's Republic of China sent a message over, congratulating the 1st Iberian American Summit Meeting in 1991.⁶⁶⁴

8.East Asia-Latin America Forum (EALAF)

The Inaugural Meeting of the EALAF was held in Singapore from 1-3 September 1999. The Meeting was attended by officials of the 27 member countries, namely China, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar; Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador, Mexico; Australia and New Zealand. In 1985, China National People's Congress established contact with AIPU. In October, the union sent its General Secretary Boubaoui as the head of a delegation to make its first visit to China, and NPC's Deputy Chairman Geng Biao met the delegation. In February 1992, the union sent another delegation to China to exchange views with Chinese side on the suspected involvement of Libya in airplane bombing. NPC Deputy Chairman Peng Chong met the delegation, and NPC's standing committee member Fu Hao held talk with them.⁶⁶⁵

9.Association For Latin America Integration

On 20 January 1994, the Chinese government presented an application to the ALADI, wishing to become an observer state of the ALADI. On 15 June, the same year, the 525th meeting of the representatives of the permanent political organ of the ALADI made a decision to accept the People's Republic of China as its observer state. China is the first Asian observer state to the ALADI, and the present permanent observer of China to the ALADI is Huo Shuzhen, Chinese ambassador to Uruguay. On 24 Oct. 2000, Ambassador Hou presented her Letter of Attorney to Rojas, Chairman and Secretary General of the Executive Committee of ALKADI.⁶⁶⁶

5.6.3 Asia

China-India Relations

Since 2015 the China-India strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity has been further deepened. The two countries have set the goal of forging a closer development partnership, made new progress in exchanges and cooperation in various areas and stayed in close communication and coordination on regional and international issues. The two countries have held frequent exchanges of high-level visits, and enhanced political mutual trust. President Xi Jinping met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the side-lines of the Seventh BRICS Summit in Ufa in July 2015, the 16th SCO Summit in Tashkent in June 2016, the G20 Hangzhou Summit in September

⁶⁶⁴https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15524.shtml

⁶⁶⁵https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15523.shtml

⁶⁶⁶https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15522.shtml

2016, and the Eighth BRICS Summit in October 2016. In November 2015 Premier Li Keqiang met Indian Prime Minister Modi during the leaders' meetings for East Asia cooperation in Malaysia. Indian President Pranab Mukherjee visited China in May 2016, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China in May 2015. Practical cooperation between the two countries has made solid progress in various areas. The two countries have maintained communication and coordination on international affairs and enhanced collaboration in the UN, BRICS, G20, China-India-Russia and other mechanisms. They have cooperated on climate change, the WTO Doha Round of negotiations, energy and food security, reform of international financial and monetary institutions, and global governance. Such cooperation has helped safeguard the common interests of China, India and other developing countries.⁶⁶⁷

The field of China-India economic cooperation is constantly expanding. In 2017, the bilateral trade volume between China and India was 84.411 billion US dollars, an increase of 20.5% year-on-year, of which I exported 68.067 billion US dollars to India, an increase of 16.5% year-on-year, and I imported 16.344 billion US dollars from India, an increase of 38.9% year-on-year. In 2018, the bilateral trade volume between China and India was US \$ 95.543 billion, an increase of 13.2% year-on-year. Among them, China's exports to India were US \$ 767.05 billion, an increase of 12.7% year-on-year, and my imports from India were US \$ 18.838 billion, an increase of 15.2% year-on-year. China's main export commodities to India are organic electrical products, chemical products and base metals and products. China's main import commodities from India are mineral products, raw materials and chemical products. In 2016, China hosted the China Tourism Year in India. In December 2018, State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited India and co-chaired the first meeting of senior humanities exchanges between China and India with Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj. In August 2019, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar (Chinese name Su Jiesheng) visited China and co-chaired the second meeting of the China-India Senior Humanities Exchange Mechanism with State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi.⁶⁶⁸

The relations between the Chinese and Indian militaries remain healthy and stable in general, with increasingly close communication and exchanges, and pragmatic cooperation in greater breadth and depth. Eight rounds of defence and security consultation and six joint military anti-terrorism training exercises have been held so far. Sound cooperation in personnel training, professional exchanges and other fields is being carried out. The two sides have also conducted border defence cooperation, which plays a positive role in maintaining peace and tranquillity in the border areas between China and India. Military leaders of the two sides visited each other in 2015 and 2016, and reached an important consensus on strengthening pragmatic cooperation between the two militaries and working together to maintain peace and stability in the border areas.⁶⁶⁹

⁶⁶⁷ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled 'China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation' published in 2017, available online at URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1429771.shtml

⁶⁶⁸ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_677220/sbgx_677224/

⁶⁶⁹ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled 'China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation' published in 2017, available online at URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1429771.shtml

India-China Informal Summit at Wuhan

1. Prime Minister of India, H.E. Shri Narendra Modi and President of People's Republic of China, H.E. Mr. Xi Jinping held their first Informal Summit in Wuhan on April 27-28, 2018, to exchange views on overarching issues of bilateral and global importance, and to elaborate their respective visions and priorities for national development in the context of the current and future international situation.
2. They believe that the simultaneous emergence of India and China as two large economies and major powers with strategic and decisional autonomy, has implications of regional and global significance. They shared the view that peaceful, stable and balanced relations between India and China will be a positive factor for stability amidst current global uncertainties. They also agreed that proper management of the bilateral relationship will be conducive for the development and prosperity of the region, and will create the conditions for the Asian Century. To this end, they decided to strengthen the Closer Development Partnership in a mutually beneficial and sustainable manner, in pursuit of national modernization and greater prosperity for their peoples.
3. Prime Minister Modi and President Xi reviewed developments in India-China relations from the strategic and long-term perspective. They agreed to significantly enhance efforts to build on the convergences through the established mechanisms in order to create the broadest possible platform for the future relationship. They also agreed that both sides have the maturity and wisdom to handle the differences through peaceful discussion within the context of the overall relationship, bearing in mind the importance of respecting each other's sensitivities, concerns and aspirations.
4. The two leaders expressed their support for the work of the Special Representatives on the India China Boundary Question and urged them to intensify their efforts to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement. The two leaders underscored the importance of maintaining peace and tranquility in all areas of the India-China border region in the larger interest of the overall development of bilateral relations. To this end, they issued strategic guidance to their respective militaries to strengthen communication in order to build trust and mutual understanding and enhance predictability and effectiveness in the management of border affairs. The two leaders further directed their militaries to earnestly implement various confidence building measures agreed upon between the two sides, including the principle of mutual and equal security, and strengthen existing institutional arrangements and information sharing mechanisms to prevent incidents in border regions.
5. The two leaders agreed to push forward bilateral trade and investment in a balanced and sustainable manner by taking advantage of complementarities between their two economies. They also discussed ways to promote greater cultural and people-to-people exchanges and agreed to explore establishing new mechanisms in this direction.
6. Prime Minister Modi and President Xi underlined that as two major countries India and China have wider and overlapping regional and global interests. They agreed on their need to strengthen strategic communication through greater consultation on all matters of common interest. They believe that such strategic communication will

have a positive influence on enhancing mutual understanding and will contribute to regional and global stability.

7. The two leaders agreed that India and China have separately made major contributions to global peace and prosperity through their respective growth and economic development, and would continue to act as engines for global growth in the future. They reiterated the importance of building an open, multipolar, pluralist and participatory global economic order which will enable all countries to pursue their development and contribute to the elimination of poverty and inequality in all regions of the world. They spoke of their respective efforts to contribute to the regional and global economic development.
8. The two leaders also shared views on their respective foreign policy visions of achieving global prosperity and security. They agreed to jointly contribute in a positive and constructive way in facilitating sustainable solutions for global challenges including climate change, sustainable development, food security etc. They underscored the importance of reform of multilateral financial and political institutions to make them representative and responsive to the needs of developing countries.
9. The two leaders agreed that as two major countries and emerging economies, India and China, given their vast developmental experiences and national capacities, should join hands to take lead in offering innovative and sustainable solutions to challenges faced by humankind in the 21st century. These include combating diseases, coordinating action for disaster risk reduction and mitigation, addressing climate change and ushering digital empowerment. They agreed to pool together their expertise and resources in these areas and create a global network dedicated to these challenges for the larger benefit of humanity.
10. Prime Minister Modi and President Xi recognized the common threat posed by terrorism, and reiterated their strong condemnation of and resolute opposition to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. They committed themselves to cooperate on counter-terrorism.
11. The two leaders highly assessed the opportunity for direct, free and candid exchange of views offered by the Informal Summit and agreed on the utility of holding more such dialogues in the future. The forward-looking dialogue raised the level of strategic communication about the perspective, priorities and vision that guide their respective policy choices domestically, regionally and globally. It also helped them in forging a common understanding of the future direction of India-China relations built upon mutual respect for each other's developmental aspirations and prudent management of differences with mutual sensitivity.⁶⁷⁰

Second India-China Informal Summit

On October 12, 2019, President Xi Jinping met with Indian Prime Minister Modi in Chennai. The two leaders were frank and had in-depth conversations on Sino-Indian relations and major international and regional issues of common concern in a friendly and relaxed atmosphere.⁶⁷¹

⁶⁷⁰ https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29853/IndiaChina_Informal_Summit_at_Wuhan

⁶⁷¹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_677220/xgxw_677226/t1707413.shtml

Prime Minister Modi kindly invited President Xi Jinping to India. He carefully selected the historic and cultural city of Chennai as the meeting place. President Xi Jinping arrived as scheduled. From the banks of the Yangtze River to the edge of the Indian Ocean, from the Wuhan meeting to Chennai's argument, the leaders of the two countries talked about the world, guiding the development of Sino-Indian relations.

Strengthened in-depth strategic communication

President Xi Jinping talked about the experience of China and India fighting side by side for national independence and liberation. He talked about the joint initiative to promote the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and Indian dream". President Xi Jinping emphasized that the world today is undergoing a major change that has not been seen in a century. As representatives of the two most populous countries, the two largest developing countries, and emerging economies, China and India are in a critical period of national development and national rejuvenation, with huge cooperation potential and vast space. The relationship between the two countries goes beyond the bilateral scope and has important and far-reaching strategic significance. China and India should be good neighbours living in harmony and good partners working hand in hand. The realization of the "Dance of Dragon and Elephant Dance" between China and India is the only correct choice for the two sides, which is in the best interests of the two countries and peoples and the world's lasting peace and prosperity. Both parties should communicate in time on major issues, respect each other's core interests, gradually seek understanding, and resolve differences. China hopes that it will develop well and that India will develop well. Prime Minister Modi highly appreciated President Xi Jinping's foresight and vision, saying that in the 21st century, world peace and human progress cannot be separated from India-China cooperation. The two countries must not only face history, but also go beyond the past and open up the future. The two sides should take care of each other's major concerns, effectively control and handle differences, prevent differences from becoming disputes, develop closer partnership, and open up a new era of India-China relations.

Promoted mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields.

President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi put forward clear goals and clear ideas on deepening and expanding pragmatic cooperation. Decided to establish a high-level economic and trade dialogue mechanism, strengthen economic development strategic linkage, explore the establishment of manufacturing partnerships, and promote the balanced and sustainable growth of bilateral trade. Agree to expand "China-India +" cooperation, promote regional connectivity, and work with all parties to reach a "regional comprehensive economic partnership agreement" as soon as possible. In the face of the rise of unilateralism and protectionism, the two sides agreed to strengthen coordination within the framework of multilateral mechanisms such as the G20, BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China, Russia, and India. The international order based on international law maintains multilateralism and the multilateral trading system and jointly responds to global challenges.

Promote exchanges and mutual learning among civilizations. President Xi Jinping, accompanied by Prime Minister Modi, visited the ancient temple complex of Mahabalipuram, a monument of Indian civilization. Prime Minister Modi personally

explained. From Bodhidharma to Shaolin Zen, the two leaders traced the origins of mutual learning and mutual learning between Chinese and Indian civilizations, and drew a blueprint for humanities exchanges and dialogue between the two countries. President Xi Jinping pointed out that China and India are both ancient civilizations with thousands of years of history, and exchanges and mutual learning have continued to this day. China and India should carry out wider areas and deeper humanities exchanges, jointly advocate and promote dialogue and exchange among different civilizations, and continue to write about the new splendour of Asian civilization. Prime Minister Modi fully agreed with this, saying that the civilizations of the two countries are ancient and profound, and the wisdom contained therein can provide inspiration for solving the challenges facing the world today. President Xi Jinping's visit has tightened the bond between the two ancient civilizations. The two sides agreed to hold the 2020 "China-India Humanities Exchange Year" and hold 70 events to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Both leaders positively evaluated the outcome of this meeting and agreed to continue to maintain this useful and productive strategic communication. Prime Minister Modi accepted the invitation of President Xi Jinping and will meet again in China.⁶⁷²

India-China Meeting in Brazil

On November 13, 2019 President Xi Jinping met with Indian Prime Minister Modi in Brasilia. President Xi Jinping pointed out that not long ago, the countries successfully held a meeting in Chennai and had in-depth communication on the international and regional situation and major issues in the relationship between the two countries. Relevant departments of the two countries are stepping up to implement the consensus we reached, extending and expanding the positive effect of the Chennai meeting. India participated as the guest country of the second China International Import Expo. It is understood that the Indian side's turnover has increased significantly compared to the previous session, and it is the exhibiting country with the largest increase in turnover. China welcomes India to actively increase exports of high-quality goods to China. Both sides should expand the scale of two-way trade and investment, and create new growth points for cooperation in areas such as production capacity, medicine, information technology, and infrastructure construction. We should jointly hold the next year's "China-India Humanities Exchange Year" and the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and India to promote non-governmental friendship. China and India should work together to uphold multilateralism, safeguard the multilateral trading system with the World Trade Organization as the core, jointly safeguard the legitimate rights and interests and space for development of developing countries, and promote the cooperation of BRICS countries for a stable and long-term cooperation.

Xi Jinping emphasized to maintain close communication with India to jointly grasp the direction of the relationship between the two countries, increase political mutual trust,

⁶⁷²https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_677220/xgxw_677226/t1707563.shtml

properly manage differences, expand pragmatic cooperation, and lead China-India relations to develop better and more stable.⁶⁷³

PM Modi said that the two meetings in Wuhan and Chennai have deepened trust and friendship. Many important consensuses we have reached are being implemented. The Indian side congratulated the 2nd China Expo for its complete success and hoped to continuously expand bilateral trade and investment with China and expand cooperation in the energy and other fields, and work together to hold a series of activities next year to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the year of cultural exchanges. He looks forward to continuing to maintain close contact with you, properly managing differences, leading the relations between the two countries to achieve more results, and continue to move to new heights.⁶⁷⁴

Major Bilateral Issues between India and China

China against UNSC Reforms Process for Permanent Seat in UNSC

India is of the view that the United Nations (UN), specifically the UN Security Council (UNSC), must reflect contemporary global realities. For this purpose, the reform of the UN, including the expansion of the UN Security Council, is essential. India also holds the view that it has all the credentials to be a permanent member of an expanded Security Council. We strongly believe that 2015, being the 70th Anniversary Year of the United Nations, provides a historic opportunity to seek concrete progress on this subject.

A series of initiatives involving bilateral and multilateral platforms have been undertaken by the Government in pursuance of this objective. India is actively engaged in the ongoing Inter-Governmental Negotiations on UNSC reform at the UN. Further, we are working alongside other reform-oriented countries through the G-4 (India, Japan, Brazil and Germany) and the L.69 Group (cross regional grouping of developing countries).

A large number of countries have supported India's candidature for permanent membership of the UNSC. However, the question of India's membership of the Security Council would be considered only after an agreement on the nature and extent of expansion of the Council is arrived at in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter which requires approval by 2/3rd of the Members of the United Nations. Accordingly, we continue with our efforts to build as large a constituency as possible for effecting the reform of the UNSC.⁶⁷⁵

⁶⁷³ More information can be accessed at MEA's Press Release available at URL: https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31938/2nd_IndiaChina_Informal_Summit

⁶⁷⁴ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_677220/xgxw_677226/t1715670.shtml

⁶⁷⁵ <https://mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/25590/qno381+permanent+seat+in+unsc>

Permanent Seat in UNSC, Rajya Sabha, Unstarred Question No. 381, to be answered on 23.07.2015

Due to India's consistent outreach efforts with member states of the United Nations, in the 69th Session of the UN General Assembly under the Agenda item 'Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters' the UN General Assembly through its Decision of 14 September 2015 decided to immediately continue Inter-Governmental Negotiations(IGN) on Security Council reform in informal plenary of the UN General Assembly and further build on the positions of and proposals made by Member States that were reflected in the text and annex of the letter dated 31 July 2015 circulated by the President of the General Assembly. China in a letter addressed to the Chair of the IGN in April 2015 stated that the inter-governmental negotiations on Security Council reform must be driven by member states and the position of member states should form the basis of further negotiations, and that this principle and consensus are not reflected in the text circulated.

China against UNSC Reforms Process, Rajya Sabha, Unstarred Question No.1302, to be answered on 10.12.2015⁶⁷⁶

Government is of the view that India has all the credentials to be a permanent member in a reformed Security Council that reflects contemporary global realities, for which expansion in both permanent and non-permanent categories of membership is essential. There is a small minority of countries known as the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group [comprising Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey] that would like to see expansion of the UNSC in only the non-permanent category and are opposed to an expansion of permanent membership altogether. Pakistan has made known its opposition to India's bid for permanent membership.

A large number of countries have supported efforts to expand the Security Council in both permanent and non-permanent categories and have also endorsed India's candidature for permanent membership in an expanded and reformed Security Council. Four out of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council have bilaterally expressed official affirmations of support for India's candidature to a permanent seat in an expanded UN Security Council. In the Joint Statement issued on the occasion of the visit of the Prime Minister to China in May 2015 it is also stated that "China attaches great importance to India's status in international affairs as a large developing country, and understands and supports India's aspiration to play a greater role in the United Nations including in the Security Council."

India's Permanent Membership Of UNSC, Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No.1775 to be answered on 01.12.2016⁶⁷⁷

The Government of India has accorded highest priority to getting permanent membership for India in an expanded United Nations Security Council. India strongly

⁶⁷⁶ <https://mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/26163/Q+NO1302+CHINA+AGAINST+UNSC+REFORMS+PROCESS>

⁶⁷⁷ https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/27725/QUESTION_NO1775_INDIA'S_PERMANENT_MEMBERSHIP_OF_UNSC

believes that it has all the credentials to be a permanent member of a reformed and expanded UN Security Council that reflects contemporary global realities. The Government of India has taken a series of initiatives at the UN as well as at bilateral level with other countries in pursuance of this objective. A large number of countries have supported India's candidature for permanent membership in an expanded UN Security Council. This has been expressed in various fora including in bilateral inter-governmental meetings and discussions. However, the question of India's membership of the Security Council would be considered only after an agreement on the nature and extent of expansion of the Council is arrived at in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter, which requires approval by 2/3rd of the Members of the United Nations. India is actively engaged in the ongoing Inter-Governmental Negotiations on UNSC reforms at the UN. India is working alongside other reform-oriented countries through its membership in the G-4 Group (India, Japan, Brazil and Germany) and the L.69 Group (cross-regional group of developing countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America) to build support among the UN Member States for expansion of the UN Security Council.

Permanent Seat of UNSC, Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 661, to be Answered on 27.6.2019.⁶⁷⁸

China's hold on a decision by the UNSC Committee to block the proposal of Designation of Individual Masood Azhar and delaying the Process

UN Designation In February 2016, Government approached the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee established under Resolutions 1267/1989/2253 with the proposal to designate Masood Azhar under the 1267 sanction regime. It was emphasized that while the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) had been designated a terror outfit by the 1267 Committee as far back as 2001 for its well-known terror activities and links to the Al Qaeda, the Committee had not included Masood Azhar who is the JeM's main leader, financier and motivator, in its list of terrorists.

The Government of India appealed to all members of the international community to support its proposal to list terrorists, including JeM Chief Masood Azhar, as a designated terrorist under the 1267 Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council and to ban terrorist organisations operating from territories controlled by Pakistan. China, which is a member of the 1267 Sanctions Committee, first sought a hold on a decision by the Committee and finally blocked the proposal on December 29, 2016.

In January 2019, after the Pulwama Attack, a fresh proposal to designate Masood Azhar as a terrorist had been made to the committee by the United States, UK and France. China, once again placed a hold on the proposal. Since, the 1267 Committee operates on the Consensus principle, individual members of the Committee – i.e. China in this case – are not required to provide a public explanation for its views.⁶⁷⁹

In response to a question in the Rajya Sabha regarding the Chinese Technical hold on Masood Azhar's UN designation, the MoS for Home Affairs stated:

⁶⁷⁸ <https://mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/31494/question+no661+permanent+seat+of+unsc>

⁶⁷⁹ <https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/28169/QUESTION+NO1613+CHINESE+TECHNICAL+HOLD+ON+MASOOD+AZHAR>

“The Government of India is firmly and resolutely committed to take all necessary measures to safeguard national security. We are equally resolved to fight against the menace of terrorism. We demand that Pakistan stop supporting terrorists and terror groups operating from their territory and dismantle the infrastructure operated by terrorist outfits to launch attacks in other countries. We strongly reiterate our appeal to all members of the international community to support the proposal to list terrorists, including JeM Chief Masood Azhar, as a designated terrorist under the 1267 Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council and to ban terrorist organisations operating from territories controlled by Pakistan. Government has raised this issue with China, including at the highest levels, and has pointed out that China’s position on listing of well-known terrorists under the 1267 Sanctions regime should be in consonance with its stated position on terrorism.”

On March 15 2019, the Vice President of India, speaking at a public function in Vijayawada, said that terrorism posing major threat to world peace. He also urged that UN must soon conclude talks on Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, tabled by India in 1996. Expressing his disappointment over the recent decision of China to block the Counter Measures proposal of the United Nations Security Council to declare Jaish-e-Mohammed Chief, Masood Azhar as a global terrorist, Shri Naidu said this highlighted the need for expansion of UN Security Council.⁶⁸⁰

1267 Sanctions Committee not able to come to a decision on the proposal for listing Mohammed Masood Azhar Alvi under the UN Sanctions regime, March 13, 2019⁶⁸¹

1. The ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee (1267 Sanctions Committee), upon completion of the no-objection period on 13 March 2019, was not able to come to a decision on the proposal for listing Mohammed Masood Azhar Alvi under the UN Sanctions regime, on account of a member placing the proposal on hold.
2. We are disappointed by this outcome. This has prevented action by the international community to designate the leader of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a proscribed and active terrorist organization which has claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir on 14 February 2019.
3. We are grateful for the efforts of the Member States who moved the designation proposal and the unprecedented number of all other Security Council members as well as non-members who joined as co-sponsors.
4. We will continue to pursue all available avenues to ensure that terrorist leaders who are involved in heinous attacks on our citizens are brought to justice.⁶⁸²

⁶⁸⁰ <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=1568888>

⁶⁸¹ https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31151/1267_Sanctions_Committee_not_able_to_come_to_a_decision_on_the_proposal_for_listing_Mohammed_Masood_Azhar_Alvi_under_the_UN_Sanctions_regime

⁶⁸² https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31151/1267_Sanctions_Committee_not_able_to_come_to_a_decision_on_the_proposal_for_listing_Mohammed_Masood_Azhar_Alvi_under_the_UN_Sanctions_regime

As per United Nations Security Council Consolidated List, JeM Leader Masood Azhar has been designated as terrorist:

Mohammed Masood Azhar Alvi

In accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1822 (2008) and subsequent related resolutions, the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List.

QDi.422

Mohammed Masood Azhar Alvi

Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website: 1 May 2019.

Reason for listing: Mohammed Masood Azhar Alvi was listed on 1 May 2019 pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 2368 (2017) as being associated with Al-Qaida for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of”, “supplying, selling or transferring arms and related material to”, “recruiting for”, “otherwise supporting acts or activities of”, and “other acts or activities indicating association with”: Jaish-i-Mohammed (QDe.019).

Additional information: Mohammed Masood Azhar Alvi founded Jaish-i-Mohammed (QDe.019) (JEM) upon his release from prison in India in 1999. Azhar was released from prison in exchange for 155 hostages held on an Indian Airlines flight that had been hijacked to Kandahar, Afghanistan. Azhar has also financially supported JEM since its founding.

The UN Security Council listed JEM on October 17, 2001, as being associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of”, “supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to” or “otherwise supporting acts or activities of” Al-Qaida (QDe.004), Usama bin Laden and the Taliban. Azhar is also a former leader of the terrorist group Harakat ul-Mujahidin / HUM (QDe.008), aka Harakat ul-Ansar; most of these groups' members subsequently joined JEM under Azhar's leadership. In 2008, JEM recruitment posters contained a call from Azhar for volunteers to join the fight in Afghanistan against Western forces.

Related listed individuals and entities:

Jaish-i-Mohammed (QDe.019), listed on 17 Oct. 2001

Harakat ul-Mujahidin / HUM (QDe.008), listed on 6 Oct. 2001⁶⁸³

China's attitude towards 1971 Liberation of Bangladesh and India China relations

⁶⁸³ <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/mohammed-masood-azhar-alvi>

The MEA Annual Reports of 1971-72 and 1972-73 have mentioned following details about China's attitude towards 1971 developments resulting in liberation of Bangladesh and India China relations. For quite some time there were hopes of a favourable response from China towards normalisation of relations with India. However, China's attitude in the recent Indo-Pak conflict has given a temporary setback. We still hope that China, which is a close neighbour of ours, will normalise her relations with us on the basis of mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs. ⁶⁸⁴

We abstained from anti-Chinese propaganda, in spite of vituperative attacks made by China during the Bangladesh developments and Pakistan's invasion of India in December. The police posse outside the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi was withdrawn on 13 September 1971. We raised the level of representation at the Chinese Embassy National Day Reception on 1 October in New Delhi and the Foreign Secretary attended the function. China on her part showed some response and on our Republic Day in 1971, Premier Chou Enlai sent his "festive congratulations" to our Prime Minister and to "the great Indian People". On 13 November 1971, Premier Chou Enlai also sent a message thanking the Prime Minister for her greetings on China's entry into the U. N., and the message ended with, "May the friendship between the Indian and Chinese people grow and develop daily". ⁶⁸⁵

Consistent with our declared desire to normalise relations with China, we took a number of steps in that direction. In July 1971 the Prime Minister sent a personal letter to Premier Chou Enlai about the Bangladesh problem and India China relations. We welcomed the restoration of China's rights in the U. N., and both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister sent messages of congratulations to their Chinese counterparts. Speaking at the Press Conference in New Delhi and in Paris on 19 October and 9 November respectively, the Prime Minister mentioned the possibilities of exchange of Ambassadors without discussing substantive issues like the border question. On 25 November, the Foreign Minister declared in Parliament that the likelihood of India unilaterally sending an Ambassador to China was "not excluded". Our Ambassadors in various capitals in the world also conveyed our desire for normalisation of relations to their Chinese counterparts. On 26 November, an invitation was conveyed to the Chinese Government to take part in the Third Asian International Trade Fair to be held in New Delhi.

Since the latter part of November 1971, China's attacks on India on behalf of Pakistan became more vitriolic. With the outbreak of the Indo-Pak hostilities, China regularly and consistently sought to condemn India as having committed "aggression" on Pakistan with the help of Soviet "Social imperialism". China held that the Indo-Soviet Treaty was actually a military alliance, aid and that the Bangladesh Government was a "puppet Government", "single-handedly engineered" by India and forcibly imposed on the people of "East Pakistan". On 16 December 1971, China officially accused India on these lines and held that "the pipe dream of a great Indian empire" cherished by the "Indian expansionists" was "not only to swallow up 'East Pakistan' but also to destroy Pakistan as a whole". Moreover, she held out the threat that "India too has its own nationalities problem" and that "henceforth there will be no tranquillity for India over the South-Asian sub-continent". ⁶⁸⁶

⁶⁸⁴ Excerpts of MEA Annual Report of 1971-72, Pg 04, <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2498?000>

⁶⁸⁵ Excerpts of MEA Annual Report of 1971-72, Pg 27, <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2498?000>

⁶⁸⁶ Excerpts of MEA Annual Report of 1971-72, Pg 28, <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2498?000>

However, following developments in Bangladesh, China took a consistently hostile stand against India and supported the Pakistan Government vis-a-vis Bangladesh. She ignored the systematic genocide committed by the Pakistani Army in Bangladesh and the resultant massive exodus of refugees which posed a serious danger to India's peace and stability. Both inside and outside the U.N., China violently criticised India. Beginning from 11 April 1971, China constantly accused India of "gross" or "crude" interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan and of threatening Pakistan and sending armed infiltrators". It condemned the Bangladesh Leaders as a "secessionist" group.

The initial Chinese reaction to the Indo-Soviet Treaty was one of cautious silence and for months there was no official reaction. On 5 October 1971, Premier Chou Enlai was reported to have told a group of Americans in Peking that he had noted the Indo-Soviet statement that "their agreement was not directed against China". Till the latter half of November, there was a significant reduction in anti-India propaganda in the Chinese Press and there was hardly any adverse comment on India's internal situation. During October-November 1971, an Indian Table Tennis Team visited China on invitation to participate in the Afro-Asian Table Tennis Tournament held in Peking and was treated well. This was the first official Indian delegation to visit China in more than 10 years.⁶⁸⁷

In the U.N., China worked for West Pakistan and actively supported the U.S. moves in the Security Council and the General Assembly against India. In the debate held on 19 November 1971 in the Third Committee of the United Nations on the influx of refugees in India, the Chinese representative took absolutely no notice of the genocide in Bangladesh which caused this exodus and dismissed the whole cruel episode as "purely Pakistan's internal affair". He held that the "so-called refugee question" was created by India in order to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan and repeated the Pakistani allegation that India was obstructing the return of the Bangladesh refugees to their homeland.

Despite this setback to the slight progress that had been made earlier, it is to be noted that China did not actively interfere in the Bangladesh struggle or the Indo-Pak conflict. It is also significant that the Sino-U.S. joint communique dated 28 February 1972 makes no mention of Bangladesh. However, China has gone out of her way to express 'support to the right of the people of Jammu & Kashmir to self-determination' in the joint communiqué. This amounts to interference in India's internal affairs and cannot be tolerated. We do not still wish to provoke China unnecessarily and are willing to normalise relations with her on a basis of equality, mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs. We hope that sooner, rather than later, China will show a positive and constructive response. Normalisation of relations between India and China, we believe, would strengthen peace and security, promote progress and lessen tensions in Asia. "Henceforth there will be no tranquillity for India over the South-Asian sub-continent".⁶⁸⁸

It is a matter of regret that India's efforts to normalise her relations with China have not yet been successful. The positive trends noticed in China's attitude towards this country before the developments in Bangladesh have unfortunately been overshadowed by the unrealistic attitude adopted by China towards Indo-Pakistan relations and towards

⁶⁸⁷ Excerpts of MEA Annual Report of 1971-72, Pg 29, <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2498?000>

⁶⁸⁸ Excerpts of MEA Annual Report of 1971-72, Pg 30, <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2498?000>

Bangladesh. India is still willing and ready to hold bilateral discussions with China on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence subscribed to by both.⁶⁸⁹

China-Japan Relations

Since 2015 China-Japan relations have maintained the momentum of improvement which started at the end of 2014. Upon invitation, President Xi Jinping met Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on the margins of the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting and the Asian-African Summit. He attended and gave an important speech at the China-Japan Friendship Exchange Meeting. Premier Li Keqiang met Prime Minister Abe during the China-Japan-ROK Trilateral Summit Meeting in 2015 and during the Asia-Europe Meeting in 2016. During the G20 Hangzhou Summit in September 2016 President Xi Jinping had another meeting with Prime Minister Abe. The two sides resumed contacts at government, parliament and party levels in an orderly way. Three rounds of high-level political dialogue were held and exchanges and cooperation in various areas were steadily pushed forward. However, complex and sensitive factors still remain in bilateral relations. In response to Japan's negative moves concerning historical and maritime territory issues, China urges Japan to abide by the four political documents and the four-point principled agreement on bilateral relations, properly manage and control disputes and conflicts, and avoid creating obstacles to the improvement of bilateral relations.⁶⁹⁰

Since the end of 2014 defence exchanges between the two countries have gradually resumed and developed. In November 2015 the Chinese and Japanese defence ministers met during the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting. The defence chiefs of the two countries have met several times on other multilateral occasions. In 2016 the defence ministries of the two countries conducted working-level exchanges. Since 2015, defence ministries of the two countries have held two expert panel consultations on the establishment of air and maritime contact mechanisms, with consensus reached on most matters. China has continued developing friendly and cooperative relations with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, with enhanced political mutual trust, strengthened economic and trade relations, closer people-to-people and cultural exchanges, and enlarged defence cooperation, so as to jointly promote peace, stability, development and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.⁶⁹¹

China's Policy towards Arab Countries⁶⁹²

The Arab countries are important partners for China to firmly follow the path of peaceful development, strengthen unity and cooperation with developing countries, and promote

⁶⁸⁹ Excerpts of MEA Annual Report of 1972-73, Pg 04, <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2499?000>

⁶⁹⁰ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled 'China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation' published in 2017, available online at URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1429771.shtml

⁶⁹¹ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled 'China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation' published in 2017, available online at URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1429771.shtml

⁶⁹² Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "China's Policy Documents on Arab Countries" published in January 2016, available online at URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/zewj_674915/t1331327.shtml

the establishment of a new type of international relations centered on win-win cooperation. China insists on developing relations with Arab countries on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Support the Middle East peace process, support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and enjoy full sovereignty, and support the efforts made by the Arab League and its member states. Adhere to the political settlement of regional hotspot issues and support the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free and other weapons of mass destruction zone in the Middle East. Support Arab countries' active efforts in strengthening unity, resisting the spread of extreme ideas, and combating terrorism.

International Affairs Cooperation

Jointly maintain the international order and international system centered on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, actively build a new type of international relations with win-win cooperation as the core, and jointly promote world peace and development. Support the United Nations in playing a leading role in maintaining world peace, promoting common development, and promoting international cooperation, supporting the necessary and reasonable reform of the United Nations, and increasing the representation and voice of developing countries, including Arab countries, in the Security Council.

Taiwan-related issues

The Taiwan issue concerns China's core interests. The one-China principle is an important foundation for China to establish and develop relations with Arab countries and regional organizations. China appreciates that Arab countries and regional organizations have abided by the one-China principle for a long time. They do not develop official relations or conduct official exchanges with Taiwan, and support the peaceful development of cross-strait relations and the great cause of China's reunification.

The field of investment and trade

1. "Belt and Road". Adhere to the principles of mutual consultation, co-construction and sharing, promote the construction of the "Belt and Road" between China and Arab countries, build energy cooperation as the main axis, with infrastructure construction and trade and investment facilitation as the two wings, with nuclear energy, aerospace satellites and new energy The field is a breakthrough "1 + 2 + 3" cooperation pattern, which promotes the upgrading of pragmatic cooperation.

2. Capacity Cooperation. Adhere to the principles of enterprise main body, market dominance, government promotion, and business operation, connect with China's production capacity advantages and the needs of Arab countries, develop advanced, applicable, effective, employment-friendly, and environmentally friendly production capacity cooperation with Arab countries to support the industrialization process of Arab countries.

3. Investment cooperation. On the basis of equality and mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, encourage and support the enterprises of both sides to expand and optimize mutual investment, expand the scope of cooperation, enrich the cooperation methods, and use various methods such as loans, mezzanine financing, direct investment and funds through equity and debt rights , Broaden investment and financing channels, and strengthen two-way investment and financing cooperation. China is willing to continue to provide Arab countries with preferential foreign aid loans and export credit funds, as well as export credit and overseas investment insurance support. Promote China-Arab businessmen to sign agreements to avoid double taxation and prevent tax evasion and tax evasion, create a good investment environment, provide convenient conditions for investors of both sides and protect the legitimate rights and interests of investors of both sides.

4. Trade. Support more Arab countries' non-petroleum products to enter the Chinese market, continuously optimize the trade structure, and strive to promote the sustained and stable development of bilateral trade. Strengthen exchanges and consultations between China-Arab economic and trade departments, complete the China-Gulf Arab States Cooperation Committee Free Trade Area negotiations and sign the free trade agreement as soon as possible. Oppose trade protectionism, actively eliminate non-tariff trade barriers, properly resolve trade disputes and frictions through friendly consultations, and gradually establish bilateral and multilateral trade dispute early warning and trade relief cooperation mechanisms.

5. Energy cooperation. Carry out cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit, promote and support China-Arab investment cooperation in the oil and gas fields, especially in oil exploration, extraction, transportation and refining, and promote the integration of oilfield engineering services, equipment trade and industry standards. Strengthen cooperation in the fields of solar energy, wind energy, hydropower and other renewable energy. Jointly build a Sino-Arab Clean Energy Training Center to comprehensively promote cooperation between the two parties in related fields.

6. Aerospace cooperation. Further develop China-Arab space cooperation, actively explore joint projects in the fields of space technology, satellites and their applications, space education, training and other fields, accelerate the implementation of the Beidou satellite navigation system in Arab countries, and actively promote China-Arab manned space exchanges and cooperation, Improve the level of cooperation in space between the two sides.

