


Chapter IX

9. Demographics

9.1 Population

1,438,385,199



Source: <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/china-population/>

- The current population of China is 1,438,373,881 as of April 29, 2020, based on Worldometer elaboration of the latest United Nations data.
- China 2020 population is estimated at 1,439,323,776 people at midyear according to UN data.
- China population is equivalent to 18.47% of the total world population.
- China ranks number 1 in the list of countries (and dependencies) by population.
- The population density in China is 153 per Km² (397 people per mi²).
- The total land area is 9,388,211 Km² (3,624,807 sq. miles)
- 60.8 % of the population is urban (875,075,919 people in 2020)
- The median age in China is 38.4 years.¹⁴⁸⁸

9.1.1 Historical Population

China's population is at once its greatest asset as well as its most significant challenge. This is as true today as the twenty-first century begins as it has been for much of China's history. Although there are not absolutely reliable historical census numbers for China, certain patterns emerge as one examines China's imperial demographic path from 60 million people two thousand years ago to passing the one billion mark in recent times.¹⁴⁸⁹

China has had a rocky population history, littered with war, famine, and natural disasters. Six of the twelve most deadly wars across the globe took place in China, killing an estimated total of over 123 million people. The most deadly was the Three Kingdoms period (220AD - 280AD), where an estimated 40 million people died from war, famine, and disease. In 1850, a man named Hong Xiuquan led a rebellion to try to create

¹⁴⁸⁸ <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/china-population/>

¹⁴⁸⁹ http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_population.htm#issues

the "Heavenly Kingdom of Taiping." By proclaiming himself to be the younger brother of Jesus, he grew his following to between 10,000 and 30,000 followers, and by late 1850 they controlled over a third of China. During the 15 years of the rebellion, an estimated 20-30 million people died, primarily due to plague and famine.¹⁴⁹⁰

China's Population Growth throughout History

As early as 2 C.E. during the Han dynasty, China had a population of some 60 million, approximately one-fourth of the world's population at that time. Historical fluctuations of growth and decline kept dynastic China's population between 37 and 60 million over a period of at least the next 1000 years before beginning to increase rapidly. In the early years of the Ming dynasty in the late fourteenth century, China's population began dramatic changes that continue to the present. Rapid increases occurred especially between 1749 and 1811 during the Qing dynasty when the country's population doubled from 177,495,000 to 358,610,000. By 1851, the population reached perhaps 431,896,000 before the effects of the disastrous Taiping Rebellion brought about a slowing of past growth patterns (Some 30,000,000 deaths occurred between 1851-1864 during the upheavals associated with the attempt to establish the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. In some areas of central China, the effects of this were not reversed until the mid-twentieth century).

Throughout the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties, increasing population pressure on China's arable land was an on-going problem. Remarkable changes in agriculture in China over this four century period attest to extraordinary successes in increasing grain production to feed the burgeoning population.


- Migration from old areas into frontier areas helped broaden agriculture and spread population beyond already densely populated areas.
- The introduction of higher-yielding rice seeds and earlier ripening varieties of rice increased productivity from existing intensively tilled fields.
- Of great significance during this period was the introduction of new crops into Chinese cropping patterns. Especially noteworthy was the acceptance of a range of New World crops that had come to Asia from the Americas via the Spanish colonizers. These new crops — corn, sweet potatoes, and peanuts, especially — were all non-competitive with common grain crops because they could be grown in marginal areas such as on hill slopes and where soils were dry or sandy.
- Increased ability to produce food was aided also by continuing attention to improving irrigation, creating level land via terracing, grain storage, and improvements in tools and organic fertilizers.¹⁴⁹¹

The doubling and redoubling of China's population occurred well before China began its industrial revolution. In spite of China's apparent success in keeping pace with population increases, these efforts however could not be sustained. Indeed, by the nineteenth century, the pressure of population numbers taxed the ability of the weakened Qing imperial system to deal with it. Between 1851 and 1949, a century of rebellion, social upheaval, and suffering, China's population base increased "only" by another

¹⁴⁹⁰ <https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/china-population/>

¹⁴⁹¹ http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_population.htm#issues

100,000,000 on top of its 432,000,000 base. (During the same period, the population of the United States increased from about 23,000,000 to 151,000,000. Of this 128 million increase in the US, 36 million was due to immigration.) While China's absolute increase over this century was far below the increases of the preceding several centuries, the magnitude of China's overall population nonetheless bequeathed to the newly established People's Republic of China a resource of great potential and challenge of immense proportions.¹⁴⁹² During 1960–2015, the population grew to nearly 1.4 billion. Under Mao Zedong, China nearly doubled in population from 540 million in 1949 to 969 million in 1979. This growth slowed because of the one-child policy instituted in 1979.¹⁴⁹³



Source: http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_population.htm#issues

Dynasty	Persons Counted	Implied Persons per Household	Adjusted to Current PRC Boundaries (millions)
Han	59,594,978	4.9	
Han	43,356,367	5.8	
Han	53,256,229	5.8	
Han	49,690,789	5.2	
Han	49,150,220	5.1	
Han	49,730,550	5.0	
Han	49,524,183	5.0	
Han	47,566,772	5.1	
Han	56,486,856	5.3	
Sui	46,019,956	5.2	
Tang	37,140,000	6.0	
Tang	41,419,712	5.9	
Tang	45,431,265	5.8	
Tang	46,285,161	5.8	
Tang	48,143,609	5.7	
Tang	48,909,800	5.7	
Tang	52,880,488	5.8	
Tang	52,919,309	5.9	
Tang	58,834,711	4.5	
Yuan (Mongol)			
Yuan	59,848,964	4.5	
Ming	59,873,305	5.6	
Ming	60,545,813	5.7	
Qing	177,495,000		176.5
Qing	268,238,000		267.0
Qing	304,354,000		303.0
Qing	358,610,000		357.0
Qing	355,540,000		353.7
Qing	395,821,000		393.8
Qing	413,457,000		411.3
Qing	431,896,000		429.5
Qing	582,603,417		582.6
PRC			

Source: <https://archive.org/details/populationofmode0000unse/page/66>

¹⁴⁹² http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_population.htm#issues

¹⁴⁹³ Banister, Judith (1992). "A Brief History of China's Population". *A Brief History of China's Population, The Population of Modern China*. pp. 51–57. doi:10.1007/978-1-4899-1231-2_3. ISBN 978-0-306-44138-7.

9.1.2 Census Data

Basic Statistics of National Population Census in 1953, 1964, 1982 and 1990.¹⁴⁹⁴

Unit: 10 000 persons

Item	1953	1964	1982	1990
Total Population	58260	69122	100391	113051
Male	30179	35479	51528	58182
Female	28081	33643	48863	54869
Women at Childbearing Age (Age 15-49)	13314	15161	24849	30635
Total Number of Households	13411	15671	22115	27862
Family Households			22008	27691
Non-family Households			107	171
Population by Age				
Age 0-6	11700	13542	13456	15548
Age 7-14	8884	14525	20269	15752
Population within Working Age	29983	34149	55087	67903
Males Aged 60 and Females Aged 55 and Over	5170	5407	9304	11684
Nationality Population	58260	69122	100391	113051
Han Nationality	54728	65130	93667	103919
Minority Nationalities	3532	3992	6724	9132
Marital Status of Population Aged 15 and Over			66548	81751
Unmarried			19012	20541
Married			42376	55737
Widowed			4764	4989
Divorced			396	484
Population Aged 6 and Over by Educational Level		55542	88979	99409
University		287	604	614
Three Years College				962
Specialized Secondary School				1728
Senior Secondary School		912	6653	7260
Junior Secondary School		3235	17820	26339
Primary School		19582	35534	42021
Illiterate and Semi-Illiterate		31526	28368	20485
Employed Population			52150	64724
Unemployed Population			14516	17026
Population of Cities, Towns and Counties	58260	69122	100391	113051
City			14525	21122
Town	7726	9455	6106	8492
County	50534	59667	79760	83437

Source: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB1999e/d04e.htm>

Note: a) Data in this table excluded the military personnel as well as the population of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. b) Working age range refers to 16-59 years for men and 16-54 years for women. c) Population by age: The sum of the population of the age groups is not equal to the total population, because the population aged 15 is not shown and there is population whose true age is unknown. d) Population by educational level: Data in 1964 refer to population aged 7 and over. Illiterate and semi-illiterate population includes children not in school. The data exclude 4.75 million persons whose education levels are unknown.

The Fifth National Census

In accordance with decision of the State Council, China carried out its fifth national population census on November 1st, 2000. The field enumeration was completed by hard work of nearly six million census workers. The post-enumeration check by sample survey showed that the enumeration was successful. At present, all data collected through the

¹⁴⁹⁴ <http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/publish.htm?sort=1>

census are under computer processing program. The advance tabulation of the major figures has completed and the results are released as follows:¹⁴⁹⁵

I. Total Population

China has a population of 1,295.33 million. Of which:

- The total population of the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities (excluding Jinmen and Mazu islands of Fujian Province hereafter) and of servicemen on the mainland of China was 1,265.83 million.
- The population of Hong Kong SAR was 6.78 million.
- The population of Macao SAR was 440 thousand.
- The population of Taiwan Province and of Jinmen, Mazu and a few other islands of Fujian Province was 22.28 million.

II. Population Growth.

Compared with the population of 1,133.68 million from the 1990 population census (with zero hour of July 1, 1990 as the reference time), the total population of the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and the servicemen of the mainland of China increased by 132.15 million persons, or 11.66 percent over the past 10 years and 4 months. The average annual growth was 12.79 million persons, or a growth rate of 1.07 percent.

III. Population of Family Households.

In the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities of the mainland of China, there were 348.37 million family households with a population of 1,198.39 million persons. The average size of family household was 3.44 persons, or 0.52 persons less as compared with the 3.96 persons of the 1990 population census.

IV. Sex Composition.

Of the people enumerated in the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and servicemen of the mainland of China, 653.55 million persons or 51.63 percent were males, while 612.28 million persons or 48.37 percent were females. The sex ratio (female=100) was 106.74.

V. Age Composition.

Of the people enumerated in the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and servicemen of the mainland of China, 289.79 million persons were in the age group of 0-14, accounting for 22.89 percent of the total population; 887.93 million persons in the age group of 15-64, accounting for 70.15 percent and 88.11 million persons in the age group of 65 and over, accounting for 6.96 percent. As compared with the results of the 1990 population census, the share of people in the age group of 0-14 was down by 4.80

¹⁴⁹⁵ Statistical Data published by National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China, on March 28, 2001, available online at URL:http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/200204/t20020423_25982.html

percentage points, and that for people aged 65 and over was up by 1.39 percentage points.¹⁴⁹⁶

VI. Composition of Nationalities.

Of the people enumerated in the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and servicemen of the mainland of China, 1,159.40 million persons or 91.59 percent were of Han nationality, and 106.43 million persons or 8.41 percent were of various national minorities. Compared with the 1990 population census, the population of Han people increased by 116.92 million persons, or 11.22 percent; while the population of various national minorities increased by 15.23 million persons, or 16.70 percent.

VII. Composition of Educational Attainment.

Of the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and servicemen of the mainland of China, 45.71 million persons had finished university education (referring to junior college and above); 141.09 million persons had received senior secondary education (including secondary technical school education); 429.89 million persons had received junior secondary education and 451.91 million persons had had primary education (the educated persons included graduates and students in schools).

Compared with the 1990 population census, the following changes had taken place in the number of people with various educational attainments of every 100,000 people: number of people with university education increased to 3,611 from 1,422; number of people with senior secondary education increased to 11,146 from 8,039; number of people with junior secondary education increased from 23,344 to 33,961; and number of people with primary education decreased from 37,057 to 35,701.

Of the people enumerated in the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and servicemen of the mainland of China, 85.07 million persons were illiterate or semi-literate (i.e. people over 15 years of age who cannot read or can read very little). Compared with the 15.88 percent of illiterate or semi-literate people in the 1990 population census, the proportion had dropped to 6.72 percent, or down by 9.16 percentage points.

VIII. Urban and Rural Population.

In the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities of the mainland of China, there were 455.94 million urban residents, accounting for 36.09 percent of the total population; and that of rural residents stood at 807.39 million, accounting for 63.91 percent. Compared with the 1990 population census, the proportion of urban residents rose by 9.86 percentage points.¹⁴⁹⁷

¹⁴⁹⁶ Statistical Data published by National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China, on March 28, 2001, available online at URL: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/200204/t20020423_25982.html

¹⁴⁹⁷ Statistical Data published by National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China, on March 28, 2001, available online at URL: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/200204/t20020423_25982.html

Following are the results from the advance tabulation on the geographic distribution of population from the fifth national population census of China:¹⁴⁹⁸

Region	Population
Beijing Municipality	13.82
Tianjin Municipality	10.01
Hebei Province	67.44
Shanxi Province	32.97
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region	23.76
Liaoning Province	42.38
Jilin Province	27.28
Heilongjiang Province	36.89
Shanghai Municipality	16.74
Jiangsu Province	74.38
Zhejiang Province	46.77
Anhui Province	59.86
Fujian Province (excluding the population in Jinmen and Mazu and a few other islands)	34.71
Jiangxi Province	41.40
Shandong Province	90.79
Henan Province	92.56
Hubei Province	60.28
Hunan Province	64.40
Guangdong Province	86.42
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region	44.89
Hainan Province	7.87
Chongqing Municipality	30.90
Sichuan Province	83.29
Guizhou Province	35.25
Yunnan Province	42.88
Tibet Autonomous Region	2.62
Shaanxi Province	36.05
Gansu Province	25.62
Qinghai Province	5.18
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region	5.62
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region	19.25
Hongkong Special Administrative Region	6.78
Macao Special Administrative Region	0.44
Taiwan Province and Jinmen, Mazu and a few other islands of Fujian Province	22.28
Servicemen	2.50

Note:1). The population (including immigrants, excluding emigrants) of the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities of the mainland of China were enumerated at the reference time of zero hour of November 1, 2000.2). The difference between the total population on the mainland of China and the sum of population of the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and of servicemen were the population with their household registration unsettled.3). Population of Hong Kong SAR was obtained from data on June 30,2000, which was provided by Hong Kong SAR government. 4). Population of Macao SAR was obtained from data on September 30, 2000, which was provided by Macro SAR government.5). Population of Taiwan Province, Jinmen, Mazu and a few other islands refers to population at the end of December 2000, which was released by the Taiwan authority.6) The population is in millions.

¹⁴⁹⁸ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/200204/t20020423_25983.html

The Sixth national population census¹⁴⁹⁹

In accordance with the Regulations on National Population Census and the Circular of the State Council on the Conduct of the 6th National Population Census, China carried out its 6th national population census of November 1, 2010. The field enumeration of the census has been successfully completed through the leadership of the State Council and governments at all levels, the support and cooperation from people of various nationalities, and the efforts of nearly 10 million census workers. Results on major figures obtained through advance tabulation are released as follows:

I. Total Population¹⁵⁰⁰

Total population of China was 1370536875 persons. Of which:

- The population of the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and of servicemen on the mainland of China through census enumeration was 1339724852 persons.
- The population of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was 7097600 persons.
- The population of Macao Special Administrative Region was 552300 persons.
- The population of Taiwan was 23162123 persons.

II. Population Growth

Compared with the population of 1265825048 from the 2000 population census (zero hour of November 1, 2000), the total population of the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and the servicemen of the mainland of China increased by 73899804 persons, or 5.84 percent over the past 10 years. The average annual growth rate was 0.57 percent.

III. Population of Family Households

In the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities of the mainland of China, there were 401517330 family households with a population of 1244608395 persons. The average size of family household was 3.10 persons, or 0.34 person less as compared with the 3.44 persons in the 2000 population census.

IV. Sex Composition

Of the population enumerated in the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and servicemen of the mainland of China, 686852572 persons or 51.27 percent were males, while 652872280 persons or 48.73 percent were females. The sex ratio (female=100) declined from 106.74 to 105.20.

V. Age Composition

Of the population enumerated in the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and servicemen of the mainland of China, 222459737 persons were in the

¹⁴⁹⁹ Communiqué of the National Bureau of Statistics of People's Republic of China on Major Figures of the 2010 Population Census, available online at URL:

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/201104/t20110429_26450.html

¹⁵⁰⁰ The National Bureau of Statistics releases China Yearbook and more information on census can be accessed online at URL: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/AnnualData/>

age group of 0-14, accounting for 16.60 percent of the total population; 939616410 persons in the age group of 15-59, accounting for 70.14 percent, and 177648705 persons in the age group of 60 and over, accounting for 13.26 percent, of which 118831709 persons were in the age group of 65 and over, accounting for 8.87 percent. As compared with the results of the 2000 population census, the share of people in the age group of 0-14 was down by 6.29 percentage points, that of the age group of 15-59 was up by 3.36 percentage points, that of the age group of 60 and over was up by 2.93 percentage points, and that of the age group of 65 and over was up by 1.91 percentage points.

VI. Composition of Nationalities

Of the population enumerated in the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and servicemen of the mainland of China, 1225932641 persons or 91.51 percent were of Han nationality, and 113792211 persons or 8.49 percent were of various national minorities. Compared with the 2000 population census, the population of Han nationality increased by 66537177 persons, or 5.74 percent; while the population of various national minorities increased by 7362627 persons, or 6.92 percent.

VII. Composition of Educational Attainment

Of the population enumerated in the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and servicemen of the mainland of China, 119636790 persons had finished university education (referring to junior college and above); 187985979 persons had received senior secondary education (including secondary technical school education); 519656445 persons had received junior secondary education and 358764003 persons had primary education (the persons with various educational attainment included graduates and students in schools). Compared with the 2000 population census, following changes had taken place in the number of people with various educational attainments of every 100,000 people: number of people with university education increased from 3611 to 8930; number of people with senior secondary education increased from 11146 to 14032; number of people with junior secondary education increased from 33961 to 38788; and number of people with primary education decreased from 35701 to 26779. Of the population enumerated in the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and servicemen of the mainland of China, 54656573 persons were illiterate (i.e. people over 15 years of age who cannot read). Compared with the 2000 population census, the size of illiterate population dropped by 30413094 persons, and the illiterate rate declined from 6.72 percent to 4.08 percent, or down by 2.64 percentage points.

VIII. Urban and Rural Population

Of the population enumerated in the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and servicemen of the mainland of China, 665575306 persons were urban residents, accounting for 49.68 percent; and 674149546 persons were rural residents, accounting for 50.32 percent. Compared with the 2000 population census, the number of urban residents increased by 207137093 persons, and the number of rural residents dropped by 133237289 persons. The proportion of urban residents rose by 13.46 percentage points.

IX. Migration of Population

Of the population enumerated in the 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and servicemen of the mainland of China, 261386075 persons lived in places other than the towns (townships or streets) of their household registration where they had left for over 6 months. Of this total, 39959423 were persons with current residence different from the place of their household registration in the same city[10], and the remaining were 221426652 persons. Compared with the 2000 population census, population in this category increased by 116995327 persons, or up by 81.03 percent.

X. Error of Enumeration

After field enumeration, a total of 402 enumeration blocks were randomly selected to conduct post-enumeration survey, resulting in a population undercount rate of 0.12 percent.¹⁵⁰¹

The State Council has decided to carry out the fifth national population census in 2000 in order to work out scientifically the national economic and social development strategy and program, to formulate the population policy, to make unified arrangement for the material and cultural life of the people and to realize the coordinated development between the population and natural resources and environment. In accordance with the Law of Statistics of the People's Republic of China, the measures hereby are formulated.¹⁵⁰²

Released as follows are the results from the 6th national population census, conducted in 2010, on the geographic distribution of resident population:

Province	Population (person)	Proportion (%)	
		2000	2010
National total	1339724852	100	100
Beijing Municipality	19612368	1.09	1.46
Tianjin Municipality	12938224	0.79	0.97
Hebei Province	71854202	5.33	5.36
Shanxi Province	35712111	2.60	2.67
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region	24706321	1.88	1.84
Liaoning Province	43746323	3.35	3.27
Jilin Province	27462297	2.16	2.05
Heilongjiang Province	38312224	2.91	2.86
Shanghai Municipality	23019148	1.32	1.72
Jiangsu Province	78659903	5.88	5.87
Zhejiang Province	54426891	3.69	4.06

¹⁵⁰¹ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevents/t20110428_402722244.htm

¹⁵⁰² http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/LF/SR/200204/t20020423_27180.html

Anhui Province	59500510	4.73	4.44
Fujian Province	36894216	2.74	2.75
Jiangxi Province	44567475	3.27	3.33
Shandong Province	95793065	7.17	7.15
Henna Province	94023567	7.31	7.02
Hubei Province	57237740	4.76	4.27
Hunan Province	65683722	5.09	4.90
Guangdong Province	104303132	6.83	7.79
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region	46026629	3.55	3.44
Hainan Province	8671518	0.62	0.65
Chongqing Municipality	28846170	2.44	2.15
Sichuan Province	80418200	6.58	6.00
Guizhou Province	34746468	2.78	2.59
Yunnan Province	45966239	3.39	3.43
Tibet Autonomous Region	3002166	0.21	0.22
Shaanxi Province	37327378	2.85	2.79
Gansu Province	25575254	2.02	1.91
Qinghai Province	5626722	0.41	0.42
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region	6301350	0.44	0.47
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region	21813334	1.52	1.63
Servicemen	2300000		
Population with permanent residence difficult to define	4649985		

Source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/201104/t20110429_26450.html

Notes:1). All figures in the Communiqué are preliminary results. 2). Resident population of a given town/street include: people living in the current town/street where their household registration is located or with their household registration to be settled; people living in the current town/street and leaving the town/street of their household registration for over 6 months; people leaving the town/street of their household registration for less than 6 months or working or studying overseas, with their household registration located in the current town/street.3). National total in this table do not include population of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Macao Special Administrative Region or Taiwan Area.4). Refers to the proportion of resident population of all provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities to the national total (including servicemen and population with permanent residence difficult to define).

The Seventh Census.

China plans to conduct its seventh national population census in 2020, the State Council announced. The census, to begin on Nov. 1, 2020, will survey the amount, structure and distribution of the population, according to a notice issued by the State Council. The census will collect data including name, ID number, gender, marriage, education, profession and other aspects of Chinese citizens, said the notice. The State Council will establish a leading group to be responsible for the research and decision-making of major issues during the census, said the notice. Government departments at all levels should give full support and carry out the census in accordance with related laws and regulations while strictly protecting the data pooled through the census, it noted. To ensure the authenticity of the survey, China will establish a data quality-tracking and accountability mechanism, and will toughen the punishment of illegal acts during the census. China conducts a national population census every 10 years, with the last census in the world's most populous country finding that its population had increased to 1.37 billion.¹⁵⁰³

9.1.3 Censuses in China¹⁵⁰⁴

The People's Republic conducted censuses in 1953, 1964, and 1982. In 1987 the government announced that the fourth national census would take place in 1990 and that there would be one every ten years thereafter. The 1982 census, which reported a total population of 1,008,180,738, is generally accepted as significantly more reliable, accurate, and thorough than the previous two. Various international organizations eagerly assisted the Chinese in conducting the 1982 census, including the United Nations Fund for Population Activities which donated US\$15.6 million for the preparation and execution of the census.¹⁵⁰⁵

The nation began preparing for the 1982 census in late 1976. Chinese census workers were sent to the United States and Japan to study modern census-taking techniques and automation. Computers were installed in every provincial-level unit except Xizang and were connected to a central processing system in the Beijing headquarters of the State Statistical Bureau. Pre-tests and small-scale trial runs were conducted and checked for accuracy between 1980 and 1981 in twenty-four provincial-level units. Census stations were opened in rural production brigades and urban neighbourhoods. Beginning July 1, 1982, each household sent a representative to a census station to be enumerated. The census required about a month to complete and employed approximately 5 million census takers.¹⁵⁰⁶

The 1982 census collected data in nineteen demographic categories relating to individuals and households. The thirteen areas concerning individuals were name, relationship to head of household, sex, age, nationality, registration status, educational level, profession, occupation, status of nonworking persons, marital status, number of children born and still living, and number of births in 1981. The six items pertaining to

¹⁵⁰³ http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-11/08/c_138540262.htm

¹⁵⁰⁴ The National Bureau of Statistics releases China Yearbook and more information on census can be accessed online at URL: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/AnnualData/>

¹⁵⁰⁵ <http://countrystudies.us/china/33.htm>

¹⁵⁰⁶ *ibid*

households were type (domestic or collective), serial number, number of persons, number of births in 1981, number of deaths in 1981, and number of registered persons absent for more than one year. Information was gathered in a number of important areas for which previous data were either extremely inaccurate or simply non-existent, including fertility, marital status, urban population, minority ethnic groups, sex composition, age distribution, and employment and unemployment.¹⁵⁰⁷

A fundamental anomaly in the 1982 statistics was noted by some Western analysts. They pointed out that although the birth and death rates recorded by the census and those recorded through the household registration system were different, the two systems arrived at similar population totals. The discrepancies in the vital rates were the result of the underreporting of both births and deaths to the authorities under the registration system; families would not report some births because of the one-child policy and would not report some deaths so as to hold on to the rations of the deceased. Nevertheless, the 1982 census was a watershed for both Chinese and world demographics. After an eighteen-year gap, population specialists were given a wealth of reliable, up-to-date figures on which to reconstruct past demographic patterns, measure current population conditions, and predict future population trends. For example, Chinese and foreign demographers used the 1982 census age-sex structure as the base population for forecasting and making assumptions about future fertility trends. The data on age-specific fertility and mortality rates provided the necessary base-line information for making population projections. The census data also were useful for estimating future manpower potential, consumer needs, and utility, energy, and health-service requirements. The sudden abundance of demographic data helped population specialists immeasurably in their efforts to estimate world population. Previously, there had been no accurate information on these 21 percent of the earth's inhabitants. Demographers who had been conducting research on global population without accurate data on the Chinese fifth of the world's population were particularly thankful for the 1982 census.¹⁵⁰⁸

9.1.4 Statistics Law of the People's Republic of China¹⁵⁰⁹

Adopted at the Third Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress, on December 8, 1983, and revised in accordance with the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Revising the Statistics Law of the People's Republic of China adopted on May 15, 1996. This Law is formulated in order to organize statistical work in an effective and scientific manner, to ensure accuracy and timeliness of statistical data, to bring into play the important role of statistics in comprehending the actual condition and strength of the country as well as in guiding national economic and social development, and to promote the smooth progress of the socialist modernization.