7. Anti-terrorism cooperation. Support Arab countries 'counter-terrorism efforts and support Arab countries in strengthening their counter-terrorism capabilities. China believes that counter-terrorism requires comprehensive measures, a combination of symptoms and root causes, and relevant counter-terrorism actions should abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international law, and respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all countries. China is willing to strengthen anti-terrorism exchanges and cooperation with Arab countries, establish a long-term security cooperation mechanism, strengthen policy dialogue and exchange of intelligence information, carry out technical cooperation

and personnel training, and jointly respond to international and regional terrorist threats.⁶⁹³

5.6.3.1. Regional Organizations

1. The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC)⁶⁹⁴

Political relationship

On May 27, 1981, just two days after the establishment of GCC, Huang Ha, Foreign Minister of China sent a telegram of congratulations to GCC Secretary-General Abdullah Bishara and China established ties with the organization. From 1990 on, the Foreign Minister of China met together every year the Foreign Ministers or their representatives of the six GCC countries and the GCC Secretary-General during the UN General Assembly in New York, exchanging views on Sino-GCC relationship and international and regional affairs of mutual interest. On September 27, 1996, Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen met the Foreign Ministers (or Deputy Foreign Ministers) of the six GCC countries and the GCC Secretary-General in New York. Both sides decided to establish a bilateral periodical consultative mechanism in political and economic fields and to hold consultations each year rotatorily in Beijing and Riyadh, where the headquarters of GCC is located. A news bulletin was published in this regard. Chinese Vice Foreign Ministers Tian Zengpei and Ji Peiding held two rounds of consultative meetings with GCC Secretary-General Hojeiran respectively in January 1997 and June 1999 during their visits to Saudi Arabia. In 2002, Chinese State Councilor Wu Yi met with Secretary-General Al-Attyah on the sidelines of her visit to Saudi-Arabia. China supports GCC's policy of unified self-improvement and common development and appreciates and encourages the active role played by GCC in pushing the Middle East peace process, restoring Arab unity, maintaining the peace and security of the Gulf region and promoting regional economic cooperation. In April 2002, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan sent a telegram of congratulations to Al-Attyah on his election as GCC Secretary-General. On September 16, 2002, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met with the foreign secretaries or their representatives of the six GCC countries and GCC Secretary-General Al-Attyah en masse, mainly exchanging views with them on Sino-GCC relations, the Iraq question and the Middle East question on the side lines of his attendance at the 57th United Nations General Assembly.⁶⁹⁵

Economic and trade relationship

Trade- Gulf region is the largest commodity market in the Middle East. China's trade with the six GCC countries has witnessed a fast growth. The total volume of trade between China and the six GCC countries in 2001 was US\$9,700,000,000 (of which the Chinese import was US\$5,700,000,000, and export US\$4,000,000,000), and that in the first six

⁶⁹³ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "China's Policy Documents on Arab Countries" published in January 2016, available online at URL:

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/zcwj_674915/t1331327.shtml

⁶⁹⁴ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15536.shtml

⁶⁹⁵ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15536.shtml

months of 2002 was US\$4,800,000,000 (of which the Chinese import was US\$2,500,000,000, and export US\$2,300,000,000). China mainly exports textile, clothing, mechanical and electrical products, light industrial products, food and edible oil while imports petroleum and petrochemical products.⁶⁹⁶ Labour Services Contract- Chinese labour services companies entered Gulf market in 1979. By the end of 2001, China had signed with the six GCC countries a total of 3, 131 contracts for undertaking labour services to the value of US\$3,100,000,000, fulfilling a business turnover of US\$1,910,000,000, with 15,042 Chinese contracted workers employed therein.

2.The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

China had contact with the Organization of the Islamic Conference long ago and has been on friendly terms with it ever since. During the 2nd Islamic Summit Conference held in February 1974, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai sent a message of congratulation to the conference. When the 3rd Islamic Summit Conference was held in January 1981, Premier Zhao Ziyang sent a congratulatory telegram to the conference. In May 1986, the Islamic Development Bank decided to present 4.06 million US dollars to China. During the 5th and 6th Summit Conference held respectively in January 1987 and December 1991, Premier Li Peng sent telegrams of congratulations to both conferences. In February, 1993, Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference Hamid Al Gabid sent a letter to Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, expounding on the stand of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on the Bosnia and Herzegovina issue. In March 1993, President of Senegal and Executive Chairman of the OIC Abdou Diouf sent a letter to Chinese President Yang Shangkun, expounding on the stand of the OIC regarding Israel's banishment of Palestinians and seeking China's support. In August 1993, a delegation at the ministerial level of the OIC led by Pakistan's Foreign Minister Abdu'l Sattar visited China, setting forth the Islamic countries' position on the Bosnia and Herzegovina issue. In December 1993, President of Senegal and Executive Chairman of the OIC Abdou Diouf sent a telegram to Chinese President Jiang Zemin regarding the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He condemned the Bosnia Serbs and appealed to China to exert the influence of a big nation and use the personal prestige of President Jiang to urge the Serbia leaders to strictly abide by the international law and the UN resolutions. In November 1994, Deputy Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference Muhammad headed a delegation to visit China at the invitation of the Chinese Islamic Association. They exchanged views with the Chinese side regarding such questions as promoting mutual understanding and developing bilateral relations, and also forwarded Secretary-General Gabid's letter to Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. In April 1995, Deputy Secretary-General of the OIC Muhammad met with Head of the Chinese Mecca Pilgrimage Group and Vice Chairman of Chinese Islamic Association Ma Xian. In July, a delegation of the OIC made up of General Director of the Multi-lateral Cooperation Department in the Foreign Ministry of Morocco Ben Hima, Pakistan's ambassador to Turkey Haq, and the OIC's representative to Morocco Muta visited China and expounded on the Islamic countries' position on the Bosnia and Herzegovina issue. China's Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo received the delegation. In February 1997, Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference Laraki sent a telegram to President Jiang Zemin, extending his condolences on the death of Deng

⁶⁹⁶[Ibid.](#)

Xiaoping. In December 1997, Premier Li Peng sent a telegram to the Organization of the Islamic Conference congratulating the convening of the 8th Summit Conference of the OIC. In January 1998, Iranian President Khatami sent a letter to Premier Li Peng in the name of Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, expressing thanks for the Chinese government's telegram of congratulations. On Nov. 10, 2000, Premier Zhu Rongji sent a message of congratulations on the occasion of the convocation of the 9th Summit Meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. On May 23, 2001, OIC Secretary-General Balekaziz sent a letter to Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, calling on China to play her role as a UN Security Council permanent member in pushing the Security Council to provide international protection for the Palestinian people. On May 31, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan sent a letter of reply to OIC Secretary-General Balekaziz, reiterating China's consistent position on the Palestine-Israel issue and expressing China's readiness to strengthen cooperation with the OIC to contribute to the realization of peace and stability in the Middle East region. On October 9 of the same year, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan had a telephone conversation with Hamad, OIC President and Qatari Foreign Secretary, expounding China's stand on the anti-terror question and expressing China's readiness to strengthen consultation and cooperation with the numerous Islamic countries.⁶⁹⁷

3.Organization of Arab Petroleum Export Countries (OAPEC)

China has not established relations with OAPEC⁶⁹⁸

4. League of Arab States-LAS

Since it came into being in 1945, the Arab League has always attached great importance to the friendly exchanges with China and has sent delegations to China many times. In May, 1993, at the invitation of Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, the Secretary-General of Arab League Maguid paid an official visit to China. In August the same year, the Arab League set up its representative office in Beijing. In October 1995, Deputy Secretary General of Arab League Kamal visited China and met with Deputy Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei, Assistant Foreign Minister Wang Changyi, President of Chinese People's Friendship with Foreign countries Association Qi Huaiyuan, Deputy Minister of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party Li Chengren and the Vice Chairman of China International Trade Promotion Council Li Dayou. In May 1996, Chinese President Jiang Zemin met Dr. Maguid, Secretary General of Arab League during an official visit to Egypt. In February 1997, Dr. Maguid went to the Chinese Embassy in Egypt to pay his condolences to the passing of Deng Xiaoping. On July 1st, at the invitation of the Chinese government Dr. Maguid attended the handover ceremony of Hong Kong to China.⁶⁹⁹

In December 1997, Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen met Dr. Maguid at the headquarters of the Arab League during his visit to Egypt. They held consultations on the Middle East problem and Sino-Arab Relations. Vice Premier Qian Qichen put forward a 4 point

⁶⁹⁷https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15538.shtml

⁶⁹⁸https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15532.shtml

⁶⁹⁹https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15529.shtml

proposal concerning the development of long term and stable Sino-Arab cooperative relations facing 21st century, which were mutual respect, equal treatment, mutually beneficial cooperation, common development and mutual support in international affairs. Dr. Maguid expressed his endorsement to the proposal. In the first half of 1998, Secretary-General of Arab League Dr. Maguid wrote many times to Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen and Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan to exchange views on the issues of Middle East peace process and Iraq. In September, an independent resolution was first adopted by the 110th session of Arab League foreign ministerial council on the League's relations with China. The resolution appealed to every member state for the full development of relations with China in all fields and proposed the establishment of a mechanism of political consultation between the Secretariat of Arab League and the Chinese Foreign Ministry. In January 1999, during his visit to Egypt, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met Dr. Maguid at the headquarters of Arab League in Cairo and signed with him the memorandum of understanding concerning the establishment of a mechanism of bilateral political consultation. Tang Jiaxuan also raised a 3 point proposal on developing Sino-Arab relations: strengthening political coordination, expanding economic cooperation and acting in close coordination and mutual support in international affairs. In May, Li Ruihuan, Chairman of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference visited Egypt and met Secretary General Dr. Maguid at the Arab League headquarters. On May 12, Secretary-General of the Arab League Dr. Maguid addressed a letter to Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, expressing sympathies on the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by NATO. On October 20, Secretary-General of the Arab League Dr. Maguid addressed a letter to Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, informing him on the resolution adopted by the September regular session of the Arab League foreign ministerial council on the Palestine issue and Arab-Israeli conflicts.⁷⁰⁰

On December 28, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan in reply to the letter by Secretary-General Maguid, reiterated the position and viewpoint of the Chinese government on the Middle East issue and stating China's concern about that issue and the importance attached to Sino-Arab exchanges and consultation. On Nov. 29, 2000, Secretary General Maguid, in a letter to Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, expressed appreciation for China's effort with regard to Arab-Israeli conflicts, particularly the attention paid by President Jiang Zemin and the effort he has made for seeking a peaceful and just settlement of the problem.⁷⁰¹

5. Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit

- **Casablanca Summit.** A Steering Committee and an Executive Secretariat. Mr. Tian Zengpei, Deputy Chinese Foreign Minister headed the Chinese delegation for the first Summit and delivered a speech reaffirming China's support for the Middle East peace process and for the countries in this Region in their efforts for regional economic cooperation. He also expressed that China would actively

⁷⁰⁰ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15529.shtml

⁷⁰¹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15529.shtml

develop its economic cooperation with regional countries and strive for the prosperity and stability in this region.⁷⁰²

- **Amman Summit.** Mr. Tian Zengpei, Deputy Chinese Foreign Minister led the Chinese delegation for the second Summit and delivered a speech reaffirming China's support for the Middle East peace process and for the countries in this Region in their efforts for regional economic cooperation. He also expressed that China would actively develop its economic cooperation with regional countries and strive for the prosperity and stability in this region.⁷⁰³
- **Cairo Conference .** It was decided in the conference that a group of five which was headed by U.S. and made up of representatives from Japan, Egypt, Russia and Netherlands would be organized and began to work on the concrete preparations at the end of 1996. Mr. Liu Shanzai, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation led the Chinese delegation for the conference and spoke on the conference reiterating China's support for the Middle East peace process and for the regional countries in their efforts to accomplish regional economic cooperation.⁷⁰⁴
- **Doha Conference.** Mr. Li Ben, Deputy Director of the Department of West Asia and Africa of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation headed the Chinese delegation for the conference.

6.The Association of Southeast Asian Nations

All the ASEAN member countries are China's friendly close neighbours. The recent years have witnessed the rapid development in the relationship of friendly cooperation between China and ASEAN, which has kept a good momentum. Since 1990s , the Sino-ASEAN relations have developed on a sound track with increasingly closer political ties.⁷⁰⁵

On country to country level, the exchange of high-level contacts between China and ASEAN has been frequent. In 1994 President Jiang Zemin paid visits to Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and Singapore. After attending the APEC informal summit in 1996, President Jiang Zemin visited the Philippines, also in the same year Premier Li Peng and Qiao Shi, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China, visited Vietnam. In 1997, Premier Li Peng paid official trips to Malaysia and Singapore. Li Ruihuan, Chairman of the National Standing Committee of Chinese People's Political Consultation Conference visited Vietnam. In April and September 1999, Li Peng, Chairman of the National People's Congress and President Jiang Zemin visited Thailand respectively. And in November this year, Premier Zhu Rongji visited Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam. The leaders of ASEAN countries who visited China in 1999 include Laotian Prime Minister Sisavath, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, Le Kha Phieu, General Secretary of Vietnamese Communist Party, Thai Prime Minister Chuan

⁷⁰²https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15530.shtm

⁷⁰³ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁴https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15530.shtm

⁷⁰⁵https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15535.shtm

leekpai, Malay Prime Minister Mahatir, Sultan of Brunei Darusslam Hassanal Bolkiah and Indonesian President Wahid.⁷⁰⁶

In the field of Sino-ASEAN relationship, Qian Qichen, Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister had been invited as a guest to attend the Post Ministerial Meeting(PMC) every year since 1991. He had exchanged views on a regular basis with his ASEAN counterparts on issues of mutual concern. The year 1995 saw the establishment of Senior Official Political Consultation mechanism, on which both China and ASEAN engage in talks regarding political and security issues every year, the venue of the meeting alternates between China and the ASEAN country-Coordinator. In July 1996, the status of China as a consultative dialogue partner of ASEAN was elevated to that of a full dialogue partner, the ASEAN Committee of Beijing(ACB) was established by the ASEAN Heads of Missions in Beijing, all this demonstrated the relationship between both sides had been developed to a new height.⁷⁰⁷

In December 1997, President Jiang Zemin and ASEAN leaders held their first ever summit and issued a joint statement, in which they announced their decision to establish a 21st century-oriented partnership of good neighbourliness and mutual trust between China and ASEAN. The joint statement charts the future course and sets a framework for the all-round and in-depth development of relations between the two sides. Vice President Hu Jingtao attended the 2nd informal summit- ASEAN+China, Japan & Republic of Korea and ASEAN+China in 1998, Premier Zhu Rongji accepted the invitation and attended the 3rd informal summit-10+3 and 10+1 held in Manila in November 1999. Until 1999, China has already signed or issued action plans of the 21st century-oriented cooperation with Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam and hopes to further develop the future relationship of mutual benefit and cooperation with all the ASEAN member countries.

In February 1997, the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee (ACJCC) was formed and an all-round dialogue structure was agreed to be established, which consists of five parallel mechanisms as follows: ASEAN-China Senior Officials Political Consultations, China-ASEAN Joint Committee on Economic and Trade Cooperation, China-ASEAN Joint Committee on Science and Technology, China-ASEAN Joint Cooperation Committee and ASEAN Committee in Beijing(ACB).⁷⁰⁸

By 1999 five rounds of China-ASEAN Senior Officials Political Consultations have been convened, in which both China and ASEAN briefed to each other the latest development on major issues such as political, diplomatic situation in their respective countries and relationship between big powers and strengthened their cooperation and coordination. As a result, China has enhanced mutual understanding and trust with ASEAN in the political and security fields. By the end of 1999 the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee has met twice, which has facilitated communication between both sides and played the role of promotion and coordination at the working level in the cooperation

⁷⁰⁶https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15535.shtml

⁷⁰⁷https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15535.shtml

⁷⁰⁸https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15535.shtml

relationship within the various China-ASEAN dialogue mechanisms. The projects initiated by ACJCC, such as the personnel exchange and the economic and trade seminar, have been successfully concluded so far. Both sides have agreed to further explore the possibility of cooperation initiatives and proposals. These include: The ASEAN side proposes to promote the technology transfer and business trade of herbal medicine, cooperate in mineral resources exploration and organize workshops on transgenic plants. The Chinese side also presented proposals on special topic studies on China-ASEAN cooperation, the skill training and an investigation on the resources and ecology environment in the Mekong River area by use of remote sensing and geo-scientific technology.⁷⁰⁹

The economic and trade, science and technology cooperation plays an essential part in the China-ASEAN relationship. In 1994 the two China-ASEAN Joint Committees on economic and trade, science and technology were established, which started the bilateral relationship of mutual benefits and cooperation in these fields. The trade volume between China and ASEAN have been in constant increase. The total trade volume has been risen to 23.5 billion US\$ from 13.0 billion US\$ in 1994, in which China's export amounted to 10.92 billion US\$ and import 12.56 billion US\$. The amount of two-way investment has also been on the rise with the passing years. ASEAN has become an important market of China in the fields of labour cooperation and project contract.⁷¹⁰

ASEAN is an extremely active regional organization which has exerted unique influences in the affairs of this region. In recent years, China and ASEAN have supported each other and established good relationship in jointly defending the interests of developing countries at APEC, the informal summit (of East Asia), the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF), the Asian-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the United Nations as well as other international and regional organizations and conferences, which has played an active role in promoting mutual understanding and trust, safeguarding regional peace and development among countries in this region.⁷¹¹

5.6.3.2. Regional Issues

1.China's Five-Point Proposal on the Current Middle East Question

1. The Chinese side welcomes and supports the "road map" peace plan for the Middle East officially announced by the "Quartet", believing that the "road map" is positive in content and provides a sound basis for resumed talks between Israel and Palestine. It is hoped that the two sides will seize this opportunity and take feasible measures to cooperate with the international community in its efforts for peace and an early solution of the question of Palestine.
2. It is time that both Israel and Palestine officially announce their acceptance of the "road map" plan and implement it as soon as possible. The top priority is for both sides to stop violence for violence and revenge for revenge promptly so as to pave

⁷⁰⁹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15535.shtml

⁷¹⁰ Ibid

⁷¹¹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15535.shtml

the way for the resumption of the talks and conclusion of an agreement. We call upon Israel to withdraw its troops to the position held before 28 September 2000, end military strikes, political isolation, economic blockade against Palestine and the policy of "targeted assassination", freeze the construction of Jewish settlements, ease humanitarian crisis in Palestine and restore the freedom of movement of Chairman Yasser Arafat. In the meantime, Israel's security should be fully guaranteed. The Palestinian National Authority has the duty to take effective measures to stop extremist and violent activities. The Chinese side stands for an early establishment of an independent state of Palestine and encourages democratic elections as well as reforms in the political, financial, economic, judicial and administrative and other areas in Palestine. The Palestinian people's right to choose a political system independently and the legitimate leaders selected by the Palestinian people through democratic elections should be respected. As for the problems that might crop up in the process of implementing the "road map", the two sides should seek negotiated settlement on the principles of openness, consultation on the basis of equality, mutual understanding and accommodation, and tackling the easier problems first.

3. In order to ensure the fulfilment of the "road map" plan, a fair, authoritative and effective international supervisory mechanism should be set up as early as possible.
4. On the basis of the relevant UN resolutions, the principle of "land for peace" laid down at the Madrid Peace Conference and the agreements and consensus reached by all parties, it is essential to resume the negotiations between Israel and Syria and between Israel and Lebanon at an early date in a bid to arrive at a final solution acceptable to all parties and to eventually bring about a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East.
5. It is the shared responsibility and duty of the international community to bring about peace and stability in the Middle East. The international community should give more attention and input to the Middle East question. The United Nations should play a bigger role. China proposes that an international conference on the Middle East question be convened as soon as possible with the participation of the five permanent members of the Security Council and all the parties concerned. China is ready to get actively involved in the international efforts to promote the Middle East peace process.⁷¹²

2.The Iraq Issue

After the breakout of the Gulf crisis, the Chinese government issued a statement opposing Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, demanding Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal of troops from Kuwait and maintaining that the disputes between the two countries be resolved through peaceful political means, rather than resorting to force. Based on this stand, china cast affirmative votes on the UN Security Council's resolutions on demanding Iraq's unconditional withdrawal of troops from Kuwait, restoring the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and legal government of Kuwait, and imposing sanctions on Iraq, etc. As to the UN Security Council Resolution 678 which

⁷¹²https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2639_665461/t22826.shtml

warrants the adoption of "any necessary means", the Chinese government abstained from voting in View of China's constant stand of striving for peaceful solution.⁷¹³

On the Iraq issue China has consistently maintained that UN Security Council's resolutions regarding the Iraq issue should be implemented comprehensively and practically. China also maintains that as a sovereign state, Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity should be respected by the international community. Iraq's compliance with UN Security Council's relevant resolutions should be given fair and objective assessment and sanctions against Iraq should be gradually eased until finally removed. China opposes the use of force against Iraq and holds that the Iraq issue be settled through peaceful means. In regard to the question of "no-fly zone", China believes that the practices of the US and the UK to set up "security zone" and "no-fly zone" in Iraqi territory violate the UN Charter and norms of international relations and are in defiance of and trampling on Iraq's sovereignty. China expresses its condemnation towards such practices.⁷¹⁴

3. Iran nuclear issue

The comprehensive agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue is a multilateral agreement approved by the UN Security Council and should be comprehensively and effectively implemented. This is conducive to peace and stability in the Middle East and the international nuclear non-proliferation system. It is also of great significance to multilateralism and the authority of the United Nations and is in the common interest of the international community. China will continue to maintain an objective, fair and responsible attitude and is committed to maintaining and implementing comprehensive agreements.⁷¹⁵

4. Problem of Cyprus

China has always insisted that the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned position be respected, that UN resolutions on Cyprus problem should be implemented in earnest. Chinese government is deeply concerned over Cyprus problem and supports all efforts by UN Secretary-general for solving the problem. We hope that the two communities, sparing no effort in cooperation with the Secretary-general, try to narrow the differences gradually through negotiation and set up mutual confidence on the basis of UN resolutions related, in seeking solutions acceptable to the two communities at an early date. This not only accords with fundamental interests of the two communities, but also is beneficial to the peace, stability and development of the region. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China is willing, together with international society, to make our own contribution to find a just and reasonable solution of the Cyprus problem⁷¹⁶

⁷¹³https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2639_665461/t15584.shtml

⁷¹⁴https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2639_665461/t15584.shtml

⁷¹⁵https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/zcwj_674915/t410699.shtml

⁷¹⁶https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/zcwj_674915/t410699.shtml

5.6.4. Oceania

The Pacific Islands Forum

In February 1988, the Chinese Ambassador to Fiji was invited by the SPOCC to attend the Talk on Establishing Dialogue Partnership held in Suva, Fiji. Since 1990, China has sent its government representative to attend the Post-Forum Dialogue meetings during the Forum meetings from the 21st to 29th, and as a result China's friendly relations and cooperation with the South Pacific Forum and its member countries have been strengthened. In July 1996, Vice Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Qian Qichen met the Secretary General of the South Pacific Forum Mr. Iremia Tabai during his official visit to Fiji. In October 2000, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Yang Jiechi signed, on behalf of the Chinese Government, the agreements on the establishment of a Forum Trade Office in China and on the establishment of China Forum Cooperation Fund with Secretary General Mr. Noel Levi. In April 1991, the Secretary General of the Forum Mr. Henry Natali visited China. In September 1992, the Secretary General of the Forum Mr. Iremia Tabai visited China. In March 1994, the Deputy Secretary General Mr. William Sutherland visited China. In July 1997, the Deputy Secretary General Mr. Tony Slatyre visited China. In May 1999, the Secretary General Mr. Noel Levi visited China.⁷¹⁷

5.6.5. Europe

China's ties with Western Europe were minimal for the first two decades of the People's Republic. China's relations with Western Europe grew rapidly in the 1970s, as more nations recognized China and diplomatic relations were established with the European Economic Community in 1975. In the second half of the 1970s, China's emphasis on an international united front against Soviet hegemony led to increased Chinese support for West European unity and for the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Ties with Western Europe also were featured prominently in Beijing's independent foreign policy of the 1980s. Furthermore, China's opening up to foreign trade, investment, and technology beginning in the late 1970s greatly improved Sino-European ties. One of the few major problems in China's relations with Western Europe in the post-Mao era was the downgrading of diplomatic ties with the Netherlands from 1981 to 1984 over the latter's sale of submarines to Taiwan.⁷¹⁸

Since the establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership between China and the European Union in 2003, the breadth and depth of bilateral relations have continued to expand, forming a good pattern of all-round, multi-level and wide-ranging exchanges and cooperation. In 2014, President Xi Jinping paid a historic visit to the EU headquarters and reached an important consensus with the EU leaders on building the four partnerships of China-EU peace, growth, reform and civilization, indicating the development direction for further deepening the mutually beneficial and comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Europe. The cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries is based on the common interests of China and regional countries and the actual need for mutually beneficial, win-win, open and transparent cross-regional

⁷¹⁷ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15540.shtml

⁷¹⁸ Robert L. Worden, Andrea Matles Savada and Ronald E. Dolan, editors. *China: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987. <http://countrystudies.us/china/126.htm>

cooperation. EU and other parties are welcome to support and constructively participate. China hopes that Britain will proceed in an orderly manner from the EU, and is willing to promote the parallel development of China-EU and China-UK relations.⁷¹⁹

China will continue to strengthen high-level exchanges with the EU and EU countries, give full play to the strategic leadership role of the China-EU leaders' meeting mechanism in the development of China-EU relations, further implement the "China-EU Cooperation 2020 Strategic Plan" jointly formulated by the two parties in 2013 and discuss follow-up Planning, strengthen exchanges and dialogues between governments at all levels. Strengthen equal exchanges and mutual learning and mutual learning among legislative bodies, political parties, localities, social groups, and other sectors, deepen and expand practical cooperation in various fields, carry out third-party market cooperation, and learn from each other's strengths in exchanges and cooperation, benign interaction and common development.

The "One Belt, One Road" initiative is an important public product provided by China to the international community. It adheres to mutual consultation, joint construction and sharing, advocates openness, inclusiveness and transparency, follows international rules and market principles, and pursues high quality and high standards based on local conditions. China welcomes the active participation of the European Union and European countries in cooperation to jointly build the "Belt and Road" into a road of peace, prosperity, openness, innovation, civilization, greenness and integrity.

Adhering to the commitment to respect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, taking concrete actions to abide by the One China principle, and respecting China's core interests and major concerns are related to the long-term and stable development of China-EU relations. The EU should clearly oppose any form of "Taiwan independence", support China's great cause of peaceful reunification, and handle Taiwan-related issues with caution. The exchanges between Europe and Taiwan should be strictly limited to unofficial and non-governmental areas, without any form of official contacts and exchanges, without signing any agreements with sovereign meaning or official nature, without establishing any institutions with official nature, and not supporting Taiwan's accession. International organizations restricted to the participation of sovereign states do not sell weapons and equipment, materials and technologies that can be used for military purposes in Taiwan, and do not engage in any form of military exchanges and cooperation.⁷²⁰

The Central Government of China supports and encourages the governments of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macao Special Administrative Region to carry out mutually beneficial and friendly cooperation with the European Union and member countries in the areas of economy, trade, culture, and tourism in accordance with the "One Country, Two Systems" policy and the provisions of the Two Basic Laws. Hong

⁷¹⁹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/zcwj_674915/t1622886.shtml

⁷²⁰ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "China's EU policy documents" published in December 2018, available online at URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/zcwj_674915/t1622886.shtml

Kong and Macao are special administrative regions of China. Hong Kong and Macao affairs are China's internal affairs, and the European Union should not interfere.

China appreciates the EU and member states' recognition that Tibet is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and does not support the "Tibet independence" position. The EU should not allow the leader of the Dalai Group to enter the EU and its member states in any capacity and under any name to engage in activities to split China, do not arrange for official contacts to engage with them in any form, and do not provide any support and convenience for the anti-China separatist activities of "Tibet Independence." . The EU should also not provide any support and convenience for the "East Turkistan" forces and any anti-China separatist, violent, terrorist, and extreme religious activities.

Cooperation in trade, investment, interconnection, finance and finance

1. Give full play to the guiding role of the China-EU high-level economic and trade dialogue, deepen the China-EU macroeconomic policy and economic and trade policy dialogue, enhance mutual understanding and correct understanding of each other's policies and regulations, promote docking and integration, tap the potential of cooperation, deal constructively with differences and frictions, and not politically address economic and trade issues Promote the long-term, stable, mutually beneficial and win-win development of China-EU economic and trade relations.

2. In a proactive and pragmatic spirit, we will move towards each other, work together to reach a mutually beneficial and win-win China-EU investment agreement, start the joint feasibility study of the China-EU Free Trade Area as soon as possible, and establish a good institutional framework for enhancing the level of China-EU economic and trade cooperation.

3. Promote the coordinated development of trade in goods and services. China will expand imports of high-quality goods from Europe through existing channels and new platforms such as China International Import Expo. The EU should relax the export control of high-tech products in China. The EU should strictly fulfill its WTO obligations, ensure that the relevant trade remedy legislation and practice are consistent with WTO rules, use trade remedy measures reasonably, and avoid discriminating against certain WTO members in law or in fact.

4. Maintain two-way opening and promote two-way investment. China will greatly relax market access, fully implement the pre-entry national treatment plus negative list management system, create a stable, fair, transparent, rule of law, and predictable business environment, protect the legitimate rights and interests of foreign investment, and treat all people within China without discrimination Registered Chinese and foreign enterprises. It is hoped that the EU will keep the investment market open, reduce and eliminate investment barriers and discriminatory barriers, provide a fair, transparent and predictable policy environment for Chinese companies to invest in Europe and protect their legitimate rights and interests.

5. Strengthen exchanges and cooperation in the field of competition between China and Europe, and jointly maintain the market order of fair competition. China pays attention to EU laws and regulations on trade and investment, and hopes that EU legislation will

comply with WTO rules, effectively maintain an open and fair market environment, and reduce and eliminate Chinese enterprises' doubts and worries. The Chinese government supports the establishment of the "EU-China Chamber of Commerce" by Chinese-funded enterprises in Europe.

6. Promote the construction of the China-Europe Interconnection Platform, strengthen the joint construction of the "Belt and Road" initiative and the European Union's Eurasian Interconnection Strategy, European Investment Plan, "Pan-European Transportation Network" and other development plans, and actively play the role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Europe The role of investment banks, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the China-Europe Mutual Investment Fund, etc., has implemented project cooperation and encouraged EU member states to actively participate. Support the healthy development of China-Europe trains, promote the simplification of international rail transport procedures, reduce transit costs, and strengthen the security of cargo.

Cooperation in scientific research, innovation, emerging industries, sustainable development.

1. Under the framework of the "Sino-European Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement", give full play to the role of the China-EU Science and Technology Cooperation Steering Committee, the Innovation Cooperation Dialogue and the joint funding mechanism for scientific research and innovation, agree on a road map for China-EU scientific and technological innovation cooperation, and cooperate fully on cutting-edge disciplines, basic research, and major social challenges To implement flagship projects in the fields of agriculture and biotechnology, environment, sustainable urbanization, ground transportation, safe green aviation, and healthy biotechnology, and expand cooperation in the fields of information and communication, intelligent manufacturing, population health, and new materials.

2. Give full play to the role of Sino-European space science and technology cooperation dialogue, promote cooperation in the fields of earth observation, space technology, space science, space application, deep space exploration, manned spaceflight, and explore the establishment of a China-EU space policy cooperation dialogue mechanism to carry out all-round docking.

4. Give full play to the role of the China-EU Industrial Dialogue and Consultation Mechanism platform, strengthen policy communication in the fields of automobiles, ships, raw materials, small and medium-sized enterprises, industrial energy efficiency, etc., promote the industrial development strategy docking, and support the development of intelligent manufacturing, green manufacturing, new energy and intelligence The cooperation in the fields of connected vehicles, new materials, high-tech ships, etc., promotes the construction of the docking and exchange platform for Sino-European SMEs, and stimulates the cooperation potential of SMEs.

4. Mutual support, exchanges and cooperation in the construction of "Digital China" and the construction of the EU's single digital market. Make good use of mechanisms such as the China-Europe Information Technology, Telecommunications and Informatization Dialogue, the China-EU Digital Economy and Cyber Security Expert Working Group, and

deepen 5G cooperation to promote technological exchanges in the digital economy, Internet of Things, Internet of Vehicles, Industrial Internet, artificial intelligence, and smart cities Cooperate with standardization, carry out pilot demonstration projects, and promote pragmatic cooperation in industry. Work together to address the risks and challenges posed by new technologies.

5. It is noted that the EU's "General Data Protection Regulations" imposes higher requirements on privacy protection, data security, trade and investment, etc. for companies with digital businesses in Europe, and hopes that the implementation of the regulations will not affect the normal business transactions between China and Europe. China is willing to continue to communicate with the EU on data protection, learn from each other, promote cooperation, jointly enhance the level of personal information protection, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of citizens.

6. Build the "China-Europe Blue Partnership", strengthen dialogue and cooperation in the fields of ocean governance, blue economy, protection and sustainable use of marine resources, innovation in marine science and technology, polar affairs, and fisheries, implement practical cooperation projects, and strengthen international agreements concerning the sea Negotiation, communication and coordination.⁷²¹

5.6.5.1. Regional Organizations

1. European Union

Bilateral Political Relations

On May 6, 1975, China and the European Economic Community reached agreement on the establishment of formal relations. On November 1, 1983, China and the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community established formal relations. Up to that time, China and the European Communities realized the establishment of full diplomatic relations. In May 1988, the EC Council established a Delegation in China. In recent years, the relations between China and the EU and its member countries have developed smoothly and both sides have maintained frequent mutual visits and contacts. President Jiang Zemin, Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee Li Peng, Premier Zhu Rongji, Chairman of the National Committee of the CPPCC Li Ruihuan and others have paid visits to most EU member countries respectively. And leaders of many EU member countries and the European Commission have also visited China early or late. Vice Premier Li Lanqing and Vice Premier Wu Bangguo visited the EU headquarters respectively in February 1998 and January 2000. Premier Zhu Rongji visited the EU headquarters in July 2000 and held talks with Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, and met Javier Solana, High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy of the EU and concurrently Secretary General of the EU Council.⁷²²

⁷²¹Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "China's EU policy documents" published in December 2018, available online at URL:

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/zcwj_674915/t1622886.shtml

⁷²²https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15542.shtml

On April 2, 1998, Premier Zhu Rongji and Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the then on-duty-in-turn presiding country for the EU, and Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission, held the First Meeting Between Chinese and EU Leaders in London. The two sides issued a joint statement, expressing the hope to establish a long-term and stable China-EU constructive partnership oriented towards the 21st century and deciding to establish a mechanism of annual meeting between the leaders of the two sides. On December 21, 1999, the Second Meeting between Chinese and EU Leaders was held in Beijing. Premier Zhu Rongji and Lipponen, Prime Minister of Finland, the then on-duty-in-turn presiding country for the EU, and the President of the European Commission Prodi held a discussion on deepening the relations between China and the EU. The Third Meeting between Chinese and EU Leaders was held in Beijing. Premier Zhu Rongji and Jacques Chirac, President of France, the then on-duty-in-turn presiding country for the EU, and Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, held talks and had an in-depth exchanges of views on China-EU relations, economic and trade cooperation, China's entry into the WTO, cooperation in cracking down on illegal immigration, human rights, the Taiwan question and other international and regional questions, and extensive consensus was reached on further strengthening of the China-EU relations. State Councillor Wu Yi and Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Shi Guangsheng exchanged views respectively on China's entry of the WTO with Pascal Lamy, the EU Trade Representative, who was a member of the visiting EU party.⁷²³

Since China and the EU established the mechanism of political dialogue and consultation in 1994, the political consultations at various levels have progressed smoothly. The Chinese Foreign Minister and the EU "troika" Foreign Minister have held regular meetings in the UN General Assembly. So far, China and the EU have held 8 political consultations, 10 dialogues on human rights, 5 forums on judicature and 2 forums on women's rights. On May 8-9, 2000, the Fourth Forum on Judicature between China and the EU was held in Lisbon. On May 26, the 7th China-EU Political Consultation between Experts at Director Level was held in Lisbon. On September 29, the 10th China-EU Dialogue on Human Rights was held in Beijing. On November 30, Errera, Vice General Secretary and Director of Political and Security Affairs of the Foreign Ministry of France, the then presiding country for the EU, led an EU "troika" delegation to come to China to attend the 8th Political Consultation.⁷²⁴

On September 24, 2002, Premier Zhu Rongji and Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, Prime Minister of Denmark and the Danish Presidency of the EU, and Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, held the fifth Sino-European Leaders Meeting in Copenhagen and exchanged views in depth on the Sino-European relations and the current major international and regional questions and reached extensive consensus on further strengthening Sino-European cooperation in various fields. After the meeting, the two sides issued a joint press communiqué.⁷²⁵

⁷²³ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15542.shtml

⁷²⁴ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15542.shtml

⁷²⁵ Ibid.

In recent years, the EU has actively adjusted its policy towards China. In December 1995, the EU adopted a document on "the Long-term Policy on China-EU Relations". In November 1996, the European Commission put forward "a New Strategy of the EU on China". On June 29, 1998, the EU Council of Foreign Ministers deliberated and adopted a new document concerning the EU policy on China for "the Establishment of a Comprehensive Partnership with China", deciding to elevate its relations with China to the level of equal importance to those with the US, Japan and Russia, strengthen the China-EU political dialogue and the cooperation and exchanges in the economic and trade and other fields and support China to enter the WTO. In September 2000, the European Commission submitted a report to the EU Council and the European Parliament, making a review and assessment of the implementation of the policy document on "the Establishment of a Comprehensive Partnership with China". The report stood for expanding the scope of the bilateral political dialogue; proposed that the EU give priority to strengthening the cooperation in the areas of sustainable development such as social and economic reforms, human resources development, environmental protection, legal system and human rights and aid to the poor, and helping and supervising China to perform its obligations after its entry into the WTO; and reiterated its adherence to the one China principle while emphasizing a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. In recent years, the Sino-European political dialogue has deepened continuously. In March 2002, the 13th Dialogue on Human Rights between China and Europe was held in Madrid, Spain. In July, the 3rd Consultation between China and Europe on cooperation in cracking down on illegal immigration was held in Brussels. In August, while attending the 9th Foreign Ministers' Meeting of the Forum of the SEATO Region in Brunei, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met with Javier Solana, High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, and exchanged views on the Sino-European relations and regional hot-spot questions. In September, while attending the UN General Assembly, Foreign Minister Tang held a meeting with the EU "Troika" Foreign Minister. In the same month, The Sino-European Consultation on Arms Control was held in Vienna. In order to correspond with the development of the situation, China and the European Union renewed the agreement on political dialogue in June this year.⁷²⁶

In March 2002, at the invitation of the Delegation for Relations with China of the European Parliament, Mr. Raidi, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Regional People's Congress, led a delegation of the Tibet People's Congress to visit the European Parliament. In April, a delegation of the Green Party Group of the European Parliament visited China. In May, a delegation of the People's Party Group of the European Parliament visited China. In July, Mrs. Elly Plooij-Van Gorsel, President of the European Parliament for Relations with China, led a delegation to come to Beijing to hold the 19th Working Conference between the Chinese and European Parliaments with the Sino-European Parliamentary Friendship Team of the Chinese National People's Congress. Li Peng, Chairman of the National People's Congress, and Qian Qichen, Vice-Premier, met with the delegation respectively. The delegation also visited Tibet. On July 31 and August 5, 2002, the European Commission issued the report on the EU-Macao relations and the report on the Hong Kong question in 2001 respectively.

⁷²⁶https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15542.shtml

Bilateral economic and trade relations and economic and technical cooperation

Along with the deepening of the China's reform and opening-up and continuous development of its economy, China-EU economic and trade relations have developed fairly rapidly. In 1985, China and the EU signed "the Agreement between China and the European Communities on Trade and Economic Cooperation" and held meetings of mixed economic and trade committee at ministerial level at irregular intervals. On October 24, 2000, the 17th Meeting of China-EU Mixed Economic and Trade Committee was held in Beijing.⁷²⁷

The EU is China's third largest trade partner, next only to Japan and the United States. According to statistics of the China General Administration for Customs, the total volume of bilateral trade between China and the European Union in 2001 was US\$76.62 billion, an increase of 11% year on year. China's export value was US\$40.90 billion, a growth of 7.1% year on year, while its import value was US\$35.72 billion, increasing by 15.8% year on year. From January to July 2002, the China-EU trade volume was US\$46.23 billion, up by 6.8% year on year. China's export value was US\$25.16 billion, up by 8.4% year on year while its import value was US\$21.07 billion, up by 4.9% year on year. Up to July 2002, the number of investment projects in China contracted by the EU member countries added up to 13,283, with contracted foreign capital amounting to US\$58.7 billion, and the investment actually made was US\$32.57 billion. Of this, from January to July 2002, the projects with EU direct investment numbered 785 in total, and the contracted capital reached US\$3.12 billion, a drop of 32.6% year on year, and the capital actually invested was US\$2.34 billion, a drop of 2.3%. According to statistics of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, up to the end of July 2002, China had introduced 14,291 technologies from the EU member countries with the contracted sum of approximately US\$70.08 billion. Of this, from January to July 2002, the number of contracts by which China introduced technologies from the EU member countries totaled 796, with contracted sum of US\$2.906 billion. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Finance, up to the end of 2001, the EU member countries and official financial institutions have provided China with government loans of approximately US\$17.84 billion in cumulative total. Of this, the government loans they provided to China in 2001 totalled US\$530 million.⁷²⁸

On January 31, 2002, Shi Guangsheng, Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, and Pascal Lamy, Trade Commissioner of the European Commission, jointly presided over the 18th Meeting of the Sino-European Mixed Economic and Trade Committee in Brussels. Through several rounds of hard negotiations, the bilateral negotiations between China and the EU on China's entry into the WTO reached a bilateral agreement on May 19, 2000. In meeting the EU delegation, President Jiang Zemin said that the agreement reached by China and the EU on China's entry into the WTO showed the two sides can absolutely reached consensus through negotiations on major strategic issues and that after its entry into the WTO, China would certainly be a responsible member, playing a constructive role. In recent years, the EU has partially adjusted its anti-

⁷²⁷https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15542.shtml

⁷²⁸https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15542.shtml

dumping policy. On April 27, 1998, the EU Foreign Ministers Meeting in Luxembourg decided to delete China from the list of countries of "non-market economy" for applying its anti-dumping rules. On April 19, 1999, the European Commission decided to give Malong Huajian Co., Ltd. in Yunnan Province the market economy status in the anti-dumping case on yellow phosphorus. This was the first time that a Chinese enterprise obtained the market economy status in the anti-dumping cases of Europe and the United States towards China. On February 2, 2000, the European Commission declared to nullify the prohibition of China's export of aquatic products to Europe. Since 1983, the EU has provided China with development assistance totalling over US\$400 million, covering such fields as economy and trade, science and technology, energy, environmental protection, industry, finance, education, health, and development of areas inhabited by minority ethnic groups. In March 2002, the European Commission issued a country strategy document on cooperation with China in 2002-2006, putting forward a plan of providing assistance to China in the next 5 years totalling 250 million euros.⁷²⁹

In recent years, the cooperation between China and the EU in the fields of economy and trade, science and technology, energy and education has further developed. Main agreements signed by the two sides are: the Summary of Talks between China and the European Union on Industrial Cooperation, the Memorandum of Understanding between China and the European Union on Industrial Cooperation in the field of Aviation, the Agreement between China and the European Union on Cooperation in Auto Industry, the Project between China and the European Union on Environmental Protection in Liaoning Province, the Project between China and the European Union on Cooperation in Environmental Management, the Project for Agricultural Cooperation and Development in Bailang, Tibet, the Project between China and the European Union on Vocational Training, the Memorandum of Understanding between China and the European Union on the Industrial Cooperation in the Field of Aviation and Communication, the Agreement between China and the European Union on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, the Elementary Education in Gansu Province, the Project between China and the European Union on Cooperation in Higher Education and the Project of the European Union for Training Young Managers. At the third conference on the cooperation in field of energy between China and the European Union on March 4-5, 1999, the two sides signed a joint statement on strengthening cooperation between China and the European Union in the field of energy. On March 6-7, 2000, the first conference of the Guiding Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation between China and the European Union was held in Brussels. At the conference, the two sides exchanged views on such questions as strengthening the scientific and technological cooperation between China and the European Union and promoting the Chinese side to participate in the Fifth Framework Plan for Research and Technological Development. On July 25-26, the international forum between China and the European Union on intellectual property rights was held in Beijing. And on November 23-24, the first round of informal consultation on the cooperation between China and the European Union in the field of nuclear energy was held in Beijing. In April 2002, Erkki Liikanen, Commissioner of the European Commission for Enterprise and Information Society, visited China. Vice-Premier Li Lanqing met with

⁷²⁹ For more information on bilateral and multilateral issues between China and other countries, access the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at URL:

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/

him and his party. In the same month, the Sino-European Forum on Cooperation in Information Society for 2002 was held in Beijing.⁷³⁰

5.6.5.2.Regional Issues

Chinese Foreign Ministry Strongly Protests Against Vatican "Canonization"

On October 1, 2000, Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement to express its utmost indignation and strong protest against a ceremony held by the Vatican, "canonizing" a number of foreign missionaries and their followers who have committed notorious crimes in China.⁷³¹ Following is the full text of the statement:

In disregard of the strong opposition of the Chinese side, the Vatican held on October 1, a ceremony for the "canonization" of a number of foreign missionaries and their followers, who committed notorious crimes in China. The Government, people and the Catholic Church of China hereby express their utmost indignation and strong protest against this act. As is known to all, some foreign Catholic missionaries were the very perpetrators and accomplices in colonialist and imperialist invasion of China in the contemporary history. Some of those "canonized" by the Vatican this time perpetrated outrages such as raping and looting in China and committed unforgivable crimes against the Chinese people. With regard to these crimes, the Vatican has never repented. Instead, it has now gone so far as to "canonize" these evil-doing sinners. This is a flagrant provocation against the Chinese people, an act aimed at reversing the verdict on the history of colonialist and imperialist invasion of China, and a gross insult to the Chinese people' patriotic resistance against foreign aggression and oppression. In doing so, the Vatican has seriously hurt the national pride and dignity of the Chinese people. The Vatican, while expressing its intention to improve its relations with China, has time and again gone against its own commitment to non-interference in China's internal affairs and that on the question of Taiwan. Now it has stubbornly insisted on the "canonization", which has severely damaged the very basis of the normalization of China-Vatican relations. It will exert a grave negative impact on the normalization process. The Vatican should be held responsible for all this.⁷³²

⁷³⁰https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_665455/t15542.shtm

⁷³¹https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2637_665459/t15573.shtm

⁷³²https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2637_665459/t15573.shtm

5.7 Multilateral Organizations Membership

5.7.1. Membership in international organizations

International Organization for Migration	International Committee of the Red Cross	United Nations	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
World Economic Forum	Asia-Europe Meeting	World Energy Council	BIS
International Olympic Committee	World Energy Council	Group of Twenty	Earth Observation Organization
Non-Aligned Movement	Asia-Europe Meeting	World Organization for Animal Health	BRICS
Zangger Committee	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)	International Criminal Police Organization	World Meteorological Organization
ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea Leaders Meeting	South Center	Indian Ocean Rim	Group of 77
China-Japan-Korea Cooperation	Nuclear Suppliers Group	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	Australian Group
Lancang-Mekong cooperation	East Asia Summit (EAS)	Preparatory Committee for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization	Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Arab maghreb union	ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)	Asian Cooperation Dialogue	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries	Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation (GMS)	Mekong River Commission	Sahel-Sahara National Community
Arab Parliamentary Union	Gulf Arab States Cooperation Committee	China-Arab Cooperation Forum	League of Arab States

Indian Ocean Commission	Islamic Cooperation Organization	China-Africa Cooperation Forum	Southern African Customs Union
West African Economic and Monetary Union	Central African Economic and Monetary Community	Central African Economic Community	Economic Community of West African States
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	Southern African Development Community	African Union	East African Community
Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation	Intergovernmental Development Organization	Shanghai Cooperation Organization	Asian Conference on Mutual Collaboration and Confidence Measures
Pacific Community	China-Central and Eastern European countries cooperation	Pacific Island Forum	EU
South American League of Nations	Organization of American States	Earth Observation Organization	Rio Group
Inter-American Development Bank	Southern Common Market	Andean Community	American Bolivar Union
Latin American parliament	Association of Caribbean States	Latin American economic system	Latin American integration association
Central American Integration System	Ibero-American Summit	East Asia-Latin America Cooperation Forum	China-Latin America Community Forum
International Agricultural Development Fund	Latin American and Caribbean Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States	Pacific Union
Caribbean Community	Latin American development bank	World Food Program	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Source: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/

1. China's relations with the Group of 77

China is not a member of the Group of 77, but has always supported its just claims and reasonable demands and maintained good cooperative relations with it. On September 27, 2019, the 43rd Foreign Ministers 'Meeting of the" Group of 77 "was held at the United

Nations Headquarters in New York. At the meeting, the Chinese representative reiterated that China will continue to work with members of the Group of 77 to firmly maintain multilateralism, improve global economic governance, promote greater investment in development, and deepen South-South cooperation.⁷³³

2. Nuclear Suppliers Group

The “Nuclear Suppliers Group” was established in 1975. Its purpose is to ensure that major nuclear supplier countries coordinate and strengthen nuclear export control to prevent the proliferation of sensitive items in the nuclear field. China opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons and is committed to international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Since the 1990s, China has promulgated the “Regulations on Nuclear Export Control” and “Regulations on the Export Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Supplies and Related Technologies”, which implement strict export control measures on nuclear and its dual-use supplies and related technologies through legal means. After joining the “Nuclear Suppliers Group”, in accordance with the “Nuclear Suppliers Group” export guidelines, China made corresponding amendments to the above two regulations, taking importing countries to accept comprehensive safeguards as a condition of nuclear exports, and introduced the principle of comprehensive control. China attaches importance to the active role of the “Nuclear Suppliers Group” in the field of preventing nuclear proliferation and is willing to strengthen cooperation with member states of the “Nuclear Suppliers Group”.⁷³⁴

3. China’s relationship with the Indian Ocean Rim

China became a dialogue partner of the Ring India Alliance in January 2000. In April 2001, Assistant Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui led a delegation to attend the 3rd Ministerial Council Meeting of the Ring India Union in Oman. Since then, Ambassador Sun Guoxiang to Sri Lanka, former APEC Senior Official Wang Jisheng, former Ambassador to Kenya An Yongyu, Ambassador to Iran Liu Zhentang, Ambassador to Iran Xie Xiaoyan, Ambassador to Yemen Luo Xiaoguang, Ambassador to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Zhang Zhan, Counsellor Du Xiacong and Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Africa Lu Sha Ye and others attended the 4th to 13th Ring India Union Council of Ministers meetings respectively. In October 2014 and October 2015, Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Ming led a delegation to attend the 14th and 15th Ministerial Council meetings of the Ring India Alliance in Perth, Australia and Padang, Indonesia. In October 2016, the Director of the African Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Lin Songtian led a delegation to attend the 16th Ministerial Council Meeting of the Ring India Union in Bali, Indonesia. In March 2017, Assistant Foreign Minister Qian Hongshan led a delegation to attend the first summit meeting of the Ring India Alliance in Jakarta, Indonesia. In October 2017, Xu Jinghu, Special Representative for African Affairs of the Chinese Government, led a delegation to attend the 17th Ministerial Council Meeting of the Ring India Alliance in Durban, South Africa. In November 2018, Ambassador Lin Songtian in South Africa represented China at the 18th Ministerial Council Meeting of the Ring India Union in Durban, South Africa. In November 2019, Ambassador Wei Hongtian of the Ministry of

⁷³³ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/lhg_682326/zghgzz_682330/

⁷³⁴ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/hgyjt_682470/jbqk_682472/

Foreign Affairs and Borders represented China at the 19th Ministerial Council Meeting of the Ring India Alliance in Abu Dhabi, UAE. During the 14th Council of Ministers of the Ring Alliance in 2014, the Tianjin Institute of Seawater Desalination and Comprehensive Utilization of the China State Oceanic Administration and the Regional Science and Technology Transfer Center of the Ring India Alliance signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation including the establishment of a desalination technology coordination center. In May 2015, the Seawater Desalination Technology Coordination Center of the Ring India Alliance Regional Science and Technology Transfer Center was unveiled in Tianjin. The first international seminar on seawater desalination under the framework of the Ring India Alliance was also held. In July 2016, the 2nd Ring India Alliance Blue Economy Core Group Seminar was held in Qingdao. Assistant Foreign Minister Qian Hongshan attended the opening ceremony of the seminar and delivered a speech.⁷³⁵

4. China's relationship with the Non-Aligned Movement

As an observer country of the Non-Aligned Movement, China attaches importance to developing and strengthening its relationship with the Non-Aligned Movement. In September 1992, State Councillor and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was invited to lead a delegation to attend the 10th summit in Jakarta. At the meeting, China officially became an observer country of the Non-Aligned Movement. China sent a delegation to attend the summits and coordinated local long-term meetings since then, and maintained regular consultations and cooperation with members of the Non-Aligned Movement in the United Nations. In September 2006, Deputy Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi led a delegation to attend the 14th summit meeting held in Havana, Cuba. In July 2009, Deputy Foreign Minister He Yafei led a delegation to attend the 15th summit meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. In May 2011, Deputy Foreign Minister Zhai Jun led a delegation to attend the 16th Ministerial Conference and the 50th Anniversary Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Bali, Indonesia. In August 2012, Assistant Minister Ma Zhaoxu led a delegation to attend the 16th summit meeting in Tehran, Iran. In September 2016, Ambassador Yin Hengmin, Special Representative for Latin American Affairs of the Chinese Government, led a delegation to attend the 17th summit meeting on Margarita Island, Venezuela.⁷³⁶

5. China's participation in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

In November 2005, the 13th SAARC Summit agreed in principle that China became an observer. In August 2006, the 27th SAARC Council of Ministers reviewed and adopted the SAARC Observer Guiding Principles, officially accepted China as an observer, and invited China to attend the 14th SAARC Summit as an observer. In 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2014, the then Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, Vice Minister Wu Dawei, Wang Guangya, Zhang Zhijun and Liu Zhenmin led delegations to attend the 14th to 18th SAARC Summits respectively. In June 2012, China appointed an ambassador to Nepal and served as China's permanent representative to SAARC. The current permanent representative of China to SAARC is the ambassador to Nepal Hou Yanqi. China has carried out a number of cooperation with SAARC countries in the fields of human resources training, poverty alleviation, economic and trade, and cultural exchanges, and has established platforms

⁷³⁵ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/lhg_682302/zghgzz_682306/

⁷³⁶ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/bjmyd_682350/zghgzz_682354/

such as China-South Asia Expo, South Asia and Southeast Asia Commodities Exhibition and Investment and Trade Fair, and China-South Asia Cooperation Forum. Activities such as a seminar for South Asian countries' party cadres, a seminar for South Asian diplomats to understand modern China, and a seminar for South Asian vocational education officials were held. In June 2013, the first China-South Asia Expo, which was renamed from the South Asian National Commodity Exhibition, was held in Kunming. In June 2018, the 5th China-South Asia Expo and the 1st China-South Asia Cooperation Forum were held in Yunnan. Vice Premier Hu Chunhua attended the opening ceremony and delivered a keynote speech. In 2018, the total trade volume between China and the 8 SAARC countries was US \$ 140.14 billion, a year-on-year increase of 10.5%.⁷³⁷

6. China's relationship with the Mekong River Commission

China attaches great importance to its relations with the Mekong Committee. Over the years, it has promoted various forms of pragmatic cooperation with the Mekong Committee and its member countries, and has achieved rich results. The mutual trust between the two parties has been continuously strengthened. Since 1996, China and the Mekong Commission have held 22 consecutive dialogues. To help countries in the basin to prevent and mitigate disasters, China has provided the Mekong Committee with hydrological data for the Lancang River during the flood season for 15 consecutive years since 2003. China has also carried out extensive experience exchanges, technical training, and field visits with the Mekong Committee and member countries. In 2010, 2014, and 2018, China, as a dialogue partner, was led by Deputy Foreign Minister Song Tao (then), Water Resources Minister Chen Lei (then), and Water Resources Minister E Jingping to participate in the first to third Session of the Mekong Summit. In the first half of 2016, the lower Mekong River Basin suffered a severe drought. Under the same disaster situation, China took emergency water supply to the downstream, which effectively eased the downstream drought and was widely praised by the Mekong Committee and downstream countries. Fan Zunpan, the CEO of the Mae Hong Committee Secretariat, then wrote to China, thanking him very much. Successive CEOs of the Mecca Secretariat visited China many times.⁷³⁸

7. China-United Nations Relations

China is one of the founding members of the United Nations and the first country to sign the Charter of the United Nations. On October 25, 1971, the 26th United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 2758 on the restoration of all legal rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, recognizing that the representative of the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal representative of China in the United Nations organization. Over the years, China has firmly supported the important role played by the United Nations in maintaining peace and promoting development, firmly supports the process of multilateralism, and firmly maintains the international system with the United Nations at its core.⁷³⁹

⁷³⁷https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/lhg_682662/zghgz_682666/

⁷³⁸https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/mghwyh_685210/gx_685214/

⁷³⁹https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/lhg_681966/zghgz_681970/

5.7.2. Membership in UN system organizations

<u>Relations between China and the United Nations High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development</u>	<u>China's relationship with the International Olympic Committee</u>
<u>China's relationship with the UN Population Fund</u>	<u>China's relationship with the United Nations Environment Programme</u>
<u>China's relationship with the International Monetary Fund</u>	<u>China's relationship with UNICEF</u>
<u>China's relationship with UN-HABITAT</u>	<u>China's relationship with the United Nations Industrial Development Organization</u>
<u>China's relationship with the World Bank Group</u>	<u>China's relationship with the World Trade Organization</u>
<u>China's relationship with the Universal Postal Union</u>	<u>Relations between China and the United Nations Commission on Narcotics</u>
<u>China's relationship with the International Organization for Migration</u>	<u>Relations between China and the International Civil Aviation Organization</u>
<u>Relations between China and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime</u>	<u>Relations between China and the World Health Organization</u>
<u>Relations between China and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</u>	<u>Relations between China and the United Nations World Tourism Organization</u>
<u>China's relationship with the International Telecommunication Union</u>	<u>Relations between China and the UN Social Development Committee</u>
<u>China's relationship with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</u>	<u>China's relationship with the International Maritime Organization</u>
<u>Relations between China and the ILO</u>	<u>Relations between China and the UN Security Council</u>
<u>China's relationship with the Peacebuilding Commission</u>	<u>Relations between China and the UN Commission on the Status of Women</u>
<u>China's relationship with the World Intellectual Property Organization</u>	<u>Relations between China and the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice</u>
<u>China and the United Nations Commission on International Law</u>	<u>China and the UN Charter Special Committee</u>
<u>China and the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space</u>	<u>Relations between China and UN human rights institutions</u>

Source: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/lhg_681966/zghgzz_681970/

5.8 Major International Treaties

5.8.1. List of major bilateral treaties concluded by China in 2018⁷⁴⁰

Serial number	Treaty name	Signing date	Signing place
1.	Agreement between the Government of the People 's Republic of China and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Chinese Cultural Center in Jordan	2018.01.08	Amman
2.	Civil Air Transport Agreement between the Government of the People 's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Congo	2018.01.09	Beijing
3.	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Angola on simplifying visa procedures	2018.01.14	Luanda
4.	Flight Agreement between the Government of the People 's Republic of China and the Hashemite Government of Jordan	2018.01.15	Amman
5.	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay on simplifying visa procedures for business personnel	2018.01.24	Montevideo
6.	Agreement between the Government of the People 's Republic of China and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Animal Health and Animal Quarantine	2018.01.31	Beijing
7.	Implementation Plan for the Cultural Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan from 2018 to 2022	2018.02.05	Beijing
8.	The Treaty between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Austria on Criminal Judicial Assistance	2018.04.08	Beijing
9.	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Eastern	2018.04.16	Beijing

⁷⁴⁰ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/tyfg_674913/t1659362.shtml

More treaties can be accessed in detail online at URL:

<http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/140396.htm>

	Republic of Uruguay on the Establishment of a Chinese Cultural Center in Uruguay		
10.	Agreement between the Government of the People 's Republic of China and the Government of Japan on Cooperative Filmmaking	2018.05.09	Tokyo
11.	Social Security Agreement between the Government of the People 's Republic of China and the Government of Japan	2018.05.09	Tokyo
12.	Joint Communique between the People's Republic of China and Burkina Faso on Restoration of Diplomatic Relations	2018.05.26	Beijing
13.	Protocol on Amending the Agreement between the Government of the People 's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Chile on Avoiding Double Taxation and Avoiding Tax Evasion	2018.05.29	San Diego
14.	International Road Transport Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Russian Federation	2018.06.08	Beijing
15.	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Belarus on Mutual Exemption of Visas for Persons Holding Ordinary Passports	2018.06.10	Qingdao
16.	Civil Air Transport Agreement between the Government of the People 's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Côte d' Ivoire	2018.06.25	Abidjan
17.	Extradition Treaty between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Cyprus	2018.06.29	Beijing
18.	Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria	2018.07.06	Sofia
19.	Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Bosnia and Herzegovina Council of Ministers on Animal Health and Animal Quarantine	2018.07.07	Sofia
20.	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Qatar on Mutual Visa Waiver	2018.07.09	Beijing

21.	Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United Arab Emirates on Customs Affairs	2018.07.19	Abu Dhabi
22.	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United Arab Emirates on Mutual Establishment of Cultural Centers	2018.07.19	Abu Dhabi
23.	The Treaty between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Senegal on Criminal Judicial Assistance	2018.07.21	Dakar
24.	Extradition Treaty between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Senegal	2018.07.21	Dakar
25.	Agreement on Civil Air Transport between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda	2018.07.23	Kigali
26.	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire on Mutual Establishment of Cultural Centers	2018.08.30	Beijing
27.	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Burkina Faso on Economic, Trade, Investment and Technical Cooperation	2018.08.31	Beijing
28.	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Gabon on Avoiding Double Taxation and Avoiding Tax Evasion	2018.09.01	Beijing
29.	Maritime Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Liberia	2018.09.05	Beijing
30.	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Congo to eliminate double taxation and prevent tax evasion	2018.09.05	Beijing
31.	Air Transport Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Armenia	2018.09.16	Guangzhou

32.	Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Latvia	2018.09.18	Beijing
33.	Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Angola to eliminate double taxation and prevent tax evasion	2018.10.09	Beijing
34.	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan on Customs Cooperation and Mutual Assistance	2018.10.13	Dushanbe
35.	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan on Maritime Search and Rescue Cooperation	2018.10.26	Beijing
36.	Civil Air Transport Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Dominican Republic	2018.11.02	Beijing
37.	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the French Republic for Mutual Recognition and Replacement of Motor Vehicle Driving Licenses	2018.11.23	Paris
38.	Extradition Treaty between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Panama	2018.12.03	Panama City
39.	Agreement on Cultural Cooperation between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Panama	2018.12.03	Panama City
40.	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Panama on Mutually Issuing Multiple Effective Visa Arrangements for Each Other's Ordinary Passport Holders	2018.12.03	Panama City
41.	The Treaty between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Ecuador on Criminal Judicial Assistance	2018.12.12	Beijing

5.8.2 China's participation in multilateral treaties in 2018⁷⁴¹

Serial number	Name	Date and place of signing	effective date	China's action	Remarks
1	Intergovernmental Agreement on International Road Transport along the Asian Highway Network	2016.12.08 Moscow	2018.09.21	Signed on 2016.12.08 2018.02.20 approved 2018.09.21 effective for China	Applicable to Hong Kong SAR, temporarily not applicable to Macau SAR
2	Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement Second Amendment	2017.01.13 Bangkok	2018.07.01	2017.01.13 signed 2017.10.07 accepted 2018.07.01 effective for China	Not applicable to Hong Kong SAR and Macau SAR
3	2004 International Convention on the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments	2004.02.13 London	2017.09.08	2018.05.30 joined	Not yet effective for China
4	Agreement on the Prevention of Non-regulation of High Seas Fisheries in the Arctic Ocean	2018.10.03 Ilulissat	Not yet in force	2018.10.03 signed	

5.8.3. Overview of China's foreign treaties concluded in 2017⁷⁴²

List of major bilateral treaties concluded by China in 2017			
Serial number	Treaty name	Signing date	Signing place
1	Cultural Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Swiss Federal Council	2017.1.16	Bern
2	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Barbados on Economic and Technical Cooperation	2017.1.18	Bridgetown
3	Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Federated States of Micronesia	2017.3.27	Beijing
4	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Malaysia on Water Resources Cooperation	2017.4.10	Kuala Lumpur

⁷⁴¹ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/tyfg_674913/t1659362.shtml

⁷⁴² https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/tyfg_674913/t1549798.shtml

5	International Road Transport Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Uzbekistan	2017.5.12	Beijing
6	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Turkey on Mutual Establishment of Cultural Centers	2017.5.13	Beijing
7	Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the People 's Republic of China and the Government of Montenegro	2017.5.13	Podgorica
8	Agreement between the Government of the People 's Republic of China and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on Customs Cooperation and Mutual Assistance	2017.5.15	Beijing
9	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Kenya on the Establishment of a Chinese Cultural Center in Kenya	2017.5.15	Beijing
10	Framework Agreement on Investment Promotion and Economic Cooperation between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Sri Lanka	2017.5.16	Beijing
11	Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Fiji	2017.5.16	Beijing
12	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Argentina on the Establishment of a Chinese Cultural Center in Argentina	2017.5.17	Beijing
13	Social Security Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Kingdom of Spain	2017.5.19	Bad Neuner
14	Agreement between the Government of the People 's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Cooperative Filming	2017.6.8	Astana
15	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on Cooperative Filming	2017.6.12	Beijing
16	Joint Communiqué of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Panama on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations	2017.6.13	Beijing
17	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the People 's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Panama on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations	2017.6.13	Beijing
18	Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation between the Government of the People 's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Cuba	2017.6.23	Beijing
19	Agreement between the Government of the People 's Republic of China and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperative Filming	2017.7.4	Moscow
20	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Equatorial Guinea on the mutual exemption of visas for personnel holding diplomatic, official and official passports	2017.7.7	Beijing

21	Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Tunisia on the establishment of a consultation mechanism	2017.7.17	Beijing
22	Framework Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Nepal on Investment Promotion and Economic Cooperation	2017.8.15	Kathmandu
23	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the International Organization for Migration on the establishment of an International Organization for Migration Office in China	2017.8.22	Beijing
24	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Kuwait on the Establishment of a Chinese Cultural Center in Kuwait	2017.8.22	Kuwait City
25	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Brazil on the joint production of films	2017.9.1	Beijing
26	Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Suriname	2017.9.13	Paramaribo
27	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Kenya on Avoiding Double Taxation and Avoiding Tax Evasion	2017.9.21	Nairobi
28	Agreement on Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe	2017.9.22	Sao Tome
29	Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Grenada	2017.10.13	Saint George
30	Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Reconstruction of the Joint Water Diversion Project between China and Kazakhstan	2017.11.15	Beijing
31	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Panama on Cooperation in the Field of Railway Transportation Systems	2017.11.17	Beijing
32	Agreement on Civil Air Transport between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Panama	2017.11.17	Beijing

5.8.4. List of multilateral treaties to which China participated in 2017

Serial number	name	Signing date location	effective date	China's action	Remarks
1	Agreement on the establishment of the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation College	2016.10.26 Islamabad	2017.8.24	2016.10.26 signed 2017.6.27 approved 2017.8.3 Deposit approval letter	Macao SAR only
2	Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States Frontier Cooperation Agreement	2015.7.10 Ufa	2016.10.29	2017.4.27 approved 2017.6.6 Deposit approval letter 2017.6.13 took effect for me	Applicable to Hong Kong and Macau SAR
3	Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement Second Amendment	2017.1.13 Bangkok	Not yet in force	2017.1.13 sign 2017.10.7 accepted	Not applicable to Hong Kong and Macau SAR
4	Attachment B.2 to the Convention on Temporary Imports and Attachment B.3 to the Special Equipment and Attachment B.3 " Attachment to Containers, Pallets, Packaging Materials, Samples and Other Imported Goods Related to Commercial Operations"	1990.6.26 Istanbul	1993.11.27	2017.7.13 accepted	
5	Shanghai Cooperation Organization Anti-Extremism Convention	2017.6.9 Astana	Not yet in force	2017.6.9 signed	
6	Select Court Agreement Convention	2005.6.30 The Hague	2015.10.1	2017.9.12 sign	
7	Memorandum of Understanding on Establishing the Lancang - Mekong Comprehensive Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation Center	2017.10.17 Beijing	Not yet in force (But temporarily applied)	2017.10.17 signed	

5.8.5. China's participation in multilateral treaties 2016⁷⁴³

Serial number	name	Signing date location	effective date	China's action	Remarks
1	Agreement for the establishment of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	May 29, 1990, Paris	1991.3.28	2016.1.15 The State Council decided to join, deposit the accession letter on the same day and take effect in China	Applicable to Hong Kong and Macau SAR
2	Amendment to Article 21 of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora	1983.4.30 Gaborone	2013.11.29	1988.7.7 Deposit acceptance letter 2013.11.29 effective for China 2016.4.11 The State Council's decision amendments apply to Hong Kong and Macau SAR 2016.5.10 amendment extended to Hong Kong and Macau SAR	Applicable to Hong Kong and Macau SAR
3	Paris Agreement	2015.12.12 Paris	2016.11.4	2016.4.22 signed 2016.9.3 approval 2016.9.3 Deposit approval letter 2016.11.4 effective for China	Applicable to Hong Kong and Macau SAR
4	Minamata Convention on Mercury	2013.10.10 Kumamoto	Not yet in force	2016.4.28 approval 2016.8.31 Deposit approval letter	Applicable to Hong Kong and Macau SAR
5	1975 International Road Transport Convention	1975.11.14 Geneva	1978	2016.4.28 State Council decided to join	Not applicable for Hong Kong and Macau SAR
6	The Nagoya Protocol of the Convention on Biological Diversity on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits from Its Use	2010.10.29 Nagoya	2014.10.12	2016.5.4 State Council decided to join 2016.6.8 Deposit of accession book 2016.9.6 effective for China	Not applicable for Hong Kong and Macau SAR
7	Agreement for the renewal of the International Cooperation Framework	2015.2.26 Paris	2015.2.26	2016.6.23 sign Effective on our country on the same day	Applicable to Hong Kong and Macau SAR

⁷⁴³ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/tyfg_674913/t1453762.shtml

	Agreement for the Fourth Generation Nuclear Energy System Research and Development				
8	Amendments to HBCD in the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants	2013.5.10 Geneva	2014.11.26	2016.7.2 approved 2016.9.27 Deposit approval letter 2016.12.26 effective for China	Applicable to Hong Kong and Macau SAR
9	2007 Nairobi International Ship Wreck Removal Convention	2007.5.18 Nairobi	Not yet in force	2016.7.12 The State Council decided to join	Not applicable for Hong Kong and Macau SAR
10	"Protocol on Amendments to International Conventions on Simplifying and Harmonizing the Customs System" Chapter 2 of Special Annex IV and Chapter 1 of Special Annex VI	1999.6.26 Brussels	2006.2.3	2016.4.20 accepted 2016.7.14 Submit acceptance letter, effective on our country on the same day	Not applicable for Hong Kong and Macau SAR
11	Agreement on the establishment of the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation College	2016.10.26 Islamabad	Not yet in force	2016.10.26 signed	
12	Agreement on Facilitation of International Road Transport among the Governments of Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States	2014.9.12 Dushanbe	Not yet in force	2016.10.28 approved 2016.12.19 Deposit approval letter	Applicable to Macau SAR, temporarily not applicable to Hong Kong SAR
13	Memorandum on the obligation of the Republic of India to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization	2016.6.24 Tashkent	Not yet in force	2016.11.10 approved 2016.12.26 Deposit approval letter	Applicable to Hong Kong and Macau SAR
14	Memorandum on the obligation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization	2016.6.24 Tashkent	Not yet in force	2016.11.10 approved 2016.12.26 Deposit approval letter	Applicable to Hong Kong and Macau SAR
15	Intergovernmental Agreement on	2016.12.8 Moscow	Not yet in force	2016.12.8 signed	Not applicable

	International Road Transport along the Asian Highway Network				for Hong Kong and Macau SAR
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5.8.6. Table on Dates of Signing and Effective Dates of Bilateral Judicial Assistance Treaties⁷⁴⁴

	The other state party to treaty	contents of treaty	date of signing (month/day/yea)	effective date (month/day/year)	Number of treaty
1.	Uzbekistan	Civil/criminal judicial assistance	12.11.1997	8.29.1998	1.
		Extradition	11.8.1999	9.29.2000	2.
2.	Kazakhstan	Civil/criminal judicial assistance	1.14.1993	7.11.1995	3.
		Extradition	7.5.1996	2.10.1998	4.
3.	Kyrghyz	Civil/criminal judicial assistance	7.4.1996	9.26.1997	5.
		Extradition	4.27.1998		6.
4.	Tajikistan	Civil/criminal judicial assistance	9.16.1996	9.2.1998	7.
5.	Turkey	Civil/mercantile/criminal judicial assistance	9.28.1992	10.26.1995	8.

⁷⁴⁴https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/tyfls_665260/tyfl_665264/2631_665276/t39537.shtml

6.	Cyprus	Civil/criminal judicial assistance	4.25.1995	1.11.1996	9.
7.	The Philippines	Criminal judicial assistance	10.16.2000		10.
		Extradition	10.30.2001		11.
8.	Cambodia	Extradition	2.9.1999	12.13.2000	12.
9.	Lao	Civil/criminal judicial assistance	1.25.1999	12.15.2001	13.
		Extradition	02.04.2002		14.
10.	Thailand	Civil/mercantile judicial assistance	3.16.1994	7.6.1997	15.
		Extradition	8.26.1993	3.7.1999	16.
11.	Singapore	Civil/mercantile judicial assistance	4.28.1997	6.27.1999	17.
12.	Vietnam	Civil/criminal judicial assistance	10.19.1998	12.25.1999	18.
13.	Indonesia	Criminal judicial assistance	7.24.2000		19.
14.	Republic of Korea	Criminal judicial assistance	11.12.1998	3.24.2000	20.