The departments of the State Council and local people's governments at various levels shall, according to the needs of their statistical work, establish statistics institutions, or staff relevant departments with statisticians, and appoint persons in charge of statistics. These statistics institutions and persons in charge of statistics are, in statistical work,

¹⁵⁰⁷ <http://countrystudies.us/china/33.htm>

¹⁵⁰⁸ <http://countrystudies.us/china/33.htm>

¹⁵⁰⁹ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/LF/SL/200203/t20020329_27176.html

under the direction of the National Bureau of Statistics or statistics institutions of local people's governments at the corresponding level.

The National Bureau of Statistics shall be in charge of the nation's automated system of statistical information and statistical data bank system. The main functions of the National Bureau of Statistics and statistics institutions of local people's governments at various levels are as follows:


- (1) to draw up plans for statistical investigations and map out and inspect statistical work throughout the country or in their respective administrative areas;
- (2) to organize State and local statistical investigation and to collect, compile and provide statistical data of the whole country or of their respective administrative areas.
- (3) to make statistical analysis of national economic and social development, to exercise statistical supervision and, in accordance with the regulations of the State Council, to conduct national economic accounting.
- (4) to administer and coordinate work concerning the statistical investigation forms and statistical standards worked out by various departments.

9.1.5 Population Control

Initially, China's post-1949 leaders were ideologically disposed to view a large population as an asset. But the liabilities of a large, rapidly growing population soon became apparent. For one year, starting in August 1956, vigorous propaganda support was given to the Ministry of Public Health's mass birth control efforts. These efforts, however, had little impact on fertility. After the interval of the Great Leap Forward, Chinese leaders again saw rapid population growth as an obstacle to development, and their interest in birth control revived. In the early 1960s, propaganda, somewhat more muted than during the first campaign, emphasized the virtues of late marriage. Birth control offices were set up in the central government and some provincial level governments in 1964. The second campaign was particularly successful in the cities, where the birth rate was cut in half during the 1963-66 period. The chaos of the Cultural Revolution brought the program to a halt, however.¹⁵¹⁰

¹⁵¹⁰ <http://countrystudies.us/china/34.htm>

Birth rate and death rate in China 1950-2014



Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China: China Statistical yearbook 2014, chapter 2 Population. Stats.gov.cn.

Note: The data is no longer available in the China Statistical yearbook. See these articles which are citing the yearbook. <http://www.yhcv.net/famine/Research/Ashton84.pdf> (p.615.)

In 1972 and 1973 the party mobilized its resources for a nationwide birth control campaign administered by a group in the State Council. Committees to oversee birth control activities were established at all administrative levels and in various collective enterprises. This extensive and seemingly effective network covered both the rural and the urban population. In urban areas public security headquarters included population control sections. In rural areas the country's "barefoot doctors" distributed information and contraceptives to people's commune members. By 1973 Mao Zedong was personally identified with the family planning movement, signifying a greater leadership commitment to controlled population growth than ever before. Yet until several years after Mao's death in 1976, the leadership was reluctant to put forth directly the rationale that population control was necessary for economic growth and improved living standards. Population growth targets were set for both administrative units and individual families. In the mid-1970s the maximum recommended family size was two children in cities and three or four in the country.¹⁵¹¹

9.1.5.1 One-Child Policy

Since 1979 the government has advocated a one-child limit for both rural and urban areas and has generally set a maximum of two children in special circumstances. As of 1986 the policy for minority nationalities was two children per couple, three in special circumstances, and no limit for ethnic groups with very small populations. The overall goal of the one-child policy was to keep the total population within 1.2 billion through the

¹⁵¹¹ <http://countrystudies.us/china/34.htm>

year 2000, on the premise that the Four Modernizations program would be of little value if population growth was not brought under control.¹⁵¹²

The State Council's white paper titled "Family Planning in China", published in August 1995, China maintains that in 1973, China began to promote family planning throughout the country. China's population increased from 900 million to 1.2 billion in the period from 1973 to February 1995, and the time needed for the population to increase by 100 million was again lengthened to around seven years. China has been through the third post-1949 peak period of births from the beginning of the 1990s, the community of women in their prime of fertility (aged 20 to 29) has exceeded 100 million each year on average, and such a huge child-bearing community has a great birth potential still. But, because China's current population and family planning programmes and policies have won understanding and support from the people, the fertility level of the population has steadily reduced and the trend of over-rapid population growth has been effectively checked along with the country's economic and social development. Compared with 1970, in 1994 the birth rate dropped from 33.43 per thousand to 17.7 per thousand; the natural growth rate, from 25.83 per thousand to 11.21 per thousand; and the total fertility rate of women, from 5.81 to around 2. Now, China's urban population has basically accomplished the change-over to the population reproduction pattern characterized by low birth rate, low death rate and low growth; and the rural population is currently in this process of change-over. According to statistics supplied by the United Nations, China's population growth rate has already been markedly lower than the average level of other developing countries. According to calculation by experts, if China had not implemented family planning but had all along kept the birth rate at the level of the early 1970s, its population would possibly have passed the 1.5 billion mark by now. Over the past two decades and more, China's promotion of family planning has created a population environment conducive to reform and opening to the outside world and socioeconomic development as well as the population conditions for safeguarding the survival and development of China.¹⁵¹³

One child for one couple is a necessary choice made under China's special historical conditions to alleviate the grim population situation. One child for one couple does not mean to "have one child" under all circumstances, but rather, while encouraging couples to have only one child, to plan arrangements for couples who have real difficulties and need to have a second child to do so. In China's cities and towns where family planning was introduced earlier and the economic, cultural, educational, public health and social security conditions are better, the overwhelming majority of couples of child-bearing age who are pleased with a small family have responded to the government's call and volunteered to have only one child. In 1990, of the non-agricultural population in China's urban localities, the total fertility rate of women dropped to 1.26, or 1.05 lower than the nation's average figure. In the countryside, the total fertility birth rate of women was 2.8. Since the founding of New China, the population growth rate of the national minorities has been not only higher than that before Liberation, but also higher than that of the Han people in the corresponding period. The total population of the national minorities increased from 35 million in 1953 to 91.32 million in 1990. Between 1982 and 1990 after the practice of family planning in the areas inhabited by minority people, the population

¹⁵¹² Ibid

¹⁵¹³ <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/familypanning/13-3.htm>

of the national minorities increased by 35.81 percent, or 3.27 times the growth of the Han population in the same period.¹⁵¹⁴

9.1.5.1.1 Critique of One-Child Policy

The one-child policy was a highly ambitious population control program. Like previous programs of the 1960s and 1970s, the one child policy employed a combination of propaganda, social pressure, and in some cases coercion. The one-child policy was unique, however, in that it linked reproduction with economic cost or benefit. Under the one-child program, a sophisticated system rewarded those who observed the policy and penalized those who did not. Couples with only one child were given a "one-child certificate" entitling them to such benefits as cash bonuses, longer maternity leave, better child care, and preferential housing assignments. In return, they were required to pledge that they would not have more children. In the countryside, there was great pressure to adhere to the one-child limit. Because the rural population accounted for approximately 60 percent of the total, the effectiveness of the one-child policy in rural areas was considered the key to the success or failure of the program as a whole.¹⁵¹⁵

In rural areas the day-to-day work of family planning was done by cadres at the team and brigade levels who were responsible for women's affairs and by health workers. The women's team leader made regular household visits to keep track of the status of each family under her jurisdiction and collected information on which women were using contraceptives, the methods used, and which had become pregnant. She then reported to the brigade women's leader, who documented the information and took it to a monthly meeting of the commune birth-planning committee. According to reports, ceilings or quotas had to be adhered to; to satisfy these cut-offs, unmarried young people were persuaded to postpone marriage, couples without children were advised to "wait their turn," women with unauthorized pregnancies were pressured to have abortions, and those who already had children were urged to use contraception or undergo sterilization. Couples with more than one child were exhorted to be sterilized.¹⁵¹⁶

The one-child policy enjoyed much greater success in urban than in rural areas. Even without state intervention, there were compelling reasons for urban couples to limit the family to a single child. Raising a child required a significant portion of family income, and in the cities a child did not become an economic asset until he or she entered the work force at age sixteen. Couples with only one child were given preferential treatment in housing allocation. In addition, because city dwellers who were employed in state enterprises received pensions after retirement, the sex of their first child was less important to them than it was to those in rural areas. Numerous reports surfaced of coercive measures used to achieve the desired results of the one-child policy. The alleged methods ranged from intense psychological pressure to the use of physical force, including some grisly accounts of forced abortions and infanticide. Chinese officials admitted that isolated, uncondoned abuses of the program occurred and that they condemned such acts, but they insisted that the family planning program was administered on a voluntary basis using persuasion and economic measures only.

¹⁵¹⁴ <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/familypanning/13-4.htm>

¹⁵¹⁵ <http://countrystudies.us/china/34.htm>

¹⁵¹⁶ <http://countrystudies.us/china/34.htm>

International reaction to the allegations were mixed. The UN Fund for Population Activities and the International Planned Parenthood Association were generally supportive of China's family planning program. The United States Agency for International Development, however, withdrew US\$10 million from the Fund in March 1985 based on allegations that coercion had been used.¹⁵¹⁷

Observers suggested that an accurate assessment of the one child program would not be possible until all women who came of childbearing age in the early 1980s passed their fertile years. As of 1987 the one-child program had achieved mixed results. In general, it was very successful in almost all urban areas but less successful in rural areas. The Chinese authorities must have been disturbed by the increase in the officially reported annual population growth rate (birth rate minus death rate): from 12 per 1,000, or 1.2 percent in 1980 to 14.1 per 1,000, or 1.4 percent in 1986. If the 1986 rate is maintained to the year 2000, the population will exceed 1.2 billion.¹⁵¹⁸

Rapid fertility reduction associated with the one-child policy has potentially negative results. For instance, in the future the elderly might not be able to rely on their children to care for them as they have in the past, leaving the state to assume the expense, which could be considerable. Based on United Nations statistics and data provided by the Chinese government, it was estimated in 1987 that by the year 2000 the population 60 years and older (the retirement age is 60 in urban areas) would number 127 million, or 10.1 percent of the total population; the projection for 2025 was 234 million elderly, or 16.4 percent. According to one Western analyst, projections based on the 1982 census show that if the one-child policy were maintained to the year 2000, 25 percent of China's population would be age 65 or older by the year 2040.¹⁵¹⁹

9.1.5.2 Promotion of Two-Child Policy

The Policy draft issued by the National Health Family Planning Commission of the PRC states that it is decided by the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee that China will continue to uphold the basic national policy of family planning and improve its strategy on population development. The policy that all couples may have two children will be implemented and the challenge of the aging population will be addressed in a proactive manner. These major initiatives are taken by the Party Central Committee based on scientific evidence of demographic, economic and social development patterns, and regarded as of strategic importance for promoting a balanced population growth and achieving the long-term development of the Chinese nation. The universal two-child policy will help to optimize the population structure, increase labour supply and mitigate the pressure of an aging population. It will facilitate sustainable and healthy economic development so as to achieve the goal of a comprehensive well-off society. It will also help to better implement the basic national policy of family planning, and promote family happiness and social harmony.

The Party Central Committee has always attached great importance to population issues. Family planning has been identified as a basic national policy in the light of our national conditions. With the joint efforts of the whole Party and society, our work in family

¹⁵¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁵¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁵¹⁹ <http://countrystudies.us/china/34.htm>

planning has made remarkable achievements, strongly promoting economic growth, social progress and people's well-being and laying a solid foundation for the comprehensive efforts of building a well-off society. Contributions made by the general public, the planned families and family-planning professionals are well acknowledged.

Now in the new century, the population growth in China has been experiencing major change. The total population growth has clearly dropped and the population of working age is beginning to shrink. Population aging is accelerated while the function of families in supporting the elderly and the young is weakened. To promote the long-term balanced development of the population, the Party Central Committee has refined the fertility policies as appropriate, in a timely way. The Third Plenary Session of the 18th Party Central Committee decided that a couple may have two children if one of them is from a single child family. With this policy steadily implemented and based on the updates in population, economic and social development, the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th Party Central Committee decides to further implement the universal two-child policy. As required by the Central Committee, the National Health and Family Planning Commission and relevant government departments have conducted a series of on-site and in-depth studies, extensively consulted experts, local officials and peoples, and made comparisons as well as analysis on various candidate approaches and scenarios.¹⁵²⁰

9.1.5.2.1 China: Two-Child Policy becomes Law

On December 27, 2015, the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress (NPC) adopted a decision amending the Population and Family Planning Law. Effective January 1, 2016, the "two-child policy" became law applicable nationwide.¹⁵²¹

Previously, on September 29, 2015, the Fifth Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China (CPC) 18th Central Committee announced that China would end its decades-long "one-child policy," allowing all married couples to have two children. This is the first time the Population and Family Planning Law was revised since its promulgation in 2001. Under article 18 of the old Law¹⁵²², the state advocated that every married couple have only one child; a second child might be allowed only when the requirements specified by laws and regulations were met.

The new article 18 in the 2015 Law provides that the state advocates that every married couple have two children and that more children may be allowed where the requirements specified by laws and regulations are met. (2015 Law, art. 18) The 2015 Law authorizes the provincial-level people's congresses to formulate implementing measures, to address such issues as who is eligible to have more than two children. In response to the possibility that a husband and a wife may come from different localities and therefore be subject to different local regulations, the new Law added that in such a situation, the couple may choose which regulations will apply. In addition, in the 2015 Law, late

¹⁵²⁰ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/chinahealth/2015-10/30/content_22325770.htm

¹⁵²¹ People's Republic of China Population and Family Planning Law (2015 Law), promulgated by the NPC Standing Committee on Dec. 29, 2015, effective Sept. 1, 2016, (*as amended* Dec. 27, 2015, effective Jan. 1, 2016), available online at URL: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-12/28/content_5028414.htm

Note: More information on the Population and Family Planning Laws of the People's Republic of China can be accessed online at the URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/population-planning>

¹⁵²² Population and Family Planning Law of the People's Republic of China (Order of the President No. 63)(2001 Law), promulgated by the NPC Standing Committee on Dec. 29, 2001, (effective Sept. 1, 2002) available online at URL: http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/21/content_25059.htm

marriage and late childbearing are no longer encouraged; the wording in article 18 that the state “encourages late marriage and late childbearing” was removed. Couples used to be rewarded with extended leave or other benefits for late marriage or late childbearing pursuant to the old article 25. The new article 25, however, provides that all couples who bear children in compliance with laws and regulations may be granted extended leave or other benefits. (2001 Law & 2015 Law, arts. 18 & 25.) Under a new birth registration system, couples who bear no more than two children will no longer be required to obtain birth permits from government authorities. This was announced in a decision issued by the CPC Central Committee¹⁵²³ and the State Council on December 31, 2015.¹⁵²⁴

9.1.5.2.2 Results of Two-child policy

An article published in *Global times* titled “ Two-child policy brings China 1 million more new-borns in 2016” maintains that China is experiencing a steady growth in its new-born population since it relaxed its family planning policy, with 1 million more new-borns in 2016 than 2015. The year of 2016 saw over 17.5 million births. The National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC)¹⁵²⁵ discussed the two-child policy for the first time, saying the policy's implementation has met the authorities' expectations. According to the NHFPC, China's current fertility rate is 1.6 live births per woman, and the number is expected to rise to 1.8 in the 13th Five-Year Plan period (2016-20). January data from the National Bureau of Statistics shows the new-born population in 2015 was 16.55 million, with the total fertility rate standing at 1.54 births per woman. China's family planning policy, introduced in the 1970s, limited most urban couples to one child. China's top legislature eased the one-child policy at the end of 2013 by allowing couples to have a second child if one of the parents was an only child. Since January 1, the policy has been further relaxed by allowing all married couples to have two children.¹⁵²⁶

9.1.6 Population Density and Distribution

Population density per sq. km in China is 135 people. Population density is a main index to show population distribution form and the regional differences of population's distribution. With the increase of China's population, the population density is on the increase.¹⁵²⁷ Overall population density in 1986 was about 109 people per square kilometre. Density was only about one-third that of Japan and less than that of many other countries in Asia and in Europe. The overall figure, however, concealed major regional variations and the high person-land ratio in densely populated areas. In the 11 provinces, special municipalities, and autonomous regions along the southeast coast, population density was 320.6 people per square kilometre. In 1986 about 94 percent of the population lived on approximately 36 percent of the land. Broadly speaking, the population was concentrated in China Proper, east of the mountains and south of the Great Wall. The most densely populated areas included the Chang Jiang Valley (of which

¹⁵²³ Decision of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Overall Implementation of the Two-Child Policy and Reforming and Improving Administration of Family Planning Services (Dec. 31, 2015), available online at URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-01/05/c_1117678260.htm

¹⁵²⁴ <http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-two-child-policy-becomes-law/>

¹⁵²⁵ For more detailed information on Family Planning NHFPC <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/chinahealth/resources.html>

¹⁵²⁶ <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1024011.shtml>

¹⁵²⁷ http://english1.english.gov.cn/2005-08/08/content_27315.htm

the delta region was the most populous), Sichuan Basin, North China Plain, Zhu Jiang Delta, and the industrial area around the city of Shenyang in the northeast. Population is most sparse in the mountainous, desert, and grassland regions of the northwest and southwest. In Nei Monggol Autonomous Region, portions are completely uninhabited, and only a few sections have populations more dense than ten people per square kilometre. The Nei Monggol, Xinjiang, and Xizang autonomous regions and Gansu and Qinghai provinces comprise 55 percent of the country's land area but in 1985 contained only 5.7 percent of its population.¹⁵²⁸

Since 1982, although the population's net increase was on the decline and the growth rate of population was also on the decrease year on year, the population density is on the increase. The density of the population rose from 105 people per sq. km in 1982 to 135 people per sq. km in 2003, rising 30 per sq. km. Now the highest population density is in Shanghai, 2,716 people per sq. km, far higher than the average level in the country. Tianjin, Beijing, Jiangsu, Shandong and Henan followed Shanghai and the population density in the cities and provinces are ranging from 579 to 895 people per sq km. Population density of Ningxia, Yunnan, Heilongjiang, Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai and Tibet is lower than the average level in the country. Thus, the population density in coastal regions in east China is higher and that in the central and west China regions, the population becomes scarce. The distribution pattern was determined by economic conditions and geographic conditions.¹⁵²⁹ By the end of 2018, the total number of Chinese population at the mainland reached 1,395.38 million, an increase of 5.30 million over that at the end of 2017. Of this total, urban permanent residents numbered 831.37 million, accounting for 59.58 percent of the total population (the urbanization rate of permanent residents), 1.06 percentage points higher than that at the end of 2017. The urbanization rate of population with household registration was 43.37 percent, 1.02 percentage points higher than that at the end of 2017. The year 2018 saw 15.23 million births, a crude birth rate of 10.94 per thousand, and 9.93 million deaths, a crude death rate of 7.13 per thousand. The natural growth rate was 3.81 per thousand. The number of population who live in places other than their household registration areas reached 286 million, of which 241 million were floating population.¹⁵³⁰

Item	Population at Year-end (10,000 persons)	Proportion (%)
National Total	139538	100.0
Of which: Urban	83137	59.58
Rural	56401	40.42
Of which: Male	71351	51.1
Female	68187	48.9
Of which: Aged 0-15 (under the age of 16)[8]	24860	17.8
Aged 16-59 (under the age of 60)	89729	64.3
Aged 60 and above	24949	17.9
Of which: Aged 65 and above	16658	11.9

Source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201902/t20190228_1651335.html

By the end of 2019, the total number of Chinese population at the mainland reached 1,400.05 million, an increase of 4.67 million over that at the end of 2018. Of this total,

¹⁵²⁸ <http://countrystudies.us/china/33.htm>

¹⁵²⁹ http://english1.english.gov.cn/2005-08/08/content_27315.htm

¹⁵³⁰ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201902/t20190228_1651335.html

urban permanent residents numbered 848.43 million, accounting for 60.60 percent of the total population (the urbanization rate of permanent residents), 1.02 percentage points higher than that at the end of 2018. The urbanization rate of population with household registration was 44.38 percent, 1.01 percentage points higher than that at the end of 2018. The year 2019 saw 14.65 million births, a crude birth rate of 10.48 per thousand, and 9.98 million deaths, a crude death rate of 7.14 per thousand. The natural growth rate was 3.34 per thousand. The number of population who lived in places other than their household registration areas reached 280 million, of which 236 million were floating population.¹⁵³¹

Item	Population at Year-end (10,000 persons)	Proportion (%)
National Total	140005	100.0
Of which: Urban	84843	60.60
Rural	55162	39.40
Of which: Male	71527	51.1
Female	68478	48.9
Of which: Aged 0-15 (under the age of 16)[11]	24977	17.8
Aged 16-59 (under the age of 60)	89640	64.0
Aged 60 and above	25388	18.1
Of which: Aged 65 and above	17603	12.6

Source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/202002/t20200228_1728917.html

¹⁵³¹ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/202002/t20200228_1728917.html

Total Population by Urban and Rural Residence and Birth Rate and, Death Rate, Natural Growth Rate by Region. (2018)

Region	Total Population (year-end) (10 000 persons)	Urban Population		Rural Population		Birth Rate (‰)	Death Rate (‰)	Natural Growth Rate (‰)
		Population	Proportion (%)	Population	Proportion (%)			
		National Total	139538	83137	59.58			
Beijing	2154	1863	86.50	291	13.50	8.24	5.58	2.66
Tianjin	1560	1297	83.15	263	16.85	6.67	5.42	1.25
Hebei	7556	4264	56.43	3292	43.57	11.26	6.38	4.88
Shanxi	3718	2172	58.41	1546	41.59	9.63	5.32	4.31
Inner Mongolia	2534	1589	62.71	945	37.29	8.35	5.95	2.40
Liaoning	4359	2968	68.10	1391	31.90	6.39	7.39	-1.00
Jilin	2704	1556	57.53	1148	42.47	6.62	6.26	0.36
Heilongjiang	3773	2268	60.10	1505	39.90	5.98	6.67	-0.69
Shanghai	2424	2136	88.10	288	11.90	7.20	5.40	1.80
Jiangsu	8051	5604	69.61	2447	30.39	9.32	7.03	2.29
Zhejiang	5737	3953	68.90	1784	31.10	11.02	5.58	5.44
Anhui	6324	3459	54.69	2865	45.31	12.41	5.96	6.45
Fujian	3941	2594	65.82	1347	34.18	13.20	6.20	7.00
Jiangxi	4648	2604	56.02	2044	43.98	13.43	6.06	7.37
Shandong	10047	6147	61.18	3900	38.82	13.26	7.18	6.08
Henan	9605	4967	51.71	4638	48.29	11.72	6.80	4.92
Hubei	5917	3568	60.30	2349	39.70	11.54	7.00	4.54
Hunan	6899	3865	56.02	3034	43.98	12.19	7.08	5.11
Guangdong	11346	8022	70.70	3324	29.30	12.79	4.55	8.24
Guangxi	4926	2474	50.22	2452	49.78	14.12	5.96	8.16
Hainan	934	552	59.06	382	40.94	14.48	6.01	8.47
Chongqing	3102	2032	65.50	1070	34.50	11.02	7.54	3.48
Sichuan	8341	4362	52.29	3979	47.71	11.05	7.01	4.04
Guizhou	3600	1711	47.52	1889	52.48	13.90	6.85	7.05
Yunnan	4830	2309	47.81	2521	52.19	13.19	6.32	6.87
Tibet	344	107	31.14	237	68.86	15.22	4.58	10.64
Shaanxi	3864	2246	58.13	1618	41.87	10.67	6.24	4.43
Gansu	2637	1258	47.69	1379	52.31	11.07	6.65	4.42
Qinghai	603	328	54.47	275	45.53	14.31	6.25	8.06
Ningxia	688	405	58.88	283	41.12	13.32	5.54	7.78
Xinjiang	2487	1266	50.91	1221	49.09	10.69	4.56	6.13

Source: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/indexeh.htm>

9.2 Vital Statistics

9.2.1 Table of births and deaths 1952-2018¹⁵³²

9.2.1.1. Birth Rate, Death Rate and Natural Growth Rate of Population (1952-1978).

Year	National			City			County		
	Birth Rate	Death Rate	Natural Growth Rate	Birth Rate	Death Rate	Natural Growth Rate	Birth Rate	Death Rate	Natural Growth Rate
1952	37.00	17.00	20.00						
1957	34.03	10.80	23.23	44.48	8.47	36.01	32.81	11.07	21.74
1962	37.01	10.02	26.99	35.46	8.28	27.18	37.27	10.32	26.95
1965	37.88	9.50	28.38	26.59	5.69	20.90	39.53	10.06	29.47
1970	33.43	7.60	25.83						
1975	23.01	7.32	15.69	14.71	5.39	9.32	24.17	7.59	16.58
1978	18.25	6.25	12.00	13.56	5.12	8.44	18.91	6.42	12.49

Source: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB1999e/d02e.htm>

Note: Figures are in Percentage.

¹⁵³² China Statistical Yearbooks (1999-2018) published by National Bureau of Statistics, are available online at URL: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/AnnualData/>

9.2.1.2. Birth Rate, Death Rate and Natural Growth Rate of Population (1978-2018).

Year	Birth Rate	Death Rate	Natural Growth Rate
1978	18.25	6.25	12.00
1980	18.21	6.34	11.87
1981	20.91	6.36	14.55
1982	22.28	6.60	15.68
1983	20.19	6.90	13.29
1984	19.90	6.82	13.08
1985	21.04	6.78	14.26
1986	22.43	6.86	15.57
1987	23.33	6.72	16.61
1988	22.37	6.64	15.73
1989	21.58	6.54	15.04
1990	21.06	6.67	14.39
1991	19.68	6.70	12.98
1992	18.24	6.64	11.60
1993	18.09	6.64	11.45
1994	17.70	6.49	11.21
1995	17.12	6.57	10.55
1996	16.98	6.56	10.42
1997	16.57	6.51	10.06
1998	15.64	6.50	9.14
1999	14.64	6.46	8.18
2000	14.03	6.45	7.58
2001	13.38	6.43	6.95
2002	12.86	6.41	6.45
2003	12.41	6.40	6.01
2004	12.29	6.42	5.87
2005	12.40	6.51	5.89
2006	12.09	6.81	5.28
2007	12.10	6.93	5.17
2008	12.14	7.06	5.08
2009	11.95	7.08	4.87
2010	11.90	7.11	4.79
2011	11.93	7.14	4.79
2012	12.10	7.15	4.95
2013	12.08	7.16	4.92
2014	12.37	7.16	5.21
2015	12.07	7.11	4.96
2016	12.95	7.09	5.86
2017	12.43	7.11	5.32
2018	10.94	7.13	3.81

Source: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/html/E0202.jpg>

Note: Figures are in Percentage.

9.2.1.3 Total Population by Urban and Rural Residence Birth Rate, Death Rate and Natural Growth Rate by Region.

Region	Total Population (year-end) (10 000 persons)	Urban Population		Rural Population		Birth Rate (%)	Death Rate (%)	Natural Growth Rate (%)
		Population	Proportion (%)	Population	Proportion (%)			
National Total	139538	83137	59.58	56401	40.42	10.94	7.13	3.81
Beijing	2154	1863	86.50	291	13.50	8.24	5.58	2.66
Tianjin	1560	1297	83.15	263	16.85	6.67	5.42	1.25
Hebei	7556	4264	56.43	3292	43.57	11.26	6.38	4.88
Shanxi	3718	2172	58.41	1546	41.59	9.63	5.32	4.31
Inner Mongolia	2534	1589	62.71	945	37.29	8.35	5.95	2.40
Liaoning	4359	2968	68.10	1391	31.90	6.39	7.39	-1.00
Jilin	2704	1556	57.53	1148	42.47	6.62	6.26	0.36
Heilongjiang	3773	2268	60.10	1505	39.90	5.98	6.67	-0.69
Shanghai	2424	2136	88.10	288	11.90	7.20	5.40	1.80
Jiangsu	8051	5604	69.61	2447	30.39	9.32	7.03	2.29
Zhejiang	5737	3953	68.90	1784	31.10	11.02	5.58	5.44
Anhui	6324	3459	54.69	2865	45.31	12.41	5.96	6.45
Fujian	3941	2594	65.82	1347	34.18	13.20	6.20	7.00
Jiangxi	4648	2604	56.02	2044	43.98	13.43	6.06	7.37
Shandong	10047	6147	61.18	3900	38.82	13.26	7.18	6.08
Henan	9605	4967	51.71	4638	48.29	11.72	6.80	4.92
Hubei	5917	3568	60.30	2349	39.70	11.54	7.00	4.54
Hunan	6899	3865	56.02	3034	43.98	12.19	7.08	5.11
Guangdong	11346	8022	70.70	3324	29.30	12.79	4.55	8.24
Guangxi	4926	2474	50.22	2452	49.78	14.12	5.96	8.16
Hainan	934	552	59.06	382	40.94	14.48	6.01	8.47
Chongqing	3102	2032	65.50	1070	34.50	11.02	7.54	3.48
Sichuan	8341	4362	52.29	3979	47.71	11.05	7.01	4.04
Guizhou	3600	1711	47.52	1889	52.48	13.90	6.85	7.05
Yunnan	4830	2309	47.81	2521	52.19	13.19	6.32	6.87
Tibet	344	107	31.14	237	68.86	15.22	4.58	10.64
Shaanxi	3864	2246	58.13	1618	41.87	10.67	6.24	4.43
Gansu	2637	1258	47.69	1379	52.31	11.07	6.65	4.42
Qinghai	603	328	54.47	275	45.53	14.31	6.25	8.06
Ningxia	688	405	58.88	283	41.12	13.32	5.54	7.78
Xinjiang	2487	1266	50.91	1221	49.09	10.69	4.56	6.13


Source: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/html/E0208.jpg>

Note: a). Data in the table are estimates from the 2018 National Survey on Population Changes. The national total population was adjusted on the basis of sampling errors and survey errors. Similar adjustments were

not made to regional figures. b).The military personnel were included in the national total population, but were not included in the population by region.

9.2.2 Total Fertility Rate from 1930-1949

The fertility rate of a country is the average number of children that women from that country will have throughout their reproductive years. In 1930, China's fertility rate was 5.5 children per woman, and this number then dropped to just under five over the next fifteen years, as China experienced a civil war and the Second World War. The fertility rate rose rather quickly after this to over 6.1 in 1955, before dropping again in the late 1950s, as Chairman Mao's 'Great Leap Forward' failed to industrialize the nation, and resulted in widespread famine that killed an estimated 45 million people. In the decade following this, China's fertility rate reached its highest level in 1970, before the implementation of the two-child policy in the 1970s, and the one-child policy in the 1980s, which radically changed the population structure. The fertility rate fell to an all-time low in the early 2000s, where it was just 1.6 children per woman. However this number has increased to 1.7 today, and the two-child policy was reintroduced in 2016, replacing the one-child policy that had been effective for over 36 years.¹⁵³³



Sources: <https://ourworldindata.org/search?q=fertility+rate+in+china>

¹⁵³³ <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1033738/fertility-rate-china-1930-2020/>

9.2.3 Life Expectancy

Year	Total	Male	Female
1981	67.77	66.28	69.27
1990	68.55	66.84	70.47
1996	70.80		
2000	71.40	69.63	73.33
2005	72.95	70.83	75.25
2010	74.83	72.38	77.37
2015	76.34	73.64	79.43

Source:<http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/html/E0204.jpg>

9.2.4 Fertility and Mortality

The mortality is one of major factors in the changes of the number and structure of the population, especially the life expectancy and baby mortality constitute important indices to measure social and economic development and improvement of the quality of people's life. With the rapid social and economic development and improvement of medical conditions, the health conditions of Chinese people were apparently approved. The mortality continued to be kept at low level.¹⁵³⁴

In 1949 crude death rates were probably higher than 30 per 1,000, and the average life expectancy was only 32 years. Beginning in the early 1950s, mortality steadily declined; it continued to decline through 1978 and remained relatively constant through 1987. One major fluctuation was reported in a computer reconstruction of China's population trends from 1953 to 1987 produced by the United States Bureau of the Census (see table 6, Appendix A; data in this table may vary from officially reported statistics). The computer model showed that the crude death rate increased dramatically during the famine years associated with the Great Leap Forward, resulting in approximately 30 million deaths above the expected level.¹⁵³⁵

According to Chinese government statistics, the crude birth rate followed five distinct patterns from 1949 to 1982. It remained stable from 1949 to 1954, varied widely from 1955 to 1965, experienced fluctuations between 1966 and 1969, dropped sharply in the late 1970s, and increased from 1980 to 1981. Between 1970 and 1980, the crude birth rate dropped from 36.9 per 1,000 to 17.6 per 1,000. The government attributed this dramatic decline in fertility to the *wan xi shao* (later marriages, longer intervals between births, and fewer children) birth control campaign. However, elements of socioeconomic change, such as increased employment of women in both urban and rural areas and

¹⁵³⁴ http://english1.english.gov.cn/2005-08/08/content_27315.htm

¹⁵³⁵ <http://countrystudies.us/china/33.htm>

reduced infant mortality (a greater percentage of surviving children would tend to reduce demand for additional children), may have played some role. To the dismay of authorities, the birth rate increased in both 1981 and 1982 to a level of 21 per 1,000, primarily as a result of a marked rise in marriages and first births. The rise was an indication of problems with the one-child policy of 1979. Chinese sources, however, indicated that the birth rate decreased to 17.8 in 1985 and remained relatively constant thereafter.¹⁵³⁶

In urban areas, the housing shortage may have been at least partly responsible for the decreased birth rate. Also, the policy in force during most of the 1960s and the early 1970s of sending large numbers of high school graduates to the countryside deprived cities of a significant proportion of persons of childbearing age and undoubtedly had some effect on birth rates. Primarily for economic reasons, rural birth rates tended to decline less than urban rates. The right to grow and sell agricultural products for personal profit and the lack of an old age welfare system were incentives for rural people to produce many children, especially sons, for help in the fields and for support in old age. Because of these conditions, it is unclear to what degree propaganda and education improvements had been able to erode traditional values favouring large families.¹⁵³⁷

In 2003, the dead population was 8.25 million in China and the crude mortality rate was 6.4 per thousand. Comparing with 1990, the mortality level dropped 0.27 per thousand point. To deduct the incomparable factors in the changes of age structure, the mortality rate of the 1990s was standardized with the age structure of the population in 1990. Since 1990, the standardized mortality rate showed a tendency of remarkable decline, that is, dropping from 6.67 per thousand in 1990 to 4.58 per thousand in 2003, down 2.09 per thousand points.¹⁵³⁸

The obvious decline of the mortality rate is seen in two groups: 0 age babies and people over 50 years old. Despite there were failed report in the deaths of 0 age babies, the investigation showed that the declining tendency of the mortality of 0-age baby was true. The death rate of the 0-age babies dropped from 23.34 per thousand in 1990 to 15.75 per thousand in 2003, down 7.59 percentage points. The mortality rate of the people at age of 50 to 64 also apparently dropped from 11.47 per thousand in 1990 to 7.62 per thousand in 2003, down 3.85 per thousand points. The largest decrease of the mortality rate was on the people over 65 years old, dropping from 56.73 per thousand in 1990 to 46.37 per thousand in 2003, down 10.36 per thousand points. The major factors for the decline of baby's death rate are the policy of family planning and optimization in fertility implemented in China, the improvement of women and infants health care system and service quality, popularization of immunity among babies and infants, and improvement of children's health care services and living conditions. Meanwhile, the health care service and living quality of senior people are also improved greatly, which facilitated the decline of senior people's death rate.¹⁵³⁹

In 2003, the population at age of 0 to 14 in China was 285.59 million, accounting for 22.1 percent of the total population; that at age of 15 to 64, 909.76 million, accounting for 70.4 percent; the population at age above 65, 96.92 million, taking up 7.5 percent and

¹⁵³⁶ <http://countrystudies.us/china/33.htm>

¹⁵³⁷ Ibid

¹⁵³⁸ http://english1.english.gov.cn/2005-08/08/content_27315.htm

¹⁵³⁹ Ibid

increasing 3.15 million. The ratio between the young and senior was 33.9 percent. The median of the age is 33.9 years old. Comparing with international standard, the feature of senior society concerning age structure became conspicuous in China. Taking care of the senior and letting them to lead a happy life and give full play to their talent became an issue for the state and society to pay attention to. **At the end of 2003, China has 96.92 millions of seniors above age of 65.**¹⁵⁴⁰

Changes of age structure of Chinese population in the period of 1982 to 2003.

Year	Ratio of population at age of 0 -14 (%)	Ratio of population at age of 65 or older (%)	Ratio between young and senior (%)	Median of age (years old)
1982	33.6	4.9	14.6	22.9
1990	27.7	5.6	20.1	25.3
2000	22.9	7.0	30.4	30.8
2001	22.5	7.1	31.6	32.3
2002	22.4	7.3	32.6	33.1
2003	22.1	7.5	33.9	33.9

Data source: Census and sampling materials on changes of population.

Source: http://english1.english.gov.cn/2005-08/08/content_27315.htm


National Health Commission of People’s Republic of China issued a report titled “ Maternal and Child Health Over 70 Years” on October,2019 which illustrates the following details:¹⁵⁴¹



Source: http://en.nhc.gov.cn/2019-10/11/c_75760.htm

¹⁵⁴⁰ http://english1.english.gov.cn/2005-08/08/content_27315.htm

¹⁵⁴¹ Excerpts from National Health Commission of People’s Republic of China issued a report titled “ Maternal and Child Health Over 70 Years” on October,2019 http://en.nhc.gov.cn/2019-10/11/c_75760.htm



Source: http://en.nhc.gov.cn/2019-10/11/c_75760.htm

Noticeably narrowed gap between urban and rural areas

The ratio of maternal mortality between urban and rural areas was

1 : 2.2 in **1990** and **1 : 1.3** in **2018**.

Constantly narrowed regional gap

The maternal mortality rate in the western region was **4.7** times higher than in the eastern region in **1996** but decreased to **2.3** times in **2018**.


Significant reduction in maternal mortality due to obstetric bleeding

In **2000**, the death rate due to obstetric hemorrhage was **20.8 per 100,000**, falling to **5.7 per 100,000** in **2017**, a decrease of **72.6%** and a contribution of **45.2%** to the decline in maternal mortality throughout the country.

Source: http://en.nhc.gov.cn/2019-10/11/c_75760.htm

Significant decline in the mortality rate of major diseases among children under age five

In **2017**, the top five causes of death among children under age five were premature or low birth weight, pneumonia, birth asphyxia, congenital heart disease and accidental asphyxia, accounting for **55.7%** of all causes of death, a **79.1%** decrease compared with the figures for **2000**.



Source: http://en.nhc.gov.cn/2019-10/11/c_75760.htm

9.2.4.1 Mortality Rate of the Maternal and Children aged under 5 in surveillance areas.

Year	Newborn Mortality Rate(‰)			Infant Mortality Rate(‰)			Mortality Rate of			Maternal Mortality Rate		
	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural
1991	33.1	12.5	37.9	50.2	17.3	58.0	61.0	20.9	71.1	80.0	46.3	100.0
1992	32.5	13.9	36.8	46.7	18.4	53.2	57.4	20.7	65.6	76.5	42.7	97.9
1993	31.2	12.9	35.4	43.6	15.9	50.0	53.1	18.3	61.6	67.3	38.5	85.1
1994	28.5	12.2	32.3	39.9	15.5	45.6	49.6	18.0	56.9	64.8	44.1	77.5
1995	27.3	10.6	31.1	36.4	14.2	41.6	44.5	16.4	51.1	61.9	39.2	76.0
1996	24.0	12.2	26.7	36.0	14.8	40.9	45.0	16.9	51.4	63.9	29.2	86.4
1997	24.2	10.3	27.5	33.1	13.1	37.7	42.3	15.5	48.5	63.6	38.3	80.4
1998	22.3	10.0	25.1	33.2	13.5	37.7	42.0	16.2	47.9	56.2	28.6	74.1
1999	22.2	9.5	25.1	33.3	11.9	38.2	41.4	14.3	47.7	58.7	26.2	79.7
2000	22.8	9.5	25.8	32.2	11.8	37.0	39.7	13.8	45.7	53.0	29.3	69.6
2001	21.4	10.6	23.9	30.0	13.6	33.8	35.9	16.3	40.4	50.2	33.1	61.9
2002	20.7	9.7	23.2	29.2	12.2	33.1	34.9	14.6	39.6	43.2	22.3	58.2
2003	18.0	8.9	20.1	25.5	11.3	28.7	29.9	14.8	33.4	51.3	27.6	65.4
2004	15.4	8.4	17.3	21.5	10.1	24.5	25.0	12.0	28.5	48.3	26.1	63.0
2005	13.2	7.5	14.7	19.0	9.1	21.6	22.5	10.7	25.7	47.7	25.0	53.8
2006	12.0	6.8	13.4	17.2	8.0	19.7	20.6	9.6	23.6	41.1	24.8	45.5
2007	10.7	5.5	12.8	15.3	7.7	18.6	18.1	9.0	21.8	36.6	25.2	41.3
2008	10.2	5.0	12.3	14.9	6.5	18.4	18.5	7.9	22.7	34.2	29.2	36.1
2009	9.0	4.5	10.8	13.8	6.2	17.0	17.2	7.6	21.1	31.9	26.6	34.0
2010	8.3	4.1	10.0	13.1	5.8	16.1	16.4	7.3	20.1	30.0	29.7	30.1
2011	7.8	4.0	9.4	12.1	5.8	14.7	15.6	7.1	19.1	26.1	25.2	26.5
2012	6.9	3.9	8.1	10.3	5.2	12.4	13.2	5.9	16.2	24.5	22.2	25.6
2013	6.3	3.7	7.3	9.5	5.2	11.3	12.0	6.0	14.5	23.2	22.4	23.6
2014	5.9	3.5	6.9	8.9	4.8	10.7	11.7	5.9	14.2	21.7	20.5	22.2
2015	5.4	3.3	6.4	8.1	4.7	9.6	10.7	5.8	12.9	20.1	19.8	20.2
2016	4.9	2.9	5.7	7.5	4.2	9.0	10.2	5.2	12.4	19.9	19.5	20.0
2017	4.5	2.6	5.3	6.8	4.1	7.9	9.1	4.8	10.9	19.6	16.6	21.1
2018	3.9	2.2	4.7	6.1	3.6	7.3	8.4	4.4	10.2	18.3	15.5	19.9


Source: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/OtherData/200509/U020150722579392934100.pdf>

9.2.5 Total fertility rate

The total fertility rate in China has greatly decreased over the past 50 years, since the high fertility rate in the 1950's and 60's (between 5 and 6) to the low in the recent decades. Due to the policy on family planning it is estimated that 300 million less births have occurred than otherwise would have. In 2002, there were 350 million women of child-bearing age (15-49, an increase of 42.26 million compared to the number in 1990; but the number of women aged 20-29 (the strongest child-bearing age bracket) decreased by 17.39 million compared to 1990. Therefore, the crude birth rate has dropped greatly.¹⁵⁴²

¹⁵⁴²<http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/OtherData/200509/U020150722579392934100.pdf>


Total Fertility Rate (1952-2000)



Source: Population Census of National Bureau of Statistics

<http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/OtherData/200509/U020150722579392934100.pdf>


Fertility Rate by age (1990-2002)



Source: Calculated according to the data of population census and 1% population sample survey.

Source: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/OtherData/200509/U020150722579392934100.pdf>

Fertility rate between age 20 and 29 (1990-2002)



Source: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/OtherData/200509/U020150722579392934100.pdf>

9.2.5.1. Female fertile rate continues to be on low level.

1. General fertile rate of women drops year by year

In 2003, general fertile rate of women at birth age (namely the ratio between the number of babies born within one year and the number of women at age of 15 to 49) was 38.01 per thousand, down 41.52 per thousand points from 79.53 per thousand in 1990. The tendency of the changes of the rate in the past decade showed that the general fertile rate saw a drastic decline in 1991, dropping 15 per thousand points from 1990. Later the rate was on a steady decrease in the following years. If the structure of women at birth age is taken into account and the structure in 1990's census is set as a standard, the standardized fertile rate of women is still in a declining tendency, but the declining scope of the rate is narrowed.

2. The number of women at birth age declines year-on-year

In 2003, the number of women at age of 15 to 49 was 350 million, increasing 44.62 million over 1990. But after the number of women at age of 20 to 29 rose to 123 million in 1992, it started to decline year-on-year. In 2003 the number dropped to 95.88 million, at the rate of decreasing 2.22 million each year. The women at age of 23, the prime age for child bearing, decreased from 11.54 million in 1990 to 8.92 million in 2003, with a reduction of 2.62 million. The decline of the women at prime birth age played an important role in stabilizing low birth rate.

3. The first marriage age of the women at birth age on the rise

With the social development, the marriage and birth concept of the people are under changes. The first marriage age on the average of the women was on the rise from 22.93

years old in 1995 to 24.15 years old in 2001. The rise of the marriage age has played a positive role in reducing the pressure from the new born population.¹⁵⁴³

US National Library of Medicine and National Institutes of Health published a report titled “A retrospective and predictive study of fertility rates in China from 2003 to 2018” which conducted A retrospective longitudinal study was conducted on age-specific and birth-order-wise crude fertility rates and total fertility rates based on national sample surveys by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. Unexpectedly, such fertility datasets were officially deleted since 2016. A time-series predictive study was conducted based on the Holt's Exponential Smoothing models to restore the deleted fertility data for 2016 and beyond, allowing a comprehensive analysis of fertility rates in China from 2003 to 2018. In all, population structure was aging fast, fertility rates continued to decrease to a substantially low level, and three North-eastern provinces displayed notable socioeconomic issues associated with low-fertility trap. Adjustment is essential for China to timely remove its still-present birth limit and devise social policies to revert the fertility downtrend.¹⁵⁴⁴

From 2003 to 2017, population in China kept growing . For females, an obvious “aging” trend was observed: both the sub-population and the sub-proportion dropped sequentially for 0–14 age group (fertility-potential) and 15–49 age group (fertility-active), but in contrast steadily increased for the 50+ age group (fertility-completed) . Fertility-active females peaked at 383 million in 2011 but then started an annual decrease of 4–6 million. Comparison of female populations between the fertility-active group (15–49) and fertility-inactive group (0–14 and 50+ combined) revealed that while the former still constituted the majority, the gap became gradually narrower to a difference of 27.2 million in 2017 . In addition, population of the most fertile age group (20–29) stood at 101.9 million in 2017, but was predicted by the National Health and Family Planning Council (NHFPC) to drop to around 80 million in 2020 (Doc. 2016–38). Such shrinkage of about 22 million 20–29 females would alone translate to a decrease of 1.5 million annual births, which was more than 20% of the population growth of 7.4 million in 2017 .

The table of *Age-specific Fertility Rate of Childbearing Women by Age of Mother and Birth Order in China Statistical Yearbook 2004–2016* reported CFRs for single-year ages or 5-year age groups from 2003 to 2015. Corresponding visualization and tabulation revealed important insights: a). CFRs on the whole dropped sequentially due to a substantial decrease in 1st births and a partial offset of minor increase in 2nd births or 3rd & beyond births. b). while 1st births were the majority, the gap of CFRs in 1st births compared to 2nd births quickly shrank to a difference of 4.1‰ in 2015. c). downward trends in total CFR were apparently associated with the dynamic shift in age-specific fertility: both 20–24 and 25–29 age groups, presumably of the highest fertility, saw sharp drops in 1st-birth CFRs, while senior age groups generally displayed mild or no increase for all birth orders; notably, for the first time ever, 25–29 group surpassed 20–24 group in 2012 regarding peak CFR for 1st births, a representative reflection of the “delaying 1st birth” trend among young females. d). peak fertility ages remained largely unchanged as 22–25, 28–30 and 29–32 respectively for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd & beyond births. e). in accordance with the partial loosening of “one-child” policy since 2014, a mild spike appeared in 2nd-birth CFR,

¹⁵⁴³ http://english1.english.gov.cn/2005-08/08/content_27315.htm

¹⁵⁴⁴ Excerpts from, published in March 2019, available online at URL: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6441840/>

but the effect was not sustainable as the parameter decreased again in 2015. In all, the above longitudinal observations reflected the “declining and delaying” fertility trends in China.¹⁵⁴⁵

TFRs further validated the reality of low fertility : far below the 2.1 replacement level, national TFR fluctuated around 1.4 since 2003, before dropping to around 1.2 since 2010 and finally reaching a low level of 1.05 in 2015. Any entity with TFR only half of the replacement level would watch its population theoretically halved in one single generation, although the lag effect might make it relatively longer for the extraordinary population decline to materialize. The sequential decrease in TFR was predominantly mirrored by the drop in 1st-birth TFR, arguing for females' inclination to delay or even avoid childbearing. With the “one-child” policy in effect, non-1st-birth TFRs remained largely stable at 0.40–0.45, but scored a mild increase to 0.5 since 2014 likely thanks to the loosening policy. The above results pointed out that not only birth limit but more importantly the unwillingness to even realize 1st births led to the plummet of TFR in China. Efforts to monitor CFR and TFR in 2016 and 2017 were stalled by the unexpected issue that the fertility table was officially deleted in *China Statistical Yearbook 2017* and *2018*, thus making it impractical to track the fertility trends.¹⁵⁴⁶

9.2.5.2. China's fertility decline and its implications for labour supply and the ageing population.

United Nations Population Division (part of UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs) report evaluates the impact of changes in the Chinese population age structures on its economy, both in the past two decades and in the near future. Demographically, China has transformed itself from a demographic transitional society, where reductions in mortality led to rapid population growth and subsequent reductions in fertility led to a slower population growth, to a post-transitional society, where life expectancy has reached new heights, fertility has declined to below-replacement level, and rapid population ageing is on the horizon. The report considers the extent to which fertility decline, the slow-down in population growth, and changes in age structure have contributed to China's economic success. Projected thirty years ahead, with assumptions of a moderate further improvement in life expectancy and continuation of current fertility level, China's age structure would have moved from one that is characteristic of a young and growing population to an old and declining one. What effect, if any, may these profound demographic changes as seen in these age structures have on China's economy? The report argues that in many ways, China has always been a demographic early achiever. Its mortality declined early and rapidly under a socialist planned economy and public health system. In this regard, China was much more successful than most other countries at similar income levels. China's fertility also declined much more rapidly and earlier in the development process than elsewhere - due partly to a government birth control program that finds no equal for the extent to which it intruded on the reproductive decisions of couples. Such a compressed demographic transition positioned China to reap a relatively large demographic dividend at an opportune time. China's first demographic dividend, deriving from fertility decline, materialised at the same time that China underwent its most radical economic transitions and faced the strongest