		Extradition	10.18.2000	4.12.2002	21.
15.	Mongolia	Civil/criminal judicial assistance	8.31.1989	10.29.1990	22.
		Extradition	8.19.1997	1.10.1999	23.
16.	United Arab Emirates	Extradition	5.13.2002		24.
17.	Bulgaria	Civil judicial assistance	6.2.1993	6.30.1995	25.
		Criminal judicial assistance	4.7.1995	5.27.1996	26.
		Extradition	5.20.1996	7.3.1997	27.
18.	Belarus	Civil/criminal judicial assistance	1.11.1993	11,29.1993	28.
		Extradition	6.22.1995	5.7.1998	29.
19.	Poland	Civil/Criminal judicial assistance	6.5.1987	2.13.1988	30.
20.	Russia	Civil/criminal judicial assistance	6.19.1992	11.14.1993	31.
		Extradition	6.26.1995	1.10.1997	32.
		Referral of jurisdiction over sentenced persons	12.02.2002		33.

21.	Romania	Civil/criminal judicial assistance	1.16.1991	1.22.1993	34.
		Extradition	7.1.1996	1.16.1999	35.
22.	Ukraine	Civil/criminal judicial assistance	10.31.1992	1.19.1994	36.
		Extradition	12.10.1998	7.13.2000	37.
		Referral of jurisdiction over sentenced persons	7.21.2001	10.12.2002	38.
23.	Hungary	Civil/mercantile judicial assistance	10.9.1995	3.21.1997	39.
24.	Lithuania	Civil/criminal judicial assistance	3.20.2000		40.
		Extradition	6.17.2002		41.
25.	Estonia	Criminal judicial assistance	6.12.2002		42.
26.	Spain	Civil/mercantile judicial assistance	5.2.1992	1.1.1994	43.
27.	Italy	Civil judicial assistance	5.20.1991	1.1.1995	44.
28.	France	Civil/mercantile judicial assistance	5.4.1987	2.8.1988	45.

29.	Belgium	Civil judicial assistance	11.20.1987		46.
30.	Hellenic Republic	Civil/criminal judicial assistance	10.17.1994	6.29.1996	47.
31.	United States	Criminal Judicial assistance	6.19.2000	3.8.2001	48.
32.	Canada	Criminal judicial assistance	7.29.1994	7.1.1995	49.
33.	Argentina	Civil/mercantile judicial assistance	4.9.2001		50.
34.	Cuba	Civil/criminal judicial assistance	11.24.1992	3.26.1994	51.
35.	Colombia	Criminal judicial assistance	5.14.1999		52.
36.	Peru	Extradition	11.5.2001	4.5.2003	53.
37.	Egypt	Civil/mercantile judicial assistance	4.21.1994	5.31.1995	54.
38.	Morocco	Civil/mercantile judicial assistance	4.16.1996	11.26.1999	55.
39.	South Africa	Extradition	12.10.2001		56.
		Criminal judicial assistance	01.21.2003		57.

40.	Tunisia	Civil/mercantile judicial assistance	5.4.1999	7.20.2000	58.
		Criminal judicial assistance	11.30.1999	12.30.2000	59.
		Extradition	11.19.2001		60.

5.8.7. List of Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Treaties that China has joined⁷⁴⁵

In the Nuclear Field⁷⁴⁶

- (i) Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (signed in August 1973, the instrument of ratification deposited in June 1974)
- (ii) Additional Protocols II and III to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (signed in February 1987, the instrument of ratification deposited in October 1988)
- (iii) Agreement Between the People's Republic of China and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in China (signed in September 1988, effective since September 1989)
- (iv) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (acceded in February 1989)
- (v) Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (acceded in February 1991)
- (vi) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (acceded in March 1992)
- (vii) Convention on Nuclear Safety (signed in 1994, ratified in April 1996)
- (viii) Protocols I and II to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (signed in April 1996, the instrument of ratification deposited in October 1997)
- (ix) Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (signed in September 1996)
- (x) Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the People's Republic of China and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in China (signed in December 1998, entered into force in March 2002)

⁷⁴⁵ <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/140396.htm>

⁷⁴⁶ More treaties can be accessed in detail on the following site.
<http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/140396.htm>

In the Chemical Field

- (i) Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (signed in January 1993, the instrument of ratification deposited in April 1997)

In the Biological Field

- (i) Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare
- (ii) Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (acceded in November 1984)

In the Conventional Field

- (i) Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and Protocols I-III (signed in September 1981, the instrument of ratification deposited in April 1982; the amended Article 1 of the Convention ratified in June 2003, the instrument of ratification deposited in August 2003)
- (ii) Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices Annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Amended Protocol II) (the instrument of ratification deposited in November 1998)
- (iii) Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons Annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Protocol IV) (the instrument of ratification deposited in November 1998)
- (iv) Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crimes (signed in December 2002)

In Other Fields

- (i) The Antarctic Treaty (acceded in June 1983)
- (ii) Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (instrument of accession deposited in December 1983)
- (iii) Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (acceded in December 1988)

- (iv) Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (acceded in June 2005)⁷⁴⁷

5.8.8. Laws and Regulations of China on Non-Proliferation Export Control⁷⁴⁸

In the Nuclear Field

- (i) Regulations of the PRC on the Control of Nuclear Export (promulgated in September 1997, revised in June 2001)
- (ii) Regulations of the PRC on the Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related Technologies Export (promulgated in June 1998)
- (iii) Measures on the Administration of Approval for Transfer and Transit of Nuclear Items (For Trial Implementation) (promulgated in January 2000)

In the Biological Field

- (i) Regulations of the PRC on the Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies (promulgated in October 2002)

In the Chemical Field

- (i) Regulations of the PRC on the Administration of Controlled Chemicals (promulgated in December 1995)
- (ii) Controlled Chemicals List (promulgated in May 1996, supplemented in June 1998)
- (iii) Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Regulations of the PRC on the Administration of Controlled Chemicals (promulgated in March 1997)
- (iv) List of New Chemicals Controlled in Category 3 (promulgated in June 1998)
- (v) Measures on the Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies (promulgated in October 2002)

In the Missile Field

- (i) Regulations of the PRC on the Export Control of Missiles and Missile-Related Items and Technologies (promulgated in August 2002)

In the Arms Export Field

- (i) Regulations of the PRC on the Administration of Arms Export (promulgated in October 1997, amended in October 2002; the Military Products Export Control List promulgated in November 2002)

Sensitive Items

- (i) Measures on the Administration of Export Registration for Sensitive Items and Technologies (promulgated in November 2002)

⁷⁴⁷ <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/140396.htm>

⁷⁴⁸ <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/140395.htm>

- (ii) Provisional Measures on the Administration of Export Licenses on Sensitive Items and Technologies (promulgated in December 2003)
- (iii) Export Licensing Catalogue of Sensitive Items and Technologies (promulgated in December 2003)

Other Related Laws and Regulations

- (i) Foreign Trade Law of the PRC (promulgated in May 1994, amended in April 2004)
- (ii) Administrative Punishments Law of the PRC (promulgated in March 1996)
- (iii) Customs Law of the PRC (promulgated in January 1987, amended in July 2000)
- (iv) Amendments to the Criminal Law of the PRC (promulgated in December 2001)
- (v) Regulations of the PRC on the Import and Export Control of Technologies (promulgated in December 2001)
- (vi) Regulations of the PRC on the Import and Export Control of Goods (promulgated in December 2001)⁷⁴⁹

5.8.9. Agreements on Disarmament and Confidence-Building Measures between China and Relevant Countries⁷⁵⁰

- (i) Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of India on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas (signed in September 1993)
- (ii) Agreement Between China and Russia on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (signed in July 1994)
- (iii) Joint Statement by the President of the People's Republic of China and the President of the Russian Federation on No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons and De-targeting of Strategic Nuclear Weapons Against Each Other (signed in September 1994)
- (iv) Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field Along the Border Areas Among China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan (signed in April 1996)
- (v) Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas (signed in November 1996)
- (vi) Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas Among China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan (signed in April 1997)
- (vii) Agreement Between the Ministry of National Defence of the PRC and the Department of Defence of the USA on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety (signed in January 1998)
- (viii) Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (signed in November 2002)
- (ix) Protocol Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of India on Modalities for the Implementation of

⁷⁴⁹ <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/140395.htm>

⁷⁵⁰ <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/140386.htm>

Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas (signed in April 2005)⁷⁵¹

5.8.10. China's Work in the Legal Field of the United Nations⁷⁵²

- Statement by Vice Foreign Minister H.E. Zhang Yesui of the People's Republic of China at High-level Political Conference for the Purpose of Signing the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2003-12-25)
- China and the International Convention against the Reproductive Cloning of Human Beings (2003-10-28)
- China and the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (2003-10-28)
- China and the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly (2003-10-28)
- China and the International Law Commission (2003-10-28)
- China and the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization (2003-10-28)
- China and the Committee of Peaceful Uses of Outer Space of the United Nations (2003-10-28)
- China and the suppression of international terrorism (2003-10-28)
- China and the International Criminal Court (2003-10-28)

5.8.11. China's Work in the Field of the Law of the Sea⁷⁵³

- The Workshop on Managing the Conflicts in the South China Sea (2001-07-09)
- China's Maritime Demarcation and Bilateral Fishery Affairs (2001-07-09)
- China and the Regional Fishery Management (2001-07-09)
- China and the Law of the Sea (2001-07-09)

5.8.12. China and International Environmental Law⁷⁵⁴

- Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (2008-11-25)
- China and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (2001-07-09)
- China and the Convention on International Trade in the Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (2001-07-09)

⁷⁵¹ <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/140386.htm>

⁷⁵² https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/tyfls_665260/tyfl_665264/2626_665266/2627_665268/

⁷⁵³ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/tyfls_665260/tyfl_665264/2626_665266/2628_665270/

⁷⁵⁴ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/tyfls_665260/tyfl_665264/2626_665266/2629_665272/

- China and the Rotterdam Convention on the Adoption of the Prior Informed Consent Procedure in International Trade in Certain Dangerous Chemicals and Agriculture Chemicals (2001-07-09)
- China and The Legally-Binding International Instrument on International Actions on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001-07-09)
- The Convention on the Prevention of the Dumping of Wastes and Other Pollutants into the Seas and Oceans and Its 1996 Protocol (2001-07-09)
- China and the Basel Convention on the Control of the Transboundary Movement of Dangerous Wastes and Their Disposal (2001-07-09)
- China and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (2001-07-09)
- China and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Its Kyoto Protocol (2001-07-09)
- China and the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-Safety (2001-07-09)

5.8.13. Mutual Judicial Assistance and Legal Cooperation between China and Foreign Countries⁷⁵⁵

- China and the Hague Conference on Private International Law (2001-07-09)
- China's Legal Work in the Field of the UN Combating Transnational Organized Crimes (2001-07-09)
- The General Survey of Treaties on Mutual Judicial Assistance and Treaties of Extradition Signed between China and Foreign Countries (2001-07-09)

5.9 Transnational Disputes

Transnational disputes are threats that do not respect national borders and threaten China's interests, values and citizens in the People's Republic of China and abroad. Some of the major transnational disputes faced by China are discussed here.

China-Myanmar dispute

China has reconsidered construction of 13 dams on the Salween River, but energy-starved Burma, with backing from Thailand, continues to consider building five hydroelectric dams downstream despite regional and international protests. Obstacles and challenges for China-Myanmar cooperation remain and it will still take time to address them, insiders told the Global Times. They cited the complicated social and political situation in the country. For instance, negotiations on the suspended Myitsone hydropower project, one of the most important but unsolved issues in China-Myanmar infrastructure cooperation, needs a practical outcome. The abrupt suspension of such a significant project has blurred political trust between China and Myanmar, Fan Hongwei, an expert on Myanmar issues at Xiamen University, told the Global Times. Whether the

⁷⁵⁵https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/tyfls_665260/tyfl_665264/2626_665266/2630_665274/

issue could be addressed properly concerns the Myanmar government's credibility and its capability to provide a sound environment for foreign investors amid challenges, said Fan. Speculation is rising in Myanmar about the future of the project since the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar issued a statement on January 12 saying "if this issue fails to be resolved after a long delay, it will seriously hurt the confidence of Chinese entrepreneurs in investing in Myanmar."⁷⁵⁶

China-North Korea dispute

Certain islands in the Yalu and Tumen Rivers are in dispute with North Korea; North Korea and China seek to stem illegal migration to China by North Koreans, fleeing privation and oppression.⁷⁵⁷

Indo-China Border

According to a Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) Report, the length of our (India) land borders with China is 3488 Km.⁷⁵⁸ According to the reply of LOK SABHA UNSTARRED QUESTION NO. 441 dated 23.02.2011 on "BORDER DISPUTE WITH CHINA", China continues to be in illegal occupation of approximately 38,000 sq. kms in the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir. In addition, under the so-called Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of 1963, Pakistan.⁷⁵⁹

Bhutan-China border issue

On 16 June 2017, a large construction party of the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China entered the Doklam area of Bhutan. The Royal Government of Bhutan in a Press Statement issued on 29 June 2017 has stated that 'it has conveyed to the Chinese side, both on the ground and through diplomatic channel, that the construction of the road inside Bhutanese territory is a direct violation of the agreements' between China and Bhutan signed in 1988 and 1998. Royal Government of Bhutan has asked that the status quo as before 16 June 2017 be maintained.

Government of India has also conveyed to the Chinese side that their actions in Doklam area amount to a significant change in the status quo which is not in consonance with the bilateral understandings reached between India and China under the framework of the Special Representatives on the Boundary Question since the Doklam area is directly relevant for determination of the tri-junction point between India, China and Bhutan. Government of India has maintained constant communication with the Royal Government of Bhutan.

Government of India is also engaged with the Government of the People's Republic of China through the diplomatic channels to maintain peace and tranquillity in accordance with various bilateral Agreements, Memorandum of Understanding, Protocol and joint

⁷⁵⁶ <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1139702.shtml>

⁷⁵⁷ https://www.indexmundi.com/china/disputes_international.html

⁷⁵⁸ <https://mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/BMIntro-1011.pdf>

⁷⁵⁹ <http://loksabhaph.nic.in/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=101301&lsno=>

statement of 1993, 1996, 2003, 2005, 2012 and 2013 and is committed to finding an amicable resolution acceptable to concerned countries.⁷⁶⁰

South China Sea Dispute

The South China Sea disputes involve both island and maritime claims among several sovereign states within the region, namely Brunei, the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. An estimated US\$3.37 trillion worth of global trade passes through the South China Sea annually, which accounts for a third of the global maritime trade. 80 percent of China's energy imports and 39.5 percent of China's total trade passes through the South China Sea.⁷⁶¹ It has been discussed in detail in the section maritime territorial disputes on page 188.

China and Russia Dispute

China and Russia have demarcated the once disputed islands at the Amur and Ussuri confluence and in the Argun River in accordance with their 2004 Agreement. Russia and China signed a landmark deal on July 21, officially ending all outstanding territorial disputes between the two countries. Under the agreement, Russia will hand over Yinlong Island (known as Tarabarov in Russia) and half of the Heixiazi Island (Bolshoi Ussuriysky) at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers, clearing the way for closer strategic and economic relations with China. The deal flowed from an initial agreement signed in 2004 by former Russian President Vladimir Putin that proposed a 50-50 division of the disputed islands. While Russia returns Yinlong and half of Heixiazi, totalling 174 square kilometres, China has given up its claim to the other half of Heixiazi.⁷⁶²

China -Tajikistan border

With the USSR's dissolution, the successor central Asian states bordering China joined the negotiations, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan forming initially a single delegation under Russian chairing (seed of the future Shanghai Cooperative Organisation). Once again, the disputes which had previously seemed intractable gave way to new approaches, and this western stretch of China's borders was also formally and amicably settled in three additional boundary treaties.⁷⁶³ The following arrangements also exist:

Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field Along the Border Areas Among China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan (signed in April 1996)

⁷⁶⁰ <https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/28722/question+no1752+indochina+border+issue>

⁷⁶¹ "Review of Maritime Transport 2018" (PDF). *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*. Retrieved 3 April 2020.

⁷⁶² John Chan, "Russia and China settle longstanding territorial disputes" 14 August 2008, available online at URL: <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2008/08/ruch-a14.html>

⁷⁶³ Maxwell, Neville. "Settlements and Disputes: China's Approach to Territorial Issues." *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 41, no. 36, 2006, pp. 3873–3881. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4418678. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020

Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas Among China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan (signed in April 1997) ⁷⁶⁴

China has also signed cooperation agreements with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan on fibre optic cables, which represent the practical launch of the Silk Road Fiber Optic Cable project.⁷⁶⁵

5.9.1 Territorial Disputes

The re-emergence of the threat from China “school of strategic analysis, after a period of semi-dormancy of some 30 years [Maxwell 1971] has brought with it a revival, in press reports, political statements and academic writing, of the allegation that there are intractable border disputes between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and a number of its neighbours, with the suggestion that the cause lies in the territorial claims by Beijing, advanced, as one recent extreme formulation put it, within a "continuity of aggression and belligerence" [Smith and Khoo 2001]. This, and the possibility that Washington will in due course add the PRC to its “axis of evil” makes a survey of its record in management of border disputes and other territorial issues appropriate and timely. ⁷⁶⁶

When the PRC was established in October 1949, its territorial limits were far from determined. The revolutionary civil war was unfinished, the Guomintang regime still finally to be crushed (or, rather, in the event, to be driven offshore to its last redoubt, which the US' armed intervention and economic support was to nourish into de facto independence, creating a perennial grievance and challenge). Manchuria was to be reclaimed from Soviet control and Xinjiang the same; in the view from Beijing, central authority, lapsed for nearly 40 years, was to be re-established in Tibet. Beyond those immediate tasks lay an invidious bequest from the old regime: a long-proclaimed rhetorical commitment that when China regained its strength, it would reclaim the "lost lands", territories amputated or pared from the Chinese empire or Republic in their times of weakness. The new men in power in Beijing must immediately have recognised the need to forswear that inheritance, since to take it up would have meant intractable quarrels and likely conflict with most of its neighbours - most seriously and unavoidably with the USSR, inheritor of the vast north-eastern tracts of Chinese imperial territory annexed by tsarist Russia under the imposed treaties of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860). That they decided that the PRC, while confirming as China's all territory remaining to it or, in the case of Tibet, reclaimable, would then settle its borders on the alignments upon which history had left them, was clearly implied by Zhou Enlai at the 1955 Bandung Conference, when he addressed the remaining problem-that of defining and settling those borders. Even after tacitly abjuring irredentist claims to territories once part of the Chinese empire but “lost” in the 19th century to expanding European imperial powers, the PRC faced a large and daunting task: negotiating or renegotiating to achieve agreed and

⁷⁶⁴ <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/140386.htm>

⁷⁶⁵ http://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201904/23/WS5cbe871b498e079e6801ec1b/the-bri-progress-contributions-and-prospects_3.html

⁷⁶⁶ Maxwell, Neville. “Settlements and Disputes: China's Approach to Territorial Issues.” *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 41, no. 36, 2006, pp. 3873–3881. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4418678. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020.

accurately defined boundaries with a dozen states, contiguous with China over thousands of miles, in often inaccessible territory charted ,primitively if at all.⁷⁶⁷

Sino-Burmese (Myanmar) sector

Of all the border sectors on the PRC's vast periphery one stood out as an open sore, requiring an urgent attention by the new government in Beijing 'the Sino-Burmese sector'. For decades through the latter part of the 19th century that frontier had been the subject of dispute, friction and occasional near-war between China and Britain, Burma's ruler. Just before the second world war, the dispute had been referred for arbitration to the League of Nations, fruitlessly. In the closing phase of the Chinese civil war large numbers of Guomintang troops had taken refuge in northern Burma and in the early 1950s, having been regrouped and equipped by agencies of the US, were still raiding back into China from those bases, and being counter-attacked in hot pursuit by troops of the People's Liberation Army, who were thus intruding into Burmese territory. The status quo along the border, insofar as there was any such thing, was marked anomalies, such as a tract of territory, always recognised by Britain as China's but nevertheless annexed under a "permanent lease" - the Namwan Assigned Tract. All in all, the Sino-Burmese border presented the two new governments with an envenomed and exceptionally complex problem, made invidious by prickly nationalist sentiments on both sides and the historical record of mutually incompatible territorial demands. In Burma, the border question became politicised, with the government being attacked for even contemplating compromise that might involve "Surrender of territory".

Burma's leaders, notably U Nu, later general Ne Win, resisted such demagogic calls to adopt postures that would make settlement unattainable, however, and responded to Beijing's proposal that a negotiated settlement to be sought. After a slow beginning, while the border areas were partially pacified, purposeful negotiations began in 1958 and quickly led to an agreement. China relinquished all claim to the Namwan Tract in exchange for a patch of territory of similar size (only defining any boundary line with our neighbours, only peaceful 50 odd square miles), and in effect, "abandoned the bulk of those claims to which the Manchus and the Guomintang had adhered with such tenacity for more than half a century. Instead of "tens of thousands of square miles, the Chinese were content with a modification of the old British [claimed] border which involve[d] in all an area of 59 square miles" (Lamb 1968). The Chinese also accepted that portion of the "McMahon Line" which ran into the Burma sector: as explained in more detail below, this was a border claim advanced by Britain in 1914 but never of the previously accepted, indeed vigorously repudiated, by both Republican and Communist governments of China. An agreement was followed by the boundary demarcation by a joint Sino-Burmese commission and in Beijing in October 1960 the prime boundaries, complemented by another, of friendship and mutual non-aggression. The PRC's moderate and compromising approach in those a stable, defined boundary with a friendly neighbour was of approach, with the implication that a neighbour's use of force greater worth to China than the acquisition of territory at the cost a single exception negotiations appears

⁷⁶⁷ Maxwell, Neville. "Settlements and Disputes: China's Approach to Territorial Issues." *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 41, no. 36, 2006, pp. 3873–3881. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4418678. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020.

to demonstrate Beijing's appreciation that probably of lasting enmity and the military distractions of a contested border. The Sino-Burmese boundary treaty was the first of a series of the PRC's settlements with neighbours which ensued resolve territorial disputes and achieve boundary settlements over through the remaining decades of the 20th century.⁷⁶⁸

China and Nepal

Chronologically next in the series came the settlement with Nepal, whose rulers had fought wars with the Chinese empire in the 18th and 19th centuries and, defeated, had to bow to Beijing's suzerainty. Nepal's sovereign independence had been granted by Britain in 1923 and internationally recognised after the second world war, however, and was not questioned by the PRC. The negotiations to settle the Sino-Nepalese border which had never previously been discussed or defined, began early in 1960, aiming at confirmation of "the existing, customary, traditional" alignment. The procedure followed is worth describing. The two sides first exchanged and compared maps giving their versions of the existing border, and these were divided according to the degree of harmony between them, or its absence. In some sectors the two sides' lines coincided: in others they diverged, but the state of actual jurisdiction was not in dispute: in both those cases arrangements were made for the borders immediate survey and demarcation on the basis of the status quo. The third group of maps showed areas in dispute. To resolve those, a joint commission was set up to survey the contested areas adjust the contradictory claims "in accordance with the principles of equality, mutual benefit, friendship and mutual benefit, friendship and mutual accommodation" (Prescott 1975). As an example of that process Mt Everest/Qomolangmo was claimed in entirety by both sides; the joint commission drew the boundary through the summit, giving each party half the mountain. The boundary treaty was signed in October 1961.

China and Pakistan

Next came the Pakistan sector. The spur to negotiation in this instance came when a member of Pakistan's UN delegation was persuaded by a Burmese representative that the Chinese had been entirely reasonable and often, indeed, magnanimous in their dealings with Rangoon over the border, and convinced president Ayub Khan that Pakistan should invite Beijing to open negotiations. The sector of Chinese territory bordering Pakistan lies between Xinjiang and the portion of the disputed state of Jammu Kashmir which is controlled by Pakistan. The border there had never been delimited, but there was an extensive history of clashing claims between petty states under British suzerainty, Hunza and Gilgit and Kashmir itself, on the one hand and Chinese authorities on the other; and there were on the record a number of varying British concepts of where a border between the Chinese and Indian empires in that sector should lie. The two negotiating teams aimed to trace the traditional customary boundary line including natural features and invoked as their guide the "Spirit of equality, mutual benefit and friendly cooperation" (Prescott *ibid*:235]. Agreement was quickly reached and formalised in Beijing in March 1963, the text providing for renegotiation of the border in

⁷⁶⁸ Maxwell, Neville. "Settlements and Disputes: China's Approach to Territorial Issues." *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 41, no. 36, 2006, pp. 3873–3881. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4418678. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020.

case ultimately the India/Pakistan dispute over Kashmir were settled in India's favour. (By that time the Sino-Indian border dispute had climaxed in a brief border-war, and India denounced the Sino-Pakistan agreement as having "surrendered" to China some 13,000 square miles of Indian territory.)⁷⁶⁹

China and Afghanistan

China borders Afghanistan as a result of an Anglo-Russian agreement of 1895 that cartographically drew out a narrow salient of Afghan territory, the Wakhan Strip, to act as a thin territorial washer separating the furthest reaches of the British and Russian empires in that zone. The Chinese, authorities concede [Tytler 1975], could reasonably have laid claim to a border in this sector more advanced from their point of view but when they sat down with the Afghans they made no such claim; instead, in an agreement signed in November 1963, they agreed a boundary on the alignment drawn for them by their former imperial rivals. As the leading historian of these frontier issues, Alastair Lamb, has noted, the PRC "has shown a surprising measure of respect for boundary lines for which good precedents date back to the 'bad old days' of colonial empires and unequal treaties" [Lamb1973]⁷⁷⁰

China and Mongolian People's Republic

Establishment of an agreed boundary between the PRC and the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) must have been one of the more problematic and laborious of Beijing's border settlements, not because there were inherent intractable disputes but, first, because until Mongolia declared independence in 1924, under Soviet aegis, it had been a part of the Chinese empire and republic (and indeed, Mao Zedong had once looked to reclaiming it), and, second, because there are few topographical features in this great stretch which can provide pegs for an obvious alignment. The complexity of the agreement formalised in June 1964 is indicated by JRV Prescott in his and encyclopaedia *Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty* (p 90): "This is the most meticulously described boundary in the whole of Asia; it stretches for 2920 miles (4968 kilometres) and is marked by 678 cement and rock markers located at 639 turning points along the boundary [their location being described] in a text of 68,000 words and illustrated by an atlas with 105 maps..."⁷⁷¹

China and Democratic Republic of Korea

Dates, circumstances and details of the PRC's border settlement with the Democratic Republic of Korea are not in the published record, but their essential elements are known. In both cases what was involved was detailing, with new surveys where necessary and minor agreed modification, and then confirming on the ground, previous Settlements,

⁷⁶⁹ Maxwell, Neville. "Settlements and Disputes: China's Approach to Territorial Issues." *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 41, no. 36, 2006, pp. 3873–3881. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4418678. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020.

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁷¹ Maxwell, Neville. "Settlements and Disputes: China's Approach to Territorial Issues." *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 41, no. 36, 2006, pp. 3873–3881. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4418678. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020.

reached in the case of Korea between China and Japan, in the case of Laos between China and France.⁷⁷²

China and Russia (formerly the USSR)

According to a CNA analysis China and the Soviet Union had initially enjoyed good relations in the aftermath of the Chinese civil war. The 2 March 1969 firefight between China and Soviet troops across the frozen Ussuri River, which forms a boundary line between China and the Soviet Union in the east, toward a disputed river island called Zhenbao (Damansky in Russian), ignited Sino-Soviet hostilities. Thirteen days later, Chinese and Soviet forces would again fight on Zhenbao, this time with much larger forces and firepower, and in the following months they would fight several more battles along the border. The transition from a conflict that in previous years had been carried out primarily through rhetoric and occasional fistfights to one that involved several direct conventional engagements between nuclear-armed states raised the prospect that hostilities might escalate to a nuclear confrontation. While China was still in its nuclear infancy, having only tested its first nuclear device in October 1964, the Soviets by 1969 had built up a large and diverse nuclear arsenal and achieved rough numerical parity in delivery vehicles with the United States. Following the conflicts on Zhenbao, Moscow adopted a coercive diplomacy strategy designed to reach a peaceful settlement with Beijing that combined increasingly provocative threats – including nuclear threats – with repeated proposals for negotiations. Several times in the months following the bloodshed on Zhenbao, the Soviet Union deliberately hinted that it might use nuclear weapons, especially in a surgical attack on China’s nascent nuclear facilities.⁷⁷³

The delineation of the border had always been a point of contention for Beijing, but when bilateral relations were good the Chinese did not raise the issue. But as political relations soured, disputes over the border became a useful tool for both sides to express their contempt. From this perspective, the conflicts that erupted on the border in March 1969 were not about territory per se, but rather served as a physical manifestation of broader political and ideological hostilities. Conflicts on the border provided a useful mechanism for Sino-Soviet animosities to play out. Zhenbao Island, after all, is a small, uninhabited, strategically meaningless island that is often submerged at high-water. At best, the island is useful for logging and for fisherman to dry their nets. As one commentator observed shortly after the conflict on 2 March, Zhenbao has “no value whatsoever to either country except one of prestige,” thus “it is not this tiny piece of land but a question of principle which is involved, a potential danger of which this little island is a symbol.

The specific dispute over the border centred on differing interpretations of the 1860 Treaty of Peking⁷⁷⁴, which identified the Amur and Ussuri rivers as forming a part of the

⁷⁷² Maxwell, Neville. “Settlements and Disputes: China's Approach to Territorial Issues.” *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 41, no. 36, 2006, pp. 3873–3881. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4418678. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020.

⁷⁷³ Excerpts from Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) analysis titled “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969” written by Michael S. Gerson published in November 2010 available online at URL: https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0022974.A2.pdf

⁷⁷⁴ The 1860 treaty of Peking, signed under the threat by the emissaries of an enfeebled and threatened China, placed the eastern border between the Tsarist and Chinese empires on two great continental rivers, the Amur and the Ussuri, China thus ceding huge tracts of territory and the entire seaboard north of Korea to Russia. Rivers make attractive features for those negotiating boundaries, as Lord Curzon pointed out in his renowned lecture

eastern boundary between China and Russia. There were two main points of contention. First, China repeatedly claimed that the Treaty of Peking was an “unequal” treaty forced upon a weak China by czarist Russia. China, according to this view, was forced to make concessions to a more powerful neighbor that “forcibly incorporated” 400,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory into Russia. Second, Moscow and Beijing disagreed on the exact location of the boundary line. While both agreed that the treaty listed the Amur and Ussuri rivers as the border, there was a sharp divergence in interpretation as to what this meant regarding ownership of the hundreds of river islands. China contended that the actual border was drawn at the “thalweg”, defined as the central line of the main river channel. “According to established patterns of international law,” China claimed, “in the case of navigable boundary rivers, the central line of the main channel should form the boundary line which determines the ownership of islands.” Since Zhenbao is clearly on the Chinese side of the main channel, Beijing argued that it is an “indisputable, iron-clad fact that [Zhenbao] is Chinese territory.” The Soviet Union, however, argued that there was no international legal norm that “automatically” established the boundary at the thalweg. According to Moscow, the boundary ran “directly along the Chinese bank,” thereby giving the Soviets ownership of all the river islands. Moscow rested its claim on a map of the border exchanged between Russian and Chinese officials in 1861. The map, Moscow argued, proved that the boundary lay along the Chinese bank. Beijing countered that the scale of the map was smaller than 1:1,000,000, and therefore it “does not, and cannot possibly, show the precise location of the boundary line in the rivers; still less is it intended to determine the ownership of islands.” Tensions on the border began as early as 1959 and progressed steadily in frequency and intensity. Although it is unclear which side initiated many of the early skirmishes along the border, Beijing was certainly the primary antagonist in the broader Sino- Soviet split, and led the charge in rhetorical lashings. In 1963, China publicly raised the issue of the many past “unequal treaties” that it was “compelled” to sign after Khrushchev brought up China’s restraint in resolving the status of Hong Kong and Macao.⁷⁷⁵

After bringing the border dispute into the open, Beijing sent a diplomatic note to Moscow proposing negotiations on outstanding border issues. Moscow responded favourably to this inquiry, agreeing to discuss a specific set of issues dealing with the border. Since China had recently concluded agreements with other states in the region, including North Korea and Pakistan, there was at least some reason for Soviets to believe that these talks might generate peaceful settlement. At this point Moscow had no interest in a protracted confrontation – rhetorical or otherwise – with China, and Khrushchev was eager to find a political solution. In late February 1964, a Soviet delegation flew to Beijing for the start of border negotiations. At the outset, both sides appeared willing to reach a settlement. In a letter to Moscow, Beijing said that it believed a peaceful solution could be reached; that until such time the status quo on the border should be maintained; and, that even though the Treaty of Peking was “unequal,” it should be used as the basis for a “reasonable settlement” of the border. Despite this initial stalemate, Soviet and Chinese negotiators

in Oxford in 1907: “The position of a river is unmistakable, no survey is required to identify or describe it.... Rivers are lines of division as a rule very familiar to both parties, and are easily transferred to a treaty or traced on a map”. On the other hand he went on to warn, rivers as border-lines may be attended by serious drawbacks, confronting diplomatists and jurists with intricate problems”

⁷⁷⁵ Excerpts from Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) analysis titled “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969” written by Michael S. Gerson published in November 2010 available online at URL: https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0022974.A2.pdf

did make progress. Most important, the Soviets agreed that the thalweg would form the boundary in the Amur and Ussuri rivers, thereby ceding 400 river islands, including Zhenbao, to China. The negotiations drew up a draft treaty for the eastern boundary, but Moscow refused to sign it until other outstanding issues were resolved, particularly the dispute over the islands near the Soviet city of Khabarovsk.

Despite the apparent progress in reaching a peaceful resolution to the border dispute, negotiations came to an abrupt halt in July 1964. In a 10 July meeting with a visiting delegation from the Japanese Socialist Party, Mao remarked, "About a hundred years ago, the area to the east of [Lake] Baikal become Russian territory, and since then Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka, and other areas have been Soviet territory. We have not yet presented our account for this list." In response to these statements, the Soviet Union withdrew its delegation from the border negotiations. A 2 September article in *Pravda*, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, interpreted Mao's accusations as a sign of China's continued "expansionist" aspirations and its ongoing polemical "cold war" against the Soviet Union. Moscow was now facing "an openly expansionist program with far-reaching pretensions."

Khrushchev personally shot back, telling a visiting Japanese delegation on 15 September that Mao promulgated "hatred and conflict," and that Mao's arguments were similar to Hitler's *lebensraum* theories. Khrushchev also made yet another early reference to the possibility of nuclear conflict. He told the Japanese that if war was forced on the Soviet Union, "we will fight with all our strength using all our means. We have sufficiently powerful means for waging war, even unlimited I would say." If an aggressor starts a war, "they will die in it." Khrushchev concluded, "We well know the destructive force of this horrible weaponry and would not want to ever use it."