¹⁵⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴⁶ <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6441840/>

unemployment pressures. The demographic factor thus was a favourable factor in China's economic growth during the last quarter century. The report suggests that China's economic growth in the last two and half decades has been highly uneven geographically, with most of the growth concentrated in its cities and coastal areas. China's rapid aging process at the same time will also take place unevenly across the country, due to the state's differential birth control policies in the past. The report concludes that being an early achiever brings with it a cost. As consequences of such a forced demographic transition, China will soon enter a long period of decline in labour supply, and will face a rapid increase in the elderly population that cannot be reversed easily and quickly. Whereas this ageing process may bring with it a second demographic dividend, such an event depends heavily on the right institutional environment. State-enforced fertility decline has also resulted in a collapse of the birth statistics collection system, caused a sustained and sharp increase in sex ratio and in female excess mortality at young ages, and forcefully altered the kinship structure for many Chinese families. These social costs are not only severe but also long lasting.¹⁵⁴⁷

9.2.6 Labour Force

A 10-percent sample tabulation of census questionnaires from the 1982 census provided badly needed statistical data on China's working population and allowed the first reliable estimates of the labour force's¹⁵⁴⁸ size and characteristics. The quality of the data was considered to be quite high, although a 40-million-person discrepancy existed between the 10-percent sample and the regular employment statistics. This discrepancy can be explained by the combination of inaccurate employment statistics and varying methods of calculation and scope of coverage. The estimated mid-1982 labour force was 546 million, or approximately 54 percent of the total population. Males accounted for slightly more than half of the estimated labour force, and the labour force participation rates for persons age fifteen years and older were among the highest in the world.¹⁵⁴⁹ The 10-percent sample showed that approximately three-fourths of the labour force worked in the agricultural sector. According to the State Statistical Bureau, in the mid-1980s more than 120 million people worked in the non-agricultural sector. The sample revealed that men occupied the great majority of leadership positions. The average worker was a youthful thirty-three years old, and three out of every four workers were under forty-five years of age. The working population had a low education level. Less than 40 percent of the labour force had more than a primary school education, and 30 percent were illiterate or semiliterate. In mid-1982 the overall unemployment rate was estimated to be about 5 percent. Of the approximately 25 million unemployed, 12 million were men and 13 million were women. The unemployment rate was highest in the northeast and lowest in the south. The unemployment rates were higher than those of East Asian, Southeast Asian, and Pacific island countries for which data were available but were lower than the rates found in North America and Europe. Virtually all of the unemployed persons in cities and towns were under twenty years of age.¹⁵⁵⁰

¹⁵⁴⁷ <https://eldis.org/organisation/A5239>

<https://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm>

¹⁵⁴⁸ For labour related laws and regulations, please access the following URL:

<https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/worker-rights>

¹⁵⁴⁹ <http://countrystudies.us/china/37.htm>

¹⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

Number of Industrial and Commercial Registered Employed Persons in Private Enterprises and Self-employed Individuals at Year-end by Sector and Region(2018)¹⁵⁵¹

Region	Employed Persons	Manufacturing	Construction	Wholesale and Retail Trades	Transport, Storage and Post	Hotels and Catering Services	Leasing and Business Services	Services to Household, Repair and Other Services
National Total	37413.0	5775.8	1765.4	14495.2	963.7	2945.1	3038.4	2200.2
Beijing	1202.4	52.9	72.9	255.1	32.3	45.2	194.6	23.3
Tianjin	205.5	38.6	7.0	69.1	6.1	19.3	20.1	12.9
Hebei	1261.3	249.6	38.1	544.6	43.7	111.7	40.6	87.9
Shanxi	642.8	73.0	21.2	282.3	33.6	69.4	26.8	55.7
Inner Mongolia	589.1	48.9	24.3	250.2	19.4	62.5	38.1	53.3
Liaoning	970.0	175.1	50.4	349.1	47.8	76.5	56.3	73.3
Jilin	768.1	63.1	46.2	323.8	47.0	71.7	30.9	61.4
Heilongjiang	459.2	33.6	8.4	182.5	29.9	81.9	15.3	52.9
Shanghai	1470.8	125.6	98.4	485.1	45.2	28.4	316.5	25.5
Jiangsu	3604.2	1028.2	311.3	1004.4	98.5	177.9	336.9	156.9
Zhejiang	2643.1	912.7	104.6	772.3	49.1	141.0	212.4	117.5
Anhui	1410.0	225.1	72.8	564.5	27.9	118.8	78.2	99.7
Fujian	1966.0	251.0	58.9	1061.4	22.3	94.2	172.3	67.1
Jiangxi	1010.3	182.6	46.3	392.8	26.1	71.0	77.9	60.3
Shandong	3057.8	530.9	156.1	1293.4	69.5	213.6	184.6	197.9
Henan	1639.0	225.5	67.3	723.1	32.8	164.2	88.2	71.7
Hubei	1837.7	187.3	75.3	778.6	60.2	179.9	108.3	124.8
Hunan	958.8	76.8	16.6	342.6	23.7	102.3	67.5	96.5
Guangdong	4585.2	730.1	136.8	2011.5	76.9	294.9	441.1	248.7
Guangxi	921.9	81.6	31.1	409.5	32.2	80.4	80.9	54.2
Hainan	219.9	7.9	17.4	78.3	4.9	26.1	23.7	15.8
Chongqing	1281.9	104.7	58.7	454.7	26.9	103.4	139.9	71.6
Sichuan	1129.1	78.0	40.2	498.6	21.6	160.6	79.9	91.5
Guizhou	727.5	54.2	27.5	274.4	18.9	81.0	47.3	51.0
Yunnan	847.4	81.8	45.4	301.3	14.1	93.6	44.2	55.8
Tibet	106.9	6.4	20.3	32.6	2.3	15.2	8.9	6.8
Shaanxi	773.8	53.1	48.8	302.1	24.5	115.3	41.4	72.5
Gansu	475.5	35.7	38.3	196.9	8.2	54.4	23.2	33.9
Qinghai	113.9	8.5	5.3	42.0	4.9	18.4	6.0	10.1
Ningxia	125.1	10.4	4.5	53.5	2.5	18.8	6.5	13.7
Xinjiang	408.7	42.6	14.7	164.9	10.6	53.4	30.0	35.8

Source: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/indexeh.htm> Note: Figures are in (10000 persons).

Number of Employed Persons at Year-end by Three Strata of Industry.

¹⁵⁵¹ China's Statistical Yearbook published, in 2019, by National Statistics Bureau, available online at URL: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/indexeh.htm>

Year	Total Employed Persons (10 000 persons)	Composition in Percentage					
		Primary Industry	Secondary Industry	Tertiary Industry	Primary Industry	Secondary Industry	Tertiary Industry
1952	20729	17317	1531	1881	83.5	7.4	9.1
1957	23771	19309	2142	2320	81.2	9.0	9.8
1962	25910	21276	2059	2575	82.1	8.0	9.9
1965	28670	23396	2408	2866	81.6	8.4	10.0
1970	34432	27811	3518	3103	80.8	10.2	9.0
1975	38168	29456	5152	3560	77.2	13.5	9.3
1978	40152	28318	6945	4890	70.5	17.3	12.2
1979	41024	28634	7214	5177	69.8	17.6	12.6
1980	42361	29122	7707	5532	68.7	18.2	13.1
1981	43725	29777	8003	5945	68.1	18.3	13.6
1982	45295	30859	8346	6090	68.1	18.4	13.5
1983	46436	31151	8679	6606	67.1	18.7	14.2
1984	48197	30868	9590	7739	64.0	19.9	16.1
1985	49873	31130	10384	8359	62.4	20.8	16.8
1986	51282	31254	11216	8811	60.9	21.9	17.2
1987	52783	31663	11726	9395	60.0	22.2	17.8
1988	54334	32249	12152	9933	59.3	22.4	18.3
1989	55329	33225	11976	10129	60.1	21.6	18.3
1990	64749	38914	13856	11979	60.1	21.4	18.5
1991	65491	39098	14015	12378	59.7	21.4	18.9
1992	66152	38699	14355	13098	58.5	21.7	19.8
1993	66808	37680	14965	14163	56.4	22.4	21.2
1994	67455	36628	15312	15515	54.3	22.7	23.0
1995	68065	35530	15655	16880	52.2	23.0	24.8
1996	68950	34820	16203	17927	50.5	23.5	26.0
1997	69820	34840	16547	18432	49.9	23.7	26.4
1998	70637	35177	16600	18860	49.8	23.5	26.7
1999	71394	35768	16421	19205	50.1	23.0	26.9
2000	72085	36043	16219	19823	50.0	22.5	27.5
2001	72797	36399	16234	20165	50.0	22.3	27.7
2002	73280	36640	15682	20958	50.0	21.4	28.6
2003	73736	36204	15927	21605	49.1	21.6	29.3
2004	74264	34830	16709	22725	46.9	22.5	30.6
2005	74647	33442	17766	23439	44.8	23.8	31.4
2006	74978	31941	18894	24143	42.6	25.2	32.2
2007	75321	30731	20186	24404	40.8	26.8	32.4
2008	75564	29923	20553	25087	39.6	27.2	33.2
2009	75828	28890	21080	25857	38.1	27.8	34.1
2010	76105	27931	21842	26332	36.7	28.7	34.6
2011	76420	26594	22544	27282	34.8	29.5	35.7
2012	76704	25773	23241	27690	33.6	30.3	36.1
2013	76977	24171	23170	29636	31.4	30.1	38.5
2014	77253	22790	23099	31364	29.5	29.9	40.6
2015	77451	21919	22693	32839	28.3	29.3	42.4
2016	77603	21496	22350	33757	27.7	28.8	43.5
2017	77640	20944	21824	34872	27.0	28.1	44.9
2018	77586	20258	21390	35938	26.1	27.6	46.3

Source: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/indexeh.htm>

The overall labour productivity reached 115,009 yuan per person in 2019, up by 6.2 percent over the previous year.¹⁵⁵²

The Overall Labour Productivity 2015-2019.



Source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/202002/t20200228_1728917.html

At the end of 2019, the number of employed people in China was 774.71 million, and that in urban areas was 442.47 million, accounting for 57.1 percent of the national employed people, 1.1 percentage points higher than the end of 2018. The newly increased employed people in urban areas numbered 13.52 million, 90 thousand less than the previous year. The surveyed urban unemployment rate was 5.2 percent at the year end, and the registered urban unemployment rate was 3.6 percent. The total number of migrant workers[12] in 2019 was 290.77 million, up by 0.8 percent over that of 2018. Specifically, the number of migrant workers who left their hometowns and worked in other places was 174.25 million, up by 0.9 percent, and those who worked in their own localities reached 116.52 million, up by 0.7 percent.¹⁵⁵³

Newly Increased Employed People in Urban Areas 2015-2019



Source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/202002/t20200228_1728917.html

¹⁵⁵² http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/202002/t20200228_1728917.html

¹⁵⁵³ Ibid.

9.2.6.1 Chinese Labour Pool Begins to Drain

An article published in *Financial Times* maintains that China's working-age population shrank in 2012, marking the beginning of a trend that will accelerate over the next two decades and have profound implications for the world's second-largest economy. By the end of December China's population aged between 15 and 59 was 937.27 m, a decrease of 3.45m from 2011, according to figures released by China's National Bureau of Statistics. Ma Jiantang, head of the National Bureau of Statistics said that it was in 2012 for the first time that there was a drop in the population of people of working age. There are different opinions on whether this means that the demographic dividend that has driven growth in China for many years is now coming to an end, he added, noting that it was only the start of a long-term trend that would see steady decreases in the working age population each and every year between now and at least 2030. Mr Ma described last year's drop as "worrying", even as the Chinese economy rebounded in the fourth quarter. China's gross domestic product grew 7.9 per cent year-on-year in the final three months, up from 7.4 per cent in the third quarter and breaking a streak of seven consecutive weaker quarters. Many analysts fear, however, that China's aging workforce could become a big drag on future growth.¹⁵⁵⁴

In a study published by OECD, titled "China's Employment Policies and Strategies" illustrates the following:¹⁵⁵⁵

China is the most populous country boasting of tremendous workforce in the world. Since its pursuance of reform and opening-up policy in late 1970's, Chinese national economy has witnessed a sound, sustainable, and rapid growth. Nevertheless, the employment issue, resulted from economic system reform, industrial structure adjustment and technological innovation, remains a strenuous, arduous and pressing task for Chinese government. The Chinese government attaches great importance to the issue of employment, and takes employment as the first priority of people's livelihood and as the top strategy for ensuring the stability of its society. Proceeding from the national conditions, the Chinese Government has explored and drawn on international experiences in its practice, gradually improves its relevant legal system, and formulated and implemented a set of proactive employment policies. The Chinese government adheres to promote employment through developing national economy, adjusting industrial structure, furthering the reform on its political and economic system, harmonizing economic development between urban and rural areas, and improving social security system. It has adopted various effective measures and done everything possible to increase job opportunities, expanded the scale of employment, and kept the unemployment rate within a socially tolerable range.¹⁵⁵⁶


Basic employment situation according to the statistics of National Bureau of Statistics, in 2005, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in China reached 18.2321 trillion Yuan (2.23 trillion USD), with an increase of 9.9 percent than in 2004. In the last ten years, Chinese GDP has been increased at an annually average rate of 8.5 percent in a sustainable and stable manner.

¹⁵⁵⁴ <https://www.cnbc.com/id/100392731>

¹⁵⁵⁵ Excerpts from OECD study, available online at URL: <http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/37865430.pdf>


¹⁵⁵⁶ Ibid.

Increasing rate of GDP from 1996 to 2005




Source: National Economy and Social Development Statistical Bulletin,
China National Bureau of Statistics

In 2005, the total population of China reached 1.30756 billion (excluding Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Macao Special Administrative Region and Taiwan Province). The total urban and rural employed population reached 758.25 million, of which the urban employed population was 273.31 million, and the rural employed population was 484.94 million. The annual growth of the new entrants reaches 10 million. There are over 150 million workforces migrating from rural to urban areas for employment. With the adjustment of industrial structure and the accelerating of urbanization, the distribution pattern of employment in primary, secondary, and tertiary industries has changed accordingly. From 1990 to 2005, the proportion of those employed in tertiary industry rose steadily from 18.5 percent to 31.4 percent; the proportion of those employed in secondary industry rose slightly from 21.4 percent to 23.8 percent; and the proportion of those employed in primary industry dropped from 60.1 percent to 44.8 percent.¹⁵⁵⁷



Source: White Paper of China's Employment Situation and Policies (2004)


¹⁵⁵⁷ Excerpts from OECD study, available online at URL: <http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/37865430.pdf>



**Source: Labour and Social Security Development Statistical Bulletin in 2005,
Ministry of Labour and Social Security**

In the context that the employment pressure has been continuously increasing, the Chinese government has adopted many measures to curb the sharp rise of urban unemployment. By the end of 2005, the registered unemployment population in urban areas reached 8.39 million, and the registered unemployment rate in the urban areas was 4.2 percent .

Registered urban unemployment rate from 1996 to 2005



**Source: Labour and Social Security Development Statistical Bulletin,
Ministry of Labour and Social Security**

I. Proactive Employment Policy

The Chinese government has enacted Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Labour Law of the People's Republic of China, and other relevant laws and regulations so as to protect the laborers' right to employment. Under the above legal framework, according to the domestic national situation in China and drawn on the international experiences, Chinese government has established the employment principle of "workers finding their own jobs, employment through market regulation and employment promoted by the government", and formulated and implemented a set of proactive employment policies, mainly including:

i) Macroeconomic Policies

The Chinese government has always regarded promoting employment as a strategic task for socio-economic development. It takes controlling unemployment rate and increasing job opportunities as one of its principal macro control targets and incorporates it in its plan for economic and social development. It adheres to the principle of expanding domestic demand, exercises a stable fiscal and monetary policy, maintains a steady and fairly rapid development of the national economy, actively adjusts the economic structure and enhances the motive power of economic growth in driving employment. The Chinese government regards persistently the development of the tertiary industry as a major orientation for the expansion of employment. It encourages the development of community services, catering, commercial and trade circulation, tourism, and so on, for the purpose of creating more job opportunities in these industries. The Chinese government has paid great attention to exploiting its advantage in labour resources, and actively developed labour-intensive industries and enterprises that have relative advantages and whose products enjoy market demands, particularly private and self-employed businesses, and medium/small enterprises (SMEs) with big employment capacity.¹⁵⁵⁸

ii) Social Security Policy

The Chinese government has taken various measures and actively explored the possibilities for the establishment of a social security system independent of enterprises and public institutions, with diversified fund sources, standardization in security system, and socialization in management and service delivery. In the mid-1980s, an unemployment insurance system was established in China to provide unemployment relief and Medicare subsidies for the unemployed, facilitate the administration of and services for the unemployed, and give full play to the role of unemployment insurance in promoting employment and re-employment. For laid-offs who get re-employed in a flexible form, such as a part-time job, temporary job and flexible working-hour job, a preliminary social insurance system suited to their job characteristics has been established.¹⁵⁵⁹

iii) Establishing and Improving the National Vocational Training System

In 1999, the Chinese government called upon all social sectors to adopt the system of paying attention to both school diplomas and vocational qualification certificates for the sake of enhancing the laborers' capacity to be employed, start up their own businesses, and adapt to job transfer. Since 2002, the state began carrying out a widespread skill-enhancement action by implementing a "Plan for Strengthening Vocational Training to Improve Employment Qualifications" and a "National Project for Training Highly Skilled Personnel." Meanwhile, a program for training 500,000 new technicians in three years was also launched. All these were aimed at cultivating rapidly a large number of skilled workers, especially workers with advanced skills, so as to improve the employment qualifications, work competence and job-transferring capacity of the workforce as a

¹⁵⁵⁸ Excerpts from OECD study, available online at URL: <http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/37865430.pdf>

¹⁵⁵⁹ Ibid.

whole. To help laid-off workers to find new jobs, from 1998 to 2000, the state carried out the "Three-Year Plan for Training 10 Million Laid-off Workers for Re-employment."

II. Challenge to Employment in China.

The above-mentioned policies have achieved positive results in practice. But Chinese government is also fully aware that in a country with a large population, solving the employment problem will take a long time. Currently the employment pressure is mainly from three areas: First, the oversupply of labour and the irrational structure of employment coexist; Second, the pressure of urban employment and the transfer of surplus rural labour to urban speed simultaneously; Third, the demand of jobs by new entrants and the re-employment of laid-off workers interlace. During the upcoming years, the employment situation in China will be still rigorous, and employment mission will be still heavy, which could be seen mainly as follows: Firstly, total supply of labour force will not decrease, and employment pressure remains great. In the coming years, the labour force will be increased by 10 million annually in urban areas. And those unemployed and laid-off workers who could not seek re-employment in the previous year are around 14 million. In addition, a large number of surplus work forces from rural areas need displaced. Secondly, some outstanding employment problems need to be resolved. Some laid-off workers from SOEs and the collective-owned urban enterprises have not been re-employed. In the coming three years, quite a few workers in the SOEs need displacement due to structure reshuffling and bankruptcy for policy reasons. Those laid-offs seeking re-employment may remain in an unstable employment situation. Thirdly, the new employment contradictions gradually emerge. The employment problems of new entrants in urban areas, in particular that for college graduates becomes more and more obvious. The surplus laborers from rural areas are shifting in a quicker pace to non-agriculture sectors and urban areas. Fourthly, the situation that laborers' capacity does not meet job requirements needs changing. In many regions and some sectors, the supply of skilled workers falls behind the demand, even in serious shortage.¹⁵⁶⁰

9.2.6.2 Preventing Trafficking for Labour Exploitation in China

The project is a partnership between the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF), and receives funding from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) with the goal of reducing trafficking for labour exploitation through the promotion of labour rights of women and children in China.¹⁵⁶¹

Project objectives

Preventing Trafficking for Labour Exploitation in China promotes improved labour rights of women and children in China with the goal of reducing trafficking for labour exploitation. To this end, the project seeks to:

- Improve relevant policy frameworks;
- Improve the implementation of trafficking prevention measures in pilot provinces; and

¹⁵⁶⁰ Excerpts from OECD study, available online at URL: <http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/37865430.pdf>

¹⁵⁶¹ https://www.ilo.org/beijing/what-we-do/projects/WCMS_140678/lang--en/index.htm

- Increase the ability of women and children to better protect their rights and migrate safely.

We continue to use the acronym ‘CP-TING’ because it is a recognized brand in China for effective trafficking prevention approaches and safe migration in pilot provinces. Prevention is the most sustainable long-term solution to trafficking. The CP-TING project developed a number of successful models for prevention in both ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ provinces, and established effective approaches for coordinated partner action and mainstreaming service delivery. Phase II of CP-TING will enhance service delivery and reach more of China’s young vulnerable migrant population. China now has a National Plan of Action in Trafficking, and the project will support the implementation of provincial level Plans of Action in Yunnan, Anhui, Hunan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Fujian, Jiangsu, and Guangdong.

Expected results

- The project will increase the capacity of agencies, social partners, and communities in eight provinces to deliver relevant services to vulnerable groups;
- 75,000 women (age 19-24) and children (boys and girls under 18) at risk of being trafficked will be empowered to protect themselves from being trafficked;
- The good practice models will be widely disseminated; and
- Leaders who design and monitor provincial programs will become advocates for trafficking prevention, effectively mobilizing local resources to ensure mainstreaming of programs within government work plans.¹⁵⁶²

9.2.6.3 Labour Lessen

A study published in China Labour Bulletin titled “Employment and Wages”, in 2019 maintains:¹⁵⁶³

Job creation and higher living standards have long been key objectives for the Chinese government. However, millions of workers in traditional industries are being laid off and many of the new jobs being created are insecure and poorly paid. The legal framework established ten years ago to protect workers has largely failed to do so, to the extent that millions of workers cannot even be sure they will get paid on time. The minimum wage has risen steadily over the last decade but there are substantial regional differences and it has not kept pace with increases in the cost of living, especially in major cities. The gap between the rich and poor in China continues to grow and despite long-standing government policies to reduce poverty, the urban and rural divide remains stubbornly in place.

I. Legal provisions on employment and the payment of wages

China has a comprehensive legal framework that defines the rights and obligations of employers and employees, primarily the 1995 *Labour Law* and the 2008 *Labour Contract*

¹⁵⁶² https://www.ilo.org/beijing/what-we-do/projects/WCMS_140678/lang--en/index.htm

¹⁵⁶³ Excerpts from China Labour Bulletin report available online at URL:

<https://clb.org.hk/content/employment-and-wages>

Law (amended 2013), which contain clear provisions on employment contracts, working hours and payment of wages, benefits and the termination of employment, specifically:

- Employers are required to conclude a written employment contract with employees (*Labour Contract Law Article 10*).
- The employment contract shall specify the term of the contract, the job description and place of work, working hours, rest and leave, labour remuneration, work safety protection etc. (*Labour Contract Law Article 17*).
- The standard workweek in China is 40 hours (eight hours per day, five days per week) although flexible working hours are allowed under certain conditions (State Council 1995 *Provisions on Working Hours of Staff and Workers*).
- Overtime shall be paid for any work exceeding standard working hours and overtime shall not exceed three hours a day or 36 hours per month (Labour Law Article 41).
- Overtime pay should not be less than 150 percent of an employee's wages during normal work days; 200 percent on rest days, and 300 percent on national holidays, such as the Lunar New Year (*Labour Law Article 44*).
- Wages shall be paid in legal tender to the workers in person on a monthly basis. No deduction of wages for personal gain may be made from wages due to workers. The payment of wages may not be delayed without reason (*Labour Law Article 50*).
- An employer shall pay wages to workers during their statutory holidays, marriage or funeral leave (Labour Law Article 51).
- If their contract is terminated, employees are entitled to severance pay based on the number of years employed at a rate of one month's wage for each full year worked (*Labour Contract Law Article 47*).¹⁵⁶⁴

II. The erosion of legal protection

These provisions give workers a broad range of rights and a reasonable level of legal protection. However, ever since the *Labour Contract Law* went into effect on 1 January 2008, employers have sought to undermine it and local government officials have failed to implement it effectively, leaving it up to employees themselves to defend their rights either through the arbitration and the court system or by collective action. By far the most common employer response to the implementation of the *Labour Contract Law* was to reassign existing employees and hire new employees as agency workers rather than as formal employees. This was seen as a way to reduce the benefits companies had to pay and make hiring and firing easier. Abuse of the system was so rampant that in 2013, the government sought to tighten loopholes in the law and ensure that only a limited number of "temporary, auxiliary or substitute" staff could be employed as agency labour. Many workers in the new service industries, in particular e-commerce and the sharing economy, do not have proper employment contracts but are instead hired as individual contractors with little or no job security and none of the welfare and social security benefits those with formal employment contracts are entitled to. The multi-billion dollar food delivery business, for example, is increasingly adopting an informal relationship with individual contractors who bid for delivery orders via smartphone apps without signing any formal contract with the company. Terms and conditions of employment for many workers in these new service industries can be changed at short notice, as can

¹⁵⁶⁴ Excerpts from China Labour Bulletin report available online at URL: <https://clb.org.hk/content/employment-and-wages>

payment rates, and the intense competition for customers has led to numerous business failures with workers being laid off without any compensation.¹⁵⁶⁵

III. Job creation and labour market imbalances

The Chinese government has a longstanding commitment to job creation, seeing it as an essential component in maintaining social and economic stability. The government claims to have created about 13 million jobs in urban areas each year on average over the last five years and kept unemployment largely under control. Although China's working age population (16 to 59 years-old) has been contracting since 2012, the labour force has continued to gradually expand to stand at 807 million in 2016, up from 789 million in 2012. This suggests that more people who were previously excluded from the workforce (or certain sectors of the workforce) have been able to find employment as the economy has expanded and new employment opportunities opened up. The problem is not the lack of new jobs it is rather that many of the new jobs being created are poorly paid, insecure and require employees to work long hours in often dangerous conditions. The vast army of couriers delivering packages from online shopping networks are an obvious example of the new employment opportunities and problems in China. The key issue for Chinese government officials and economic planners is not how many jobs are created but the extent to which employers can provide employees with decent, reasonably-paid jobs with the opportunity for career advancement. In addition, China's labour market has long-struggled to provide employers with the well-trained and competent workers they need to make their businesses grow. The mismatch between the needs of job seekers and employers has been highlighted on numerous occasions over the last few years, especially whenever new college graduates enter the job market. Another major problem is the fact that many businesses are reluctant to invest any time or resources in training; rather they expect new staff to have all the skills they need to perform their jobs straight away. The view of many business owners is that providing training to their own staff will only encourage them to look for a better paying job elsewhere. This short-sighted view will have to change if China is to bridge the skills gap that is stalling the transition from a low-wage to a skills-based economy.¹⁵⁶⁶

IV. Managing unemployment

Throughout much of the 2010s, China's official unemployment rate hovered steadily around four percent and the number of unemployed persons remained stable at around nine million. This rigidity stemmed from the very narrow base the statistics were drawn from. Only workers with an urban household registration (about half the total workforce) were included in the data, and the unemployment rate only referred to the proportion of officially registered urban job-seekers to the total number of employed urban workers. It ignored all rural workers and rural migrant workers, foreign workers, as well as those in insecure, part-time or casual work. These statistics were widely acknowledged as being next to useless in gauging the true state of unemployment in China, so in 2018 the National Bureau of Statistics introduced a new system based on monthly surveys of workers in urban areas, reportedly based on International Labour Organization (ILO) standards. The first survey results put the overall urban unemployment rates for January,

¹⁵⁶⁵ Excerpts from China Labour Bulletin report available online at URL:

<https://clb.org.hk/content/employment-and-wages>

¹⁵⁶⁶ Ibid.

February and March 2018 at 5.0, 5.0 and 5.1 percent respectively. The rate in the 31 major cities surveyed was slightly lower; 4.9, 4.8 and 4.9 percent in the first three months. By way of comparison, China's overall rate is still lower than both the average unemployment rate in developing countries (5.5 percent) and developed countries (6.6 percent). While the new survey method is certainly an improvement on the previous official unemployment rate, it still does not represent the whole picture. Rural unemployment is not included and importantly neither are people in short-term or precarious employment who make up an increasingly large proportion of the urban working population. That said, the authorities have taken some practical steps to ensure that China's actual unemployment rate does not get out of hand. In laying-off up to six million workers in heavy industries such as coal and iron and steel, local governments have taken a very cautious approach, setting aside 100 billion yuan for early retirement schemes and retraining programs. Laid-off workers have been offered decent early retirement packages and have a guaranteed pension when they reach retirement age. For many older workers the package is enough to live on while younger workers can supplement their income with flexible work using on-demand apps for delivery or ride hailing services.¹⁵⁶⁷

V. Wage arrears

Most laid-off workers however are not as lucky as those from state-owned enterprises like Masteel. Workers in the private sector often struggle to get the compensation and social insurance benefits they are entitled to under the law and, in many cases, they are owed several months' wages when made redundant, which they struggle to recover. The non-payment of wages is by far the most important single cause of labour disputes in China today, not just for laid-off workers but employees in many sectors of the economy where the payment of monthly wages is not guaranteed. Chinese government officials are well aware of this chronic issue, admitting that the "deep rooted conflict" in the construction sector remains unresolved and acknowledging moreover that the problem is spreading to other industries. In a *People's Daily* report in January 2017, a Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) official noted that: The MOHRSS has proposed several measures to address the problem and even issued a 2020 deadline to "basically eradicate wage arrears." However most proposals are simply administrative or judicial measures design to mitigate the failings of employers rather than tackle the fundamental imbalance in labour relations that allows employers to not sign formal employment contracts and delay payment of wages whenever they see fit.


VI. Minimum wage levels

Minimum wage rates in China are determined by regional governments, based on local living costs, local wages and the overall supply and demand for labour. As a result, there is considerable variation in minimum wage levels in major cities and poorer rural areas. The highest monthly minimum wage as of July 2018 was in Shanghai (2,480 yuan), which was roughly double the minimum wage in smaller cities in provinces such as Hunan, Hubei, Liaoning and Heilongjiang. Minimum wage rates in major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing and Shenzhen have basically doubled since China emerged from the

¹⁵⁶⁷ Excerpts from China Labour Bulletin report available online at URL: <https://clb.org.hk/content/employment-and-wages>


global economic slowdown in 2010. Rates of increase in many other provinces, notably Guangdong, have not kept pace and the gap between the major cities and smaller urban areas has continued to grow (see graph below). In 2010, for example, minimum wage rates in Beijing and the Guangdong manufacturing hub of Dongguan were basically the same but in 2019, the monthly minimum wage in Beijing was 480 yuan higher than in Dongguan.¹⁵⁶⁸

Monthly minimum wage rates in selected cities 2010-2019



The slower minimum wage growth in Dongguan is partly explained by the desire of the Guangdong provincial government to slow the outflow of business, particularly manufacturing, to other countries and the Chinese interior where costs are lower. The policy has severely impacted the lives of low-paid workers across the province, according to a survey conducted the Hong Kong-based group Worker Empowerment in 2017. The majority of workers surveyed earned not much more than the minimum wage and as a result struggled to maintain even a basic existence. They were forced to live in low-rent poor quality housing, spent most of their income on food and many walked to and from work in order to avoid transport costs. China's *Minimum Wage Regulations* implemented by the then Ministry of Labour and Social Security in March 2004, stipulate that each region should set its minimum wage at between 40 and 60 percent of the local average wage. However, very few cities have ever reached that target. Moreover, the discrepancy between average and minimum wages has actually been increasing rather than decreasing over the last few years. In many cities such as Guangzhou and Chongqing, the minimum wage is now less than 24 percent of the average wage, while in Beijing it is just under 20 percent.


¹⁵⁶⁸ Excerpts from China Labour Bulletin report available online at URL: <https://clb.org.hk/content/employment-and-wages>



Source: <https://clb.org.hk/content/employment-and-wages>

VII. Income inequality


According to official government statistics for 2018, the average per capita disposable income of China’s richest 20 percent (70,640 yuan) was 11 times higher than the average income of the poorest 20 percent, which stood at just 6,440 yuan. While the annual average per capita disposable income of the richest 20 percent in China’s cities increased by nearly 20,000 yuan in the five years from 2013 to 2017, the disposable income of the poorest 20 percent in urban areas grew by less than 4,000 yuan (see chart below).



Source: <https://clb.org.hk/content/employment-and-wages>

The wealth gap within China’s cities is still relatively small however when compared to the gap between the rural poor and the urban rich. In 2017, the average annual per capita disposable income of the richest 20 percent in urban areas (77,097.20 yuan) was 23 times higher than the average per capita disposable income of the poorest 20 percent in rural

areas, which stood at just 3,301.90 yuan. As the chart below shows, incomes for the poorest rural residents have remained largely stagnant over the last decade as the gap with the richest urban residents continues to grow. The gap between the urban rich and rural poor was 22 times in 2010, for example, and about 21.5 times in 2005. Looking back to beginning of the reform era, Piketty et al found that the gap between urban to rural average incomes had risen from less than 200 percent in 1978 to about 350 percent in 2015.¹⁵⁶⁹



Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2015, 2018.

The urban-rural divide is probably the most important factor in wealth inequality in China today: Not simply because of the substantial income gap between rural and urban households but also because nearly all of China's best healthcare, education, cultural and social services are located in urban areas. Whereas urban residents have reasonably unfettered access to such services, rural residents often have to pay excessive fees on top of the cost of travelling to and staying in the city that provides the services. Although smaller and, to some extent, medium-sized cities have begun to relax their administrative barriers to rural migration, there are no signs that major cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou will make it easier for rural migrants to gain access to their jealously guarded social welfare, healthcare and education systems.

VIII. Analysis and conclusion

A superficial glance at China's major cities seems to show a reasonably affluent society: young, hard-working middle class families, determined to make a better life for themselves. This illusion was shattered however in late 2017 when the municipal government of Beijing embarked on a 40-day high-profile campaign to clean out the city's shanty towns and evict the so-called "low-end population" who produce, market, and deliver the goods, services and lifestyle products that Beijing's middle class families aspire to. The evictions revealed the harsh truth that the affluence of China's cities depends almost entirely on the impoverishment of the underclass.

The Chinese government has made the alleviation of poverty, fairer income distribution and the expansion of the middle class a high priority. One of the key reasons why low-

¹⁵⁶⁹ Excerpts from China Labour Bulletin report available online at URL: <https://clb.org.hk/content/employment-and-wages>

wage earners have so far not been able to earn a decent income and bridge the gap to the middle class is because they lack the institutional means to bargain collectively for better pay and working conditions. Workers have demonstrated time and again over the last decade that they have the means and the ability to organize collectively, stage strikes and protests in response to specific labour rights violations. What they do not have however is a trade union that can represent them in collective bargaining with employers. China's sole legally mandated trade union, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) has a titular presence in many workplaces but the union representatives are largely under the sway of management and have no real connection to ordinary workers. There is an increasing urgent need for China's workers to assert more control over the union and make it more representative and effective. The Chinese government too will need to put pressure on the ACFTU to play its part in improving labour relations and maintaining long-term social, economic and political stability.¹⁵⁷⁰


Congressional Research Service report titled "China's Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, Implications for the United States" published in 2019 states the following:

The decline in China's working age population may have contributed to rising wages in China. As indicated in Figure 9, China's average monthly wages (converted into U.S. dollars) in 1990 were \$55, compared with \$32 for Vietnam and \$221 for Mexico.²⁴ However, in 2018, China's average monthly wages (at \$990) were 316% higher than Vietnam's wages (\$238) and 158.5% higher than Mexico's (\$383). From 2007 to 2018, China's average monthly wages rose by 263%. The American Chamber of Commerce in China (AmCham China) 2019 Business Climate survey listed rising labour costs as the second-biggest challenge facing U.S. firms in China (56% percent of recipients cited them as their largest concern).²⁵ Figure 10 shows a comparison of labour costs per unit of production for the countries listed in the previous figure, indexed relative to U.S. levels. In 2000, China's unit labour production costs were 42.3% of U.S. levels and by 2018 they rose to 75.5% of U.S. levels.¹⁵⁷¹

¹⁵⁷⁰Excerpts from China Labour Bulletin report available online at URL: <https://clb.org.hk/content/employment-and-wages>

¹⁵⁷¹<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf>

Average Monthly Wages for China, Mexico and Vietnam:1990-2018




Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

Notes: Because data are listed in U.S. dollars rather than local currency, changes to wages may also partially reflect changes to exchange rates with the U.S. dollar. However, such data may reflect average labor costs in dollars that U.S.-invested firms might face in their overseas operations.

Labour Cost Index for China, Mexico, and Vietnam Relative to those in US:2000-2018

(U.S. level = 100)




Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

Notes: The labor cost of producing one unit of output, indexed to U.S. levels.

9.2.7 Gender Balance

The following chart is the population pyramid for China. A population pyramid illustrates the age and sex structure of a country's population and may provide insights about political and social stability, as well as economic development. The population is distributed along the horizontal axis, with males shown on the left and females on the right. The male and female populations are broken down into 5-year age groups represented as horizontal bars along the vertical axis, with the youngest age groups at the bottom and the oldest at the top. The shape of the population pyramid gradually evolves over time based on fertility, mortality, and international migration trends.



Source: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>

Population by Age and Sex (2018)

Age	Population		Percentage to			Sex Ratio (Female=100)	
	(person)	Male	Female	Total Population (%)	Male		Female
Total	1144648	585299	559349	100.00	51.13	48.87	104.64
0-4	67393	35887	31506	5.89	3.14	2.75	113.91
5-9	63322	34279	29043	5.53	2.99	2.54	118.03
10-14	62248	33775	28473	5.44	2.95	2.49	118.62
15-19	58258	31552	26706	5.09	2.76	2.33	118.14
20-24	68050	36085	31965	5.95	3.15	2.79	112.89
25-29	92977	47710	45268	8.12	4.17	3.95	105.39
30-34	93201	46843	46358	8.14	4.09	4.05	101.05
35-39	81886	41517	40370	7.15	3.63	3.53	102.84
40-44	83574	42557	41017	7.30	3.72	3.58	103.75
45-49	102384	52108	50276	8.94	4.55	4.39	103.64
50-54	96850	48939	47911	8.46	4.28	4.19	102.15
55-59	69844	35208	34636	6.10	3.08	3.03	101.65
60-64	68014	34092	33923	5.94	2.98	2.96	100.50
65-69	54799	26974	27825	4.79	2.36	2.43	96.94
70-74	34810	16905	17905	3.04	1.48	1.56	94.42
75-79	22799	10745	12054	1.99	0.94	1.05	89.15
80-84	14845	6457	8389	1.30	0.56	0.73	76.97
85-89	6902	2870	4033	0.60	0.25	0.35	71.16
90-94	2031	665	1365	0.18	0.06	0.12	48.74
95+	458	131	327	0.04	0.01	0.03	40.07

Source: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/html/E0209.jpg>

Household, Population, Sex Ratio and Household Size by Region (2018)

Region	Number of Households (household)	Family Household	Collective Household	Population (person)			Sex Ratio (Female=100)	Family Household Population (person)			Collective Household Population (person)			Average Family Size (person/ household)
				Male	Female	Male		Female	Male	Female				
National Total	378643	371225	7419	1144648	585299	559349	104.64	1113633	566631	547002	31015	18668	12347	3.00
Beijing	6769	6490	279	17673	8781	8892	98.75	16773	8371	8403	900	410	490	2.58
Tianjin	4529	4171	358	12794	6863	5931	115.72	11278	5678	5599	1517	1185	332	2.70
Hebei	19693	19580	113	61907	31210	30697	101.67	61115	31123	29992	792	87	705	3.12
Shanxi	10121	10035	86	30481	15593	14888	104.73	30054	15217	14837	427	376	52	2.99
Inner Mongolia	7908	7852	56	20781	10608	10174	104.26	20537	10407	10130	244	200	44	2.62
Liaoning	13885	13791	94	35744	17905	17839	100.37	35181	17771	17410	563	134	429	2.55
Jilin	8334	8305	29	22173	11198	10975	102.03	22090	11155	10935	83	43	40	2.66
Heilongjiang	11926	11910	16	30946	15697	15249	102.93	30862	15636	15225	85	60	24	2.59
Shanghai	8139	7971	169	19877	10256	9621	106.61	19368	9922	9446	509	334	174	2.43
Jiangsu	21450	20769	681	65996	33555	32441	103.43	63116	31895	31222	2879	1660	1220	3.04
Zhejiang	18096	17728	368	47034	24418	22616	107.97	45813	23645	22168	1221	773	448	2.58
Anhui	16479	16243	236	51812	26667	25145	106.06	50570	25596	24974	1241	1071	171	3.11
Fujian	10944	10546	398	32309	16806	15503	108.41	30975	15941	15033	1335	865	470	2.94
Jiangxi	10985	10863	123	38080	19579	18500	105.83	37504	19369	18134	576	210	366	3.45
Shandong	28896	28656	240	82408	41363	41045	100.77	81529	40943	40585	880	420	460	2.85
Henan	23052	22976	76	78679	39815	38864	102.45	78382	39634	38748	297	181	115	3.41
Hubei	15856	15269	586	48498	24973	23525	106.15	45846	23199	22647	2652	1774	878	3.00
Hunan	17033	16766	267	56516	28469	28047	101.51	55116	27973	27143	1400	496	904	3.29
Guangdong	30474	28361	2113	93024	50209	42815	117.27	85610	45007	40602	7414	5201	2213	3.02
Guangxi	11778	11714	64	40353	20996	19357	108.47	39792	20688	19104	561	308	253	3.40
Hainan	2120	2023	97	7658	3917	3741	104.69	7264	3825	3439	394	92	302	3.59
Chongqing	8685	8590	96	25416	12730	12686	100.35	24920	12501	12419	496	229	267	2.90
Sichuan	23359	23142	217	68344	33944	34400	98.67	67227	33424	33804	1116	520	596	2.91
Guizhou	9034	8991	43	29487	15403	14084	109.37	29292	15273	14019	194	130	64	3.26
Yunnan	11840	11683	157	39584	20523	19061	107.67	38592	19783	18808	993	740	253	3.30
Tibet	729	716	13	2817	1401	1416	98.98	2767	1372	1395	50	29	21	3.86
Shaanxi	10434	10193	241	31684	15879	15804	100.47	30407	15235	15172	1276	644	632	2.98
Gansu	6265	6156	108	21614	11001	10613	103.65	21126	10680	10446	488	321	167	3.43
Qinghai	1523	1485	39	4945	2571	2373	108.34	4821	2482	2340	123	89	34	3.25
Ningxia	1747	1722	26	5638	2794	2844	98.27	5461	2789	2672	177	6	172	3.17
Xinjiang	6560	6529	31	20375	10175	10200	99.76	20246	10097	10149	130	78	51	3.1

Source: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/indexeh.htm>

The People's Republic of China has about 34 million more men than women on its mainland, but also has its most balanced gender ratio since the first national population census was conducted in 1953, according to census data released. Males accounted for 51.27 percent of the mainland's 1.34 billion people, while females made up 48.73 percent of the total, according to data from the sixth national population census released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The ratio of males was 0.36 percentage points lower than that of 2000, when the previous census was conducted. This same figure was 0.06 percentage points lower than the previous record low of 51.33 percent in 1964, according to NBS data. Despite this, China still faces challenges in balancing its gender ratios, as China's sex ratio at birth was 118.06 percent in 2010, higher than the 116.86 percent of 2000, said Ma Jiantang, director of the NBS.

The 2010 sex ratio at birth was 0.53 points lower than the ratio of 118.59 percent obtained from a population sample survey carried out in 2005 or 1.39 points lower than the ratio of 119.45 percent recorded from another population sample survey carried out in 2009, indicating that China is still making progress, according to Ma. "The gender ratio of 118.06 was still beyond the normal range. We must pay great attention to this problem and take more effective measures to promote sex equality in terms of employment and salaries," he said. China's first national population census took place in 1953. Results of that census showed that males made up 51.82 percent of the population on the mainland at that time, while females accounted for 48.18 percent.¹⁵⁷²

9.2.8 China Statistical Yearbook¹⁵⁷³

China Statistical Yearbook is a collection of statistics which comprehensively reflects China's economic and social development, covers the nation and provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities for the previous year, and includes a number of major indicators for a few selected years and for recent years. China Statistical Yearbook is published in September each year.

<u>2001</u> 1574	<u>2002</u> 1575	<u>2003</u> 1576	<u>2004</u> 1577	<u>2005</u> 1578	<u>2006</u> 1579	<u>2007</u> 1580	<u>2008</u> 1581	<u>2009</u> 1582
<u>2010</u> 1583	<u>2011</u> 1584	<u>2012</u> 1585	<u>2013</u> 1586	<u>2014</u> 1587	<u>2015</u> 1588	<u>2016</u> 1589	<u>2017</u> 1590	<u>2018</u> 1591

9.2.9 Statistical Communiqué¹⁵⁹²

The Statistical Communiqué of the People's Republic of China on the National Economic and Social Development is released in late February each year. It includes statistics of the areas of economy, agriculture, industry, investment, trade, foreign economy, public

¹⁵⁷² http://www.china.org.cn/china/2011-04/28/content_22462221.htm

¹⁵⁷³ <http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/publish.htm?sort=1>

¹⁵⁷⁴ <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB2001e/ml/indexE.htm>

¹⁵⁷⁵ <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB2002e/ml/indexE.htm>

¹⁵⁷⁶ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/yarbook2003_e.pdf

¹⁵⁷⁷ <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/yb2004-e/indexeh.htm>

¹⁵⁷⁸ <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2005/indexeh.htm>

¹⁵⁷⁹ <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2006/indexeh.htm>

¹⁵⁸⁰ <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2007/indexeh.htm>

¹⁵⁸¹ <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexeh.htm>

¹⁵⁸² <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2009/indexeh.htm>

¹⁵⁸³ <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2010/indexeh.htm>

¹⁵⁸⁴ <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2011/indexeh.htm>

¹⁵⁸⁵ <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2012/indexeh.htm>

¹⁵⁸⁶ <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2013/indexeh.htm>

¹⁵⁸⁷ <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2014/indexeh.htm>

¹⁵⁸⁸ <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2015/indexeh.htm>

¹⁵⁸⁹ <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm>

¹⁵⁹⁰ <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2017/indexeh.htm>

¹⁵⁹¹ <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2018/indexeh.htm>


¹⁵⁹² <http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/publish.htm?sort=1>

finance, banking, transportation, telecommunications, tourism, education, science and technology, culture, health, social services, population, people's lives, social security, resources, environment and safety for the previous year.

<u>2000</u> 1593	<u>2002</u> 1594	<u>2003</u> 1595	<u>2004</u> 1596	<u>2005</u> 1597	<u>2006</u> 1598	<u>2007</u> 1599	<u>2008</u> 1600	<u>2009</u> 1601
<u>2010</u> 1602	<u>2011</u> 1603	<u>2012</u> 1604	<u>2013</u> 1605	<u>2014</u> 1606	<u>2015</u> 1607	<u>2016</u> 1608	<u>2017</u> 1609	<u>2018</u> 1610

9.2.10 BRICS Joint Statistical Publication

This publication includes data on social and economic development in BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). It shows the development of the five countries from different angles, including country profiles, population, national accounts, price indices, living standards, industry, energy, agriculture, transportation, information society, public finance, banking, foreign economic relations, tourism and so on.¹⁶¹¹



9.3 Ethnic Groups

China is a united multi-ethnic nation of 56 ethnic groups. As the majority (91.6 percent) of the population is of the Han ethnic group, China's other 55 ethnic groups are customarily referred to as ethnic minorities. According to the fifth national census in 2000, 18 ethnic minorities have a population of over one million, namely the Zhuang, Manchu, Hui, Miao, Uygur, Yi, Tujia, Mongolian, Tibetan, Bouyei, Dong, Yao, Korean, Bai, Hani, Li, Kazak and Dai. Of these the Zhuang ethnic group has the biggest population,

¹⁵⁹³ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/200203/t20020329_25981.html
¹⁵⁹⁴ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/200302/t20030228_25509.html
¹⁵⁹⁵ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/200403/t20040303_25987.html
¹⁵⁹⁶ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/200502/t20050228_25600.html
¹⁵⁹⁷ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/200603/t20060302_25737.html
¹⁵⁹⁸ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/200703/t20070301_25866.html
¹⁵⁹⁹ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/200802/t20080228_25995.html
¹⁶⁰⁰ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/200905/t20090522_26166.html
¹⁶⁰¹ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/201002/t20100226_26295.html
¹⁶⁰² http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/201102/t20110228_26426.html
¹⁶⁰³ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/201202/t20120222_26575.html
¹⁶⁰⁴ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201302/t20130222_72261.html
¹⁶⁰⁵ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201402/t20140224_515103.html
¹⁶⁰⁶ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201502/t20150228_687439.html
¹⁶⁰⁷ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201602/t20160229_1324019.html
¹⁶⁰⁸ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201702/t20170228_1467503.html
¹⁶⁰⁹ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201802/t20180228_1585666.html
¹⁶¹⁰ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201902/t20190228_1651335.html
¹⁶¹¹ <http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/publish.htm?sort=1>
¹⁶¹² <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/OtherData/BRICS/>

numbering 16.179 million. There are 17 ethnic groups with a population of between 100,000 and one million, namely the She, Lisu, Gelao, Lahu, Dongxiang, Va, Sui, Naxi, Qiang, Tu, Xibe, Mulam, Kirgiz, Daur, Jingpo, Salar and Maonan. There are 20 ethnic groups with a population of between 10,000 and 100,000, namely, Blang, Tajik, Primi, Achang, Nu, Ewenki, Gin, Jino, Deang, Ozbek, Russian, Bonan, Monba, Oroqen, Derung, Tatar, Hezhen, Gaoshan (excluding the Gaoshan ethnic group in Taiwan) and Lhoba. The Lhoba ethnic group, at 2,965, has the smallest population. The Han people can be found throughout the country, mainly on the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River, the Yangtze River and the Pearl River valleys, and the Northeast Plain. The 55 ethnic minorities, though fewer in number, are also scattered over vast areas and can be found in approximately 64.3 percent of China, mainly distributed in the border areas of northeast, north, northwest and southwest China. Yunnan Province, home to more than 20 ethnic groups, has the greatest diversity of ethnic groups in China. Over China's long history, repeated instances of ethnic group migrations, opening up new land for cultivation, emigration, relocation of the ruling dynasty, and a host of other reasons, gave rise to the situation of "living together over vast areas while some living in compact communities in small areas." This continues to provide the practical basis for political, economic and cultural intercourse between the Han and the various minority peoples, and for the functioning of the regional ethnic autonomy system.¹⁶¹³

9.3.1 Regional ethnic autonomy

Regional Ethnic Autonomy Equality, unity, mutual help and common prosperity are the basic principles of the Chinese government in handling the relations between ethnic groups. In accordance with these basic principles, China practices a regional ethnic autonomy system. Where ethnic minorities live in compact communities, autonomous organs of self-government are established under the unified leadership of the state. The minority people exercise autonomous rights, are masters in their own areas and administer their own internal affairs. Besides, the state makes great efforts to train ethnic minority cadres and professional technicians in institutions of higher learning, and universities, colleges and cadre schools for ethnic minorities. The Central Government also actively aids the ethnic autonomous areas with funds and materials so as to promote the development of the local economies and cultures. The Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy adopted in 1984 at the Second Session of the Sixth NPC is the basic law specifically guaranteeing that the constitutionally decreed regional ethnic autonomy system is carried out. Today, in addition to the five autonomous regions (Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang Uygur, Guangxi Zhuang, Ningxia Hui, and Tibet autonomous regions), China has 30 autonomous prefectures and 120 autonomous counties (known, in some cases, as "banners"), as well as over 1,100 ethnic townships. The organs of self-government in ethnic autonomous areas are the people's congresses and people's governments of autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties (banners). The chairperson or vice-chairpersons of the standing committee of the people's congress and the government head of an autonomous region, autonomous prefecture or autonomous county (banner) shall be citizens of the ethnic group exercising regional autonomy in the area concerned.