Mao later told officials from North Korea and Albania that his comments on 10 July were designed to "make [the Soviet Union] nervous" in order to "achieve a relatively rational border treaty." He was deliberately "saying a few empty words, firing a few blank shots" to "take the offensive" in the negotiations. According to Mao, Khrushchev "does not feel good if you don't fire a few blank shots at him." In actuality, Mao claimed, he did not intend to demand the return of all the lands he mentioned in his comments to the Japanese on 10 July, which totalled 1.5 million square kilometres. In responding to Khrushchev's reference to nuclear weapons, he told the Albanian Defence Minister, "Since we fired a blank round, he responded with a round of his own." Mao's characterization of Khrushchev's reference to Soviet nuclear capabilities as a "[blank] round" must also be treated carefully. Already by July 1964 Mao was firmly convinced of the growing Soviet threat to China. At a meeting of Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee, Mao said, "We cannot only concern ourselves with imperialism, while disregarding revisionism, we need to prepare for war on two fronts."⁷⁷⁶

In the beginning of 1965 the Soviet Union initiated a major military buildup along the Sino-Soviet border. In 1965 the Soviets had 14 combat divisions along the border, only 2 of which were combat-ready; by 1969, Soviet forces had increased to between 27 and 34 divisions in the border areas (about half of which were combat- adversarial relationship

⁷⁷⁶ Excerpts from Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) analysis titled "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969" written by Michael S. Gerson published in November 2010 available online at URL: https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0022974.A2.pdf

with China. ready), totalling 270,000-290,000 men. In January 1966, the Soviets signed a mutual defense treaty with Mongolia, which allowed Soviet troops and equipment to be stationed there. The Chinese threat was a key reason for the new alliance, and *Pravda* announced that Soviet and Mongolian forces would “jointly” defend their respective territories. Despite the build-up, Chinese leaders continued to assert publicly that they had the military advantage. By the mid-1960s, skirmishes on the border were occurring with increasing frequency. China accused the Soviets of “intruding” 16 times on Zhenbao Island between 23 January 1967 and 2 March 1969, and 18 times on Qiliqin Island north of Zhenbao between November 1967 and 5 January 1968. In all, China claimed the Soviets “provoked” 4,189 border incidents between 15 October 1964 and 15 March 1969. The Soviets accused China of 488 “deliberate violation[s] of the USSR state border,” between June and August 1969, and a later source claims that there were as many as 8,690 border incidents involving 35,000 Chinese, including 3,000 soldiers, between 1965 and 1968.⁷⁷⁷

The Chinese resisted the Soviet attempt to deny their people and troops' access to the border rivers, at last meeting force with force, and in an all-out battle on the ice of the Ussuri on March 15, 1969 they prevailed. With that decisive victory they brought to an end the era, beginning in the mid-19th century, in which Russia could force China to give ground. Faced with the choice of accepting defeat in border clashes or launching all-out, even nuclear war, Moscow backed off. The sporadic exchanges of gunfire along the borders ceased after a meeting of the Soviet premier, Kosygin and Zhou Enlai in Beijing in September 1969, and steadily through the 1970s and into the 1980s tension along the borders relaxed. The Soviets lifted their confluence blockade in 1977 [Maxwell 1978]. But the way to a negotiated settlement continued to be blocked by the fundamental contradiction between the two sides' approach. The deadlock persisted into the 1980s, and gave every appearance of being irresolvable. It could be broken, certainly, only if one side of the other changed, indeed reversed, its approach - and that is exactly what the USSR, under Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership, did in 1986. In a well-heralded speech in Vladivostok Gorbachev switched his government from the failed "escalation strategy" to the "cooperation strategy": he clearly signalled Moscow's new willingness to negotiate a comprehensive boundary settlement with China in the way proposed by Beijing, starting from the position that the thalweg principle ruled the river sectors. Beijing's response was prompt and positive. Real border negotiations quickly began, and showed again that even the most complex and poisoned border disputes become susceptible to resolution if both sides seek agreement, in good faith: compromises reached in the process of negotiation will develop mutual confidence.⁷⁷⁸

Through the 1990s there was a steady series of announcements from the two capitals of progressive agreement on border sectors, those then being handed over to joint commissions for the demarcation process (greatly facilitated now by aerial survey and global positioning), and then sealed in diplomatic terms. After the collapse of the USSR, agreements already reached were confirmed in Sino-Russian treaties, and the negotiations on remaining issues continued. The intractability of one or two of those

⁷⁷⁷ Excerpts from Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) analysis titled “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969” written by Michael S. Gerson published in November 2010 available online at URL: https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0022974.A2.pdf

⁷⁷⁸ Maxwell, Neville. “Settlements and Disputes: China's Approach to Territorial Issues.” *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 41, no. 36, 2006, pp. 3873–3881. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4418678. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020.

persisted, baffling the efforts of the two sides to find compromises (for example, the case of Bear Island, at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri). Rather than allowing those outstanding disputes to block the way to overall settlement, they were subjected to detailed protocols on maintenance of the status quo and left for resolution to "the greater wisdom of a later generation"; and, with those formalised exceptions, the settlement of the whole stretch of the Sino-Russian boundaries was treaty-finalised, to acclaim and mutual congratulations in Moscow and Beijing.⁷⁷⁹

Then, to the astonishment of specialists watching these events. It was announced in Vladivostok in 2005 that agreement had been reached on Bear Island and another hitherto intractable problem - after more than three centuries of dispute, China and Russia at last had boundaries settled to the last metre! While the sectors of Sino-Soviet border on the eastern rivers were the scene of the largest scale fighting in the late 1960s, the western sector, running for some 1,850 miles between the tri-junctions with Mongolia in the north and Afghanistan in the south, also saw serious skirmishes - and there the territorial disputes were older and involved tracts of territory more extensive by far than in the east. The sub-sectors of this western border were delimited in the imperial era, but there was a long-standing disagreement between Moscow and Beijing about just what the various treaties established, of which diplomatic protocols took precedence. The entire sector thus required renegotiation, and was included, but not yet agreed, in the Sino-Soviet negotiations. With the USSR's dissolution, the successor central Asian states bordering China joined the negotiations, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan forming initially a single delegation under Russian chairing (seed of the future Shanghai Cooperative Organisation). Once again, the disputes which had previously seemed intractable gave way to new approaches, and this western stretch of China's borders was also formally and amicably settled in three additional boundary treaties.⁷⁸⁰

China and Vietnam

China's border with Vietnam, some 800 miles in length, was settled as an entity with that Laos, of which it is a continuation, in negotiations between France and China in the period 1885-95. The negotiations followed some clashes on the Indo-China frontier between Chinese and French troops, and wider hostilities involving French naval forces. The French and Chinese authorities found common cause in dealing with brigandage across the frontier and a boundary between their imperial domains was delimited in a series of agreements and conventions, and to a great extent demarcated. There were never complaints from the Chinese side that these negotiations and the formal agreements they produced were in any sense "unequal", and Franco-Chinese collaboration on border questions extended into the post-second world war period. - But the relatively brief era of mutual understanding between China and its imperial neighbour France overlay an ancient history of enmity and conflict between China and Vietnam, which was to reassert itself in the three-week war in 1979 between the PRC and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The PRC presented its attack on Vietnam as a punitive foray necessitated by Vietnam's provocations along the border and Hanoi's intransigent refusal to negotiate a

⁷⁷⁹ Maxwell, Neville. "Settlements and Disputes: China's Approach to Territorial Issues." *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 41, no. 36, 2006, pp. 3873–3881. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4418678. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020.

⁷⁸⁰ Maxwell, Neville. "Settlements and Disputes: China's Approach to Territorial Issues." *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 41, no. 36, 2006, pp. 3873–3881. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4418678. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020.

settlement, likening it tacitly to China's pre-emptive and punitive offensive in the Sino-Indian border war. Deng Xiaoping, then China's leader, spoke of teaching Vietnam a lesson". In a strategic concept, the Chinese military action was certainly akin to that of 1962 against India, though on a far greater scale: a sudden assault aimed at the destruction of opposing forces, a ceasefire unilaterally declared from a position of victory and a self-timed withdrawal. But the Vietnamese fought the invading Chinese to a standstill, inflicting extremely heavy casualties, and when the Chinese announced achievement of their war aims and began their withdrawal their claims of victory were hollow.⁷⁸¹

This conflict had, in fact, little or nothing to do with the problem of the border, in which differences in treaty-interpretation were reflected on the ground in differences of little more than hundreds of metres, and the exodus from Vietnam of the Hou people, also cited by Beijing as justification for its attack, was also subsidiary. The essential issue over which the war was launched and fought was that of the relationship between Beijing and Hanoi, and the Chinese attacked to assert their regional hegemony. Vietnam, in Beijing's view, had developed a hostile, even treacherous relationship with China first through its alliance with the USSR, second in its military response to incessant incursions from its other neighbour and client of Beijing, Pol Pot's Cambodia, which it had successfully invaded, Beijing's war aims were to chastise Vietnam for its defiance and leave Hanoi weakened and chastened, and it certainly failed in the latter purpose. Vietnam stood firm - or, as Beijing would have put it, remained intransigent. Tension along the border remained high, skirmishes escalating into large-unit conflict again in 1981. It was not until the later 1990s that the two sides could see their way back into negotiations to resolve their minor border disputes, which the armed conflict had greatly magnified and entrenched. But in 2000, Beijing and Hanoi announced the settlement of the Sino-Vietnamese land boundary in a new treaty, indicating that the negotiators had succeeded in putting behind them the bitterness of their war.⁷⁸²

China and India

In reference to the land border mentioned by China, the Indian position in this matter is clear and consistent and is given below.

- According to a Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) Report, the length of our (India) land borders with China is 3488 Km.⁷⁸³

- According to the reply of LOK SABHA UNSTARRED QUESTION NO. 441 dated 23.02.2011 on "BORDER DISPUTE WITH CHINA", China continues to be in illegal occupation of approximately 38,000 sq. kms in the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir. In addition, under the so-called Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of 1963, Pakistan

⁷⁸¹ Ibid.

⁷⁸² Maxwell, Neville. "Settlements and Disputes: China's Approach to Territorial Issues." *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 41, no. 36, 2006, pp. 3873–3881. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4418678. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020.

⁷⁸³ <https://mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/BMIntro-1011.pdf>

This information is already addressed in chapter VI, titled Defence, of the Compendium under the subheading 6.1.1 Indo-China Border dispute, page 11.

illegally ceded 5,180 sq. km. of Indian Territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to China.

- China regards the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a dispute that should be settled properly through dialogue between India and Pakistan. China also disputes the international boundary between India and China. Government has conveyed to the Chinese side its clear and consistent position that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. In 2003, India and China agreed to each appoint a Special Representative to explore from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework for a boundary settlement. There have been fourteen meetings of the Special Representatives so far, the last in November 2010. An “Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question” was signed between India and China on April 11, 2005. At present the two Special Representatives are exploring the framework for a settlement covering all sectors of the boundary.⁷⁸⁴

- In another reply of LOK SABHA UNSTARRED QUESTION NO. 645 dated 26.11.2014 on “BORDER DISPUTE WITH CHINA”, China disputes the international boundary between India and China. In the Eastern Sector, China claims approximately 90,000 square kilometres of Indian territory in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. The fact that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral and inalienable part of India has been clearly conveyed to the Chinese side on several occasions, including at the highest level.

In recent years, following agreements related to India-China border have been signed between the two countries:

1. Agreement on the maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas, signed in September 1993.
2. Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the military field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas, signed in November 1996.
3. Protocol on modalities for the implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the military field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas, signed in April 2005.
4. Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question, signed in April 2005.
5. Agreement on the establishment of Working Mechanism on Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, signed in Jan 2012.
6. Border Defence Cooperation Agreement signed in October 2013.

These Agreements lay down the political parameters and guiding principles for settling the India-China boundary question, institute confidence building measures to facilitate contacts and enhance understanding and cooperation between the border defence forces as well as provide procedures to be followed where there is no common understanding of the Line of Actual Control. The two sides have agreed to appoint a Special Representative (SR) each, to explore the framework for a boundary settlement from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship. There have been seventeen meetings of SRs so far, last one in New Delhi on February 10-11, 2014. The two sides

⁷⁸⁴ <http://loksabhaph.nic.in/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=101301&lsno=15>

This information is already addressed in chapter VI, titled Defence, of the Compendium under the subheading 6.1.1 Indo-China Border dispute, page 11.

agree that peace and tranquillity on the border is the basis for the continued expansion of India-China relations.⁷⁸⁵

Military Developments during Indo-China War (1962)

Following Indo-China War of 1962, the “Henderson Brooks-PS Bhagat Report” was submitted in May 1963 by enquiry team ‘Operations Review Committee’ consisting Lieutenant General TB Henderson Brooks and Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) PS Bhagat who were asked by the Indian Army to go through the official records and prepare a report on the War. The general presented his study to the authorities and was immediately classified as “Top Secret”.⁷⁸⁶

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (GOI) has mentioned year wise developments in its Annual Reports regarding Diplomatic activities, VVIP visits, border and air intrusions, massive aggressions etc. by the Chinese Military. These details and White Paper issued by the GOI are mentioned below:

- Government of India had accorded de jure recognition to the new Government of China on the 30th December 1949.⁷⁸⁷
- A direct Delhi-Peking telegraph communication service, the second telegraph link between India and China, was inaugurated on the 3rd January 1955.⁷⁸⁸
- The cordial relations existing between India and China were strengthened further by a number of events of international importance.
- On the 29th April, 1954, an agreement was signed concerning Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India at Peking. This agreement contains, inter alia, five principles, popularly known as Panchashila, which have become the guiding principles in the relationship between India and China.
- At the invitation of the Government of India, Premier Chou Enlai visited Delhi for three days in the last week of June 1954. The two Prime Ministers discussed many matters of common concern. In the joint statement issued at the conclusion of Premier Chou Enlai’s visit, the two Prime Ministers reaffirmed their adherence to the above mentioned five principles⁷⁸⁹

Joint Statement of Prime Ministers of India and China (June 28, 1954)

His Excellency Chou Enlai, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, came to Delhi at the invitation of His Excellency Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Republic of India. He stayed here for three days. During this period the two Prime Ministers discussed many matters of common concern to India and China. In particular they discussed the prospects of peace in South East Asia and the developments that had taken place in the Geneva Conference in regard to Indo-

⁷⁸⁵ https://mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/24344/Q_NO_645_BORDER_DISPUTE_WITH_CHINA

⁷⁸⁶ A copy of the above report, claim as original by Neville Maxwell, is available at URL:

<http://www.indiandefencereview.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/TopSecretdocuments2.pdf>

⁷⁸⁷ MEA Annual Report 1949-50, Page 09, Available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2476?000>

⁷⁸⁸ MEA Annual Report 1954-55, Page 19, Available online at <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2481?000>

⁷⁸⁹ MEA Annual Report 1954-55, Page 19, Available online at <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2481?000>

China. The situation in Indo-China was of vital importance to the peace of Asia and the world and the Prime Ministers were anxious that the efforts that were being made at Geneva should succeed. They noted with satisfaction that some progress had been made in the talks at Geneva in regard to an armistice. They earnestly hoped that these efforts will meet with success in the near future and that they would result in a political settlement of the problems of that area. The talks between the Prime Ministers aimed at helping, in such ways as were possible, the efforts at peaceful settlement that were being made in Geneva and elsewhere. Their main purpose was to arrive at a clearer understanding of each other's point of view in order to help in the maintenance of peace, both in cooperation with each other and with other countries. Recently India and China have come to an agreement in which they have laid down certain principles which should guide the relations between the two countries. These principles are:

- Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- Non-aggression;
- Non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- Equality and mutual benefit; and
- Peaceful co-existence.

The Prime Ministers reaffirmed these principles and felt that they should be applied in their relations with other countries in Asia as well as in other parts of the world. If these principles are applied not only between various countries but also in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and security and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would give place to a feeling of confidence. The Prime Ministers recognised that different social and political systems exist in various parts of Asia and the world. If, however, the above-mentioned principles are accepted and acted upon and there is no interference by any one country with another, these differences should not come in the way of peace or create conflicts. With the assurance of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each country and of non-aggression, there would be peaceful co-existence and friendly relations between the countries concerned. This would lessen the tensions that exist in the world today and help in creating a climate of peace. In particular, the Prime Ministers hoped that these, principles would be applied to the solution of the problems in Indo-China where the political settlement should aim at the creation of free, democratic, unified and independent States, which should not be used for aggressive purposes or be subjected to foreign intervention. This will lead to a growth of self-confidence in these countries as well as to friendly relations between them and their neighbours.

The adoption of the principles referred to above will also help in creating an area of peace which, as circumstances permit, can be enlarged, thus lessening the chances of war and strengthening the cause of peace all over the world. The Prime Ministers expressed their confidence in, the friendship between India and China which would help the cause of world peace and the peaceful development of their respective countries as well as other countries of Asia. These conversations were held with a view to help in bringing about a greater understanding of the problems of Asia and to further a peaceful and cooperative effort, in common with other countries; of the world, in solving these and like problems. The Prime Ministers agreed that their respective countries should maintain close contacts so that there should continue to be full understanding between them. They appreciated greatly the present opportunity of meeting together and having a full

exchange of ideas leading to a clearer understanding and cooperation in the cause of peace.⁷⁹⁰At the invitation of the Government of the People's Republic of China the Prime Minister of India paid a return visit to China in the latter half of October. He was given a warm reception by the Government and people of China and exchanged views with Chinese leaders. Earlier, a Trade Agreement between India and China was signed on the 14th October, at New Delhi. The agreement was valid for an initial period of 2 years and thereafter it could be renewed by negotiation.⁷⁹¹

Extracts from the Speeches and Statements of Policy in Parliament of the Minister for External Affairs on Panchashila (Lok Sabha-September 29, 1954).

"The House (September 29, 1954) knows about the five principles, which were included in the joint statement, that we issued here when Prime Minister Chou En-Lai came here. I do not think anyone present can possibly take exception to these five principles or any of them. What were they? They were recognition of territorial integrity and sovereignty and independence, non-aggression, non-interference, mutual respect, etc. Can anyone take exception to them? And yet people have taken exception to it. On what grounds? Oh! they say "How can you believe that this will be acted upon"? Of course if you cannot believe in anything, there is no fun in talking or writing, and the only thing left is to live in isolation or to fight and subdue the other party-there is no other way. It is not a question of believing the other party's word; it is a question of creating conditions where the other party cannot break its word, or if I may say so, where it finds it difficult to break its word. May be the other party breaks its word, and it is likely to find itself in a much worse quandary. These conditions are created by the joint statement that was made both in India and in Rangoon, and if these five principles are repeated by the various countries of the world in their relations to each other, they will create an atmosphere. That does not mean that all the forces of aggression and interference and mischief in various countries have been ended. Of course not; they are there, but it does mean that you make it slightly more difficult for them to function and you encourage the other forces, and that is the way for human relationship whether of the individual or of the bigger groups"

Source: MEA Annual Report 1954-55, Page 40, available online at
URL:<https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2481?000>

⁷⁹⁰ MEA Annual Report 1954-55, Page 51, Available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2481?000>

⁷⁹¹ MEA Annual Report 1954-55, Page 19 , available online at <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2481?000>

Extracts from the Speeches and Statements of Policy in Parliament of The Minister for External Affairs on China And India (November 22, 1954)

"The mere fact of a closer understanding between India and China is a factor of vital importance not only to those two countries but to others also. Therefore, the visit of Premier Chou-En-lai to India and my visit to China assumed a significance of some historic Importance. Apart from conflicts which exist in many parts of the world, the major difficulty appears to be the prevalence of fear and the reactions to that all-pervading fear. The two great groups of nations which have been ranged against each other for several years suspect each other of aggressive designs. Each charges the other with evil intentions and with preparations for external aggression or internal subversion. Every act of one country or one group which is aimed at the other leads to a counter-act. Thus tension grows and a vicious circle continues. We discussed this matter in Peking, as we had done previously in New Delhi, and we agreed that everything should be done to remove this fear and apprehension from men's minds so as to produce an atmosphere which is more helpful in the consideration and solution of problems. The leaders of China assured me that they were anxious to do this and I have no doubt that they meant what they said because circumstances that exist today demand such a course of action even from the point of view of national interest. The 'Five, principles', or the Panchashila as I would like to call them, to which we agreed some months ago, appear to me to offer a firm basis for friendly intercourse between nations". "Briefly put, I would say that the political consequences of my visit to China were a deeper understanding between India and China. and what they stand for and what they work for, and a knowledge that there is much in common in the tasks that confront them, and it is desirable for them to cooperate in as large a measure as possible India, as she is situated geographically and politically, can be of some service in interpreting some countries to others and thus helping to remove misunderstandings. Probably my visit also helped a little in easing the existing tensions in Indo-China and in South-East Asia. As such, it helped in the larger and vital problem of world peace."

Source: MEA Annual Report 1954-55, Page 41-42, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2481?000>

Treaties, Conventions and Agreements concluded by India with China (from 1954-55)

- Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India signed at Peking on 29 April 1954;
- Trade Agreement between the Republic of India and the Republic of China signed at New Delhi on 14 October 1954.⁷⁹² The growth of Sino-Indian relations during the year was marked by visits of leading men and women from both sides and an exchange of cultural and goodwill delegations between the two countries. Sino-Indian Trade showed an upward trend. In 1954-55 figures of imports and exports showed substantial improvement in the total trade between the countries as compared to 1953-54.⁷⁹³
 - A direct Delhi-Peking telegraph communication service, the second telegraph link between India and China, was inaugurated on the 3rd January, 1955.⁷⁹⁴
 - In 1955-56, the Government of India's efforts to secure for the People's Republic of China her rightful place in the United Nations continued. India's representatives at the tenth session of the General Assembly and meetings of the United Nations organs continued to support and put forward this demand.⁷⁹⁵
 - A Protocol with the People's Republic of China regarding the handing over to the Government of China of the postal, telegraph and public telephone services and the Rest

⁷⁹² MEA Annual Report 1954-55, Page 69 , available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2481?000>

⁷⁹³ MEA Annual Report 1955-56, Page 20, Available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2482?000>

⁷⁹⁴ MEA Annual Report 1954-55, Page 19, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2481?000>

⁷⁹⁵ MEA Annual Report 1955-56, Page 20, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2482?000>

Houses operated by the Government of India in Tibet region of China signed on 1 April, 1955 at Lhasa.⁷⁹⁶

VISITS (May-December 1955)

- In May, following the invitation extended to him by the Prime Minister, Mr. Chou-Enlai, at the Bandung Conference, Shri Krishna Menon visited Peking.
- At the invitation of the Chinese Health Minister, the Health Minister of India, Raj Kumari Amrit Kaur, paid a three-week visit to China in October.
- In December, Madame Soong Ching Ling, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Peoples' Congress of China visited this country at the invitation of the Prime Minister of India. During her brief tour of various parts of the country, Madame Soong received a warm and enthusiastic welcome from the people of India.⁷⁹⁷
- A delegation of Students and Doctors led by Shri C. P. Ramaswamy Iyer and a delegation of Film artists, technicians and writers under the leadership of Shri Prithviraj Kapoor visited China during September-October 1955.
- At the invitation of the All China Athletics Federation, the Volley-ball Federation of India sent a team to China in the middle of September. The Political Science and Law Association of China invited a lawyers' Delegation which also visited China during the same month. The Governments of India and China also agreed to exchange Scholars for studies. Ten Chinese scholars arrived in India to study in various Universities and Colleges in the country. The Government of India also granted scholarships to ten students for studies in China.⁷⁹⁸

VISITS (During 1956)

- Prime Minister Chou Enlai paid three separate visits to India at the end of 1956 and spent nearly three weeks touring the country and visiting some of the important development and industrial projects. This visit, which coincided with the Buddha Jayanti celebrations, enabled the Chinese Prime Minister to participate in some of the functions. During these visits, he had important discussions with our Prime Minister on Sino-Indian relations and other international problems affecting world peace.⁷⁹⁹
- Their Holinesses, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama visited (1956) India to attend the 2500th Buddha Jayanti Celebrations. During their stay in India for two months, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, visited almost all the sacred places associated with the Buddha and also some of the important cities and development centres in India. They were received throughout India by people of all faiths with marked warmth and enthusiasm.⁸⁰⁰
- At the invitation of the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress, India sent a Parliamentary Delegation to China in September/October, 1956. The Delegation consisting of 29 members representing, both Houses of, Parliament and led by the Speaker, Shri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, was accorded a warm welcome by the Government and the people of China and toured different parts of the country.

⁷⁹⁶ MEA Annual Report 1955-56, Page 51, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2482?000>

⁷⁹⁷ MEA Annual Report 1955-56 Page 20, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2482?000>

⁷⁹⁸ MEA Annual Report 1955-56, Page 20, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2482?000>

⁷⁹⁹ MEA Annual Report 1956-57, Page 22, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2483?000>

⁸⁰⁰ MEA Annual Report 1956-57, Page 07, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2483?000>

Similarly, at the invitation of the Chinese Government, a Defence Services delegation of nine members representing the three Armed Services, under the leadership of Lt. General J. N. Chowdhury, visited military institutions and installations in different parts of China.⁸⁰¹

Trade Agreement with China signed on 25 May, 1957 at New Delhi and renewed on 25 May 1959.⁸⁰² 17 March, 1959 during the year under review, our relations with China suffered a serious setback. It will be recalled that in the middle of March 1959 there was a sudden uprising in Lhasa leading to the outbreak of hostilities between the Tibetans and the Chinese forces and, as a consequence, the Dalai Lama, with a small entourage, left Lhasa on. In view of the age-old cultural and religious relationship between Tibet and India, there was a spontaneous outburst of sympathy with the Tibetan people when the news of the disturbances was published in India. The Government of India made it clear that while they sympathised with the Tibetans in their aspirations for autonomy, they fully recognized the suzerainty of China and could not, in any way, intervene in the developments inside Tibet. When, however, the Dalai Lama sought refuge in India, the Government of India, in exercise of their sovereign right, agreed to grant asylum to him and to afford to the Dalai Lama the courtesy which befitted his recognized spiritual position. But even while evincing natural concern at the developments in Tibet, the Government of India categorically repudiated the Chinese suggestion that Indian territory was used by the Tibetan rebels as the directing centre for the uprising against the Chinese or indeed for any purpose prejudicial to Chinese interests.⁸⁰³

In 1958-59 During the month following the Tibetan disturbances, it was noted with surprise and concern that normal facilities and courtesies expected in international relations and specifically embodied in the 1954 Agreement between India and China were being denied to the Indian Representatives and Indian nationals in Tibet. Trade was adversely affected because of new currency regulations and restrictions imposed by the Chinese authorities on border type of trade. Chinese official propaganda challenged the bona fides of India's policies. The Government of India, in various notes, protested to the Chinese Government against their unfriendly attitude and against the manifold difficulties of her representatives and her nationals, but continued to affirm her faith in the importance of continuing friendly relations between the two countries.⁸⁰⁴ 1959 In the wake of the Dalai Lama, nearly 14,000 Tibetan refugees entered into India through passes in NEFA, Bhutan, Sikkim and the U.P. The Government of India, on humanitarian considerations, made arrangements, in co-operation with the Governments of West Bengal, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, for the reception and relief of the refugees who had come into Indian territory. Camps were opened in Massamari (Assam), Buxa (West Bengal) and later in Dalhousie (Punjab) for the Tibetan refugees. Later, with the co-operation of the Sikkim Darbar, nearly 4,000 of them were put on gainful work in Sikkim. The Government of India established machinery for liaison and co-operation with a non-party Central Relief Committee to utilize the generous contributions in cash and kind received from India and abroad.⁸⁰⁵

⁸⁰¹ MEA Annual Report 1956-57, Page22,available online at URL:<https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2483?000>

⁸⁰² MEA Annual Report 1957-58, Page82,available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2484?000>

⁸⁰³ MEA Annual Report 1957-58, Page 31,available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2484?000>

⁸⁰⁴ MEA Annual Report 1957-58, Page 32,available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2484?000>

⁸⁰⁵ MEA Annual Report 1957-58, Page 32,available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2484?000>

July- August 1959: The anxiety of the Indian people over the developments in Tibet had hardly abated when a number of incidents occurred, which clearly indicated that Chinese troops in considerable strength had spread themselves along the common border and at some points even intruded into Indian territory. In July, an Indian Police party, which was proceeding on a reconnaissance tour towards Khurnak, was taken into custody by Chinese troops in Indian territory in the Spanggur area, Ladakh. In August, a strong detachment of Chinese forces pushed back our defence pickets in Khinzemane area of the Kameng Frontier Division. At the end, of August, a large Chinese detachment actually attacked and overwhelmed the Indian border post at Longju resulting in the death of 3 Indian personnel and the withdrawal of the picket further south. The Government of India strongly protested against these border violations. In Khinzemane, the Indian picket re-established itself on the McMahon Line, but in the case of Longju the Government of India asked, through normal diplomatic channel, for the immediate withdrawal of the Chinese detachment.⁸⁰⁶

There was natural indignation in the country against these violations' of India's territorial integrity. This was magnified all the more when, in his letter of 8 September 1959, Premier Chou Enlai for the first time asserted Chinese claims to NEFA and large parts of Ladakh and other small pockets inside India's traditional borders. This claim came as a surprise as, in earlier years, the Chinese had always endeavoured to explain away their maps as being merely reprints of old maps, and Premier Chou Enlai, in his conversation with our Prime Minister, had virtually accepted the McMahon Line as the boundary between India and China in the eastern sector. In response to the anxiety expressed in Parliament at these developments, the Government of India released in three White Papers⁸⁰⁷ all notes, memoranda and letters exchanged between the two Governments since the conclusion of the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954. Public indignation at the action of China' was further intensified by the attack on an Indian Police rescue party in the Chang Chenmo Valley in Ladakh on 21 October 1959. Nine members of the Police party were killed and 10 unlawfully taken into custody by the Chinese troops at a point which is 40 miles within Indian territory. The Prime Minister, in a speech on the conclusion of a three-day debate in the Lok Sabha in November, affirmed that while India will always be prepared for peaceful negotiations, she could not accept any challenge to her territorial integrity and, if need be, would defend her borders land her honour with all means at her disposal.

November-December 1959: Premier Chou Enlai, in his letter dated 8 November 1959, suggested that as a prelude to discussions regarding the border, the two Prime Ministers should agree that the forces of both the countries might be withdrawn 20 kilometres from their existing lines of occupation and, at the same time, the two Prime Ministers should meet to discuss the border question. While welcoming in principle the suggestion of such a meeting, the Prime Minister of India, in his reply of 16 November, suggested that both the countries should agree not to send forward patrols and thus avoid the risk of further border incidents. In Ladakh, however, where the actual extent of occupation is itself in doubt, it was suggested that the Chinese forces should withdraw east of the frontier as

⁸⁰⁶ MEA Annual Report 1957-58, Page 32, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2484?000>

⁸⁰⁷ For the three White Papers no. 1, 2 & 3, available at: <http://www.claudearpi.net/white-papers-on-china>

White Paper 1 (1954 – August 1959)

White Paper 2 (September – November 1959)

White Paper 3 (November 1959 – March 1960)

demarcated in the Indian maps, and India, on her part, would undertake to withdraw west of the Chinese frontier as indicated in the latest Chinese maps of 1956. On 17 December Premier Chou Enlai wrote another letter to our Prime Minister suggesting immediate talks between the two Prime Ministers in China or in Rangoon. He suggested 26 December as the date for such a meeting. This was followed up later by detailed exposition of the Chinese standpoint in a note given by the Chinese Foreign Office to our Embassy in Peking on 26 December.⁸⁰⁸

Meetings were held in Delhi between the Prime Ministers of India and China from 10 to 25 April, 1960: During the year under review boundary disputes between India and China remained unresolved. China continued to remain in occupation of large areas of Indian Territory and to bring forward claims to other areas which had traditionally been part of India. The Government of India remained steadfast on their position that the frontiers of India, which are based on geographical features supported by tradition and custom, had long been clear and required no further definition. A series of meetings were held in Delhi between the Prime Ministers of India and China from 10 to 25 April, 1960, to discuss these differences. The two Prime Ministers agreed that the officials of the two Governments should meet to examine the factual material in the possession of the two Governments on which each side relied for support of its stand. It was also agreed that for the duration of these talks every effort should be made by the two parties to avoid friction and clashes in the border areas.

In February 1961, the Report of the officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the boundary question was placed before Parliament. The Report proved that the Indian alignment was well-supported by internationally accepted principles on the formation of traditional boundaries, as well as by unbroken historical evidence and administrative record. The Chinese line by contrast was found to be inconsistent in logic, poor in documentary evidence and lacking in content. There was a sharp contrast between the wealth of consistent and conclusive data produced by India and the sketchy and contradictory material brought forward by China. In the light of such incontrovertible evidence, the only course left for the Chinese was either to withdraw from the Indian territory under their unlawful occupation and make amends for their past actions or to try to ignore it completely. They did the latter. The Report was not published in China in 1961; nor did the Chinese leaders give it any serious consideration.⁸⁰⁹In pursuance of this directive, teams of officials of the two Governments held meetings spread over three sessions in Peking, Delhi and Rangoon, respectively during the period June-December 1960. The report was signed by the officials of two governments on 12 December, 1960, and has since been submitted to the two Governments. The Government of India are now examining the report to consider further action, on the question. Notwithstanding the agreement reached at the conclusion of the Prime Ministers meeting, a number of instances of violations of Indian air and ground-space along the Sino-Indian boundary came to the attention of the Government of India. Prompt protests were made to the Chinese Government against these violations. Necessary precautions were taken to strengthen the security of the border to prevent any wilful violations of the Indian frontier.

⁸⁰⁸ MEA Annual Report 1957-58, Page 33, available online at URL <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2484?000>

⁸⁰⁹ MEA Annual Report 1960-61, Page 28, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2487?000>

14 November 1960: Difficulties encountered by Indian representatives and traders in Tibet did not materially decrease and the provisions of the 1954 Agreement were not, fully observed. Indian traders continued to suffer difficulties because of the lack of facilities to repatriate their legitimate profits after the Indian and Tibetan currency were declared as illegal tender. Instances of harassment of and discrimination against Indian, nationals were also reported. In the early part of the year, the Kashmiri Muslims residing in Lhasa and neighbouring regions were subjected to severe hardship and intimidation but it was gratifying to, note that they were eventually permitted to return to India. All these difficulties were brought to the attention of the Chinese Government through official notes and memoranda. Official correspondence exchanged with the Chinese Government since March 1960 was published in White Paper No. IV⁸¹⁰ and presented to Parliament on 14th November 1960.

During the year 1960-61, the Government of India were obliged to take action under the Foreigners Act against a number of Chinese Nationals who were indulging in anti-Indian activities on Indian soil. Notwithstanding these unfortunate features the Government of India remained firm in their belief that friendly relations between the two countries are vital to the peace of Asia and the World. India continued to support the request for seating the representatives of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and continued to entertain the hope that the relations between the two countries could by persistent endeavours be restored to those of true understanding and mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.⁸¹¹ Tibetan refugees continued to arrive during the year and their total number rose to 25,000. About 17,000 refugees have been dispersed from transit camps and temporarily provided with work. The Missamari camp has been closed down. A transit camp at Bhalukpung in NEFA was started and 1,800 refugees accommodated there, The Buxa camp now accommodates about 1,500 student lamas. An equal number of old and infirm monks are accommodated at Dalhousie. A handicrafts training-cum-production centre was established at Dalhousie and employs 600 skilled Tibetan refugee craftsmen. A selfhelp centre consisting of about 200 Tibetan refugees is functioning at Darjeeling. 100 Tibetan refugees have been sent for training in small scale industries to centres at various places in India. A residential school which will eventually accommodate 500 Tibetan refugee children has been opened at Mussoorie. Efforts were being made to establish other similar institutions elsewhere. A land settlement scheme expected to provide for 500 refugees has been started at Bhalukpung in NEFA. The Mysore Government have offered facilities for the settlement of 3,000 refugees on land in their State. About 1,200 refugees are expected to be rehabilitated on land in Ladakh.⁸¹² During the year 1960-61, relations with China, strained since 1959, tended to worsen. While Chinese propaganda still sought to convey the impression that the border problem with India was a 'family affair' to be settled by negotiations, China's military activity along the border was increased in disregard of solemn Chinese assurances.

In July 1961, Shri R. K. Nehru, Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, visited China on his way back from Mongolia. It was an informal visit, which he utilised to meet the Chinese leaders and seek their reactions to the facts established by the Report of the

⁸¹⁰ for reference of **White Paper No. IV**, please check <http://www.claudearpi.net/white-papers-on-china>
White Paper 4 (April – November 1960)

⁸¹¹ MEA Annual Report 1960-61, Page 29, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2487?000>

⁸¹² MEA Annual Report 1960-61, Page 29, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2487?000>

officials. At his meetings with the Chinese leaders, he emphasised the fact that the occupation of Indian territory by China had come in the way of friendly relations between the two countries. When, on his return to India, he repeated this in a brief statement to the press, the Chinese Government charged him with prevarication and abuse of Chinese hospitality. It was pointed out to the Chinese Government that such accusations and offensive remarks were not conducive to contacts at high level between the two Governments.⁸¹³ Shri G. Parthasarathi relinquished charge as Indian Ambassador to China on 19 July 1961. The Embassy has since remained under a Charge d' Affaires.⁸¹⁴

November 1961: While no move came from the Chinese Government for further consideration of the boundary question in the light of the Report, they sent a number of notes to the Government of India, alleging that Indian troops, personnel and aircraft had repeatedly encroached on Chinese territory and air space causing tension in the border areas, that they themselves had desired to maintain the status quo and tranquillity of the border by ordering their troops not to send patrols within 20 kilometres, of the alignment claimed by them. Reports received by the Government of India established the hollowness of these Chinese protestations; for the Chinese had in fact intensified patrolling on the border, intruded on a number of occasions into Indian territory, constructed new military roads close to the border in the Middle and Eastern sectors and well within the Indian territory under their unlawful occupation on the Western sector, and set up new army posts much deeper in Indian territory than those of 1959-60. Instances of Chinese violation of Indian territory and Indian air space have been cited in recent notes sent by the Government of India to the Government of China and published in White Paper No. V⁸¹⁵, presented to Parliament in November 1961.

1962: During the first three months of 1962, there was a further exchange of correspondence with the Government of China about the Sino-Indian border. The Government of China continued to make baseless charges of Indian intrusions into Chinese territory and air space. These charges have been refuted in detail. At the same time, the attention of the Government of China has been drawn to the fact that, contrary to their contention, it is they who have intruded into and occupied large tracts of Indian territory. While declaring their willingness to consider certain minor mutual adjustments of the border in the interests of friendship between the peoples of India and China, the Government of India have firmly rejected the untenable Chinese claim that the entire boundary between India and China has not been delimited and should be the subject of negotiations. The Government of India have pointed out the absurdity of Chinese allegations that certain areas in the Middle and Eastern sections of the boundary, which are traditionally and legally a part of India, have been "occupied" in recent years by Indian authorities. They have also repudiated the Chinese attempt to justify their illegal occupation of areas in the Western sector of the border by threatening to occupy Indian territory in the Eastern sector. The Government of India have reiterated their desire for peace and friendship with China; but pointed out that this could only be ensured by the withdrawal of Chinese forces from all areas which have traditionally been a part of India. Indian Missions in China continue to suffer from various restrictions. Even for the celebration of the Indian Republic Day on 26 January 1962, the Chinese authorities

⁸¹³ MEA Annual Report 1961-62, Page 34, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2488?000>

⁸¹⁴ MEA Annual Report 1961-62, Page 34, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2488?000>

⁸¹⁵ for reference of **White Paper No. V**, please check <http://www.claudearpi.net/white-papers-on-china>
White Paper 5 (November 1960 – November 1961)

delayed providing hotel accommodation until it was too late, and the facilities could not be utilised.