¹⁶¹³ http://english1.english.gov.cn/2006-02/08/content_182626.htm

Organs of self-government in ethnic autonomous areas enjoy extensive self-government rights beyond those held by other state organs at the same level. These include: enacting regulations on the exercise of autonomy and separate regulations corresponding to the political, economic and cultural characteristics of the ethnic group(s) in the areas concerned; having the freedom to manage and use all revenues accruing to the ethnic autonomous areas; independently arranging and managing local economic development, education, science, culture, public health and physical culture, protecting and sorting out the cultural heritage of the ethnic groups, and developing and invigorating their cultures.¹⁶¹⁴

9.3.2 Demographic Overview¹⁶¹⁵

Approximately 93 percent of China's population is considered Han. Sharp regional and cultural differences, including major variations in spoken Chinese, exist among the Han, who are a mingling of many peoples. All the Han nonetheless use a common written form of Chinese and share the social organization, values, and cultural characteristics universally recognized as Chinese.

Officially, China has fifty-six "nationality" groups, including the Han. The Chinese define a nationality as a group of people of common origin living in a common area, using a common language, and having a sense of group identity in economic and social organization and behaviour. Altogether, China has fifteen major linguistic regions generally coinciding with the geographic distribution of the major minority nationalities. Members of non-Han groups, referred to as the "minority nationalities," constitute only about 7 percent of the total population but number more than 70 million people and are distributed over 60 percent of the land.

Some minority nationalities can be found only in a single region; others may have settlements in two or more. In general, however, the minorities are concentrated in the provinces and autonomous regions of the northwest and the southwest. In Xizang, Xinjiang, and Nei Monggol autonomous regions, minorities occupy large frontier areas; many are traditionally nomadic and engage primarily in agriculture or pastoral pursuits. Minority groups in Yunnan and Guizhou provinces and in the Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region are more fragmented and inhabit smaller areas.

According to the 1982 census, approximately 95 percent of Xizang's civilian population of 1.9 million are Tibetan (Zang nationality). An internally cohesive group, the Tibetans have proven the most resistant of the minority groups to the government's integration efforts. Xinjiang, which is as vast and distant from Beijing as Xizang, is the minority area next in demographic and political significance. Despite a large-scale immigration of Han since the 1950s, in 1985 around 60 percent of Xinjiang's 13.4 million population belonged to minority nationalities. Of these, the most important were 6.1 million Uyghurs and more than 900,000 Kazaks, both Turkic-speaking Central Asian peoples .

Provinces with large concentrations of minorities include Yunnan, where the Yi and other minority groups comprised an estimated 32 percent of the population in 1985; Guizhou,

¹⁶¹⁴ http://english1.english.gov.cn/2006-02/08/content_182618.htm

¹⁶¹⁵ <http://countrystudies.us/china/36.htm>

home of more than half of the approximately 4 million Miao; and sparsely populated Qinghai, which except for the area around the provincial capital of Xining is inhabited primarily by Tibetans and other minority nationality members, amounting in 1986 to approximately 37 percent of the total provincial population. Additionally, in 1986 minority nationalities constituted approximately 16 percent of the population of Nei Monggol Autonomous Region. The Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region contains almost all of the approximately 13.5 million members of what is China's largest minority nationality, the Zhuang; most of them, however, are highly assimilated.

Because many of the minority nationalities are located in politically sensitive frontier areas, they have acquired an importance greater than their numbers. Some groups have common ancestry with peoples in neighbouring countries. For example, members of the Shan, Korean, Mongol, Uygur and Kazak, and Yao nationalities are found not only in China but also in Burma, Korea, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Soviet Union, and Thailand, respectively. If the central government failed to maintain good relations with these groups, China's border security could be jeopardized. Since 1949 Chinese officials have declared that the minorities are politically equal to the Han majority and in fact should be accorded preferential treatment because of their small numbers and poor economic circumstances. The government has tried to ensure that the minorities are well represented at national conferences and has relaxed certain policies that might have impeded their socioeconomic development.¹⁶¹⁶

The minority areas are economically as well as politically important. China's leaders have suggested that by the turn of the century the focus of economic development should shift to the northwest. The area is rich in natural resources, with uranium deposits and abundant oil reserves in Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region. Much of China's forestland is located in the border regions of the northeast and southwest, and large numbers of livestock are raised in the arid and semiarid northwest. Also, the vast amount of virgin land in minority areas can be used for resettlement to relieve population pressures in the densely populated regions of the country.

In the early 1980s, the central government adopted various measures to provide financial and economic assistance to the minority areas. The government allotted subsidies totalling approximately -Y6,000 million in 1984 to balance any deficits experienced in autonomous areas inhabited by minority nationalities. After 1980 the autonomous regions of Nei Monggol, Xinjiang, Xizang, Guangxi, and Ningxia and the provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Qinghai were permitted to keep all revenues for themselves. The draft state budget written in April 1986 allocated a special grant of -Y800 million to the underdeveloped minority nationality areas over and above the regular state subsidies. The standard of living in the minority areas improved dramatically from the early to the mid-1980s. In Xizang Autonomous Region, annual per capita income increased from -Y216 in 1983 to -Y317 in 1984 (national per capita income was -Y663 in 1983 and -Y721 in 1984). The per capita net income of the minority areas in Yunnan Province increased from -Y118 in 1980 to -Y263 in 1984, for an increase of 81.3 percent. Overall, however, the minority areas remained relatively undeveloped in 1986.¹⁶¹⁷

¹⁶¹⁶ <http://countrystudies.us/china/36.htm>

¹⁶¹⁷ Ibid

9.3.3 Policy¹⁶¹⁸

Since 1949 government policy toward minorities has been based on the somewhat contradictory goals of national unity and the protection of minority equality and identity. The state constitution of 1954 declared the country to be a "unified, multinational state" and prohibited "discrimination against or oppression of any nationality and acts which undermine the unity of the nationalities." All nationalities were granted equal rights and duties. Policy toward the ethnic minorities in the 1950s was based on the assumption that they could and should be integrated into the Han polity by gradual assimilation, while permitted initially to retain their own cultural identity and to enjoy a modicum of self-rule. Accordingly, autonomous regions were established in which minority languages were recognized, special efforts were mandated to recruit a certain percentage of minority cadres, and minority culture and religion were ostensibly protected. The minority areas also benefited from substantial government investment.

Yet the attention to minority rights took place within the larger framework of strong central control. Minority nationalities, many with strong historical and recent separatist or anti-Han tendencies, were given no rights of self-determination. With the special exception of Xizang in the 1950s, Beijing administered minority regions as vigorously as Han areas, and Han cadres filled the most important leadership positions. Minority nationalities were integrated into the national political and economic institutions and structures. Party statements hammered home the idea of the unity of all the nationalities and downplayed any part of minority history that identified insufficiently with China Proper. Relations with the minorities were strained because of traditional Han attitudes of cultural superiority. Central authorities criticized this "Han chauvinism" but found its influence difficult to eradicate.¹⁶¹⁹

Pressure on the minority peoples to conform were stepped up in the late 1950s and subsequently during the Cultural Revolution. Ultra-leftist ideology maintained that minority distinctness was an inherently reactionary barrier to socialist progress. Although in theory the commitment to minority rights remained, repressive assimilationist policies were pursued. Minority languages were looked down upon by the central authorities, and cultural and religious freedom was severely curtailed or abolished. Minority group members were forced to give up animal husbandry in order to grow crops that in some cases were unfamiliar. State subsidies were reduced, and some autonomous areas were abolished. These policies caused a great deal of resentment, resulting in a major rebellion in Xizang in 1959 and a smaller one in Xinjiang in 1962, the latter bringing about the flight of some 60,000 Kazak herders across the border to the Soviet Union. Scattered reports of violence in minority areas in the 1966-76 decade suggest that discontent was high at that time also.

After the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, policies toward the ethnic minorities were moderated regarding language, religion and culture, and land-use patterns, with the admission that the assimilationist policies had caused considerable alienation. The new leadership pledged to implement a bona fide system of autonomy for the ethnic minorities and placed great emphasis on the need to recruit minority cadres. Although

¹⁶¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁶¹⁹ <http://countrystudies.us/china/36.htm>

the minorities accounted for only about 7 percent of China's population, the minority deputies to the National People's Congress made up 13.5 percent of all representatives to the congress in 1985, and 5 of the 22 vice chairmen of its Standing Committee (23 percent) in 1983 were minority nationals. A Mongol, Ulanhu, was elected vice president of China in June 1983. Nevertheless, political administration of the minority areas was the same as that in Han regions, and the minority nationalities were subject to the dictates of the Chinese Communist Party. Despite the avowed desire to integrate the minorities into the political mainstream, the party was not willing to share key decision-making powers with the ethnic minorities. As of the late 1970s, the minority nationality cadres accounted for only 3 to 5 percent of all cadres. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese government in the mid-1980s was pursuing a liberal policy toward the national minorities. Full autonomy became a constitutional right, and policy stipulated that Han cadres working in the minority areas learn the local spoken and written languages. Significant concessions were made to Xizang, historically the most nationalistic of the minority areas. The number of Tibetan cadres as a percentage of all cadres in Xizang increased from 50 percent in 1979 to 62 percent in 1985. In Zhejiang Province the government formally decided to assign only cadres familiar with nationality policy and sympathetic to minorities to cities, prefectures, and counties with large numbers of minority people. In Xinjiang the leaders of the region's fourteen prefectural and city governments and seventy-seven of all eighty-six rural and urban leaders were of minority nationality.¹⁶²⁰

9.3.4 People from other immigration jurisdictions

In accordance with the Regulations on National Population Census, China carried out its 6th national population census with zero hour of November 1, 2010 as the reference time. The census covered, for the first time, residents from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan and foreigners living within the territory of China. Released as follows are major figures concerning population of the above category who received census enumeration.¹⁶²¹

I. Total Population Covered

The census covered 234829 residents from Hong Kong SAR, 21201 residents from Macao SAR, 170283 residents from Taiwan, and 593832 foreigners residing in the territory of China and receiving census enumeration, totaling 1020145 persons.

II. Sex Composition

¹⁶²⁰ <http://countrystudies.us/china/36.htm>

¹⁶²¹ National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China released Major Figures on Residents from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan and Foreigners Covered by 2010 Population Census on April 29, 2011, available online at URL: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcommingevents/t20110429_402722638.htm

Note: Referring to population of residents from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and foreigners who had stayed, by the reference time of the census, for more than 3 months, or planned to stay for more than 3 months in the territory of China, excluding residents from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and foreigners who came to China for a short stay such as business trip or tourism. "Territory" here refers to the territory of customs, thus not including Hong

Kong, Macao and Taiwan. https://web.archive.org/web/20110514214156/http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcommingevents/t20110429_402722638.htm

Of the population covered, 605821 persons were males, and 414324 persons were females. Of all residents covered from Hong Kong SAR, there were 141321 males and 93508 females. Of all residents covered from Macao SAR, there were 11708 males and 9493 females. Of all residents covered from Taiwan, there were 116547 males and 53736 females. Of all foreigners covered, there were 336245 males and 257587 females.

III. Duration of Stay

Of the population covered, 103754 persons stayed in China for less than 3 months, 90078 persons stayed for 3-6 months, 143210 persons stayed for 6-12 months, 183001 persons stayed for 1-2 years, 249668 persons stayed for 2-5 years, and 250434 persons stayed for more than 5 years.

IV. Purpose of Staying in the Mainland of China

Of the population covered, 204962 persons came to the mainland of China for business, 201955 persons came for employment, 202482 persons came for study, 186648 persons came for settlement, 100113 persons came to visit relatives, and 123985 persons came for other purposes.

V. Geographic Distribution

Of the population covered, 316138 persons stayed in Guangdong Province, 208602 persons stayed in Shanghai Municipality, 107445 persons stayed in Beijing Municipality, 64177 persons stayed in Jiangsu Province, 62564 persons stayed in Fujian Province, 47396 persons stayed in Yunnan Province, 36380 persons stayed in Zhejiang Province, 33098 persons stayed in Shandong Province, 23834 persons stayed in Liaoning Province, and 23445 persons stayed in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. The remaining 97066 persons stayed in other provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities.

VI. Composition of Nationality of Foreigners

Of all foreigners covered, 120750 were from the Republic of Korea, 71493 the United States, 66159 from Japan, 39776 from Myanmar, 36205 from Viet Nam, 19990 from Canada, 15087 from France, 15051 from India, 14446 from Germany, and 13286 from Australia. The remaining 181589 persons came from other countries.¹⁶²²

9.3.5. Ethnic Minority Rights

Selected Major Laws and Regulations:¹⁶²³

- Provisions on Implementing the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (May 11, 2005)
- Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law of the People's Republic of China (February 28, 2001)

¹⁶²² National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China released Major Figures on Residents from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan and Foreigners Covered by 2010 Population Census on April 29, 2011, available online at URL:http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevents/t20110429_402722638.htm

Note: Referring to population of residents from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and foreigners who had stayed, by the reference time of the census, for more than 3 months, or planned to stay for more than 3 months in the territory of China, excluding residents from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and foreigners who came to China for a short stay such as business trip or tourism. "Territory" here refers to the territory of customs, thus not including Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.

¹⁶²³ <https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/ethnic-minority-rights>

9.4 Religions

China is a country of great religious diversity and freedom of religious belief. It has over 100 million followers of various faiths, more than 100,000 sites for religious activities, about 300,000 religious personnel and over 3,000 religious associations. These associations run 76 religious schools and colleges to train religious personnel. In China, all regular religious activities - such as worshipping Buddha, chanting scriptures, praying, expounding on scriptures, holding Mass, baptism, initiation into monk- or nun-hood, Ramadan and observance of religious festivals - are all managed by the religious personnel and adherents themselves, are protected under the law and are free from interference. The holy books of each religion are published and distributed by religious associations. Each religion in China has its own national periodical, which is also circulated abroad.¹⁶²⁴

The main religions are Buddhism, Islam, Roman Catholic and Protestant Christianity, China's indigenous Taoism, Shamanism, Eastern Orthodox Christianity and the Naxi people's Dongba religion. The Hui, Uygur, Kazak, Kirgiz, Tatar, Uzbek, Tajik, Dongxiang, Salar and Bonan peoples adhere to Islam; the Tibetan, Mongolian, Lhoba, Monba, Tu and Uygur, to Tibetan Buddhism (also known as Lamaism), and the Dai, Blang and Deang to Hinayana Buddhism. Large numbers of Miao, Yao and Yi are Catholic or Protestant Christians. Religious Han Chinese tend to practice Buddhism, Christianity, or Taoism.

Buddhism was introduced to China from India around the first century AD, growing increasingly popular to become the most influential religion in China after the fourth century. Tibetan Buddhism, as a branch of Chinese Buddhism, is popular primarily in Tibet and Inner Mongolia. Now China has more than 13,000 Buddhist temples. It is probable that Islam first reached China around the mid-seventh century. The Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) witnessed the zenith of prosperity of Islam. Now China has more than 30,000 mosques.¹⁶²⁵

Catholic influence reached China in the seventh century, and Protestantism was introduced into China in the early 19th century. Now there are more than 4,600 Catholic and over 12,000 Protestant churches, as well as over 30,000 other types of Christian places of worship in China.

Taoism is based on the philosophy of Lao Zi (traditionally said to be born in 604 BC) and his work, the Dao De Jing (Classic of the Way and Virtue). It probably took shape as a religion during the second century, and China now has more than 1,500 Taoist temples.¹⁶²⁶

In the white paper titled “Freedom of Religious Belief” issued by the state council of People’s Republic of China in 1997, states that China has the following national religious organizations: Buddhist Association of China, Taoist Association of China, Islamic Association of China, Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association, Chinese Catholic Bishops' College, Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee of the Protestant Churches

¹⁶²⁴ http://english1.english.gov.cn/2006-02/08/content_182603.htm

¹⁶²⁵ Ibid

¹⁶²⁶ Ibid

of China¹⁶²⁷, and China Christian Council. Religious leaders and leading organs of the various religious bodies are selected and ordained in accordance with their own regulations.¹⁶²⁸

Religious organizations in China run their own affairs independently and set up religious schools, publish religious classics and periodicals, and run social services according to their own needs. As in many other countries, China practices the principle of separating religion from education; religion is not a subject taught in schools of the popular education in China, although some institutions of higher learning and research institutes do teach or conduct research into religion.

The "cultural revolution" (1966 to 1976) had a disastrous effect on all aspects of the society in China, including religion. But in the course of correcting the errors of the "cultural revolution" governments at all levels made great efforts to revive and implement the policy of freedom of religious belief, redressed the unjust, false or wrong cases imposed on religious personages, and reopened sites for religious activities. Since the 1980s, approximately 600 Protestant churches have been reopened or rebuilt each year in China. By the end of 1996 more than 18 million copies of the Bible had been printed, with special tax exemption treatment speeding their publication. In addition, more than eight million copies of a hymn book published by the China Christian Council in 1983 have been distributed. From 1958 to 1995, a total of 126 Catholic bishops were selected and ordained by the Chinese Catholic church itself. In the past dozen years more than 900 young Catholic priests have been trained or consecrated by Chinese Catholicism. More than 3,000 Protestants attend the Sunday service at Chongwenmen church in Beijing each week. The Beijing Nantang Catholic Cathedral observes Mass four times each week with an attendance of more than 2,000. Of these, one Mass is held in English specially for foreigners in Beijing.¹⁶²⁹

In the course of the country's long history, the various religions in China have become part of the traditional Chinese thinking and culture. It is traditional for Chinese religious believers to love their country and religions. The Chinese government supports and encourages the religious circles to unite the religious believers to actively participate in the construction of the country. The various religions all advocate serving the society and promoting people's well-being, such as the Buddhists' "honoring the country and benefiting the people," the Catholics and Protestants' "glorifying God and benefiting the people," the Taoists' "being benevolent, peaceful and harmonious, saving the world and benefiting the people," and the Islam's "praying to Allah to give great reward in this world and hereafter."

¹⁶²⁷ The founding of the People's Republic of China put an end to the era of semi-colonial and semi-feudal society in China, thus providing the historical conditions for Chinese Catholicism and Protestantism to become independent and self-managing. In July 1950, 40 leading figures from various religious denominations headed by Wu Yaorong published the "Three-Self Declaration," titled "The Way in Which the Chinese Christianity Works for New China's Construction," expressing the attitude of Chinese Christians who supported New China, and their determination to cast off imperialist influence and achieve the "Three Selves" (self-administration, self-support and self-propagation) of Chinese churches. In September 1950, 1,527 leading Christians signed the declaration. Three or four years later the number of Christians who had signed the document reached more than 400,000, about two-thirds of the total number of Christians in the country. Christians have since then adhered to the principles of the "Three Selves."

¹⁶²⁸ <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/bjzl/t168753.htm>

¹⁶²⁹ Ibid.

In the Constitution of the People's Republic of China freedom of religious belief is a basic right enjoyed by all citizens. Article 36 of the Constitution stipulates, "Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief." It also goes on to say, "No State organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion." Again, "the State protects normal religious activities," and "No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the State." In addition, "Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination."¹⁶³⁰

China's Law on National Regional Autonomy, General Principles of the Civil Law, Education Law, Labor Law, Compulsory Education Law, Electoral Law of the People's Congresses, Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees, Advertisement Law, and other laws stipulate that all citizens, regardless of their religious beliefs, have the right to vote and stand for election; the legitimate property of religious bodies is subject to legal protection; education is separate from religion, and all citizens, regardless of their religious beliefs, enjoy equal educational opportunities in accordance with the law; the people of all ethnic groups should respect each other's languages, customs and habits, and religious beliefs; citizens shall not be discriminated against in terms of employment because of different religious beliefs; and no advertisements or trademarks shall include discriminatory contents against any ethnic group or religion.¹⁶³¹

Religion should be adapted to the society in which it is prevalent. This is a universal law for the existence and development of religion. Now the Chinese people are building China into a modern socialist country with Chinese characteristics. The Chinese government advocates that religion should adapt to this reality. However, such adaptation does not require citizens to give up religious belief, nor does it require any religion to change its basic doctrines. Instead, it requires religions to conduct their activities within the sphere prescribed by law and adapt to social and cultural progress.

Nevertheless, since the 1980s some pernicious organizations have sprung up in certain areas of China, which engage in illegal and even criminal activities under the signboard of religion. Some of the heads of these pseudo-religions distort religious doctrines, create heresies, deceive the masses, refuse to obey the State's laws and decrees, and incite people to overthrow the government. Some pretend to be supernatural beings, and have killed or injured people; others organize promiscuity, or defraud people of money or property. They are a serious danger to the normal life and productive activities of the people. The broad masses of the people and personages of the religious circles detest this phenomenon, and so, in order to safeguard the public interest and the sanctity of the law, and to better protect the people's right to freedom of religious belief and normal religious activities, China's judicial organs punish law-breakers and criminals who severely endanger the society and the public interest in accordance with the law.¹⁶³²

¹⁶³⁰ <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/bjzl/t168753.htm>

¹⁶³¹ *Ibid*

¹⁶³² <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/bjzl/t168753.htm>

9.4.1 Management of Religion by Chinese Government.

The Chinese government document on policy- 'Religious Affairs Ordinance', and White paper titled 'China's Policy and Practice of Guaranteeing Freedom of Religious Belief', stipulates that for the CPC management of religious activities is imperative.

9.4.1.1. China: Revised Regulations on Religious Affairs

On September 7, 2017, China's State Council released a revised version of the Religious Affairs Regulations (Regulations), which took effect on February 1, 2018; the Standing Committee of the State Council adopted the Regulations on June 14, 2017 [Decree No. 686 of the State Council of the People's Republic of China: Religious Affairs Regulations] available on State Council website¹⁶³³. The Regulations are formulated with the stated goals of ensuring citizens' freedom of religious belief, maintaining religious and social harmony, and regulating the administration of religious affairs.

I. General Principles

The Regulations specify in Chapter I that citizens are entitled to the right of freedom of religious belief. (art. 2) In the revised Regulations, an article is added stating that the management of religious affairs should adhere to the principles of protecting legitimate religious activities, curbing and preventing illegal and extreme practices, resisting infiltration, and fighting crime. (art. 3.) Another new article prohibits individuals and organizations from creating contradictions and conflict between different religions, within a single religion, or between religious and non-religious citizens; from advocating, supporting, or funding religious extremism; and from using religion to undermine ethnic unity, divide the nation, or carry out terrorist activities. (art. 4.)

II. The Management of Religious Affairs

(1) Religious Groups and Schools

Under the revised Regulations, a new article asserts that religious groups are authorized to perform several functions, including assisting governments at all levels in the implementation of laws, regulations, rules, and policies; preserving the lawful rights and interests of citizens with religious beliefs; guiding the group's religious affairs; formulating a system of rules and regulations for the group and supervising their implementation; engaging in religious cultural study; and carrying out religious education and training (art. 8.). Article 9 of the revised Regulations states that only national religious groups and those in provinces, autonomous regions, and directly-governed municipalities may establish religious schools, select and send students of religion to study abroad, and receive students of religion from abroad. Other organizations or individuals do not have the right to set up religious schools, select students of religion to study abroad, or accept foreign students of religion. (arts. 9 & 11.)

¹⁶³³ Full detailed document is available on the following URL:
<http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1626734/1626734.htm>

(2) Venues for Religious Activity

The revised Regulations specify that venues for religious activities include temples, churches, and other fixed places. Other religious gathering places should be determined by the religious affairs departments of province-level governments. (art. 19.) In order to be established, a venue for religious activity must have the necessary funds from “legitimate sources.” The configuration of the venue should also meet the requirements of urban and rural planning. (art. 20.) Another new provision prohibits the construction of large, outdoor religious statues outside of temple and church grounds. (art. 30.)

(3) Religious Professionals

The revised Regulations prohibit persons who have not obtained or who have lost religious professional credentials from engaging in activities as religious professionals. (*Id.* art. 36.) The Regulations also now state that religious groups, religious schools, and religious activity sites must handle social insurance registration for religious professionals in accordance with the relevant regulations. (art. 39.)

(4) Religious Activities

The Regulations newly prohibit non-religious groups, non-religious schools, non-religious activity sites, and temporary activity sites not appropriately designated as religious ones from conducting religious activities, accepting religious donations, carrying out religious training, and organizing citizens leaving the country to participate in religious training, meetings, and activities. (art. 41.) The Regulations also prohibit proselytizing, holding religious activities, establishing religious organizations, or setting up religious activity sites in schools or educational bodies other than religious schools. (article 44.) Several other provisions are added that regulate religious informational publications and online religious services. (arts. 45-48.)

(5) Religious Assets

The revised Regulations provide that religious groups, schools, and venues can manage and use public assets or collectively owned assets in accordance with laws and regulations. They also enjoy ownership or other property rights with regard to other lawful assets. (art. 49.) Religious groups, schools, and venues may accept overseas or domestic donations for charitable causes in accordance with the law. (art. 57.) In addition, they should adopt the national financial and accounting system and register as taxpayers. (art. 59.)

III. Legal Responsibility

The revised Regulations also establish additional provisions on legal responsibilities and punishments for violations of laws and regulations relating to religious affairs. (Ch. VIII.) One of these new provisions provides that, in the case of advocating, supporting, or funding religious extremism, or using religion to harm national security or public safety, undermine ethnic unity, divide the nation and conduct terrorist activities, where a crime is constituted, criminal responsibility is pursued in accordance with law; where no crime is constituted, administrative punishments will be given by relevant departments in accordance with law; and where losses are caused to citizens, legal persons or other

organizations, civil liability must be borne in accordance with law. (art. 63).Where religious groups, religious schools, or religious activity sites carry out any of the conduct in the preceding paragraph and “the circumstances are serious,” the relevant departments will employ the necessary measures to rectify it; those refusing rectification are to have their registration certificate or establishment permit revoked. (*Id.* art. 63)¹⁶³⁴

In a white paper titled “China's Policies and Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief” issued by The State Council Information Office of PRC, the government maintains that since the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012, China, under the staunch leadership of the CPC Central Committee with Xi Jinping as the core, has advanced law-based governance in all respects, integrating religious work into the national governance system, employing laws to deal with all social relationships concerning religion, and improving the management of religious work under the rule of law.¹⁶³⁵

The state manages religious affairs involving national and social public interests in accordance with the law but does not interfere in the internal affairs of religions. The state protects citizens’ right to freedom of religious belief, normal religious activities and the lawful rights and interests of religious groups, bans illegal religious activities, prohibits the dissemination of extremist thought and engagement in extremist activities in the name of religion, resists the infiltration of hostile foreign forces taking advantage of religion, and fights against illegal and criminal activities under the guise of religion. Believers should abide by the Constitution, laws, rules and regulations of the country. Religious activities should be carried out within the bounds of the law. No religion should interfere in the implementation of administrative, judicial and educational functions of the state. No abolished religious and feudal privileges should be resumed. No activities which employ religion to endanger social stability, national unity and state security are allowed to be carried out.

i) Adhering to the principle of independence and self-management. Religious groups and religious affairs are not subject to control by foreign countries; this principle is enshrined in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese government supports all religions in upholding the principle of independence and self-management, allowing religious groups, clerical personnel and believers to manage religious affairs themselves in accordance with the Constitution and law. This principle is a historic choice made by Chinese religious believers in the Chinese people’s struggle for national independence and social progress, as Catholicism and Protestantism, which were known as foreign religions in China, had long been controlled and utilized by colonialists and imperialists. The establishment of this principle conforms to the historical trend of the Chinese people’s search for national independence and liberation, to the demands of the times to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation, and as a result religions in China have taken on an entirely new look, winning widespread understanding, respect and support of friendly religious believers around the world.¹⁶³⁶

¹⁶³⁴ <https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-revised-regulations-on-religious-affairs/>

¹⁶³⁵ Excerpts from a white paper titled “China's Policies and Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief” issued by The State Council Information Office of PRC, published in 2018, available online at URL: <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1626734/1626734.htm>

¹⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*

ii) Actively guiding religions in adapting to the socialist society. Actively guiding religions in adapting to the socialist society means guiding religious believers to love their country and compatriots, safeguard national unity, ethnic solidarity, be subordinate to and serve the overall interests of the nation and the Chinese people. It also means guiding religious groups to support the leadership of the CPC and the socialist system; uphold and follow the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics; develop religions in the Chinese context; embrace core socialist values; carry forward China's fine traditions; integrate religious teachings and rules with Chinese culture; abide by state laws and regulations, and accept state administration in accordance with the law.

iii) Freedom of religious belief is protected by the Constitution. According to Article 36 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, "Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No State organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion." Article 36 also stipulates that "No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the State," and that "Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign control." These stipulations serve as the constitutional basis for the State in protecting citizens' freedom of religious belief, administering religious affairs in accordance with the law, and building positive relations with and among religions.¹⁶³⁷

iv) Freedom of religious belief is protected by basic laws. China's Criminal Law, National Security Law, and Counter-Terrorism Law provide for the protection of citizens' freedom of religious belief. The principle of equal protection for all Chinese citizens is enshrined in the Election Law of the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses, Organic Law of the People's Courts, Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates, Organic Law of the Urban Residents Committees, Organic Law of the Villagers Committees, Criminal Procedure Law, Education Law, Labor Law, Employment Promotion Law, and Trade Union Law. These laws stipulate that all citizens enjoy equal rights to vote and stand for election to people's congresses at all levels and to community-level self-government organizations, the right to equality before the law, the right to education, the right to work and to free choice of employment, and the right to join or organize trade unions in accordance with the law, irrespective of religious belief. The Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy states that organs of self-government in ethnic autonomous areas shall guarantee citizens of all ethnic groups the freedom of religious belief. According to the Law on the Protection of Minors, minors enjoy equal rights to life, development, protection, participation and education in accordance with the law, irrespective of their religious belief. The Advertisement Law prohibits any advertisements that contain any information that discriminates against religions. The Criminal Law stipulates that workers of State organs involved in serious cases, which illegally deprive citizens of their right to freedom of religious belief, shall be investigated for criminal responsibility. The General Provisions of the Civil Law states that a lawfully established place of worship qualifying as a legal person may register for the status of legal person to accept donations.

¹⁶³⁷ Excerpts from a white paper titled "China's Policies and Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief" issued by The State Council Information Office of PRC, published in 2018, available online at URL: <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1626734/1626734.htm>

v) Administrative regulations regarding religious affairs are improving. The revised Regulations on Religious Affairs released in September 2017 strengthen the protection of Chinese citizens' freedom of religious belief and the lawful rights and interests of religious groups, bring government's management of religious affairs under due procedures in accordance with the law, and add provisions on safeguarding national security and maintaining social harmony. The Regulations prescribe the rights and responsibilities of religious organizations, places of worship, and religious believers when establishing places for and holding religious activities, setting up and running religious institutions, applying for legal person status, publishing and distributing religious books and periodicals, receiving donations, managing religious property, conducting charity activities, and carrying out exchanges with other countries. The Regulations prohibit the commercialization of religions, and include additions concerning religious information services on the Internet. In addition, the Regulations also require local governments to provide public services to religious organizations, religious institutions, and places of worship, and incorporate such sites into the overall local plans for land use and urban and rural planning. The Regulations forbid any organization or individual from creating disputes and conflicts between believers and non-believers and prohibit print publications and the Internet from disseminating information which discriminates against religious or non-religious citizens.¹⁶³⁸

vi) The religious activities of foreigners in China are protected in accordance with the law. The Rules on the Administration of Religious Activities of Foreigners in the People's Republic of China highlights China's respect for the freedom of religious belief of foreigners within the territory of the People's Republic of China, and its commitment to protecting the friendly relations, and cultural and academic exchanges with regards to religion between foreigners and Chinese religious groups. Foreigners may attend religious activities at temples, mosques, churches, and other sites for religious activities. They are also permitted to preach at places of worship when invited to do so by Chinese religious bodies at or above the provincial level. Foreigners may hold religious activities attended by foreigners at sites approved by government religious affairs departments at or above the county level. They may invite Chinese clerical personnel to perform baptisms, weddings, funerals, prayers, or other religious services. They are allowed to carry religious printed text, audio-video products, and other religious articles that conform to relevant regulations when entering Chinese territory. Foreigners who conduct religious activities within China shall abide by Chinese laws and regulations. They shall not establish religious organizations, set up religious offices and sites for religious activities, run religious institutions, or recruit foreign students studying in China without authorization; nor shall they recruit followers, appoint clerical personnel from among Chinese citizens or engage in other missionary activities. The Law of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of Activities of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations Within China prohibits overseas NGOs from illegally engaging in or sponsoring religious activities.¹⁶³⁹

¹⁶³⁸ Excerpts from a white paper titled "China's Policies and Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief" issued by The State Council Information Office of PRC, published in 2018, available online at URL: <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1626734/1626734.htm>

¹⁶³⁹ Ibid

Religious extremism and violent terrorist activities are dealt with in accordance with the law. The Counter-Terrorism Law of the People's Republic of China states that China opposes all extremism that seeks to instigate hatred, incite discrimination and advocate violence by distorting religious doctrines or through other means, and forbids any discriminatory behaviour on the grounds of region, ethnicity and religion. The Regulations on Religious Affairs prohibit any organization or individual from advocating, supporting or sponsoring religious extremism, or using religion to undermine ethnic unity, divide the country, or engage in terrorist activities. China takes measures against the propagation and spread of religious extremism, and at the same time, carefully avoids linking violent terrorism and religious extremism with any particular ethnic group or religion.¹⁶⁴⁰

vii) Conducting Religious Activities in an Orderly Manner. The major religions practiced in China are Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism; with a total of nearly 200 million believers and more than 380,000 clerical personnel. China has numerous Buddhist and Taoist believers, but it is difficult to accurately estimate their numbers as there are no set registration procedures which ordinary believers must follow as part of their religion. There are around 222,000 Buddhist clerical personnel and over 40,000 Taoist clerical personnel. The 10 minority ethnic groups, the majority of whose population believe in Islam, total more than 20 million, with about 57,000 clerical personnel. Catholicism and Protestantism have 6 million and 38 million followers in China respectively, with 8,000 and 57,000 clerical personnel. China also has many folk beliefs which are closely linked to local cultures, traditions and customs, in which a large number of people participate. There are approximately 5,500 religious groups in China, including seven national organizations which are Buddhist Association of China, Chinese Taoist Association, China Islamic Association, Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, Bishops' Conference of Catholic Church in China, National Committee of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches in China, and China Christian Council.

viii) Conditions of places of worship have been notably improved. The State requires the registration of places of worship for group religious activities in accordance with the law, so as to provide legal protection and ensure that all activities are carried out in an orderly manner. At present, there are about 144,000 places of worship registered for religious activities in China, among which are 33,500 Buddhist temples (including 28,000 Han Buddhist temples, 3,800 Tibetan Buddhist lamaseries, and 1,700 Theravada Buddhist temples), 9,000 Taoist temples, 35,000 Islamic mosques, 6,000 Catholic churches and places of assembly spread across 98 dioceses, and 60,000 Protestant churches and places of assembly. Religious groups and places of worship follow the unified tax regulations of the State, pay taxes and enjoy tax breaks accordingly. The government ensures that places of worship have access to public services such as running water, electricity, gas, heating, roads, communications, broadcast facilities, televisions, and medical services.¹⁶⁴¹

ix) Religious texts and literature are published as prescribed by the law. The printing, publication and circulation of religious text, in different languages and editions,

¹⁶⁴⁰ Excerpts from a white paper titled "China's Policies and Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief" issued by The State Council Information Office of PRC, published in 2018, available online at URL: <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1626734/1626734.htm>

¹⁶⁴¹ Ibid.

and printed works, audio-visual products and e-books that record, explain and/or annotate religious doctrines and canons, have met the diverse demands of citizens with religious beliefs from the various ethnic groups. Several large collections of religious classics, including the Chinese Buddhist Canon, the Chinese Taoist Canon and A Collection of Editions and Commentaries for the Laozi, have been compiled and published. Traditional sutra printing houses in Tibetan Buddhist temples have been well preserved and developed. There are now 60 such sutra printing houses, including the one in the Potala Palace, that can print 63,000 different sutras every year. Islamic classics, such as the Koran, have been translated and published in Chinese, Uygur, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz languages. The publication and circulation of the New Collection of Al-Wa'z Speeches series and other reading materials and magazines have exceeded 1.76 million copies. China has printed over 160 million copies of the Bible in more than 100 different languages for over 100 countries and regions, including 80 million copies printed in the Chinese language, 11 ethnic minority languages and braille for churches in China. A great many religious groups and places of worship have launched websites; and the Islamic Association of China has a website in both Chinese and Uygur languages.

x) The religious education system has been further improved. By September 2017, there are 91 religious schools in China whose establishment was approved by the State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA), including 41 Buddhist, 10 Taoist, 10 Islamic, 9 Catholic and 21 Protestant schools. There are six national level religious colleges, namely, the Buddhist Academy of China, High-level Tibetan Buddhism College of China, Chinese Taoist College, China Islamic Institute, National Seminary of the Catholic Church in China, and Nanjing Union Theological Seminary. At present, more than 10,000 students study in these religious schools whose graduates total more than 47,000.¹⁶⁴²

xi) Social security for religious clerical personnel has been enhanced. The SARA and other relevant departments jointly issued the “Directives on Solving the Social Security Problem for Religious Clerical Personnel” in 2010, and again the “Notice of Further Solving the Social Security Problem for Religious Clerical Personnel” in 2011, which brought clerical personnel into the social security system. At the end of 2013, 96.5 percent of clerical personnel were covered by medical insurance, 89.6 percent by the old-age insurance, and all qualified personnel by subsistence allowance welfare. Almost all clerical personnel were covered by the social security system in China.

The religious activities of believers are being conducted in an orderly manner. All normal religious activities, including attending religious services, fasting, worshiping Buddha, praying, preaching, reciting scriptures, burning incense, attending Mass, being baptized or ordained, observing extreme unction, holding memorial ceremonies, and celebrating religious festivals, which believers conduct at places of worship or in their own homes in accordance with customary religious practices, are protected by law, and no organization or individual may infringe on these rights. Traditional Tibetan Buddhist activities such as scripture study and debate, initiation into monkhood or nun hood, abhisheka (empowerment ceremony) and self-cultivation, and tests and degree promotions in lamaseries are held on a regular basis, while ceremonial activities are also held during important religious festivals. Muslim customs regarding food and drink, clothing,

¹⁶⁴² Excerpts from a white paper titled “China’s Policies and Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief” issued by The State Council Information Office of PRC, published in 2018, available online at URL: <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1626734/1626734.htm>

festivals, marriages and funerals are fully respected. The Islamic Association of China organizes for Muslims to go on pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia every year, with the number of participants exceeding 10,000 a year since 2007.¹⁶⁴³ Activities that disturb the normal order in places of worship have been rectified. In accordance with the “Directives on Some Issues Relating to the Management of Buddhist and Taoist Temples”, the SARA¹⁶⁴⁴ and other relevant departments have been conducting joint investigations since 2012 into the problem of religious revenue being used by businesspeople or “go public”. In 2017, the SARA and 11 related departments issued “Guidelines on Further Controlling the Commercialization of Buddhism and Taoism”, which prohibits commercial capital from being invested in religious revenues, to prevent normal religious activities from being affected by money-grabbing behaviour. Relevant departments have intensified the management of the Internet regarding religious affairs, and swiftly dealt with the spread of illegal information concerning religions, effectively protecting the legal rights and interests of religious groups.¹⁶⁴⁵

9.4.1.2. Restructuring of the United Front Work Department.

United front work (*tongzhan gongzuo*, 统战工作) is the process of building a “united front” coalition around the CCP in order to serve the Party’s objectives, subordinating targeted groups both domestically and abroad. United front work is viewed by Party leaders as a crucial component of the CCP’s victory in the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949), and is now central to controlling and utilizing domestic groups that might threaten the CCP’s power, as well as projecting influence abroad. Building a greater understanding of united front work is essential to countering political influence and interference conducted by the CCP.¹⁶⁴⁶

An article titled “Fears about Chinese influence grow as more powers given to shadowy agency” published in South China Morning Post stated the following:

China is to broaden the scope of a controversial Communist Party department responsible for its overseas liaison work to include ethnic and religious affairs. The consolidation of the United Front Work Department is part of a restructure of party agencies. It will take over the duties of state agencies overseeing ethnic and religious affairs, as well as the overseas Chinese portfolio. Observers said the move added to concerns about Beijing’s tight grip on religious and ethnic affairs, and worries about its

¹⁶⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴⁴ The **State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA)** was a functioning department under the State Council which oversaw religious affairs for the People’s Republic of China. Originally created in 1951 as the Religious Affairs Bureau, SARA was closely connected with the United Front Work Department of the Communist Party of China and charged with overseeing the operations of China’s five officially sanctioned religious organizations: a. Buddhist Association of China, b. Chinese Taoist Association, c. Islamic Association of China, d. Three-Self Patriotic Movement (Protestant), e. Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association. SARA was dissolved in 2018, placing all religious affairs directly under the United Front Work Department.

¹⁶⁴⁵ <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1626734/1626734.htm>

¹⁶⁴⁶ <https://jamestown.org/program/reorganizing-the-united-front-work-department-new-structures-for-a-new-era-of-diaspora-and-religious-affairs-work/>

political infiltration overseas. It's the mysterious department behind China's growing influence across the globe. And it's getting bigger.¹⁶⁴⁷

Founded in 1942, the department is responsible for managing the party's relations with non-party elites both inside and outside China, aiming to shore up support for its rule. But the new set-up will mean this once opaque agency will have to be more open about its activities. Back in 2015, President Xi Jinping said a rapidly changing internal and external situation meant the department's work had to be more coordinated. The department has meanwhile extended its reach over the years, with its bureaus responsible for liaising with people in Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and foreign nations, for example, coordinating with Chinese student associations in other countries. Last May, it set up a new bureau to focus on the Muslim-majority Xinjiang region in the far west, where ethnic violence has killed hundreds of people in recent years. The restructure will see the department take over responsibility for the State Administration for Religious Affairs, a move Beijing said was aimed at consolidating the party's direction on religion and ensuring religious activities were consistent with socialism. The State Ethnic Affairs Commission will also come under the department's leadership. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office will meanwhile be merged with the department. It will also be responsible for studying the conditions faced by overseas Chinese, cultural exchanges and for uniting the Chinese diaspora. Strengthening the power of the United Front Work Department is part of a sweeping restructure that will see more fusion of the party and the state. But it comes as the department is under growing scrutiny from Western governments, such as Australia and the United States, that are suspicious of China's tactics to spread its influence abroad and meddle in local politics.¹⁶⁴⁸

¹⁶⁴⁷ <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2138279/bigger-overseas-liaison-agency-fuels-fears-about>

¹⁶⁴⁸ <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2138279/bigger-overseas-liaison-agency-fuels-fears-about>

Before Restructuring of UFWD



Source:<https://jamestown.org/program/reorganizing-the-united-front-work-department-new-structures-for-a-new-era-of-diaspora-and-religious-affairs-work/>

After Restructuring of UFWD.



Source: <https://jamestown.org/program/reorganizing-the-united-front-work-department-new-structures-for-a-new-era-of-diaspora-and-religious-affairs-work/>

9.4.1.3 The UFWD's Growing Role in Religious Affairs Work

The reorganization of the UFWD has occurred in parallel with a renewed drive by the CCP to “sinicize” (*zhongguohua*, 中国化) Islam and other religions even more tightly under state control. Religious affairs work is now to be carried out by Bureaus 11 and 12, which are almost entirely staffed by former SARA officials. Both bureaus interact with members of various religious groups, and the exact division of labour between these bureaus is unclear. However, the Twelfth Bureau has a Protestantism division, Daoism division and a Buddhism division as well as other divisions that may focus on Islam and Catholicism. No references exist to similar divisions in the Eleventh Bureau—which may indicate that the Twelfth Bureau has responsibilities for specific religions, while the Eleventh Bureau may instead have functional responsibilities (such as overseeing religious schools) in

order to avoid duplication of work. Like all UFWD bureaus, these bureaus appear to have some international responsibilities, seeking to influence religious activities around the world. One Twelfth Bureau official spoke last year at the founding of the Australia China Buddhist Council —which has as its honorary president Huang Xiangmo, a PRC billionaire who had his Australian visa revoked for being “amenable to conducting acts of foreign interference”. In January 2019, an Eleventh Bureau official led a Chinese Buddhist delegation to a forum in New York.¹⁶⁴⁹

9.4.2 Falun Gong

Falun Gong, (Chinese: “Discipline of the Dharma Wheel”)also spelled **Falungong**, also called **Falun Dafa**, controversial Chinese spiritual movement founded by Li Hongzhi in 1992. The movement’s sudden prominence in the late 1990s became a concern to the Chinese government, which branded it a “heretical cult.”¹⁶⁵⁰

Chinese authorities initially treated Falungong as a loosely knit group of quirky but benign qigong devotees. Falun Gong is certainly one of the most important phenomena to emerge in China in the last decade. The April demonstration marks the emergence of Falun Gong on to the world stage.¹⁶⁵¹ Falun Gong has its roots in the qigong boom of the 1980s. According to Falun Gong sources, Li Hongzhi developed Falun Gong from 1984, after himself being the recipient of the teachings of ‘more than 20 masters’. Testing the new system out on several disciples first, he made the system public in May 1992. This is also the date at which Falun Gong enters official history, as this is when it was registered with the Chinese National Qigong Scientific Research Association. In December 1992, Li Hongzhi made the first public demonstration of his skills, at the 1992 Oriental Health Expo in Beijing. Apparently, he caused a paralysed and wheelchair-bound man to walk, destroyed gall and kidney stones and cured ‘difficult and complex illnesses of all kinds’. The director of the fair declared that Falun Gong was ‘the star cultivation system’. During 1993 and 1994 he gave classes in Falun Gong all over China. By March 1993, when an introductory and laudatory article was written in the journal Chinese Qigong (published by the National Chinese Medicine Association), he had already given classes in Beijing, Changchun, Taiyuan, and in Shanxi province. In July and August 1993, the journal Qigong and Science reported that he gave lectures 10 nights in a row in a 2200 seat university auditorium, with people sitting in the aisles, and, as the article notes ‘no air conditioning at the height of the Beijing summer’. Qigong and Science also reported his appearance on talkback radio in Wuhan in March 1993 while he was giving classes there. On the program ‘Happy Train’ on the Wuhan People’s Broadcasting Station, and later on Hubei Yangtse Economic Broadcasting Station, he conducted hotline consultations and remote healing. Li’s first book, China Falungong was published in April 1993 (preface dated December 1992) through the Junshi Yiwen Press, a publishing house associated with the People’s

¹⁶⁴⁹ Excerpts from a study titled “Reorganizing the United Front Work Department: New Structures for a New Era of Diaspora and Religious Affairs Work” published in China Brief in 2019, available online at URL: <https://jamestown.org/program/reorganizing-the-united-front-work-department-new-structures-for-a-new-era-of-diaspora-and-religious-affairs-work/>

¹⁶⁵⁰ <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Falun-Gong>

¹⁶⁵¹ A study published by National Library of Australia titled “The Past, Present, Future of Falun Gong”, available online at URL: <https://www.nla.gov.au/benjamin-perry/the-past-present-and-future-of-falun-gong>

Liberation Army. A Falun Gong site claims that between May 1992 and December 1994, Li gave 56 public nine-day lectures in all the major cities of China.¹⁶⁵²

In 1994, Li published his second book, *Zhuan Falun*. Clearly, in this period (1992–1994) Falun Gong was public, advertising its presence and making no attempt to hide the nature of its doctrines. In all this publicity, none of the ‘border science’ content was hidden; it was far from alone among qigong groups in this.¹⁶⁵³

In 1995, Li started to spread his message beyond China, giving lectures in Stockholm and Paris in 1995, Sydney, Houston and New York City in 1996. The period after 1995 also marks the disappearance of Falun Gong from the *qigong* periodical literature. The year 1995, in fact, is an important point in the history of Falun Gong as it was in December that it left the National *Qigong* Scientific Research Association. Within the next year or two, Falun Gong’s Internet presence probably appeared and took over its publicity and dissemination functions. The best way to describe Falun Gong is as a cultivation system. Cultivation systems have been a feature of Chinese life for at least 2 500 years and probably much more. They are sets of mental and physical regimens that may involve special techniques of breathing, exercises, visualisations, meditations, diets, behaviours, or sexual practices that aim at refining the body into a higher form. The various versions of *qigong* are all cultivation systems, though some have been stripped down to the simple physical aspect. *Taiji quan*—or *taichi* as it is known here —is one of these.¹⁶⁵⁴

At the beginning of the first chapter of *Zhuan Falun* (Falun Gong’s main text, first published in 1994), Li Hongzhi, its leader, explains that Falun Gong differs from all other varieties of *qigong* which were concerned solely with healing and fitness. Falun Gong’s physical exercises claim to be superior to those of all other cultivation systems. What is particularly novel about them is that Li Hongzhi promises that, while cultivating, one of his *fashen* or law bodies will protect the practitioner. Law bodies are one of the marvellous things that develop as one cultivates. ‘*Fashen*,’ Li explains, ‘looks the same as the person does. You don’t have *fashen* now. When your cultivation has reached a certain level, you will ... enter into an extremely high level. Only then will you develop *fashen*’. High level *qigong* masters have them, and apparently, ‘The *fashen* (law body) of a high-level *qigong* grand master is controlled and dictated by the thoughts of the main body. *Fashen* also has his own thoughts, his own independent ability to solve problems and carry out tasks. Some masters have not reached the state of enlightenment. There are a few things he does not know yet, but his *fashen* already knows’. One of the most distinctive claims about Falun Gong as a cultivation system is that you can cultivate 24 hours a day, even though you are not doing the exercises. According to the Falun Gong texts, ‘the *fa* [or law] refines the practitioner’.¹⁶⁵⁵

Falun Gong, or Falun Dafa, and the name of its leader Li Hongzhi, came to the world’s attention, or perhaps to be more precise, the attention of the foreign media based in Beijing on Anzac Day April 25, 1999, which was a Sunday. About 3 a.m. on that day people

¹⁶⁵² Ibid

¹⁶⁵³ A study published by National Library of Australia titled “The Past, Present, Future of Falun Gong”, available online at URL: <https://www.nla.gov.au/benjamin-perry/the-past-present-and-future-of-falun-gong>

¹⁶⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵⁵ A study published by National Library of Australia titled “The Past, Present, Future of Falun Gong”, available online at URL: <https://www.nla.gov.au/benjamin-perry/the-past-present-and-future-of-falun-gong>

started gathering around a compound called Zhongnanhai, in the heart of central Beijing, and sat down on the footpath. By 8 o'clock that morning, between 10 and 15 thousand people were there in a line stretching more than 2 kilometres around the north and west walls, in some places eight people deep. Compounds are often surrounded by high walls in China, and this one is no exception, but Zhongnanhai is important because it houses the places of residence and work of the Chinese leadership. At about 9 a.m., Premier Zhu Rongji saw a delegation of protesters and instructed three staff members to hear their complaints more fully. By 9 o'clock that evening, the locals had quietly made their way home and those from outside Beijing had been taken by bus to the railway station and given tickets home. By all accounts the police were polite and low-key. The protesters apparently did not shout slogans, hold banners or hand out leaflets. It is reported that they collected their litter before they left.¹⁶⁵⁶