In August-September 1961, the Government of India received confirmatory reports that Chinese force had established three new army posts in Ladakh at point 780 12' E and 35deg 19' N at NYAGZU and near DAMBUGURU and had constructed roads to link these posts with their bases in the rear. The note of the Government of China of 30 November 1961 admitted the existence of their army posts at point 780 12' E and 35 19' N and at NYAGZU but denied that there was any post near DAMBUGURU. It has been checked and confirmed that a Chinese army post exists about 11/2 miles southwest of DAMBUGURU.⁸¹⁶

During the year 1961-62, there was a further curtailment of the economic and cultural facilities provided to Indian traders and pilgrims in Tibet under the 1954 Agreement. Indian traders had to contend with restrictions on their movements, a termination of the traditional pattern of barter trade, ban on the export of conventional merchandise to India, and the denial of facilities for the repatriation of their assets and profits to India. At the same time the Chinese persisted in their policy of discouraging the payment of debts by Tibetans to Indian traders. These restrictive trade and fiscal policies, together with the acts of discrimination against Indian traders, led to a serious fall in Indo-Tibetan trade, and caused a sharp decline in the customary number of Indian trading establishments in Yatung. Indian Missions in Tibet, which had been guaranteed certain rights and immunities under the 1954 Agreement, fared no better. The numerous restrictions placed on them greatly reduced their sphere of activity. The Indian Trade Agencies at Gyantse and Gartok were unable to start building of the Agency accommodation (mere mud-huts in Gartok) because of the dilatory and obstructive tactics of the Chinese authorities.

The Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 expires on 2 June 1962. Under Article VI of the Agreement a request had to be made by either party by 1 December 1961, for its renewal. Neither party made any such move by the due date; but on 3 December 1961 the Government of China offered to negotiate a new agreement. They sought in particular to separate the Sino-Indian border problem and the question of trade relations between India and Tibet. This was not acceptable to the Government of India. Replying to the Chinese offer, the Government of India asked for a reversal of the aggressive policies pursued by the Government of China during the last few years and the restoration of a climate of peace which would assure the strict observance of the Five Principles both in letter and spirit as essential pre-requisites to negotiations for a new agreement.

During the year, it was found that Chinese nationals resident in India served with notices to quit India for engaging in subversive activities, against the State, were either defying these orders or seeking to defeat them. The Government of India had, therefore, to deport some of them. 12 have been deported out of a total Chinese population of over 12,000 in India.⁸¹⁷ Tibetan refugees continued to arrive during the year, and the total number rose to 33,000. The number of new arrivals till October 1961 was 4,091. 5,000 refugees are still in various transit camps awaiting dispersal. The responsibility for providing

⁸¹⁶ MEA Annual Report 1961-62, Page 35, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2488?000>

⁸¹⁷ MEA Annual Report 1961-62, Page 36, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2488?000>

educational facilities to the Tibetan refugees was transferred to the Ministry of Education, and a Central Committee was set up for coordinating such educational activities. A Tibetan Schools Society, with the representatives of the Government of India and the Dalai Lama as members, has been formed. It has been entrusted with the management of the Mussoorie School. The new schools, at Simla and Darjeeling, were opened during the year. The Government took over the Tibetan Refugees Handicraft Training Centre at Dalhousie. The Centre is now being managed by the Indian Co-operative Union on behalf of the Government. Schemes for the re-settlement on land at Periyapattana of 3,000 refugees, and of about 900 more in Ladakh were sanctioned and are being implemented. Offers from the Governments of Madhya Pradesh and Orissa to provide land for the re-settlement of Tibetan refugees in agricultural colonies are being considered.⁸¹⁸ During the year 1962-63, the three Trade Agencies at Gartok, Gyantse and Yatung, and the Consulates-General at Lhasa and Shanghai, were closed down. The earlier arrangement, under which our Ambassador in China was accredited to this country respectively, has been altered.⁸¹⁹

May-December 1962: Pakistan agreed in May 1962 to negotiate with China regarding part of the border of Kashmir with Sinkiang. As Pakistan has no border with China, the Government of India protested to both China and Pakistan over the illegality of their negotiations, reaffirmed India's sovereignty over the territory concerned and declared that India would not recognise any demarcation of the borders by- them. However, on 26 and 28 December 1962, it was announced that China and Pakistan had agreed in principle on the location and alignment of the boundary actually existing between the two countries and intended to, sign a border agreement on this basis. The Indian delegation, then at Rawalpindi, expressed "surprise and regret" at the nature and timing of this announcement. This was followed by protests which the Government of India lodged with the Governments of China and Pakistan reaffirming India's sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir and repudiating the validity of any agreement between parties who had no legal or constitutional locus standi in respect of Indian territory.⁸²⁰

During the year 1962-63, China intensified her aggressive military activities all along the Indian border. Chinese forces crossed the frontier in the north-west corner of NEFA on 8 September 1962 and after a series of probing attacks mounted on 20 October 1962 a large-scale attack on Indian territory in both the Western and the Eastern Sectors. Anti-Indian propaganda in the Chinese and Tibetan press reached its peak during the year. This was stepped up towards the last few months in support of the Chinese massive aggression. Early in 1962 Chinese troops intensified their aggressive forward patrolling in the Western Sector of the India-China boundary. On 30 April 1962 the Government of China repeated their threat that they, would order the extension of patrolling along the entire boundary. They also continued to set up a number of new aggressive military posts in the Ladakh region. To eliminate the possibility of military clashes the Government of India once again suggested on 14 May 1962 that, as an interim measure in the Ladakh region, Indian forces should withdraw west of the Chinese claim line as shown on Chinese maps and Chinese forces should withdraw east of the traditional international boundary. This would create the proper atmosphere for peaceful talks on the boundary question between the two Governments. India was further willing to permit the continued use of

⁸¹⁸ MEA Annual Report 1961-62, Page 37, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2488?000>

⁸¹⁹ MEA Annual Report 1962-63, Pg 04, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2489?000>

⁸²⁰ MEA Annual Report 1962-63, Pg 19, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2489?000>

the Aksai Chin road for Chinese civilian traffic. This proved India's earnest desire to settle the boundary question.⁸²¹ May-June 1962: In their reply dated 2 June 1962, however, the Chinese Government brusquely, rejected the offer. Also, while notes were being still exchanged on the renewal of the Sino-Indian Trade Agreement of 1954, the Government of China, in May 1962, in sharp contrast to their repeated declaration that they desired to renew the Agreement, suddenly withdrew their Trade Agencies in Kalimpong and Calcutta. The Government of India had always provided the Chinese Trade Agencies with requisite facilities for their functioning. On the other hand the Government of China had denied even normal facilities to Indian Trade Agencies in Tibet, and held out veiled threats when reasonable time for withdrawal was sought. The experience of Indian Trade Agencies in Tibet, and the systematic Chinese aggression made it clear from the beginning that China had no intention of conforming to the provisions of the 1954 Agreement. By their actions the Chinese Government had shown their complete disregard of the letter and the spirit of the Agreement as well as of the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence enunciated in the Preamble to the Agreement. The Agreement itself lapsed on 2 June 1962.

July-September 1962: Cases of violation of Indian air space by Chinese aircraft also increased during the year. The Government of India lodged serious protests against this. The Chinese Government resorted to sending notes alleging "intrusions" on the part of Indian aircraft over territories which are parts of India. In July 1962 Chinese troops encircled an Indian post in the Galwan Valley. There were clashes in the Pangong Lake area. In a note dated 26 July 1962 the Government of India referred to the tense situation prevailing in Ladakh and indicated their willingness to enter into discussions on the India-China boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials submitted in December 1961 as soon as the present tensions have been eased and a suitable climate for talks and discussions is created. On 22 August, the Government of India suggested that discussions should be held between the two Governments for the definition of measures to restore the status quo of the boundary in the Ladakh region which had been altered by force since 1957, and to remove the current tensions in this area so as to create an appropriate climate for purposeful discussions. In their reply dated 13 September 1962 the Chinese Government demanded that Indian troops should withdraw from all sectors of the India-China boundary and asserted that the Indian Government had attached preconditions to negotiations.

During the year (8 September-20 October 1962), China intensified her aggressive military activities all along the Indian border. Chinese forces crossed the frontier in the north-west corner of NEFA on 8 September 1962 and after a series of probing attacks mounted on 20 October 1962 a large-scale attack on Indian territory in both the Western and the Eastern Sectors. Anti-Indian propaganda in the Chinese and Tibetan press reached its peak during the year. This was stepped up towards the last few months in support of the Chinese massive aggression. While notes on the holding of preliminary discussions were still being exchanged, Chinese troops suddenly marched across the well-established and hitherto peaceful international boundary in the Eastern Sector. Even then the Government of India continued to maintain a moderate attitude and requested the Government of China on 6 October 1962 to correct the situation created by

⁸²¹ MEA Annual Report 1962-63, Pg 25, available online at URL <https://mea.lib.nic.in/?pdf2489?000>

the presence of Chinese troops south of the Mc Mahon Line, to withdraw these forces and undo the wilful and deliberate alteration, of the status quo in a new sector of the boundary.⁸²²

Till 8 September 1962 no Chinese forces had crossed the traditional frontier between India and China in the Eastern Sector along the highest watershed ridge in the region. The massive attacks simultaneously mounted by China in the Eastern and Western Sectors of the India-China border on 20 October 1962 destroyed all hope of settling the India-China differences in accordance with normal international practices. On 24 October 1962, four days after the Chinese massive attack, the Chinese Government proposed that the two countries should agree to respect 'the line of actual control' as defined by China and that the armed forces of each side should withdraw 20 Kilometres from this line and disengage. When these Chinese proposals which were plainly terms of surrender were not accepted by India, China continued her invasion of Indian territory and launched further massive attacks on Jang, Walong, Tawang, Se La, Bomdi La and other places in NEFA and on Indian posts in the Chip Chap, Galwan and Chang Chenmo valleys and the Pangong-Spanggur Lake areas in Ladakh. After over-running large areas of Indian territory, the Chinese Government announced, on the morning of 21 November 1962, a unilateral cease-fire which was obviously calculated to retain the gains of their latest aggression.

The wording of the Chinese statement was deliberately vague and ambiguous. Although clarifications were sought, it was clear that the Chinese Government had no intention of defining, with any degree of precision, the base line from which they proposed to carry out Withdrawals in both the Western and Eastern Sectors. The line that they referred to as the 'LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL' of 7 November 1962 was by all indications in the Western Sector the line which the Chinese forces had reached only as a result of their latest massive aggression launched from 20 October. In the Eastern Sector it differed in some places from the highest watershed which is the natural frontier. Though put in the garb of a cease-fire declaration, this was the same as the earlier three-point proposal.⁸²³ Since October 1962 the Indian Consulates-General in Lhasa and Shanghai had been subjected to a number of additional restrictions. Ever since 1959 the movements of Indian staff there had been restricted and they had been denied any contacts with the local population. They were also not permitted to move beyond the municipal limits of the city. The telegraphic contact with the Indian Consulate General in Lhasa was completely cut off between 9 and 25 October 1962.

The telephonic communications of the Consulate-General were also interfered with during this period and outsiders were forbidden to enter the premises of the Consulate-General. Supplies of essential commodities such as milk, eggs and firewood were stopped⁸²⁴ 15 December 1962: In view of the restrictions and curbs imposed by the Chinese Government it was finally decided by the Government of India to withdraw the Indian Consulates-General at Shanghai and Lhasa with effect from 15 December 1962 as these Consular Posts were no longer able to perform their normal duties. The Chinese Government were informed of this decision and requested to take similar action in respect of the Chinese Consulates-General at Bombay and Calcutta. Indian Consulates-

⁸²² MEA Annual Report 1962-63, Pg 26, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2489?000>

⁸²³ MEA Annual Report 1962-63, Pg 26, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2489?000>

⁸²⁴ MEA Annual Report 1962-63, Pg 28, Available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2489?000>

General at Lhasa and Shanghai were closed on 15 December and Officers and staff members returned to India thereafter. The Chinese closed their Consulates-General at Bombay and Calcutta and their officers and staff members left for China.⁸²⁵

Pakistan-China alliance.

The year 1963 also saw the Pakistan-China alliance take shape and form. It would be futile to deny that China has begun to cast deep shadows over Indo-Pakistan relations, to the extent of coming to a possible rapprochement over individual issues. Thus, Pakistan offered gratis to China the services of her Foreign Secretary, Mr. S. K. Dehlavi, who embarked upon a tour of some European States to minimise the Chinese threat to India and dissuade them from helping India.⁸²⁶ Kashmir: Joint talks on Kashmir and other related matters were undertaken at Minister-level between the representatives of India and Pakistan under a joint statement issued by the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India. These began towards the end of December 1962 and continued till the middle of May 1963. The talks, despite every effort made by Sardar Swaran Singh to, arrive at an equitable and honourable settlement, ended in failure. From the beginning, the Government of Pakistan various steps which came in the way of a settlement-the so-called agreement with China on Kashmir's border with Sinkiang and an unprecedented campaign of vilification against India, in Pakistan as also in the capitals of Europe, in violation of a joint appeal by the two Ministers for moderation in mutual criticism. Under the Sino-Pakistani Agreement, Pakistan gave away about 2,000 square miles of Indian territory to China, with which it has no border.⁸²⁷

Pakistan's growing collusion with China against India was no longer in doubt. Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Mr. Bhutto, declared in the Pakistan National Assembly, that the security and integrity of Pakistan involved the security and integrity of the largest State in Asia. The reference was obviously to China. On another occasion he stated that even if the Kashmir issue was settled amicably, Pakistan would not go to the defence of India against China. This showed why Pakistan had rejected India's offer of a No-war Agreement and the Prime Minister's assurance that arms received from friendly countries for India's defence against China would not be used against Pakistan.

It is significant that when India was attacked by China in October 1962, Pakistan was one of the very few countries which offered no sympathy or support to India. On the other hand, a Pakistani public man in a key position, assured the late Mr. John Strachey, the Labour M.P., that if China attacked India again, "he and his friends would not miss their opportunity this time", but would immediately attack India.⁸²⁸ On 4 March 1963, the Governments of China and Pakistan announced that, on 2 March 1963, the two Governments had "reached an agreement in principle regarding the alignment of the boundary between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan". Under this agreement, a Joint Boundary Demarcation Commission was stated to have been entrusted with the responsibility of implementing this "agreement" on the ground by the erection of boundary pillars. The Government of India immediately protested to both the Governments that there was no

⁸²⁵ MEA Annual Report 1962-63, Pg 29, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2489?000>

⁸²⁶ MEA Annual Report 1963-64, Pg 27, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2490?000>

⁸²⁷ MEA Annual Report 1963-64, Pg 28, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2490?000>

⁸²⁸ MEA Annual Report 1963-64, Pg 29, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2490?000>

common boundary between China and Pakistan and that the Government of India would not recognise any illegal arrangements involving Indian territory between parties that had, no legal or constitutional locus standi in the matter. The Chinese objective clearly was to come to terms on the question of the ownership of Kashmir and involve itself in its neighbour's dispute.

The Government of China took this deliberate step to exacerbate relations between the Governments of India and Pakistan. On 13 August 1963, the Prime Minister laid White Paper No. IX on the floor of both Houses of Parliament, containing the notes, memorandum and letters exchanged between the Government of India and China for the period January-July 1963. The Prime Minister made a statement on Chinese troop concentrations in the Lok Sabha on 16 August 1963. He said that, while professing to solve the dispute by peaceful means, the Chinese had further augmented their forces all along the India-China border. The numerous "civil post" set up by the Chinese had become military in character.

The strength of Chinese troops on the border was also greater than that which existed prior to the Chinese aggression in October-November 1962. While increasing their own troop dispositions all along the India-China border, the Chinese Government had been making baseless allegations about intrusions by Indian troops into Chinese territory and violations of Chinese airspace by Indian aircraft. The policy of the Government of India, in deference to the Colombo proposals, was that Indian military personnel would not cross the so-called "line of actual control" all along the India- China border.⁸²⁹

Further, the Governments of China and Pakistan agreed to despatch representatives to take action in respect of demarcating the so-called boundary on the ground. The Government of India protested against this on 30 September 1963 and pointed out that contrary to the Chinese Government's earlier statement, that the "agreement" was only provisional in character, the announcement that boundary demarcation teams of both sides had reached agreement on ground survey, aerial photography and erection of boundary markers along the border showed that, there was nothing provisional about the illegal "agreement" as these arrangements are normally made for the permanent demarcation of an international frontier. By 9 June 1963, 3,942 persons captured by Chinese forces on Indian territory during the armed conflict of October-November 1962, were repatriated to India.⁸³⁰

In contrast to the observance of the Geneva Convention by the Government of India, the Chinese Government rejected the requests made by the International Committee of Red Cross to be permitted to inspect the POW camps in China where Indian prisoners were held. Furthermore, the Chinese authorities violated the Geneva Convention by not extending facilities to Indian authorities to carry out the last rites, according to normal customary and religious practices, of Indian soldiers who had died during the hostilities in October November 1962.⁸³¹

⁸²⁹ MEA Annual Report 1963-64, Pg 40, available at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2490?000>

⁸³⁰ MEA Annual Report 1963-64, Pg 41, available online at URL <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2490?000>

⁸³¹ MEA Annual Report 1963-64, Pg 42, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2490?000>

Maritime Territorial Disputes⁸³²

China is a party to multiple maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS), including in particular the following:

- a dispute over the Paracel Islands in the SCS, which are claimed by China and Vietnam, and occupied by China;
- a dispute over the Spratly Islands in the SCS, which are claimed entirely by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and in part by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, and which are occupied in part by all these countries except Brunei;
- a dispute over Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, which is claimed by China, Taiwan, and the Philippines, and controlled since 2012 by China; and
- a dispute over the Senkaku Islands in the ECS, which are claimed by China, Taiwan, and Japan, and administered by Japan.

EEZ Dispute


In addition to maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, China is involved in a dispute, principally with the United States, over whether China has a right under international law to regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating within China's EEZ. The position of the United States and most other countries is that while the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which established EEZs as a feature of international law, gives coastal states the right to regulate economic activities (such as fishing and oil exploration) within their EEZs, it does not give coastal states the right to regulate foreign military activities in the parts of their EEZs beyond their 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. The position of China and some other countries (i.e., a minority group among the world's nations) is that UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to regulate not only economic activities, but also foreign military activities, in their EEZs. The dispute over whether China has a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating within its EEZ appears to be at the heart of incidents between Chinese and U.S. ships and aircraft in international waters and airspace dating back at least to 2001.⁸³³

Note: The Doklam Military Standoff in 2017 involved Indian military efforts to block Chinese strategic road construction in an area of disputed ownership between China and Bhutan. Despite the limited territorial scope of this military interaction, the crisis between Beijing and New Delhi quickly escalated to include mutual force build-ups near that area and an exchange of explicit war threats. The information on it is already addressed in chapter VI, titled Defence, of the Compendium under the subheading 6.1.1 Indo-China Border dispute, page 12.

China's government has published a policy paper titled "[China's position in the Sikkim section of the Sino-Indian border](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/P020170802541371281020.pdf)" can be accessed online at URL: <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/P020170802541371281020.pdf>

⁸³² Excerpts from Congressional Research Service Reports on Foreign Policy and Regional Affairs titled 'U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress' published in March, 2020 available online at URL: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf>

⁸³³ Excerpts from Congressional Research Service Reports on Foreign Policy and Regional Affairs titled 'U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress' published in March, 2020 available online at URL: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf>



Source: BBC News (2016) based on data from UNCLOS and CIA.

Available online at URL: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf>

Notes: (1) The red line shows the area that would be enclosed by connecting the line segments in the map of the nine-dash line. Although the label on this map states that the waters inside the red line are “China’s claimed territorial waters,” China has maintained ambiguity over whether it is claiming full sovereignty over the entire area enclosed by the nine line segments. (2) The EEZs shown on the map do not represent the totality of maritime territorial claims by countries in the region. Vietnam, to cite one example, claims all of the Spratly Islands, even though most or all of the islands are outside the EEZ that Vietnam derives from its mainland coast.

China’s Approach to the SCS and ECS⁸³⁴

In General China’s approach to maritime disputes in the SCS and ECS, and to strengthening its position over time in the SCS, can be characterized in general as follows:

- China appears to have identified the assertion and defense of its maritime territorial claims in the SCS and ECS, and the strengthening of its position in the SCS, as important national goals.
- To achieve these goals, China appears to be employing an integrated, whole-of-society strategy that includes diplomatic, informational, economic, military, paramilitary/law enforcement, and civilian elements.
- In implementing this integrated strategy, China appears to be persistent, patient, tactically flexible, willing to expend significant resources, and willing to absorb at least some amount of reputational and other costs that other countries might seek to impose on China in response to China’s actions.

⁸³⁴ Excerpts from Congressional Research Service Reports on Foreign Policy and Regional Affairs titled ‘U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress’ published in March, 2020 available online at URL: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf>

Table 1 summarizes China’s apparent goals relating to the South China, and the types of actions it undertakes in support of those goals, as assessed by the Center for a New American Security in a January 2020 report on China’s strategy for the South China Sea.

Table 1. China’s Apparent Goals and Supporting Actions for South China Sea

As assessed in January 2020 CNAS report

Supporting actions	Apparent goals				
	Rally support domestically	Deter U.S.	Intimidate neighbors and encourage appeasement/compliance	Tempt neighbors to cooperate in exchange for future economic benefits	Reinforce image of China as an economic powerhouse
PLA operations ^a	X	X	X		
China Coast Guard operations ^b	X	X	X		
Maritime militia swarming			X		
Dredging fleet and island construction team operations ^c	X	X	X		
Operations by state banks and state-owned enterprises ^d				X	X
State media operations ^e	X	X	X		

Source: Adapted by CRS from table on page 20 of Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan Neuhard, *Total Competition, China’s Challenge in the South China Sea*, Center for a New American Security, January 2020.

“Salami-Slicing” Strategy and Grey Zone Operations

Observers frequently characterize China’s approach to the SCS and ECS as a “salami-slicing” strategy that employs a series of incremental actions, none of which by itself is a *casus belli*, to gradually change the status quo in China’s favour. Other observers have referred to China’s approach as a strategy of grey zone operations (i.e., operations that reside in a grey zone between peace and war), of creeping annexation or creeping invasion, or as a “talk and take” strategy, meaning a strategy in which China engages in (or draws out) negotiations while taking actions to gain control of contested areas.⁸³⁵

Island Building and Base Construction

Perhaps more than any other set of actions, China’s island-building (aka land-reclamation) and base-construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands in the SCS have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is rapidly gaining effective control of the SCS. China’s large-scale island-building and base-construction activities in the SCS appear to have begun around December 2013, and were publicly reported starting in May 2014. Awareness of, and concern about, the activities appears to have increased substantially following the posting of a February 2015 article showing a series of “before and after” satellite photographs of islands and reefs being changed by the work. China occupies seven sites

⁸³⁵ Excerpts from Congressional Research Service Reports on Foreign Policy and Regional Affairs titled ‘U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress’ published in March, 2020 available online at URL: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf>

in the Spratly Islands. It has engaged in island-building and facilities construction activities at most or all of these sites, and particularly at three of them—Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef, all of which now feature lengthy airfields as well as substantial numbers of buildings and other structures. Although other countries, such as Vietnam, have engaged in their own island-building and facilities-construction activities at sites that they occupy in the SCS, these efforts are dwarfed in size by China’s island-building and base construction activities in the SCS.⁸³⁶

Other Chinese Actions That Have Heightened Concerns

In addition to island-building and base-construction activities, additional Chinese actions in the SCS and ECS that have heightened concerns among U.S. observers include the following, among others:

- China’s actions in 2012, following a confrontation between Chinese and Philippine ships at Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, to gain de facto control over access to the shoal and its fishing grounds;
- China’s announcement on November 23, 2013, of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the ECS that includes airspace over the Senkaku Islands;³³
- frequent patrols by Chinese Coast Guard ships—some observers refer to them as harassment operations—at the Senkaku Islands;
- Chinese pressure against the small Philippine military presence at Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands, where a handful of Philippine military personnel occupy a beached (and now derelict) Philippine navy amphibious ship;
- a growing civilian Chinese presence on some of the sites in the SCS occupied by China in the SCS, including both Chinese vacationers and (in the Paracels) permanent settlements; and
- the movement of some military systems to its newly built bases in the SCS.

Negotiations on SCS Code of Conduct (COC)

In 2002, China and the 10 member states of ASEAN signed a nonbinding Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea in which the parties, among other things:

reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law

⁸³⁶ Excerpts from Congressional Research Service Reports on Foreign Policy and Regional Affairs titled ‘U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress’ published in March, 2020 available online at URL: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf>

of the Sea....undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner....reaffirm that the adoption of a [follow-on] code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective .

In July 2011, China and ASEAN adopted a preliminary set of principles for implementing the DOC. U.S. officials since 2010 have encouraged ASEAN and China to develop the follow-on binding Code of Conduct (COC) mentioned in the final quoted paragraph above. China and ASEAN have conducted negotiations on the follow-on COC, but China has not yet agreed with the ASEAN member states on a final text. On March 8, 2017, China announced that the first draft of a framework for the COC had been completed, and that “China and ASEAN countries feel satisfied with this.” On May 18 and 19, 2017, it was reported that the China and the ASEAN countries had agreed on the framework.¹³¹ A May 18, 2017, press report stated that [China’s Vice-Foreign Minister] Liu Zhemin “called on others to stay out [of the negotiations], apparently a coded message to the United States. ‘We hope that our consultations on the code are not subject to any outside interference,’ Liu said.” An August 3, 2017, press report stated that “the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has omitted references to China’s most controversial activities in its joint communique, a draft reviewed by Reuters shows. In addition, a leaked blueprint for establishing an ASEAN-China code of maritime conduct does not call for it to be legally binding, or seek adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).” An August 6, 2017, press report stated that “Southeast Asian nations agreed with China on Sunday [August 6] to endorse a framework for a maritime code of conduct that would govern behaviour in disputed waters of the South China Sea, a small step forward in a negotiation that has lasted well over a decade. The unsticking of the framework after years of obstruction is widely seen as a concession by China, which has opposed any legally binding code on maritime engagement, stepped up naval patrols and built artificial islands to enforce its claims, equipping them with military weapons.”

Some observers have argued that China has been dragging out the negotiations on the COC for years as part of a “talk and take strategy,” meaning a strategy in which China engages in (or draws out) negotiations while taking actions to gain control of contested areas.⁸³⁷

China’s position on South China Sea Dispute.

China’s contestation for the whole of the SCS and its land territories as part of their sovereign rights has been propagated upon a 2000 year old history, with the Chinese believing that it was their ancestors (Ming and Han dynasties) who first discovered and occupied the territories of SCS.

⁸³⁷ Excerpts from Congressional Research Service Reports on Foreign Policy and Regional Affairs titled ‘U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress’ published in March, 2020 available online at URL: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf>

China's sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea is historically established⁸³⁸

1. As early as the Western Han Dynasty in the 2nd century BC, the Chinese people sailed in the South China Sea and discovered the South China Sea islands in long-term practice. Ancient Chinese historical books, such as "Foreign Objects" of the Eastern Han Dynasty, "Funan Biography" during the Three Kingdoms period, "Dream Records" and "Acknowledgements of Lingwai" in the Song Dynasty, "Shiyi Zhilue" in the Yuan Dynasty, "East and West", "Guide to the Wind", "Guide Zhengfa" and "Hai Guo Wen Jian Lu" in the Qing Dynasty not only recorded the activities of the Chinese people in the South China Sea, but also recorded the geographical location and landforms of the islands in the South China Sea.

2. The naming of the South China Sea islands by the Chinese people is partly quoted by Western navigators and marked in some authoritative navigation guides and charts from the 19th to 20th centuries. Such as Nanyit (Hongxiu Island), Sin Cowe (Jinghong Island), Subi (Zhubi Jiao) come from Hainan dialect pronunciation "Nanyi", "Weighing hook", "Ugly".

3. Many foreign documents have documented the fact that for a long period of time only Chinese people lived and produced in the Nansha Islands. The British Navy's "Guide to the China Sea" published in 1868 mentioned the Zhenghe Group Reefs of the Nansha Islands: "Hainan fishermen live by capturing sea cucumbers and shells, and each island has its own footprint, and some live on the island reefs". Various editions of "China Maritime Records" in 1912, 1923, 1937, etc., stated that Chinese fishermen produced and lived on the Nansha Islands.

4. In the Song Dynasty, China set up economic and pacification ambassadors in the Guangxi and Guangxi regions, with Suinan in total. In the Song Dynasty General Zeng Gongliang mentioned in the Song Dynasty that in order to strengthen the coastal defense of the South China Sea, it set up a sea inspector to inspect the South China Sea. In the Qing Dynasty, the "Qiongzhou Mansion" edited by Mingyi and the "Yazhouzhi" edited by Zhong Yuandi all included "Shitang" and "Changsha" in the "Hai Phong" entry.

5. The governments of successive generations of China have also marked the South China Sea islands as Chinese territory on official maps. "General Map of the World" in the "Divisional Map of the Direct Qing Provinces of the Qing Dynasty" in 1755, "Map of the Ten Thousand Years of the Qing Dynasty" in 1767, "The Geographical Map of the Ten Thousand Years of the Qing Dynasty" in 1810, and "The Unification of the World in the Qing Dynasty" in 1817 All maps and other maps have drawn the South China Sea islands into China.

⁸³⁸ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "China insists on resolving disputes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea through negotiations" published in July 2016, available online at URL:

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/zcwj_674915/t1380600.shtml

China has always firmly maintained its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea⁸³⁹

1. China's sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea did not encounter any challenges before the 20th century. From the 1930s to the 1940s, France and Japan illegally invaded some islands and reefs of China's Nansha Islands by force. In response, the Chinese people stood up to resist. At that time, the Chinese government took a series of measures to defend the sovereignty of the Nansha Islands.

2. In 1933, France once invaded some islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands and issued a government bulletin declaring "occupation", creating the "Nine Isles Incident". All walks of life in China have reacted strongly and protested in groups, condemning the French aggression. Chinese fishermen living in the Nansha Islands also resisted on the ground. Fu Hongguang, Ke Jiayu, Zheng Landing and others cut down the French flagpoles flying French flags on the islands of Taiping, Beizi, Nungwi and Zhongye.

3. After the "Nine Isles Incident", a spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the islands of the Nansha Islands "only have fishermen on the island and are internationally recognized as Chinese territory." At the same time, the Guangdong Provincial Government, in response to France, tricked Chinese fishermen into flying the French flag, ordered county magistrates to announce that Chinese fishing vessels operating in the Nansha Islands and sea areas were prohibited from flying foreign flags, and issued Chinese flags to fishermen to fly.

4. During the war of aggression against China, Japan illegally occupied the islands of the South China Sea. The Chinese people resisted bravely against Japanese aggression. With the advancement of the World Anti-Fascist War and the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War, China, the United States and Britain issued the "Cairo Declaration" in December 1943 solemnly announcing that Japan must return the stolen Chinese territory to China. In July 1945, China, the United States, and the United Kingdom issued the Potsdam Proclamation, of which Article 8 clearly stated that "the conditions of the Cairo Declaration will be implemented."

5. In August 1945, Japan announced its acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation's unconditional surrender. From November to December 1946, the Chinese government appointed Colonel Lin Zun and other senior military and political officials to take four warships "Yongxing", "China Construction", "Taiping", and "Zhongye" to the Xisha and Nansha Islands.

6. After the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, it has repeatedly reaffirmed and adopted measures such as legislation, administrative rule, and diplomatic negotiations to further safeguard its sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and related rights and interests in the South China Sea. China's patrolling, law enforcement, resource development and scientific investigations of the South China Sea islands and related waters have never been interrupted.

⁸³⁹ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "China insists on resolving disputes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea through negotiations" published in July 2016, available online at URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/zcwj_674915/t1380600.shtml

7. In August 1951, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai issued a "Statement on the Draft Treaty between the United States and Britain on Japan and the San Francisco Conference", stating, "The Xisha Islands and Nungwi Islands are just like the entire Nansha Islands, Zhongsha Islands and Dongsha Islands, Territories, although they once fell when the Japanese imperialists launched the war of aggression, but after Japan's surrender, they were completely taken over by the Chinese government at that time. Whether or not the draft stipulates and how to stipulate it will not be affected in any way.

8. In May 1996, the Chinese government announced that 49 territorial sea-base points and straight-line territorial baselines connected by straight lines, and 28 territorial sea-base points and straight-line baselines of the Xisha Islands along the coast of mainland China, from the high corner of Shandong to the steep corner of Hainan Island, and announced The remaining territorial sea baseline will be announced separately.

9. In June 1998, China promulgated the Law of the People's Republic of China on Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelf, which established the basic legal system of China's Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelf and clearly stated: "The provisions of this Law do not affect the Historic rights".

10. In June 2012, the State Council approved the cancellation of the offices of the Xisha Islands, Nansha Islands, and Zhongsha Islands in Hainan Province, and the establishment of a prefecture-level Sansha city to govern the islands and reefs of the Xisha Islands, Zhongsha Islands, and Nansha Islands and their sea areas.

China's sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea has been widely recognized by the international community⁸⁴⁰

1. After the end of the Second World War, China recovered the South China Sea islands and resumed the exercise of sovereignty. Many countries in the world recognized the South China Sea islands as Chinese territory.

2. In 1951, the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan stipulated that Japan waive all rights, names and demands of the Nansha Islands and Xisha Islands. In 1952, the Japanese government formally expressed its renunciation of all rights, names and requirements of rights to Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, the Nansha Islands and the Xisha Islands. In the same year, the fifteenth map of the "Atlas of the World" and the "Map of Southeast Asia" recommended by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Okazaki, signed all the targets of the Xisha, Nansha Islands, Dongsha and Zhongsha Islands that the peace agreement stipulates that Japan must give up. Painting belongs to China.

3. In October 1955, ICAO held a meeting in Manila. The United States, Britain, France, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, South Vietnam and Taiwan of China sent representatives to attend. The representative of the Philippines was the chairman of the meeting and the representative of France As vice

⁸⁴⁰ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "China insists on resolving disputes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea through negotiations" published in July 2016, available online at URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/zcwj_674915/t1380600.shtml

chairman. Resolution No. 24 adopted by the meeting required the Chinese Taiwan authorities to strengthen meteorological observations in the Nansha Islands, and no representative at the meeting objected or reserved.

4. On September 4, 1958, the Chinese Government issued the "Statement of the People's Republic of China on Territorial Seas", announcing that China's territorial waters are 12 nautical miles wide, clearly stating: "This provision applies to all territories of the People's Republic of China, including ... Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Zhongsha Islands, Nansha Islands and other islands belonging to China." On September 14, Prime Minister Fan Wen of the Vietnamese Government also solemnly stated that Premier Zhou Enlai of the State Council of China, "The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam recognizes and endorses the People's Republic of China Statement of the Government on September 4, 1958 regarding the decision on the territorial sea", "The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam respects this decision".⁸⁴¹

5. From March 17 to April 1, 1987, the 14th meeting of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission discussed the "Global Sea Level Observing System Implementation Plan 1985-1990" (IOC / INF-663 REV). The document proposes to include the Xisha Islands and Nansha Islands into the global sea level observation system, and to explicitly list these two islands as "People's Republic of China".⁸⁴²

Statement (2016/07/12) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China on the Award of 12 July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration Established at the Request of the Republic of the Philippines

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China solemnly declares that the award is null and void and has no binding force. China neither accepts nor recognizes it.

1. On 22 January 2013, the then government of the Republic of the Philippines unilaterally initiated arbitration on the relevant disputes in the South China Sea between China and

⁸⁴¹ Note 1: White papers issued by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Vietnam on the South China Sea dispute spells out Hanoi's position, It deplored what it called "new developments" in the waters, including "unilateral actions, power-based coercion, violation of international law, militarisation, change in the status quo, and infringement upon Vietnam's sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction as provided in international law". These activities "undermined the interests of nations concerned and threatened peace, stability, security, safety, and freedom of navigation and overflight in the region". Available online at URL: http://nghiencubiendong.vn/download/doc_download/132-white-paper-on-the-hoang-sa-paracel-and-truong-sa-spratly-islands-part-1

Note:2 For more information please refer to the White paper issued by Malaysia. The paper is meant to function as the country's 10-year policy plan for defence and national security, structured not only to deal with internal challenges like natural disasters and terrorism threats, but also external geopolitical risks stemming from tensions between the United States and China that have spilled over to an ongoing regional dispute over islands in the South China Sea. Available online at URL:

<http://www.mod.gov.my/images/mindef/article/kpp/Defence%20White%20Paper.pdf>

⁸⁴² Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "China insists on resolving disputes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea through negotiations" published in July 2016, available online at URL:

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/zcwj_674915/t1380600.shtml

the Philippines. On 19 February 2013, the Chinese government solemnly declared that it neither accepts nor participates in that arbitration and has since repeatedly reiterated that position. On 7 December 2014, the Chinese government released the Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, pointing out that the Philippines' initiation of arbitration breaches the agreement between the two states, violates the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and goes against the general practice of international arbitration, and that the Arbitral Tribunal has no jurisdiction. On 29 October 2015, the Arbitral Tribunal rendered an award on jurisdiction and admissibility. The Chinese government immediately stated that the award is null and void and has no binding force. China's positions are clear and consistent.

2. The unilateral initiation of arbitration by the Philippines is out of bad faith. It aims not to resolve the relevant disputes between China and the Philippines, or to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea, but to deny China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea. The initiation of this arbitration violates international law. First, the subject-matter of the arbitration initiated by the Philippines is in essence an issue of territorial sovereignty over some islands and reefs of Nansha Qundao (the Nansha Islands), and inevitably concerns and cannot be separated from maritime delimitation between China and the Philippines. Fully aware that territorial issues are not subject to UNCLOS, and that maritime delimitation disputes have been excluded from the UNCLOS compulsory dispute settlement procedures by China's 2006 declaration, the Philippines deliberately packaged the relevant disputes as mere issues concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS. Second, the Philippines' unilateral initiation of arbitration infringes upon China's right as a state party to UNCLOS to choose on its own will the procedures and means for dispute settlement. As early as in 2006, pursuant to Article 298 of UNCLOS, China excluded from the compulsory dispute settlement procedures of UNCLOS disputes concerning, among others, maritime delimitation, historic bays or titles, military and law enforcement activities. Third, the Philippines' unilateral initiation of arbitration violates the bilateral agreement reached between China and the Philippines, and repeatedly reaffirmed over the years, to resolve relevant disputes in the South China Sea through negotiations. Fourth, the Philippines' unilateral initiation of arbitration violates the commitment made by China and ASEAN Member States, including the Philippines, in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) to resolve the relevant disputes through negotiations by states directly concerned. By unilaterally initiating the arbitration, the Philippines violates UNCLOS and its provisions on the application of dispute settlement procedures, the principle of "pacta sunt servanda" and other rules and principles of international law.

3. The Arbitral Tribunal disregards the fact that the essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration initiated by the Philippines is issues of territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation, erroneously interprets the common choice of means of dispute settlement already made jointly by China and the Philippines, erroneously construes the legal effect of the relevant commitment in the DOC, deliberately circumvents the optional exceptions declaration made by China under Article 298 of UNCLOS, selectively takes relevant islands and reefs out of the macro-geographical framework of Nanhai Zhudao (the South China Sea Islands), subjectively and speculatively interprets and applies UNCLOS, and obviously errs in ascertaining facts and applying the law. The conduct of the Arbitral

Tribunal and its awards seriously contravene the general practice of international arbitration, completely deviate from the object and purpose of UNCLOS to promote peaceful settlement of disputes, substantially impair the integrity and authority of UNCLOS, gravely infringe upon China's legitimate rights as a sovereign state and state party to UNCLOS, and are unjust and unlawful.

4. China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea shall under no circumstances be affected by those awards. China opposes and will never accept any claim or action based on those awards.

5. The Chinese government reiterates that, regarding territorial issues and maritime delimitation disputes, China does not accept any means of third party dispute settlement or any solution imposed on China. The Chinese government will continue to abide by international law and basic norms governing international relations as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including the principles of respecting state sovereignty and territorial integrity and peaceful settlement of disputes, and continue to work with states directly concerned to resolve the relevant disputes in the South China Sea through negotiations and consultations on the basis of respecting historical facts and in accordance with international law, so as to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea.⁸⁴³

China- Vietnam Dispute

i) China has interrupted Vietnamese hydrocarbon exploration.⁸⁴⁴

China has responded angrily when Vietnam has performed South China Sea gas exploration with other nations. It forced Vietnam to halt oil and gas drilling in July 2017 and March 2018 that was being carried out by Spain's Repsol. But Rosneft has appeared undeterred, and in May contracted a submersible rig owned by Japan Drilling to drill another well in the gas block. The risk of collisions between Chinese vessels and those from Malaysia and Vietnam in the South China Sea has been heightened in recent weeks as China has tried to obstruct the two countries' oil and gas exploration, a Washington-based think tank said on July 17, 2019. The analysis comes with a stand-off simmering between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels at Vanguard Bank, a reef in the disputed Spratly Islands, risking an escalation of tensions and anti-China protests as it did five years ago. Beijing has shown it is increasingly willing to use threat of force and threats to block its neighbours' oil and gas ambitions, said the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, which works under the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. China, Vietnam and Malaysia have all played down the incident, but the initiative said China had been harassing the two nations' oil and gas exploration ships for at least six weeks, again citing ship tracking data. It said Chinese coastguard vessel Haijing 35111 had patrolled around

⁸⁴³ <http://ca.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/cpot/t1380154.htm>

⁸⁴⁴ White papers issued by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Vietnam on the South China Sea dispute spells out Hanoi's position, It deplored what it called "new developments" in the waters, including "unilateral actions, power-based coercion, violation of international law, militarisation, change in the status quo, and infringement upon Vietnam's sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction as provided in international law". These activities "undermined the interests of nations concerned and threatened peace, stability, security, safety, and freedom of navigation and overflight in the region". Available online at URL: http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/download/doc_download/132-white-paper-on-the-hoang-sa-paracel-and-truong-sa-spratly-islands-part-1

Luconia Breakers, a reef cluster at the southern end of the Spratlys, between May 10 and 27, including an oil and gas block licensed to petroleum company Sarawak Shell. When Malaysia sent two oil and gas supply vessels to the area, the Chinese coastguard vessel circled them provocatively, “coming to within 80 metres”, the initiative said. “Beijing appears to be committed to preventing new unilateral oil and gas activities by its neighbours,” said the initiative, adding that situations around China’s ongoing oil and gas surveying were fluid and dangerous. The initiative said the July 3 manoeuvre by Haiyang Dizhi could be a coincidence, but “it seems more likely meant to punish Vietnam for allowing Rosneft’s drilling in block 06-01”. “China’s actions off both the Malaysian and Vietnamese coasts since May show that Beijing is increasingly willing to employ coercion and the threat of force to block oil and gas operations by its neighbours, even while pursuing its own energy exploration in disputed waters.” Beijing and Hanoi accused each other of allowing ships to ram opposing vessels. Anti-China protests swept Vietnam, and in its south-eastern Binh Duong province 14 factories owned by Chinese businesses were attacked.⁸⁴⁵

ii) China occupies some of the Paracel Islands also claimed by Vietnam

In 2014, the deployment of a Chinese drilling rig in waters near the Paracel Islands led to several confrontations between Vietnamese and Chinese ships and provoked protests in Vietnam. That same year, Beijing began land reclamation operations in some of the features it controls in the Spratly archipelago, increasing surface area with man-made structures and in turn building military installations on them. Analysts note China’s success in changing the facts on the ground gradually, without triggering a major confrontation with other claimants or the US. China has also established a new city on one of the islands – Sansha on Woody Island – in turn leading to an increased Chinese tourism.

In July 2016, a ruling by an international tribunal in The Hague determined China had no “historic rights” over the sea and ruled that some of the rocky outcrops claimed by several countries could not legally be used as the basis for territorial claims. Beijing rejected the ruling and described it as having “no binding force”.⁸⁴⁶

China- Japan dispute over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands which are also claimed by Taiwan. As per claims of Japan:

1. The Senkaku Islands were not included in the territory which Japan renounced under Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 that legally defined the territory of Japan after World War II. Under Article 3 of the treaty, the islands were placed under the administration of the United States as part of the Nansei Shoto Islands. The Senkaku Islands are included in the areas whose administrative rights were reverted to Japan in accordance with the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands that entered into force in 1972.

⁸⁴⁵ <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3018951/china-blocking-malaysian-and-vietnamese-oil-and-gas-vessels>.

⁸⁴⁶ <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/article/2186449/explained-south-china-sea-dispute>

2. The Senkaku Islands have historically and consistently been part of the Nansei Shoto Islands which have been part of the territory of Japan. From 1885, surveys of the Senkaku Islands had been thoroughly conducted by the Government of Japan through the agencies of Okinawa Prefecture and through other means. Through these surveys, it was confirmed that the Senkaku Islands had been not only uninhabited but also showed no trace of having been under the control of the Qing Dynasty of China. Based on this confirmation, the Government of Japan made a Cabinet Decision on January 14, 1895, to erect markers on the islands to formally incorporate the Senkaku Islands into the territory of Japan. These measures were carried out in accordance with the internationally accepted means of duly acquiring territorial sovereignty under international law (occupation of terra nullius). The Senkaku Islands are not part of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores Islands that were ceded to Japan from the Qing Dynasty in accordance with Article II of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, concluded in April 1895.⁸⁴⁷

Chinese objection to Indian naval presence and oil exploration in SCS

Incident involving INS Airavat in South China Sea.⁸⁴⁸

In response to questions on a report in a leading international daily, the Official Spokesperson said,

1. The Ministry has seen news reports about an alleged confrontation between an Indian Navy ship and a Chinese vessel off the coast of Vietnam in July 2011.
2. The Indian Naval vessel, INS Airavat paid a friendly visit to Vietnam between 19 to 28 July 2011. On July 22, INS Airavat sailed from the Vietnamese port of Nha Trang towards Hai Phong, where it was to make a port call. At a distance of 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast in the South China Sea, it was contacted on open radio channel by a caller *identifying himself as the "Chinese Navy" stating that "you are entering Chinese waters"*. No ship or aircraft was visible from INS Airavat, which proceeded on her onward journey as scheduled.
3. There was no confrontation involving the INS Airavat.
4. India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in accordance with accepted principles of international law. These principles should be respected by all.

Chinese state-run newspaper 'Global Times' stated that Containing China in strategy and security is the driving force of India-Vietnam ties. Economic cooperation between the two states also carries strategic motives. In 2013, India's ONGC Videsh signed an agreement with Petro Vietnam to explore and develop oil and natural gas fields in the disputed areas in the South China Sea.⁸⁴⁹

⁸⁴⁷ https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html

⁸⁴⁸ https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/3040/Incident_involving_INS_Airavat_in_South_China_Sea

⁸⁴⁹ <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1092070.shtml>

India's Position on SCS Dispute.

Statement on Award of Arbitral Tribunal on South China Sea Under Annexure VII of UNCLOS⁸⁵⁰

India has noted the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS) in the matter concerning the Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China.

India supports freedom of navigation and over flight, and unimpeded commerce, based on the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the UNCLOS. India believes that States should resolve disputes through peaceful means without threat or use of force and exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that could complicate or escalate disputes affecting peace and stability. Sea lanes of communication passing through the South China Sea are critical for peace, stability, prosperity and development. As a State Party to the UNCLOS, India urges all parties to show utmost respect for the UNCLOS, which establishes the international legal order of the seas and oceans.

RAJYA SABHA UNSTARRED QUESTION NO.2100 TO BE ANSWERED ON 11.07.2019 DISPUTES IN SOUTH CHINA SEA

India's position on South China Sea is consistent and has been articulated on several occasions in the past. India attaches importance to freedom of navigation, overflight and unimpeded lawful commerce in the international waters in accordance with international laws, notably the United Nations' Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982. India stands for the peaceful resolution of disputes, including through respect for legal and diplomatic processes, without resorting to the threat or use of force, and in accordance with international laws. India stands ready to work with international partners to maintain and promote peace, stability and development in the Indo-Pacific region.⁸⁵¹


⁸⁵⁰ https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/27019/Statement_on_Award_of_Arbitral_Tribunal_on_South_China_Sea_Under_Annexure_VII_of UNCLOS

⁸⁵¹ <https://mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/31592/QUESTION+NO2100+DISPUTES+IN+SOUTH+CHINA+SEA>

MARITIME DISPUTES IN THE EAST AND SOUTH CHINA SEAS

Many of China's maritime disputes centre on maritime rights, especially claims to exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelves, involving questions not of sovereignty but of jurisdiction – whether states have the right to exploit resources (oil, gas, minerals, fish). These are complicated issues because United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is open to interpretation on overlapping claims to sea territory, islands, and EEZs.

- CHINA
- VIETNAM
- PHILIPPINES
- MALAYSIA
- TAIWAN
- JAPAN



Source: Lowlyinstitute.org

Available online at URL: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/south-china-sea>

5.9.2 Refugee Asylum

China acceded to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol in September 1982. Despite its accession to the treaties, the domestic law on refugees and asylum is still under development. Currently, the only relevant legal provisions are article 32 of the Constitution and article 46 of the Exit and Entry Law. The former provides the general principle on asylum, declaring that the country may grant asylum to foreigners who request it for political reasons. The latter provides that refugees and asylum seekers in China may obtain ID cards. A comprehensive refugee law that would cover a wide range of issues relating to refugees and asylum is under consideration. The UNHCR Beijing Office conducts refugee registration and refugee status determinations in China. Recognized refugees are permitted to remain temporarily in China while the UNHCR is seeking a durable solution, which most of the time involves resettlement in a third country. Non-Indochinese refugees are generally treated as aliens who have no right to employment. They are supported by the UNHCR in terms of food, accommodation, health care, and children's education.⁸⁵²

In addition to article 46 specifically on refugees, refugees and asylum seekers in China are subject to other provisions of the Exit and Entry Law governing foreigners and stateless persons, as well as other relevant Chinese laws. For example, foreigners who are sixteen years old or older must carry their documentation for examination by public security organs. Foreigners must also submit their residence permits to the local public security organs wherever they reside. Hotels must report information concerning foreign guests to the local public security organs.⁸⁵³

I. General Background⁸⁵⁴

A. Indochinese Refugees

Although not a traditionally popular destination for refugees and asylum seekers, the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) was one of the top ten refugee-hosting countries recognized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) until it was recently replaced by Sudan in mid-2015, largely due to the fact that it accepted and still hosts a large number of Indochinese refugees.⁸⁵⁵ In the late 1970s, China accepted about 260,000 refugees who fled from Vietnam to China. They were provided refugee status and settled in southern China. Most of the Indochinese refugees were ethnic Chinese.⁸⁵⁶ According to the UNHCR, the Indochinese refugees and their children are well integrated and receive protection from the Chinese government.⁸⁵⁷

⁸⁵² <http://cs.mfa.gov.cn/wgrlh/lhqz/lhqzjjs/t1120988.shtml>

⁸⁵³ <http://cs.mfa.gov.cn/wgrlh/lhqz/lhqzjjs/t1120988.shtml>

⁸⁵⁴ <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/china.php>

⁸⁵⁵ UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015 at 6 (2015), <http://www.unhcr.org/56701b969.html>, archived at <https://perma.cc/S4P9-F558>.

⁸⁵⁶ *UNHCR Regional Representation in China*, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/hk/unhcr/en/about_us/China_Office.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2015), archived at <https://perma.cc/C573-RSBZ>. According to the Chinese government, China accepted a total of 283,000 Indochinese refugees from 1978 onward "in the spirit of humanitarianism." *China's Relationship with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)*, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland (Apr. 16, 2004), <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cegv/eng/rqrd/jblc/t85094.htm>, archived at <https://perma.cc/8TTS-9CFG>.

⁸⁵⁷ *2015 UNHCR Sub-regional Operations Profile – East Asia and the Pacific*, UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e487cd6.html#> (last visited Dec. 30, 2015), archived at <https://perma.cc/MB9S-8MKA>.

B. Non-Indochinese Refugees

Other than the Indochinese refugees, China attracted few refugees and asylum seekers before the mid-1990s. In the past two decades, the number of refugees and asylum seekers coming to China has gradually increased, and the country “is becoming a transit and destination country for mixed migration as a result of its geographical and economic importance.”⁸⁵⁸ According to data provided by the UNHCR, as of June 2015, there were 301,057 refugees, among whom 300,000 were Indochinese refugees, and 564 asylum seekers in China. Top countries of origin for the non-Indochinese refugees and asylum seekers in China are Somalia, Nigeria, Iraq, and Liberia.⁸⁵⁹

C. Inflows of Displaced Foreigners from Neighboring Countries

There have also been large-scale inflows of displaced foreigners from neighboring countries, such as North Korea and Burma (Myanmar), whom the Chinese government generally does not recognize as refugees. Undocumented North Koreans who have crossed into China since the mid-1990s are generally treated as illegal economic migrants. For the more than 30,000 ethnic Kokangs displaced by armed conflicts in Burma who flooded into China in 2009, the Chinese government promptly opened camps to host them and provided other humanitarian assistance, although the authorities did not refer to them as refugees.⁸⁶⁰

II. Legislation

China acceded to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol in September 1982. Despite its early accession to these treaties, the domestic law on refugees and asylum is still under development. Currently, the only legal provisions relevant to refugees are one article in the Constitution providing the general principle on asylum, and one article in the Exit and Entry Law that gives legal status to refugees and asylum seekers. A comprehensive refugee law that would cover a wider range of refugee issues is under consideration.

A. Constitution

Article 32 of the Constitution declares that China “may grant asylum to foreigners who request it for political reasons.”⁸⁶¹

B. 2012 Exit and Entry Law

In 2012, the PRC Law on the Administration of Exit and Entry (Exit and Entry Law) was promulgated, which replaced two former exit and entry laws governing Chinese citizens and foreigners, respectively. Effective July 1, 2013, the new Exit and Entry Law contains a provision that, for the first time, allows refugees and asylum seekers to obtain ID cards

⁸⁵⁸ *Id.*; 2015 UNHCR Subregional Operations Profile, *supra* note 4.

⁸⁵⁹ *The People’s Republic of China Fact Sheet*, UNHCR (Aug. 2015), <http://www.unhcr.org/5000187d9.pdf>, archived at <https://perma.cc/E366-DQPK>.

⁸⁶⁰ https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/china.php#_ftn1

⁸⁶¹ <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/china.php>

in China. According to article 46 of the Exit and Entry Law, foreigners who apply for refugee status in China may, during the screening process, stay in China with temporary identity certificates issued by public security organs. Foreigners who are recognized as refugees may stay or reside in China with the refugee identity certificates issued by public security organs.⁸⁶²

Article 46 is deemed a positive first step in providing a legal ground for refugees to live in China. Recognizing that refugees and asylum seekers are entitled to ID cards, the law “lays a foundation for future enhancement of refugees’ rights in China, such as the right to work and the right to education.”⁸⁶³

C. Draft Refugee Law

Efforts to forge a comprehensive refugee law were reportedly initiated in the 1990s, but so far no draft laws have been released. In 2012, the draft Regulations on Determination of Status and Administration of Refugees was prepared by Central Government authorities. If passed, the Regulations would address the definition of refugees, competent authorities in charge of refugee affairs, refugee status determinations, temporary stays and repatriation of refugees, and loss and removal of refugee status.

III. Refugee and Asylum Issues

Although there is only one article in the Exit and Entry Law specifically governing refugees, refugees and asylum seekers in China are subject to other provisions of that Law governing foreigners and stateless persons, as well as other relevant Chinese laws.⁸⁶⁴

A. Admission of Refugees and Handling Refugee Claims

Other than article 46 of the Exit and Entry Law, there are no legal provisions specifically regulating the admission of refugees and handling refugee claims under Chinese law. Nor is there an explicit, competent authority in charge of refugee affairs. The Ministry of Public Security should be responsible for matters relevant to refugee status recognition and repatriation of refugees and the Ministry of Civil Affairs should attend to refugee resettlement, but no law explicitly authorizes them as the competent authorities. In practice, refugee registration and refugee status determinations for non-Indochinese refugees are generally conducted by the UNHCR Beijing Office. According to the Office, it generally has access to asylum seekers who are in Beijing and conducts refugee status determinations. Recognized refugees are permitted to remain temporarily in China while the UNHCR is seeking a durable solution, which most of the time involves resettlement in a third country.⁸⁶⁵

B. Refugees Arriving at the Border

Article 20 of the Exit and Entry Law allows any foreigners who “need to enter China urgently for humanitarian reasons” to apply for visas to enter China before the visa-

⁸⁶² <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/china.php>

⁸⁶³ <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/china.php>

⁸⁶⁴ <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/china.php>

⁸⁶⁵ Ibid

issuing authorities at their port of entry. The Law, however, also requires that such foreigners possess supporting materials proving that relevant Chinese authorities have preapproved their application for a visa at a port of entry. According to a UNHCR officer, refugees in China normally enter the country with valid visas, mostly student visas and some tourist visas, due to strict border control.⁸⁶⁶

C. Recent Adjustments

China does not appear to have made adjustments or amendments to its refugee law in response to the current refugee crisis.

D. Refugee Status Determination

The refugee status determination is generally conducted by the UNHCR Beijing Office and Chinese authorities have not substantially engaged themselves in the UNHCR process, according to the UNHCR Beijing Office. Refugees are recognized under the UNHCR's mandate.

E. Accommodations and Assistance Provided to Refugees

Non-Indochinese refugees in China are generally treated as aliens who have no right to employment. They are supported by the UNHCR in terms of food, accommodation, health care, and children's education. In November 2013, the UNHCR reported that refugee children in five Chinese provinces were allowed to attend public schools at the primary level under the same conditions as local children.⁸⁶⁷

F. Accepting Refugees for Resettlement

In 1981 and 1982, China provided resettlement opportunities for some 2,500 Laotian and a small number of Cambodian refugees from camps in Thailand. While most of them voluntarily repatriated, some chose to stay in China.

G. Path to Naturalization

In general, as provided by China's Nationality Law, a foreign national or stateless person who is willing to abide by China's Constitution and laws may be naturalized as a Chinese citizen upon approval of the application, as long as he or she (1) is a close relative of a Chinese national, (2) has settled in China, or (3) has other legitimate reasons. In practice, naturalization may be rare other than through marriage or a great contribution to the country. A foreigner who has entered the country holding a temporary stay visa may be granted a residence permit, according to the Exit and Entry Law, if he or she has a special talent or is an investor as stipulated by the state, or based on humanitarian reasons. The Law also provides that a foreigner who has made "remarkable contributions to China's economic and social development" or meets other conditions may be granted permanent residence in China.⁸⁶⁸

⁸⁶⁶ <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/china.php>

⁸⁶⁷ *ibid*

⁸⁶⁸ <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/china.php>

H. Stay and Residence

The Exit and Entry Law requires all foreigners in China aged sixteen or above to carry their passports, other international travel documents, or foreigner stay or residence permits for examination by public security organs. Furthermore, foreigners who reside in China must submit their residence permits to the local public security organs of any place they reside for examination.[32] For those who temporarily stay in hotels, the hotels are required by law to register foreigners' information and report their information to the local public security organs. For those who stay or reside in domiciles other than hotels, the foreigners themselves or persons who accommodate.⁸⁶⁹

5.9.3 Human Trafficking

The Chinese Criminal Law defines trafficking as “the abduction, kidnapping, trading and transporting of women and children for the purpose of selling.” Offences such as forced labour and other trafficking related offences are punished as other crimes and not as trafficking offences.⁸⁷⁰

Offences Criminalised under Article 240 of the Criminal law of the People's Republic of China⁸⁷¹

- Abducting or trafficking a woman or child
- Engaging in abducting and trafficking women or children as part of a ring
- Abducting and trafficking more than three women and/ or children
- Raping abducted women
- Seducing, tricking, or forcing abducted women into prostitution, or selling abducted women to others who in turn, force them into prostitution
- Kidnapping women or children using force, coercion, or narcotics, for the purpose of selling them
- Stealing infants or babies for the purpose of selling them
- Causing abducted women or children, or their family members, serious injuries or death or other grave consequences
- Selling abducted women or children outside the country

Offences Criminalised under Article 241

- Buying abducted women or children
- Buying abducted women and forcing them to have sex
- Buying abducted women or children and depriving them of or restricting their physical freedom, or injuring or insulting them.

⁸⁶⁹ More information on the topic can be accessed at China's Ministry of Public Security's website at URL: <https://www.mps.gov.cn/n6557558/c5983468/content.html>

⁸⁷⁰ <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgvienna/eng/dbtyw/jdwt/crimelaw/t209043.htm>

⁸⁷¹ Ibid.

Penalties are specified in Article 240⁸⁷²

Those buying abducted women or children but not obstructing bought women from returning to their original residence in accordance with their wishes, not abusing bought children and not obstructing efforts to rescue them, may not be investigated for their criminal liability.⁸⁷³

National Trafficking Trends

- Country of origin, destination and transit for trafficked persons
- The majority of cases identified in China are internal trafficking cases
- Recent years have seen increased violence in cross-border trafficking crimes
- Destination country for foreign brides and victims of forced marriage
- Authorities continue to detain and deport North Korean trafficking victims who face severe punishment and/or death upon their repatriation
- The average age of trafficked victims has decreased due to increased trafficking of infants
- The high prevalence of trafficking victims being kidnapped is unique in the region⁸⁷⁴

The trafficking situation in China has evolved in recent years, with men, women and children trafficked both domestically and across borders for the purposes of forced labour and sexual exploitation. Two particular forms of trafficking specific to the Chinese context are the trafficking of children for illegal adoption, and the trafficking of women and girls for forced marriage. As a criminal enterprise, trafficking has become an increasingly complex phenomenon in China, as traditional exploitative trends for forced marriage or adoption have in recent years been coupled with an increasing number of victims forced into street performance, begging and theft. Organ trafficking has also emerged as a lucrative business for traffickers.⁸⁷⁵

While China's internal migrant population, estimated to exceed 252 million people, exhibits vulnerabilities to exploitation, the lack of available data makes it difficult to determine the prevalence and evolving patterns of human trafficking within the country. The government's birth limitation policy and a historic cultural preference for sons have also resulted in an uneven sex ratio, contributing substantially to the demand for foreign brides.⁸⁷⁶

In addition to the continued trafficking patterns, in recent years Chinese victim profiles have also become more diverse. The proportion of child trafficking cases has been growing since 2001 and a considerable number of young female migrant workers and students have been targeted by perpetrators. Recent trends have shown that there has been an increase in the trafficking of disabled persons (notably those with mental illness,

⁸⁷² <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgvienna/eng/dbtyw/jdwt/crimelaw/t209043.htm>

⁸⁷³ Note: Chinese Criminal Law also punishes trafficking related offences through articles 134 238, 244, 262,321, 358

⁸⁷⁴ <http://un-act.org/china/>

⁸⁷⁵ <http://un-act.org/china/>

⁸⁷⁶ Ibid

or those who are deaf and mute) and students. Anecdotal evidence further suggests that cross-border and transitory trafficking of women is increasing with cases of individuals from southwest China trafficked through Myanmar into countries such as Thailand and Malaysia. Criminal organizations operating in the region are also becoming more organized, professional and diverse. The Ministry of Public Security has recently observed that, with enhanced public awareness of human trafficking, it has become increasingly difficult for traffickers to succeed through traditional modes such as deception and fraud. Consequently, they are now using more violent and coercive measures such as threats, direct force and kidnapping. Victims have reportedly been exploited in various work environments such as brick kilns, coal mines and factories, whereas foreign women are routinely recruited to China through marriage brokers and fraudulent employment offers, often facilitated by organized criminal groups.⁸⁷⁷

Furthermore, reports of more varied and unsystematic exploitation have emerged in recent years. Children have been reportedly forced by certain schools to work in factories, and government officials and businessmen have been arrested for participating in the forcible commercial sexual exploitation of minors. Trafficking victims from China have also been detected in overseas Chinese expatriate communities, an indicator of how international the criminal industry has become.

Anti-trafficking mechanisms at a glance

- National Plan of Action I implemented (2008-2012)
- National Plan of Action II currently being implemented (2013-2020)
- Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking (COMMIT) Task Force (2005), with UN-ACT as secretariat
- Hotspot policing conducted in high risk areas and joint border operations conducted with law enforcement counterparts in Viet Nam and Myanmar
- Several projects have been initiated by the All China Women's Federation (ACWF) to prevent trafficking among migrant populations in various source and destination provinces
- Operational Guide for Anti-Trafficking Police has been established and is currently used by police officers
- A team of interpreters for Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) languages has been established to support cross-border case investigations
- A team of interpreters for Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) languages has been established to support cross-border case investigations
- Various joint policies on prosecution, prevention and victim protection issued by:
 - a. Ministry of Public Security
 - b. All China Women's Federation
 - c. Ministry of Civil Affairs
 - d. Supreme People's Court

⁸⁷⁷ <http://un-act.org/china/>

- Inter-Ministerial Joint Meeting Mechanism (IMJMM) holds annual and thematic meetings as well as information sharing on a monthly basis
- Shelters provide interim care to trafficking victims with managers and staff in most provinces having received training (Ministry of Civil Affairs)
- Operational guide to assist victims of trafficking has been developed and distributed to all shelters
- Anti-trafficking campaigns have been disseminated through television, print media and online platforms
- Numerous documentaries and animations have been produced and broadcast to raise awareness among the general public.⁸⁷⁸

5.9.4 Illicit Drugs

The present globalization of the drug issue has posed a grave menace to human well-being and development. On her southwestern border China is adjacent to the "Golden Triangle," one of the main sources of drugs in the world. Since the late 1970s, the illicit international narcotics tide has constantly invaded China, and criminal drug-related activities touched off by transit drug trafficking have re-emerged. The number of drug addicts has kept rising, drug-related cases have constantly increased, the drug scourge is becoming more serious with each passing day, and the situation is grim for the anti-drug struggle.⁸⁷⁹

Sticking to the Position of Strict Drug Control

For many years, the Chinese government has taken drug control as a fundamental objective, and has formulated and implemented a series of principles, policies and measures in this regard.

- Attending to drug control as a vital matter involving the rise and fall of the Chinese nation.
- Implementing a comprehensive drug control strategy.
- Persisting in drug control according to law.
- Formulating the working principle of 'promoting' 4-in-1 prohibitions' simultaneously, eradicating sources of drugs and obstructing their channels of trafficking, enforcing the law strictly.
- Taking the prevention of drug abuse by teenagers as a basic project in drug control.
- Actively participating in and promoting international cooperation in drug control.

In 1990, the Chinese government set up the National Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC), composed of 25 departments, including the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Health and General Administration of Customs. The NNCC leads the nation's drug control work in a unified way, and is responsible for international drug control cooperation, with an operational agency based in the Ministry of Public Security. In 1998,

⁸⁷⁸ <http://un-act.org/china/>

⁸⁷⁹ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "Narcotics Control in China" published in June 2000, available online at URL: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/1/index.htm>

with the approval of the State Council, the Ministry of Public Security set up the Drug Control Bureau, which also serves as an operational agency of the NNCC. Now, the governments of all the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and most counties (cities and districts) in China have set up corresponding drug control leading organs. Meanwhile, the public security organs of 24 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, and of the 204 regions (cities and prefectures) and 735 counties (cities and districts) under the jurisdiction of these provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities have set up police anti-drug squads. The Chinese People's Armed Police, frontier defence force of the public security authorities, judicial departments, Customs, supervision and control organs of pharmaceuticals, and administration departments for industry and commerce also undertake corresponding anti-drug law enforcement tasks. In 1998, the China Narcotics Control Foundation was set up, with the approval of the State Council, aiming at collecting funds from society at large to support drug control work.⁸⁸⁰

Constantly Strengthening Drug Control Legislation

Criminal legislation for drug control has improved step by step. On July 1, 1979, the Criminal Law of the PRC was adopted at the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC), which specified the crimes of manufacturing, trafficking and transporting drugs, and the relevant punishments. In the 1980s, the NPC Standing Committee issued, successively, the Customs Law of the PRC, the Regulations of the PRC on Administrative Penalties for Public Security, the Resolution on Severely Punishing Criminals Who Have Seriously Sabotaged the Economy, the Supplementary Regulations on Punishing Smuggling, and other laws, which formulated further regulations on punishing drug-related crimes and raised the highest legal punishment for serious drug-related crimes to the death penalty. On December 18, 1990, the 17th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh NPC adopted the Decision on Drug Control, which included comprehensive regulations on the types of drug related crimes and penalties, the punishments for drug addicts and compulsory drug addiction rehabilitation, and clearly specified China's universal jurisdiction over the crimes of smuggling, trafficking, transporting and manufacturing drugs.⁸⁸¹

On March 14, 1997, at the Fifth Session of the Eighth NPC, the Criminal Law of the PRC was revised. On the basis of absorbing and retaining the main contents of the Decision on Drug Control, the revised Criminal Law made important amendments and supplements to the legal regulations on drug-connected crimes, thus further improving China's criminal legislation in this regard. The Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate made relevant judicial interpretations of the revised Criminal Law.

Severely punishing drug-connected crimes is one of the outstanding characteristics of China's criminal legislation for drug control. The revised Criminal Law fully embodies this principle.

- First, the law comprehensively specifies the types of drug-related crimes, guaranteeing that various drug-related criminal offenses are punished by law. The

⁸⁸⁰ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "Narcotics Control in China" published in June 2000, available online at URL: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/1/index.htm>

⁸⁸¹ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "Narcotics Control in China" published in June 2000, available online at URL: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/1/index.htm>

law specifies 12 crimes, which cover the smuggling, trafficking, transporting and manufacturing of drugs, the illegal holding of drugs, the harbouring, transferring and concealing of drugs and illicit drug-related money, the smuggling of materials for manufacturing drugs, the illegal trading in such materials, the illegal cultivation of mother plants of narcotic drugs, the illegal trading, transporting, hand-carrying and holding of seeds and seedlings of such plants, and the illegal provision of narcotics and psychotropic substances, as well as the criminal punishments for these crimes. In addition, the penalties for the laundering of drug-related money are stipulated.

- Second, the law specifies that the criminal responsibility of a person for smuggling, trafficking, transporting or manufacturing narcotic drugs, regardless of their quantity, be legally pursued and punished. The quantity of drugs shall be calculated according to the verified amount of the drugs smuggled, trafficked, transported, manufactured or illegally held, and not in terms of purity.⁸⁸²
- Third, economic sanctions are applied against drug-related crimes. The law specifies that property shall be confiscated or a fine imposed for drug-related crimes, aiming at depriving drug criminals of their illegal income and destroying their economic ability to commit drug-related crimes again.
- Fourth, those who make use of or instigate minors to smuggle, sell, transport or manufacture drugs, sell drugs to minors, or lure, instigate, deceive or force them into taking or injecting drugs, and those who have again committed drug-related crimes after having already been convicted of the crime of smuggling, selling, transporting, manufacturing or illegally holding drugs shall be punished with severity.
- Fifth, criminals who smuggle, sell, transport or manufacture large amounts of drugs shall be sentenced to death. The fact that China legislatively punishes drug-connected crimes with severity is required by the reality of the anti-drug struggle, and shows China's stand for strict drug control.⁸⁸³

China has promulgated more than 30 relevant laws, statutes and regulations.⁸⁸⁴ In September 1984, the seventh meeting of the Standing Committee of the Sixth NPC adopted the Law of the PRC on the Management of Medicines and Chemical Reagents. Article 39 of the Law specifies: The state adopts special procedures for the administration of narcotics and psychotropic substances. In 1987 and 1988, the State Council promulgated the Procedures for Narcotic Drug Control, and the Procedures for Psychotropic Substances Control, which specify clearly the administration of the production, supply, transportation, use, import and export of narcotics and psychotropic substances. In 1995, the State Council promulgated the Procedures for Compulsory Drug Addiction Rehabilitation, and the Ministry of Health issued the Procedures for the Administration of Pharmaceuticals for Drug Addiction Treatment. Hence the work in this regard has laws to follow. The Criminal Law of the PRC, the Customs Law of the PRC, and the Decision on Drug Control made by the NPC Standing Committee include stern penalties for the criminal offenses of illegally trading and smuggling precursor chemicals,

⁸⁸² Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "Narcotics Control in China" published in June 2000, available online at URL: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/1/index.htm>

⁸⁸³ Ibid

⁸⁸⁴ Detailed information on drug reporting and crime is available online at URL: <https://www.mps.gov.cn/n6557558/c6208477/content.html>

ephedrine and other raw materials and ingredients intended to be processed into drugs. In addition, the legislative organs of Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Guangdong, Gansu, Shaanxi, Heilongjiang and Jiangsu provinces, and the Guangxi Zhuang and Ningxia Hui autonomous regions have worked out local drug control statutes in accordance with local conditions.⁸⁸⁵

Cracking Down on Drug-related Crimes

In China, drugs mainly come from other countries, and the Chinese government has done its best to ban transit drug trafficking. In the 1980s, the government organized public security, armed police and customs organs, and the civilian joint defense teams to coordinate the fight against drug trafficking, mainly in the southwest border areas and southeast coastal areas. It mobilized a large number of people, a great quantity of materials and a large amount of money. Three "lines of defence" were set up to keep drugs from flowing in: The first line was the borderland, where exit and entry were subject to strict examination; the second line was composed of checkpoints in inland regions; and the third line consisted of checks on vital lines of communication, airports, railway stations and harbours. In the 1990s, the work of banning transit drug trafficking was further intensified and attention was paid to "eradicating sources of drugs and obstructing their channels of trafficking." Checking was publicly done on key lines of communication, and at airports, railway stations, sea ports and harbours, so that a situation was created in which defence was organized in a unified way and actions were coordinated with due divisions of labour.⁸⁸⁶

China is a country with a large population. So it needs a lot of legal narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. While endeavouring to protect people's health and meet the needs of medical treatment the government practices strict control of 118 narcotic drugs and 119 psychotropic substances, and their production, trading, use and import and export are restricted to prevent illegal circulation. The illegal production, trafficking and supply or abuse of such drugs and substances are promptly investigated and punished. A large number of criminal cases of stealing, illegal buying and selling or addiction of pethidine and other narcotic drugs have been investigated and severely dealt with in Heilongjiang, Shanxi and Shaanxi provinces and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in the northern part of China.⁸⁸⁷

Exercising Strict Control over the Precursor Chemicals

Since the 1980s, transnational smuggling and trafficking of precursor chemicals and of ephedrine have increased rapidly in tandem with the prevalence of the global drug problem and the extended production of chemo-synthesized drugs. The Chinese government takes seriously its responsibility to the international community to strictly control these chemicals and ephedrine, in earnest compliance with its duties under international anti-drug conventions. Laws and regulations on the control of such chemicals have gradually been perfected. In October 1988, the relevant government

⁸⁸⁵Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "Narcotics Control in China" published in June 2000, available online at URL: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/1/index.htm>

⁸⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁷ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "Narcotics Control in China" published in June 2000, available online at URL: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/1/index.htm>

departments issued a document on the control of exports of acetic oxide, ether and chloroform, which can be used for synthesis of heroin and other narcotic drugs. In January 1993, China exercised control over the export licenses for the 22 precursor chemicals as listed in the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, and in June 1996 it also exercised control over the import licenses for these chemicals. In April 1997, China's relevant foreign trade department issued the Interim Regulations on the Control of the Import and Export of Precursor Chemicals, and in December 1999, the Regulations on the Control of the Import and Export of Precursor Chemicals was officially issued. In March 1998, the State Council issued the Notice on Further Strengthening the Control of Ephedrine. The notice stipulates that the production, trading, transportation, use and export of ephedrine shall be subject to special control. In December 1998, the relevant departments jointly issued the Notice on Issues Pertaining to the Strengthened Control of the Export of Ephedrine-typed Products, exercising control over the export of the 12 saline products, semi-finished products, derivatives and single preparations of ephedrine. In June 1999 and May 2000, they issued the Procedures for the Control of Ephedrine and the Regulations on the Control of Transportation Licenses for Ephedrine, which have further improved the rules on the strict control of ephedrine. In collaboration with UN drug control organs and competent departments of other countries, the relevant departments of China have set up an international system to check the import and export of precursor chemicals. China joined with more than 20 countries, regions and international organizations, during the global drive known as "Purple Action" to thwart illegal trafficking in potassium permanganate. In 1999, the NNCC added the prohibition of drug manufacture to its "simultaneous promotion of three prohibitions" anti-drug principle (simultaneous prohibition of addiction, trafficking and cultivation of drugs), making it the "simultaneous promotion of four prohibitions" principle.⁸⁸⁸

Treatment and Rehabilitation

According to Chinese law, drug takers must be rehabilitated. The State Council has promulgated the Procedures for Compulsory Drug Addiction Rehabilitation, and the related department has formulated the Guiding Principles for Commonly Used Therapies Applicable to Opiates Addicts and the Procedures for the Control of Pharmaceuticals for Drug Addiction Treatment, to standardize the work of the rehabilitation and treatment of addicts in China. The state has also established drug dependence research centres, drug abuse monitoring centres, drug dependence treatment centres and narcotic drugs laboratories, and organized scientific research institutions and experts to conduct research on scientific methods of rehabilitation for addicts and pharmaceuticals for drug addiction treatment. China has adopted various measures to rehabilitate addicts, taking compulsory measures as the main principle. All addicts are sent to compulsory rehabilitation centres established by governments at all levels. Those who resume drugs after receiving compulsory treatment are sent to re-education-through-labour centres administered by judicial departments, where they are forced to undergo treatment side by side with re-education through physical labour. Addicts who are unsuitable for receiving treatment in compulsory rehabilitation centres are ordered to give up within a

⁸⁸⁸ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "Narcotics Control in China" published in June 2000, available online at URL: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/1/index.htm>

definite time period under the guardianship of their family members and the education and administration of the local public security stations. Some local medical institutions also offer services for the rehabilitation and treatment of volunteer addicts. In some areas, measures adaptable to local conditions have also been taken to supervise and help addicts become rehabilitated through mass organizations and organizations at the grassroots level.⁸⁸⁹

In China, addicts mainly receive treatment at compulsory rehabilitation centres and treatment and re-education-through-labour centres-special schools for educating and saving addicts from ruin. Specific and concrete provisions are formulated in the Procedures for Compulsory Drug Addiction Rehabilitation on the construction, administration, rehabilitation measures and welfare provisions of compulsory rehabilitation centres. Chinese public security and judicial organs have also formulated regulations on the hierarchical and standardized administration of compulsory rehabilitation centres and treatment and re-education-through-labour centres. Governments at all levels also earmark large amounts of funds for the establishment of special rehabilitation centres each year. Mass organizations, including the trade unions, the Communist Youth League (CYL) organizations, the women's federations and the associations of self-employed industrialists and businessmen, help with the work of rehabilitating addicted women, workers and staff members, young people and self-employed laborers by making full use of their own advantages, to great effect.⁸⁹⁰

In 2018, under the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee and the State Council, the national anti-narcotics department, in accordance with the unified deployment of the National Anti-Drug Committee, fully implemented the spirit of the 19th CPC National Congress and the Second and Third Plenary Sessions of the 19th CPC Central Committee, and thoroughly implemented General Secretary Xi Jinping's in-depth advancement of the special operations of "Two Fights and Two Controls in Anti-Drug 2018", key anti-drug rectification and the creation of demonstration cities, continue to deepen drug prevention publicity and education, and promote the achievement of important stage results in the anti-drug people's war. The "Six Quan" drug management system with Chinese characteristics faithfully fulfils the major responsibilities and missions entrusted by the party and the people, resolutely wins the people's war against drugs in the new era.⁸⁹¹

Developing International Cooperation in Drug Control

The Chinese government takes an active part in international affairs connected with drug control. In June 1985, approved by the NPC Standing Committee, China acceded to the UN 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances that had been revised by the 1972 Protocol. In September 1989, China obtained the approval of the NPC Standing Committee to accede to the UN Convention

⁸⁸⁹ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "Narcotics Control in China" published in June 2000, available online at URL: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/1/index.htm>

⁸⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁹¹ Excerpts from Ministry of Public Security Report titled '2018 Drug Situation Report' published in June, 2019, available online at URL: <https://www.mps.gov.cn/n6557558/c6535096/content.html>

Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, becoming one of the first member countries to it. Beginning in 1984, China has sent delegations many times to attend international drug control meetings held by the United Nations, the International Criminal Police Organization, the World Customs Organization and the World Health Organization. In October 1989, China held the Asian Region Anti-Drug Seminar in Beijing and in November 1996, hosted the International Stimulant Specialists Meeting in Shanghai. The Chinese government sent delegations to take part in the 17th and 20th UN special General Assembly sessions on drug control in February 1990 and June 1998, declaring the Chinese government's resolute anti-drug stand, policies and measures to the international community.⁸⁹²

China is an active supporter and promoter of cooperation in drug control in the sub-region, as initiated by the UN. In May 1991, the NNCC of China hosted the first meeting of senior officials of China, Thailand, Myanmar and the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) in Beijing, to discuss the proposal on multilateral cooperation against drug abuse in the sub-region. In June 1992, China, Myanmar and the UNDCP signed the China/Myanmar/UNDCP Joint Cooperation Project on Drug Control in Rangoon, Myanmar. In October 1993, China, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and the UNDCP signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Narcotic Drugs Control, which stressed keeping contacts between high officials to further the cooperation in drug control in the sub-region. On May 1995, China, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia and the UNDCP convened the first minister-level meeting on cooperation in sub-region drug control in Beijing. The meeting adopted the Beijing Declaration and signed the Sub-region Drug Control Program of Action. In 1999, the Chinese government sent delegations to attend the sub-region minister-level meetings in Japan and Laos to continue to promote enthusiastic cooperation in drug control in the sub-region.

China has constantly strengthened bilateral and multilateral cooperation in drug control with other countries. In 1985 China began to cooperate with the United States in drug control, and in 1987 the governments of the two nations signed the Sino-US Memorandum of Cooperation in Narcotic Drugs Control. In 1997, the heads of the two states signed the Sino-US Joint Statement containing contents on cooperation in drug control, which upgraded this cooperation between the two countries to a new level. Subsequently, the governments of China and the United States mutually accredited anti-drug liaison officers. Meanwhile, China attached importance to the cooperation in drug control with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In April 1996, China and Russia signed the Agreement on Cooperation Against Illicit Trafficking and Abuse of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. In 1998 the heads of state of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed a joint statement, taking cracking down drug-connected and transnational crimes as major contents in cooperation among the five countries. In addition, the Chinese government has signed bilateral agreements on cooperation in drug control with the governments of Mexico, India, Pakistan, Colombia and Tajikistan. For many years, China has developed cooperation in many forms with the United States, Canada, Japan, France, Australia, Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia in anti-drug information exchange, training and law enforcement. Since 1996, China has successively established a liaison officer system of anti-drug law-enforcement

⁸⁹² Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "Narcotics Control in China" published in June 2000, available online at URL: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/1/index.htm>

cooperation in border areas with Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam and Russia. Besides, the police authorities of China, the United States, Canada, Japan and the Republic of Korea have on many occasions jointly cracked cases of illicit traffic in drugs through international anti-drug information exchange and judicial cooperation, effectively deterring transnational drug-related crimes.⁸⁹³

5.9.5 Terrorism

Terrorism, which endangers innocent lives, causes losses of social wealth and jeopardizes security of States, constitutes a serious challenge to human civilization and a serious threat to international peace and security. The Chinese Government opposes and condemns all forms of terrorism and is against using terrorism as a means of achieving political objectives. The fight against terrorism calls for protracted and concerted efforts of the international community. It is imperative to strengthen international cooperation at all levels and establish an international anti-terrorism mechanism under the auspices of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, relevant Security Council resolutions, all conventions against international terrorism as well as documents adopted by the UN General Assembly in this regard. China supports all efforts aimed at strengthening anti-terrorism conventions within the framework of the United Nations, including the early completion of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. China encourages all States to become parties to the existing international anti-terrorism conventions as soon as possible and to effectively implement such conventions.⁸⁹⁴

For some time China's Xinjiang, under the combined influence of separatists, religious extremists and terrorists, has seen frequent incidents of terrorist attacks, which have been detrimental to the life and property of people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang. In the face of these real threats, Xinjiang has taken resolute action to fight terrorism and extremism in accordance with the law, effectively curbing the frequent occurrences of terrorist activities. Xinjiang is situated in northwest China and the hinterland of the Eurasian Continent, covering an area of 1.66 million sq. km. It borders eight countries: Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.⁸⁹⁵

Xinjiang has long been an inseparable part of Chinese territory. The vast areas both north and south of the Tianshan Mountains, called the Western Regions in ancient times, were in close contact with the Central Plains as early as the pre-Qin period (c. 2100-221 BC). With the establishment of the unified feudal dynasties Qin (221-206 BC) and Han (206 BC-AD 220), multi-ethnic unification has been the norm in China's historical development, and therefore Xinjiang has always been part of a unitary multi-ethnic China. In 60 BC, government of the Western Han Dynasty established the Western Regions Frontier Command in Xinjiang, officially making Xinjiang a part of Chinese territory.

⁸⁹³ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "Narcotics Control in China" published in June 2000, available online at URL: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/1/index.htm>

⁸⁹⁴ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "China's Position Paper on Counter-Terrorism" published in May 2004, available online at URL: <http://ee.china-embassy.org/eng/ztlm/fdkbzy/t112725.htm>

⁸⁹⁵ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang" published in March 2019, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/03/18/content_281476567813306.htm

Xinjiang has been a multi-ethnic region since ancient times. Down the ages, many ethnic groups have lived here, frequently migrating and communicating with each other. The earliest explorers of Xinjiang included the Sai, Rouzhi, Wusun, Qiang, Qiuci, Yanqi, Yutian, Shule, Shache, Loulan and Cheshi in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (770-221 BC). Following them were peoples entering Xinjiang in large numbers in different periods: the Xiongnu (Hun), Han, and Qiang in the Qin and Han dynasties; the Xianbei, Rouran, Gaoche, Yeda, and Tuyuhun in the period of the Wei, Jin, and Northern and Southern Dynasties (220-589); the Turk, Tubo, and Ouigour peoples in the period of the Sui and Tang dynasties (581-907); the Khitans in the period of the Song, Liao, and Jin dynasties (916-1279); the Mongolian, Jurchen, Dangxiang (Tangut), Kazak, Kirgiz, Manchu, Xibe, Daur, Hui, Uzbek, and Tatar peoples in the period of the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties (1279-1911). By the end of the 19th century, 13 ethnic groups – the Uygur, Han, Kazak, Mongolian, Hui, Kirgiz, Manchu, Xibe, Tajik, Daur, Uzbek, Tatar, and Russian – had settled in Xinjiang, with the Uygurs having the largest population. The multi-ethnic region constitutes an integral part of the Chinese nation.⁸⁹⁶


The Uygur ethnic group came into being in the long process of migration and ethnic integration; they are not descendants of the Turks. The main ancestors of the Uygurs were the Ouigour people living on the Mongolian Plateau during the Sui and Tang dynasties. We find that many different names were used to refer to the Ouigour people in historical records. Historically, to resist oppression and slavery by the Turks, the Ouigour people united with some of the Tiele tribes to form the Ouigour tribal alliance. In 744, the Tang court conferred a title of nobility on Kutlug Bilge Kaghan, who united the Ouigour tribes. In 788, the then Ouigour ruler wrote to the Tang emperor, requesting to have their name changed to “Huihu” (Uygur). After the Uygur Khanate suffered a major defeat in war in 840, some of them moved inland to live with the Han people, the rest of the surviving Uygurs were divided into three sub-groups. One of the sub-groups moved to the Turpan Basin and the modern Jimsar region, where they founded the Gaochang Uygur Kingdom. Another moved to the Hexi Corridor, where they merged with local ethnic groups to become what was later known as the Yugu people. The third sub-group moved to the west of Pamir, scattered in areas from Central Asia to Kashgar, and joined the Karluk and Yagma peoples in founding the Karahan Kingdom. There they merged with the Han people in the Turpan Basin and the Yanqi, Qiuci, Yutian, Shule, and other peoples in the Tarim Basin to form the main body of the modern Uygur group. In the Yuan Dynasty, ancestors of the modern Uygur people were called the “畏兀儿” people in the Chinese language. In the Yuan and Ming dynasties, the various ethnic groups in Xinjiang further merged; Mongolians, especially those of the Chagatai Khanate, were fused with the Uygurs, adding fresh blood to the Uygur group. In 1934, Xinjiang issued a government order, stipulating that “维吾尔” would be the standard Chinese name for Uygurs, which for the first time expressed the accurate meaning of “Uygur”: to maintain unity among the people.⁸⁹⁷

⁸⁹⁶Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China’s White paper titled “The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang” published in March 2019, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/03/18/content_281476567813306.htm

⁸⁹⁷Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China’s White paper titled “The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang” published in March 2019, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/03/18/content_281476567813306.htm

The Origin of Terrorism and Extremism in Xinjiang

Separatism is the hotbed in which terrorism and extremism take root in Xinjiang. For a long time terrorist and extremist forces have been beating the drum for separatist activities by distorting, fabricating and falsifying the history of Xinjiang, exaggerating the cultural differences between ethnic groups, instigating isolation and hatred, and advocating religious extremism. At the turn of the 20th century, separatists and religious extremists in and outside China, inheriting the so-called theories of “Pan-Turkism” and “Pan-Islamism” created by former colonialists, spread the word that Uygurs were the only “masters” of Xinjiang, that the ethnic cultures of Xinjiang were not Chinese culture, and that Islam was the only religion practiced by ethnic groups of Xinjiang. They incited all ethnic groups speaking Turki and believing in Islam to join in creating the theocratic state of so-called “East Turkistan”. They denied the history of China jointly built by all its ethnic groups, and clamored for “opposition to all ethnic groups other than Turks” and for the “annihilation of pagans”.⁸⁹⁸



Source: <https://www.vox.com/2018/8/15/17684226/uighur-china-camps-united-nations>

From the early 20th century to the late 1940s, the “East Turkistan” forces, in an attempt to split and control Xinjiang and establish their state, promoted and spread the ideas of “Pan-Turkism”, “Pan-Islamism”, and violence and terrorism. They organized and planned a series of separatist activities. In 1915 separatist Maswud returned to Ili, opened a school and publicly preached separatism to the students. On November 12, 1933,

⁸⁹⁸Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China’s White paper titled “The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang” published in March 2019, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/03/18/content_281476567813306.htm

Mohammad Imin founded the so-called “East Turkistan Islamic Republic”, but the farce ended in less than three months because of strong opposition from the people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang. On November 12, 1944, separatists led by Elihan Torae founded the so-called “Republic of East Turkistan”, which soon collapsed a year later. Afterwards, a series of separatist organizations and individuals continued their subversive and separatist activities under the banner of “East Turkistan” in a vain attempt to establish their own state.

The “East Turkistan” forces have not resigned themselves to defeat. With the support of international anti-China forces, the “East Turkistan” forces have resorted to all means, fair or foul, to organize, plan and carry out acts of separatism and sabotage. In the early 1950s the separatists instigated many riots in Xinjiang, calling on Uygurs to “unite under the moon-and-star banner to create a republic of Islam”. In the 1960s there were the riots in Ili and Tacheng on the China-Russia border, the riot of the “East Turkistan People’s Revolutionary Party”, and the armed rebellion of the Gang of Ahongnof in southern Xinjiang. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, religious extremism made further inroads into Xinjiang. It soon blended with terrorism to stir up social unrest in the region, seriously undermining local stability and security.⁸⁹⁹

Since the 1990s, especially after the September 11 attacks in the US, the “East Turkistan” forces inside and outside China have stepped up their collaboration as terrorism and extremism spread around the globe, trying desperately to establish “East Turkistan” through “Jihad” (holy war). In the name of ethnicity and religion, they deceitfully used people’s ethnic identity and religious belief to instigate religious fanaticism, spread religious extremism, and incite the common people to join in violent and terrorist activities. They brainwashed people with the “Jihad”, abetting them to “die for their belief in order to enter heaven”. Incomplete statistics show that from 1990 to the end of 2016, separatist, terrorist and extremist forces launched thousands of terrorist attacks in Xinjiang, killing large numbers of innocent people and hundreds of police officers, and causing immeasurable damage to property.

Killing ordinary people. On February 5, 1992, while the whole of China was celebrating the Spring Festival, a terrorist group planted bombs on a No. 52 and a No. 30 bus in Urumqi, blowing up the 2 buses, killing 3 people and injuring 23 others. On February 25, 1997, “East Turkistan” terrorists caused explosions on a No. 2, a No. 10 and a No. 44 bus in Urumqi, destroying the 3 buses, killing 9 and causing serious injury to 68. On July 30, 2011, two terrorists hijacked a truck at the junction of a food street in Kashgar City, stabbed the driver to death, drove the truck into the crowd, and then attacked the public with their knives. In this incident, 8 were killed and 27 injured. The next day, knife-wielding terrorists randomly attacked pedestrians on Xiangxie Street, Renmin West Road, killing 6 and injuring 15. On February 28, 2012, nine knife-wielding terrorists attacked civilians on Xingfu Road, Yecheng County, Kashgar Prefecture, resulting in 15 deaths and 20 injuries. On March 1, 2014, eight knife-wielding Xinjiang terrorists attacked passengers at the Kunming Railway Station Square and the ticket lobby, leaving 31 dead and 141 injured. On April 30, 2014, two terrorists hid in the crowd at the exit of Urumqi

⁸⁹⁹Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China’s White paper titled “The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang” published in March 2019, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/03/18/content_281476567813306.htm

Railway Station. One attacked people with his knife and the other detonated a device inside his suitcase, killing 3 and injuring 79. On May 22, 2014, five terrorists drove two SUVs through the fence of the morning fair of North Park Road of Saybagh District, Urumqi, into the crowd, and then detonated a bomb, claiming the life of 39 and leaving 94 injured. On September 18, 2015, terrorists attacked a coal mine in Baicheng County, Aksu Prefecture, causing 16 deaths and 18 injuries.⁹⁰⁰

Assassinating religious leaders. On August 24, 1993, two terrorists stabbed Senior Mullah Abulizi, imam of the Great Mosque in Yecheng County, Kashgar Prefecture, leaving him seriously wounded. On March 22, 1996, two masked terrorists broke into the house of Akemusidike Aji, vice president of the Islamic Association of Xinhe County, Aksu Prefecture, and assistant imam of a mosque, and shot him dead. On May 12, 1996, Aronghan Aji, vice president of the China Islamic Association and president of Xinjiang Islamic Association, and hatip of Id Kah Mosque in Kashgar was stabbed 21 times by four terrorists on his way to a mosque and seriously wounded. On November 6, 1997, a terrorist group, under the command of the “East Turkistan” organization stationed abroad, shot and killed Senior Mullah Younusi Sidike, member of the China Islamic Association, president of Aksu Islamic Association and imam of the Great Mosque of Baicheng County, on his way to the mosque for worship. On January 27, 1998, this same group shot and killed Abulizi Aji, imam of the Great Mosque of Baicheng County on his way to the mosque for worship. On July 30, 2014, the 74-year-old Senior Mullah Juma Tayier, vice president of Xinjiang Islamic Association and imam of the Id Kah Mosque, was brutally killed by three terrorists on his way home after morning Fajr prayer.

Striking at Terrorism and Extremism in Accordance with the Law

Counterterrorism and de-radicalization in Xinjiang has always been conducted in accordance with the law. Currently, China’s anti-terrorism law system is composed of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, the National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Counterterrorism Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Regulations on Religious Affairs, and the Opinions on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases Involving Terrorism and Extremism jointly issued by the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of Justice.⁹⁰¹

In view of local reality and in accordance with the Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China and the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional Ethnic Autonomy, Xinjiang has accelerated the enactment of local regulations, including the Regulations of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region on Religious Affairs, the Measures of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region on Implementing the Counterterrorism Law of the People’s Republic of China, and the Regulations of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region on De-radicalization. These laws and regulations are powerful legal instruments to contain and combat terrorism and extremism. The local government fully respects and safeguards civil rights including freedom of religious belief. It protects lawful religious

⁹⁰⁰Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China’s White paper titled “The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang” published in March 2019, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/03/18/content_281476567813306.htm

⁹⁰¹http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/03/18/content_281476567813306.htm

activities, fulfills the reasonable religious demands of believers, protects the legitimate rights and interests of citizens and organizations, strikes severely at all forms of terrorism, and forbids violations of the law and crimes such as spreading extremism, inciting ethnic hatred, and dividing the country by means of religion. Since 2014, Xinjiang has destroyed 1,588 violent and terrorist gangs, arrested 12,995 terrorists, seized 2,052 explosive devices, punished 30,645 people for 4,858 illegal religious activities, and confiscated 345,229 copies of illegal religious materials.⁹⁰²

Law-based de-radicalization has been launched in Xinjiang to deal with illegal religious activities, illegal religious publicity materials, and illegal spread of religions through the internet, which has effectively curbed the breeding and spread of religious extremism. Religious extremism's interference in administration, judicial affairs, education, marriage and medical services has been eradicated; school enrollment rate has increased significantly and continues to rise; the public has become more aware of the dangers of religious extremism. At the same time, lawful religious activities have been protected more effectively through the promulgation and amendment of local regulations concerning religious affairs, including the Regulations of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region on Religious Affairs. These local regulations specify the rights and interests of religious groups, religious staff, and venues for religious activities, and draw a clear line between lawful and illegal religious activities, providing legal guarantees for people of all ethnic groups to engage in lawful religious activities.

Finding Experience for Counterterrorism and De-radicalization

Xinjiang has paid special attention to human rights protection in its counterterrorism effort, preventing any violation of human rights caused by counterterrorist measures. To this end, the local government has enhanced legislation. Counterterrorism does not target any specific region, ethnic group or religion. It is stipulated in the Counterterrorism Law of the People's Republic of China that "In counterterrorism work, citizens' freedom in religious belief and ethnic customs shall be respected, and any discrimination based on regions, ethnic groups, religions and other grounds shall be prohibited." The local government also abides by the policies and stipulations in the Constitution, other state laws and administrative regulations concerning freedom of religious belief.⁹⁰³ In the course of counterterrorism and de-radicalization, the people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang have their freedom of religious belief fully protected. Balancing compassion and severity and taking measures for prevention, education and rehabilitation. Xinjiang follows the criminal justice policy of balancing compassion and severity, and taking the approach of reforming the offenders through education. A few leaders and core members of violent and terrorist gangs who have committed heinous crimes or are inveterate offenders will be severely punished in accordance with the law so as to protect citizens' basic human rights from the scourge of terrorism and extremism. Offenders who have committed minor crimes under the influence of religious extremism will be educated,

⁹⁰²Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang" published in March 2019, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/03/18/content_281476567813306.htm

⁹⁰³ For more information please access Information Office of the State Council of PRCs White Paper titled "Freedom of Religion in Xinjiang" published on June, 2016 available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/06/02/content_281475363031504.htm

rehabilitated and protected through vocational training, through the learning of standard Chinese language and labor skills, and acquiring knowledge of the law; these people are large in number. The approach to the second group of people is rehabilitation rather than punishment, care instead of rejection. Through such education, they will improve their ability to distinguish right from wrong, to resist infiltration, and to correct themselves. They will rid themselves of terrorist influence, the extremist mindset, and outmoded cultural practices. They will increase their employability, expand their employment channels, and become more confident in life. This approach clearly demonstrates the humanitarian stance of the Chinese government.⁹⁰⁴

Designated Terrorist Organizations in China

The "East Turkistan" terrorist organizations identified by China's Ministry of Public Security (MPS) are: the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), the World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC) and the East Turkistan Information Center (ETIC). The 11 identified "East Turkistan" terrorists are: Hasan Mahsum, Muhanmetemin Hazret, Dolqun Isa, Abudujelili Kalakash, Abudukadir Yapuquan, Abudumijit Muhammatkelim, Abudula Kariaji, Abulimit Turxun, Hudaberdi Haxerbik, Yasen Muhammad, and Atahan Abuduhani. Zhao Yongchen, deputy director of the ministry's Counter-Terrorism Bureau, said the four terrorist groups, all based abroad, had conducted terrorist activities in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China aimed at splitting the country, including bombings, assassinations, arsons, poisoning and assaults.

The ETIM⁹⁰⁵ was put on the list of global terrorist organizations by the United Nations on Sept. 11, 2002, and three identified terrorists were already subjects of Interpol red notices. Chinese police had requested Interpol issue red notices on the other eight.⁹⁰⁶

Designations of Individuals and Entities and other groups relating to China as per United Nations Security Council Consolidated List⁹⁰⁷

A. Individuals

QDi.268 Name: 1: ABDUL 2: HAQ 3: N/A 4: N/A

Name (original script): 阿不都·哈克

Title: na

Designation: na

DOB: 10 Oct. 1971

POB: Hetian Area, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, China

⁹⁰⁴ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang" published in March 2019, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/03/18/content_281476567813306.htm

⁹⁰⁵ For detailed information on ETIM please access UNSC website-link: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/eastern-turkistan-islamic-movement

⁹⁰⁶ <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zt/zgfk/t89059.htm>

⁹⁰⁷ <https://scsanctions.un.org/en/?keywords=al-qaida#alqaedaent>

Good quality a.k.a.: a) Maimaitiming Maimaiti b) Abdul Heq c) Abudu Hake d) Abdul Heq Jundullah e) 'Abd Al-Haq f) Memetiming Memeti g) Memetiming Aximu h) Memetiming Qekeman i) Maiumaitimin Maimaiti j) Abdul Saimaiti k) Muhammad Ahmed Khaliq
Low quality a.k.a.: a) Maimaiti Iman b) Muhelisi c) Qerman d) Saifuding

Nationality: China

Passport no: na

National identification no: China 653225197110100533 (Chinese national identity card number)

Address: a) Afghanistan (current location as at Jul. 2016) b) Pakistan (previous location as at Apr. 2009)

Listed on: 15 Apr. 2009 (amended on 13 Dec. 2011, 20 Jun. 2017).

Other information: Overall leader and commander of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (QDe.088). Involved in fundraising and recruitment for this organization.

B. Entities and other groups

QDe.088 Name: EASTERN TURKISTAN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT (ETIM)

A.k.a.: a) The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party b) The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah c) Islamic Party of Turkestan d) Djamaat Turkistan

F.k.a.: na

Address: na

Listed on: 11 Sep. 2002 (amended on 3 Oct. 2008, 13 Dec. 2011)

Other information: Active in China, South Asia and Central Asia. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 20 May 2010.

KPe.055 Name: CHANG AN SHIPPING & TECHNOLOGY

A.k.a.: a) 長安海連技術有限公司 b) CHANG AN SHIPPING AND TECHNOLOGY

F.k.a.: na

Address: Room 2105, DL1849, Trend Centre, 29-31 Cheung Lee Street, Chai Wan, Hong Kong, China

Listed on: 30 Mar. 2018

Other information: Registered owner, ship manager, and commercial manager of Panama-flagged vessel HUA FU, a cargo ship that loaded DPRK coal at Najin, DPRK on 24 September 2017.

KPe.040 Name: DCB FINANCE LIMITED

A.k.a.: na

F.k.a.: na

Address: a) Akara Building, 24 de Castro Street, Wickhams Cay I, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands b) Dalian, China

Listed on: 30 Nov. 2016

Other information: DCB Finance Limited is a front company for Daedong Credit Bank (DCB), a listed entity.

KPe.059 Name: HUAXIN SHIPPING HONGKONG LTD

A.k.a.: 華信船務(香港)有限公司

F.k.a.: na

Address: Room 2105, Trend Centre, 29-31 Chueng Lee Street, Chai Wan, Hong Kong, China

Listed on: 30 Mar. 2018

Other information: Ship and commercial manager of the ASIA BRIDGE 1. Hong Kong-owned vessel, the probable “ASIA BRIDGE 1” was instructed on 19 October 2017 by Huaxin Shipping to make preparations for entry into Nampo, DPRK to receive a shipment of coal bound for Vietnam. The “ASIA BRIDGE 1” was instructed by an unidentified employee of Huaxin Shipping Ltd. to make preparations to receive 8,000 metric tons of coal and then sail to Cam Pha, Vietnam. The master of the vessel was instructed to cover the ship’s name and other markings using canvas while in port at Nampo.

KPe.072 Name: SHANGHAI DONGFENG SHIPPING CO LTD

A.k.a.: na

F.k.a.: na

Address: Room 601, 433, Chifeng Lu, Hongkou Qu, Shanghai, 200083, China

Listed on: 30 Mar. 2018

Other information: Registered owner, ship and commercial manager of the DONG FENG 6, a vessel that loaded coal at Hamhung, DPRK, on 11 July 2017 for export in violation of UN sanctions.

KPe.073 Name: SHEN ZHONG INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING

A.k.a.: 沈忠國際海運有限公司

F.k.a.: na

Address: Unit 503, 5th Floor, Silvercord Tower 2, 30, Canton Road, Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China

Listed on: 30 Mar. 2018

Other information: Ship and commercial manager of HAO FAN 2 and HAO FAN 6, St Kitts-Nevis-flagged vessels. The HAO FAN 6 loaded coal at Nampo, DPRK, on 27 August 2017. HAO FAN 2 loaded DPRK coal at Nampo, DPRK, on 3 June 2017.

KPe.074 Name: WEIHAI WORLD-SHIPPING FREIGHT

A.k.a.: na

F.k.a.: na

Address: 419-201, Tongyi Lu, Huancui Qu, Weihai, Shandong, 264200, China

Listed on: 30 Mar. 2018 (amended on 23 May 2018)

Other information: Ship and commercial manager of the XIN GUANG HAI, a vessel that on loaded coal at Taean, DPRK, on 27 October 2017 and had an ETA of 14 November 2017 to Cam Pha, Vietnam, but it did not arrive. ⁹⁰⁸

China and the suppression of International Terrorism

As a responsible member of the international community, China supports the United Nations in playing a leading and coordinating role in international cooperation against terrorism. China upholds the UN Charter and other principles and norms of international law. In 2002, China took many measures in the field of fighting against terrorism. First of all, it took an active part in international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. At the

⁹⁰⁸ <https://scsanctions.un.org/en/?keywords=al-qaida#alqaedaent>

multi-lateral plane, China supported anti-terrorism resolutions adopted by UN agencies including the Security Council and conscientiously implemented the relevant resolutions. On January 28-February 1, 2002, the 6th session of the Special Committee against Terrorism of the General Assembly met. At the meeting, China continued to adopt a serious and constructive attitude to participate actively in the work of drafting a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and an International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.⁹⁰⁹ China has joined most of the international counterterrorism conventions, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages.⁹¹⁰

Within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and the heads of state of other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization signed on June 7, 2002, the Agreement of the State Parties to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Regional Anti-Terrorism Agency at the Summit Conference in Petersburg of Russia. The Regional Anti-Terrorism Agency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to be established soon in accordance with the Agreement will play a positive role in the international anti-terrorism fight. On December 28, 2002, the 31st Session of the Standing Committee of the 9th National People's Congress made a decision to approve the Agreement.⁹¹¹ Under the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China and countries involved have signed the following documents: the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, Cooperation Between SCO Member States on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, SCO Convention on Combating Terrorism, SCO Convention on Combating Extremism, SCO Cooperation Programme on Fighting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism for 2019-2021, and SCO Plan of Action for Cooperation with Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on Fighting Terrorism, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crimes.⁹¹² In the bilateral field, China has established anti-terrorism consultation mechanism with the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, India and Pakistan and made use of all international occasions to publicize its own anti-terrorism stand. Secondly, domestic anti-terrorism measures had been strengthened.⁹¹³

5.10 Annual Work Report tabled at the third session of 13th National People's Congress.

Premier Li Keqiang delivered a government work report including '**a review of our work in 2019 and the first few months of 2020**' on May 22, 2020 on behalf of the State

⁹⁰⁹https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/tyfls_665260/tyfl_665264/2626_665266/2627_665268/t15472.shtml

⁹¹⁰ Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang" published in March 2019, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/03/18/content_281476567813306.htm

⁹¹¹https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/tyfls_665260/tyfl_665264/2626_665266/2627_665268/t15472.shtml

⁹¹² Excerpts from Information Office of the State Council of China's White paper titled "The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang" published in March 2019, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/03/18/content_281476567813306.htm

⁹¹³https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/tyfls_665260/tyfl_665264/2626_665266/2627_665268/t15472.shtml

Council to the legislature for deliberation at the third session of the 13th National People's Congress (NPC). Premier Li Keqiang expressed the following points on International Relations in his speech to the 13th NPC (3rd Session):⁹¹⁴

i) A review of our work in 2019 and the first few months of 2020

- We achieved fruitful outcomes in pursuing China's major country diplomacy.
- We successfully hosted the second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation and other major diplomatic events.
- President Xi Jinping and other Party and state leaders visited many countries and attended major international events, including the G20 Leaders' Summit, the BRICS Leaders Meeting, the Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, the East Asian leaders' meetings on cooperation, the China-EU Leaders' Meeting, and the China–Japan–ROK Leaders' Meeting.
- We successfully pursued economic diplomacy and cultural and people-to-people exchanges.⁹¹⁵

ii) Advancing the reform and development of social programs to safeguard and improve living standards

- China cares deeply about our overseas nationals, who serve as a crucial bridge linking China and the rest of the world. We will give play to the unique role of overseas Chinese nationals and their family members and relatives at home, and forge a stronger bond of attachment among all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation. Together, we can create more remarkable achievements.
- China stands ready to work with other countries to strengthen international cooperation on COVID-19 control, promote stability in the world economy, advance global governance, and uphold the international system with the United Nations at its core and an international order based on international law.
- China will continue to pursue peaceful development, and advance friendship and cooperation with other countries as it opens up wider to the rest of the world. China will remain an important force promoting world peace, stability, development, and prosperity.

"One Country, Two Systems":

iii) Advancing the reform and development of social programs to safeguard and improve living standards

- We will fully and faithfully implement the policy of "One Country, Two Systems," under which the people of **Hong Kong** govern Hong Kong and the people of **Macao** govern Macao, with a high degree of autonomy for both regions. We will establish

⁹¹⁴ Excerpts from work report including 'a review of our work in 2019 and the first few months of 2020', available online at URL: <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-22/Full-text-Premier-Li-s-speech-at-the-third-session-of-the-13th-NPC-QHaP1FpB8k/index.html>

⁹¹⁵ Excerpts from work report including 'a review of our work in 2019 and the first few months of 2020', available online at URL: <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-22/Full-text-Premier-Li-s-speech-at-the-third-session-of-the-13th-NPC-QHaP1FpB8k/index.html>

sound legal systems and enforcement mechanisms for safeguarding national security in the two special administrative regions, and see that the governments of the two regions fulfil their constitutional responsibilities. We will support Hong Kong and Macao in growing their economies, improving living standards, and better integrating their development into China's overall development, and help them maintain long-term prosperity and stability.

- We will adhere to the major principles and policies on work related to **Taiwan** and resolutely oppose and deter any separatist activities seeking "Taiwan independence." We will improve institutional arrangements, policies, and measures to encourage exchanges and cooperation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, further cross-Strait integrated development, and protect the well-being of our fellow compatriots in Taiwan. We will encourage them to join us in opposing "Taiwan independence" and promoting China's reunification. With these efforts, we can surely create a beautiful future for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.⁹¹⁶

⁹¹⁶ Excerpts from work report including ‘a review of our work in 2019 and the first few months of 2020’ , available online at URL: <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-22/Full-text-Premier-Li-s-speech-at-the-third-session-of-the-13th-NPC-QHaP1FpB8k/index.html>