The Zhongnanhai protest clearly caught the Chinese leadership as much by surprise as it did the foreign press. The date 25 April 1999 was, of course, only about six weeks before the 10th anniversary of the brutal suppression of the students' occupation of Tiananmen and most eyes, local and foreign, were fixed firmly on that. Some of the later, much more extreme, official reaction to Falun Gong can perhaps be put down to the state of mind of the leadership at that very particular time.¹⁶⁵⁷

For almost three months after the April 25 demonstration, the Chinese leadership was ominously quiet. That is not to say that the forthcoming crackdown was unexpected or that Falungong leaders were unprepared. On April 28, a government official, warning believers not to repeat the April 25 protest, said in a Xinhua interview that ran in newspapers and on the air, "Those who jeopardize social stability under the pretext of practicing any 'qigong' will be dealt with according to the law." By May 7, reports were circulating that President Jiang Zemin had called the group a major threat, that a high-level task force had been formed with Party leaders Hu Jintao and Luo Gan in charge, and that the decision to designate Falungong an illegal organization had already been made. By June 1999, security in Beijing had been tightened. Early in the month, police held several busloads of practitioners in a local stadium for a day. Later in June, some 3,000 police officers cleared out practice sites on Changan Avenue, Beijing's major thoroughfare, and vowed to clean up all public practice sites in the city. Even as Party officials denied reports of an imminent crackdown, they warned Falungong leaders to stop spreading rumours designed to "provoke" the membership into readying demonstrations.¹⁶⁵⁸

This unusual protest did not, of course, come out of nowhere. The specific and particular spur for it actually took place outside Beijing itself, in nearby Tianjin. On 11 April a small magazine aimed at youngsters called *Teenage Science and Technology Outlook* published an article by He Zuoxiu called 'I'm Opposed to Qigong Practise by Teenagers' which *inter alia*, was critical of *qigong* in general and Falun Gong in particular. He, one of China's most eminent physicists, who is famous for helping design China's hydrogen bomb in the 1960s, described as nonsense a Falun Gong claim that an engineer, by practising Falun Gong, was able to separate his 'true' spirit from his body and enter a steel-smelting

¹⁶⁵⁶ A study published by National Library of Australia titled "The Past, Present, Future of Falun Gong", available online at URL: <https://www.nla.gov.au/benjamin-perry/the-past-present-and-future-of-falun-gong>

¹⁶⁵⁷ Ibid

¹⁶⁵⁸ <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/china/China0102-02.htm>

furnace. At another point, He writes, 'I mentioned that a postgraduate in my institute had two relapses of mental disorder each time after he practised Falun Gong'. In response, several thousand Falun Gong practitioners protested outside the offices of the magazine. Their protests were met with action by police, and some people were detained. In my introduction I noted the difficulties with different sources of information on Falun Gong. Here is a case in point. Falun Gong sources, including the very sympathetic Danny Schechter, author of the recent book *Falun Gong's Challenge to China : Spiritual Practice or 'Evil Cult'?*, say that it was riot police who were involved and that 45 people were arrested. The journalists of *Asia week* magazine say that 'police' detained five people. The day after the protest, *The South China Morning Post* quoted 'a demonstrator' in the Beijing gathering to the effect that '50 people were detained by police; someone was also beaten up'. Whatever the case, the response of Falun Gong was to seek redress from the leadership of the country by going to them and, albeit very quietly and politely, making it clear that they would not be treated so shabbily.¹⁶⁵⁹

This crackdown has continued at various levels of intensity ever since. There have been televised court cases of high-ranking officials who were sent to gaol, official statements of the seriousness of the threat still posed by the movement, continuing arrests, alleged cases of self-immolation. Falun Gong sources claim that by March 2001, 162 people 'have died as a result of police torture and brutality since the crackdown began'. An official commentary slightly earlier, in February, claims that 'the year-long campaign has helped more than 98 per cent of the followers reject the fallacies of Falun Gong and throw off the spiritual control exercised by Li Hongzhi. The base of the cult is being destroyed day by day as, more and more, its followers have come to realise their errors and have mended their ways'.¹⁶⁶⁰ Chinese officials signalled through public statements and legal initiatives and through less-well publicized security strategies that they had no intention of relaxing the pressure. Public activities included an anti-cult exhibit in Beijing, a media blitz on the evils of Falungong featuring former adherents, and announcements about the trials of those allegedly responsible for orchestrating the self-immolation deaths in Tiananmen Square in January 2001. More importantly, behind the scenes, China's leaders continued to enforce the "responsibility system," whereby "all levels of government leaders, police, neighbourhood cadres, work units and family members must receive punishment" if a practitioner reaches Beijing to protest. The tactic made it possible to keep Falungong from making international headlines and allowed local authorities to continue to persecute believers with little chance of eyewitness international coverage. Overseas, Chinese embassy officials took on the task of weakening international support for Falungong.¹⁶⁶¹

The question that is most often asked about the whole Falun Gong affair is 'why is the Chinese Government so concerned about this group?' First, whether you believe the figures of the Chinese authorities or of Falun Gong, this group was large, numbering in the tens of millions. There are, of course, serious difficulties in assessing exactly how large because practitioners have never signed up to Falun Gong as people would to a political party or gym club. And, like any movement of this kind, there are those who are deeply committed and those who are only mildly committed. When the crackdown came, one

¹⁶⁵⁹ A study published by National Library of Australia titled "The Past, Present, Future of Falun Gong", available online at URL: <https://www.nla.gov.au/benjamin-perry/the-past-present-and-future-of-falun-gong>

¹⁶⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶¹ <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/china/China0102-02.htm>

can imagine that for many people letting go of Falun Gong was not onerous at all; they just moved on to another, more acceptable, form of *qigong*.¹⁶⁶² How many people in the People's Republic are still seriously committed to Falun Gong, in spite of the crackdown, is impossible to tell. One thing that is certain, given the history of more orthodox religions as well as sectarian traditions in China, is that when and if Falun Gong practitioners are allowed to be public again, many will re-emerge. As well as having a large number of practitioners in China, Falun Gong also seems to have had a large number of adherents who were Chinese Communist Party members. We shouldn't really be surprised by this as the group, as I will show soon, was well in the mainstream of acceptability for several years and its early publications were in fine upstanding presses, including one that belonged to the People's Liberation Army. Nonetheless, as it became clear that Falun Gong was not simply a standard *qigong* method, but one that possessed a reasonably well-developed ideology and that ideology was clearly not compatible with the ideology of the Party, perhaps a crackdown became inevitable.¹⁶⁶³ It has to be noted here, that Falun Gong was by no means the only group of this kind in the mid-to-late 1990s. It probably wasn't even the largest. Also notable was the group known as Zhonggong, which was banned in January 2000, with a leader, Zhang Hongbao, who currently resides on Guam. Others continue to practise in China and have, like Falun Gong, an increasing presence overseas.¹⁶⁶⁴

Clearly what made Falun Gong the target that it became was the demonstration of April 1999. It is the fact that it somehow slipped under the official radar which points to another important reason for real government concern. If large numbers of polite and well-behaved people can gather outside Zhongnanhai unannounced and unnoticed, so presumably could a group of rather less well-behaved people. In other words, Falun Gong had developed a method to mobilise ordinary Chinese people that the Party had neither control over nor cognisance of.¹⁶⁶⁵

Falun Gong also has a very extensive Internet presence. The three main sites, which have English and Chinese versions, are Falundafa, Minghui—called in English Clearwisdom, also with French, German and Russian versions—and Faluninfo. The first is a general introductory site. The second offers daily news updates including the latest writings of Li Hongzhi. The third is aimed at the Human Rights market. There is also a site devoted to some practitioner's views on quasi-scientific topics called Zhengjian, with its English version, Pure Insight. There are four Australian-based Falun Gong websites offering local contacts, local activities and local practice sites while mirroring a great deal of information from the main Falun Gong sites. These sites display a high degree of discipline, with the branch sites effectively mirroring the main sites' contents, quickly and accurately, by adding and removing material.¹⁶⁶⁶

¹⁶⁶² A study published by National Library of Australia titled "The Past, Present, Future of Falun Gong", available online at URL: <https://www.nla.gov.au/benjamin-perry/the-past-present-and-future-of-falun-gong>

¹⁶⁶³ A study published by National Library of Australia titled "The Past, Present, Future of Falun Gong", available online at URL: <https://www.nla.gov.au/benjamin-perry/the-past-present-and-future-of-falun-gong>

¹⁶⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶⁵ A study published by National Library of Australia titled "The Past, Present, Future of Falun Gong", available online at URL: <https://www.nla.gov.au/benjamin-perry/the-past-present-and-future-of-falun-gong>

¹⁶⁶⁶ <https://www.nla.gov.au/benjamin-perry/the-past-present-and-future-of-falun-gong>

9.4.2.1 Falun Gong: An Evil Cult

In a letter to the Editor of Washington Post sent on January 10, 2000 in response to an editorial of December 31, 1999, China maintains:

Facts have shown that Falun Gong is nothing but an evil cult that has all the inherent characteristics of a cult: worship of its leader, systematic mind control, spreading heretic ideas, amassing wealth, secret organization and endangering the society. For example, its ringleader Li Hongzhi fabricated and spread such fallacies as "doomsday" and "earth explosion". Many Falun Gong practitioners were driven into such intense fear by these heresies that they became insane and even committed suicide or killed their loved ones. Li amassed \$5.4 million through illegal publication of Falun Gong materials and tax evasion. 1400 followers died as a result of practising Falun Gong and refusing medical attention when falling ill. Falun Gong disrupted public order and stability by staging illegal demonstrations around media agencies and government organs. In order to protect the human rights and fundamental freedom of the citizens and maintain public order, the Chinese government took necessary measures to prevent Li and his accomplices from inflicting more harm to others. In doing so, the government has made a strict distinction between the cult core members and ordinary practitioners who are victims of Li's evil cult, with the former being dealt with according to law and the latter not accountable for once they break with Falun Gong. The government's policy has been well received by the populace and 99% of Falun Gong adherents quit the cult after realizing its evil nature, so in China Falun Gong has definitely lost its "momentum". Yet some U.S. officials and media have criticized China for outlawing this cult and spoken on its behalf. They seem to be unaware of the pernicious impact of this cult and are trying to make a fuss over it. One could only wonder: Is it a double standard or are there any ulterior motives behind all this?¹⁶⁶⁷

In a policy paper titled "Falun Gong's Ulterior Motive", published on Mission of PRC to EU, China maintains that Falun Gong is an anti-humanity and anti-society cult organization. Deluded by "Master" Li Hongzhi's heretical fallacies and in order to reach "all-round fulfilment", over 1700 Falun Gong addicts have either committed suicide or died as a result of refusing medicines or medical treatment. Thousands of practitioners have become maimed. A large number of families have thus suffered greatly. Some practitioners even went so far as to kill innocent people with the view to "driving away the devil and eliminating karma". Falun Gong has severely endangered public interests and disrupted public order. It is just out of the purpose to better protect the human rights of the general public that the Chinese government banned Falun Gong and adopted the policy of persuasion and education towards the vast majority of practitioners so as to help them get rid of the mind manipulation by Falun Gong. The so-called "persecution" is a false and unfounded charge. It is a big irony that such a cult organization as Falun Gong even brought up a lawsuit in the name of human rights. Its ulterior motive is to interfere with and undermine the smooth development of China-Belgium relations and to defame China's image in the international community. Falun Gong's scheme is doomed to failure.¹⁶⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶⁷ <http://lt.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/jpflg/t125342.htm>

¹⁶⁶⁸ <http://www.chinamission.be/eng/more/flgwt/t72361.htm>

9.4.2.2. Falun Gong and the media campaign

The journalistic narrative and framing of Falun Gong as a social threat in one news organization's attempt to legitimize the government's crackdown against the group. Although the economic reforms and political relaxation since the 1980s might have expanded the media's latitude, the press, especially state-owned media outlets, still functions as an agent for the Beijing regime in important political and social issues. This paper shows how journalists, through news frames, construct particular parameters within which to assess the 'reality' about Falun Gong.¹⁶⁶⁹

The media campaign featured an outpouring of rhetoric from just about every institution and social stratum on the "evil nature" of Falungong and its alleged efforts to hoodwink the public. Xinhua reported that "hundreds of thousands" of retired People's Liberation Army and People's Armed Police personnel avowed complete agreement with the Chinese Communist Party line on the Falun Gong issue." So, too, did religious leaders (including a Tibetan Living Buddha) who claimed to be concerned with protecting religious freedom. Academic experts in the fields of politics, philosophy, sociology, education, psychology, science, law, and medicine contributed "opinions."¹⁶⁷⁰

Another article on the front page has the headline, 'Sect Vows to Stop Evil Tide Sweeping Mankind to Catastrophe,' and says that it is, 'one of numerous cults and folk religions that are filling a spiritual void' in China. This language and its referents has, however, become the stock in trade of the Chinese Government in its attacks on Falun Gong. For them Falun Gong is an 'evil cult', or in slightly more poetic terms in the title of a free CD Chinese embassies distribute, a 'cult of evil'. The Chinese authorities have also taken to describing Falun Gong as a 'heresy.' The original Chinese term translates more accurately, if more clumsily, as 'heterodox teaching'.¹⁶⁷¹

On 22 July 1999, the Ministry of Civil Affairs banned Falun Gong, declaring it an illegal organisation. There followed a widespread crackdown. On the propaganda front, the authorities went all out with editorials in the *People's Daily* and all other major newspapers, feature articles, television specials, information on websites, and so on, as well as denunciatory articles in the much smaller circulation but, in this case crucial, *qigong* press. Many ordinary practitioners protesting the crackdown are reported to have been detained by the police but most were released after a few days. At the time, police arrested 70–100 alleged leaders of the movement and hundreds of teachers at lower levels. For the party members who were involved, there were self-criticism sessions and demands that they denounce the teachings and the teacher. Television featured film footage of heavy equipment destroying videos and tapes. All the books disappeared from sale.¹⁶⁷²

The following activities were explicitly banned: hanging up or posting banners, images, symbols, and logos; distributing books, audio-video products, and other propaganda; gathering a crowd to conduct activities; holding meetings, parades, and demonstrations in the form of sit-ins or visiting superior authorities; disturbing the social order by means

¹⁶⁶⁹ <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0129298042000329775>

¹⁶⁷⁰ <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/china/China0102-02.htm>

¹⁶⁷¹ <https://www.nla.gov.au/benjamin-perry/the-past-present-and-future-of-falun-gong>

¹⁶⁷² <https://www.nla.gov.au/benjamin-perry/the-past-present-and-future-of-falun-gong>

of fabricating or distorting the facts and deliberately spreading rumours or using any other means to instigate, organise, link up, or direct activities opposing decisions of the government. The propaganda effort focussed on five main topics concerning Li Hongzhi. First, Li is alleged to have falsified his own background claiming a strange and wonderful spiritual life. Secondly, it is alleged that he propagated 'heretical ideas and fallacies on every possible occasion'. Thirdly, that in advocating 'heretical ideas' he sought to 'control the minds of the practitioners of 'Falun Gong'. Fourthly, that his activities 'infringed on other people's rights and seriously disrupted the social order'. Finally, that Li used Falun Gong to 'amass dirty money', and committed 'economic crimes of tax evasion and money laundering'. The main evidence produced for the public to criticise Falun Gong centred on the dual claims that Falun Gong induced some of its followers into self-destructive behaviours and that in general, they were forbidden to visit doctors and seek orthodox medical treatment.

The most important part of the media campaign may have been the "investigatory" reports into Falungong's accounts of its activities and motives which purported to show duplicity and subversive intent on the part of Falungong leaders. These accounts provided a justification for a legal assault on the organization and its individual practitioners. One such report purported to prove that Li Hongzhi and his lieutenants (who later received lengthy prison terms) meticulously orchestrated the April 25 protest for political gain. In so doing, the report argued, they posed a critical and unlawful threat to social order. Another account similarly analysed what it claimed was the political intent and social order danger behind other Falungong demonstrations. Still another gave "evidence" of a tightly knit hierarchical organization unregistered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs and, therefore, operating illegally.¹⁶⁷³

The leadership's frustration with the failure of its efforts to quickly and thoroughly dismantle Falungong was also evident in its media campaign. A long Xinhua commentary in October 2000 restated allegations of the cult's danger, detailing how totally corrupt it was, how little support it had among the masses, and how it "openly opposes the party and government and has transformed completely from head to tail into a reactionary political organization with the aim of overthrowing the People's Republic of China and the socialist system." By January 2001, the government had to admit that, contrary to earlier statements, the war had not yet been won, and the "broad masses" had to be made to understand the "duration, complexity and ferocity of our battle with Falun Gong." In an effort to showcase Falungong's tenacity and deviousness, China Central Television, for the first time, aired footage of protests and of followers claiming divinity.¹⁶⁷⁴ The official reaction to the demonstration could not, at this stage, have been more different from the reaction to the democracy protesters of ten years before. The official Chinese news agency declared that the government had never banned 'any health fitness activities'. It described the protest not as a 'demonstration' but as a 'gathering'. But it also warned, ominously as it turned out, that 'those who jeopardise social stability under the pretext of practising any *gong* shall be dealt with according to law'.¹⁶⁷⁵

Xinhua News Agency or **New China News Agency**, the official state-run press agency of the People's Republic of China. Xinhua is the biggest and most influential media

¹⁶⁷³ <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/china/China0102-02.htm>

¹⁶⁷⁴ <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/china/China0102-02.htm>

¹⁶⁷⁵ <https://www.nla.gov.au/benjamin-perry/the-past-present-and-future-of-falun-gong>

organization in China, as well as the largest news agency in the world in terms of correspondents worldwide. Xinhua is a ministry-level institution subordinate to the State Council and its president is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. It has a campaign aimed at defacing the Falun Gong (and the reports can be accessed here: <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/ztbd/jpflg/index.htm>). The Mission of PRC to European Union has a whole list of reports available on their website too. (accessible here: <http://www.chinamission.be/eng/more/flgwt/>).

9.4.3 Xinjiang

In a white paper titled “Freedom of Religious Belief in Xinjiang”, PRC maintains that in Xinjiang the Religious and cultural heritages are effectively protected. A total of 109 religious and cultural sites in Xinjiang, including Id Kah Mosque in Kashgar, Shengyou Lamasery in Zhaosu and the Kizil Grottoes, have been designated as cultural relics sites under the protection of the autonomous region and the state. Among the 109 sites, 46 are key cultural relics sites under the protection of the state, and 63 are under the protection of the autonomous region. The central government has allocated special funds to renovate cultural relic protection sites at the state and autonomous-region levels, including the Id Kah Mosque in Kashgar, Baytulla Mosque in Yining, Jiaman Mosque in Hotan, Yanghang Mosque in Urumqi and the Tomb of the Fragrant Imperial Concubine (Apak Hoja Mazzar) in Kashgar. The Xinjiang government has funded the renovation and repair of 28 temples, including Sulayman' s Minaret in Turpan and Shengyou Lamasery in Zhaosu. Many ancient religious books, including the Biography of the Prophet (Qissasul anbiya), Volume II of the Golden Light Sutra (Suvar aprabhasa Sutra), and Maitrisimit Nom Bitig, have been included in the Catalog of National Rare Books of China. Special funds have been allocated to protect and edit some books, such as the Koran and The Prophet Muhammad: A Biography, which have been passed down from history. Intangible cultural heritage items relating to religion are also under effective protection and inheritance.¹⁶⁷⁶

i) Religious personages' right to participate in the deliberation and administration of state affairs is protected. People's congresses and committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) at all levels supervise and inspect the implementation of the policy of religious freedom and the enforcement of pertinent laws and regulations. Among people's congresses and the CPPCC committees at all levels, 1,436 religious believers from Xinjiang serve as deputies and members to fulfill the right to participate in the deliberation and administration of state affairs through the two organs, raising views and recommendations or submitting proposals and motions on government work, especially religious work.¹⁶⁷⁷

ii) Regulate activities of administrative departments. In Xinjiang, religious affairs departments at the county level or above manage the religious affairs of their respective administrative regions in accordance with the law, and other administrative departments are in charge of administrative work related to religious affairs within their

¹⁶⁷⁶ Excerpts from a white paper titled “Freedom of Religion in Xinjiang” published by Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on June 2, 2016, available online at URL: http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7238246.htm

¹⁶⁷⁷ Ibid.

respective statutory duties. Relevant departments of the state and local government in Xinjiang provide training sessions for functionaries of religious affairs departments to improve their capabilities in administrating religious affairs. Those who have violated the legitimate rights and interests of religious organizations, venues for religious activities or clerical personnel or believers will bear due legal responsibilities, and those who have committed crimes will be held criminally responsible. Standing committees of the people's congresses at all levels supervise the administration of religious affairs in accordance with the law.

iii) Punish illegal behaviour in the guise of religion. The Chinese government prohibits any organization or individual from splitting the country, disseminating extremist religious thoughts, inciting ethnic hatred, undermining national unity, disturbing the social order, or impairing citizens' physical and mental health in the name of religion. The government prohibits any act that impedes the implementation of the systems of state administration, justice, education, culture, marriage, family planning or inheritance in the name of religion. It also prohibits behavior that violates national security and interests, public interests, and citizens' legitimate rights and interests in the name of religion. Judicial organs at all levels in Xinjiang combat criminal activities in the name of religion to better ensure the citizens' freedom of religious belief and normal religious activities. No Xinjiang citizen has been punished because of his or her rightful religious belief.¹⁶⁷⁸

iv) Attach equal importance to management and services. Relevant functional departments at governments at all levels in Xinjiang actively help religious circles solve practical difficulties and provide them with services. They help religious organizations and schools improve work and school conditions, eliminate all security risks of venues for religious activities, include clerical personnel in the social security system, and provide living allowances for disadvantaged clerical personnel on a regular basis.

v) Uphold principles of independence and self-management of China's religious undertakings. China's religious undertakings are run by religious groups, personnel or citizens, and its religious affairs or organizations are not subject to any foreign domination. Foreigners must abide by Chinese laws and regulations when participating in religious activities within Chinese territory and must not interfere in China's religious affairs. As a provincial-level administrative region of China, Xinjiang sticks to the principle of independence and self-management in terms of its religious affairs. Religious extremists, in the name of religion, spread radical and extremist views, and take extremist means to try to establish a theocracy. Religious extremism is not religion, but tries to make use of religion. It is by nature anti-human, anti-society, anti-civilization and anti-religion, and is an important ideological foundation for violent and terrorist activities.¹⁶⁷⁹

vi) Religious extremism is the common enemy of all humanity. It is the undeniable obligation of all countries and all peoples, including religious believers, to fight against religious extremism. Xinjiang has adopted a policy of "de-extremization" to prevent and

¹⁶⁷⁸Excerpts from a white paper titled "Freedom of Religion in Xinjiang" published by Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on June 2, 2016, available online at URL: http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7238246.htm

¹⁶⁷⁹ Ibid.

combat religious extremism, which is a just act to safeguard the fundamental interests of the country and the people, as well as an important part of the battle of the world community against religious extremism

vii) Crack down on terrorism and extremism in accordance with the law. Xinjiang cracks down on the propaganda of terrorism and extremism and the incitement of terrorist and extremist activities in accordance with relevant laws and regulations, such as the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China and the Counterterrorism Law of the People's Republic of China.

viii) Strengthen international cooperation. Xinjiang conducts activities for better understanding and promotion of the traditional friendship between China and other countries, promotes cooperation with related countries, and fights East Turkistan terrorist forces. It learns from the world community's experience in the prevention of the proliferation of religious extremism, "de-extremization" and the combat against cyber terrorism. It also actively participates in multilateral anti-terrorist cooperative mechanisms, conducts dialogues between different cultures and restricts the scope of religious extremism. The "de-extremization" adopted by Xinjiang has effectively contained the spread of religious extremism, and made a great contribution to international "de-extremization," prevention of and combat against terrorism, and world peace and development.¹⁶⁸⁰

China, based on its national conditions, sticks to the principle of independence and self-management of religious undertakings, and will never allow any foreign organization or individual to interfere with China's religious affairs. China is a socialist country in which the religions of Xinjiang exist and are active. That religions must be adapted to the socialist society is not only the requirement of China's national conditions but the intrinsic requirement of religions for their own existence and development. Today, the freedom of religious belief in Xinjiang cannot be matched by that in any other historical period, and is undeniable to anyone who respects the facts. The Chinese government resolutely opposes the politicization of religious matters and any other country's interference in China's internal affairs in the name of religion. China is now at a decisive stage of comprehensively building a moderately prosperous society in all respects. As the core region of the Silk Road Economic Belt, Xinjiang will continue its international cooperation and exchanges on the basis of equality, friendship and mutual respect, promote dialogue and exchanges among different religions and civilizations, enhance mutual trust and understanding, and make remarkable contributions to world peace and development as well as to human civilization and progress as a whole.¹⁶⁸¹

¹⁶⁸⁰ Excerpts from a white paper titled "Freedom of Religion in Xinjiang" published by Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on June 2, 2016, available online at URL:

http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7238246.htm

¹⁶⁸¹ Ibid.

9.4.3.1 Repression of Religion in Xinjiang

The report titled "Official Repression of Religion Continues in Xinjiang", published by the US Congressional Executive Commission on China states the following:¹⁶⁸²

Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) continue to target "illegal religious activities" and "religious extremism" as threats to the region's stability, maintaining curbs over religious activities undertaken outside of government-approved parameters and singling out Islamic practices in a number of cases. At a December 2010 XUAR Communist Party Committee Standing Committee meeting, attendees called for "resolutely preventing illegal religious activities and striking against religious extremist forces in accordance with law" as part of the region's work to maintain stability, according to a Xinjiang Daily report (via Xinhua, December 8, 2010). Following the meeting, the Party issued opinions on demarcating and preventing "illegal" religious activities in early 2011, which multiple localities reported implementing, according to descriptions of the opinions. (Full text not available. See references in, e.g., an April 24, 2011, report from Buddhism Online and an April 6 report on the Aksu District Government Web site.) Recent reports from XUAR media and government sources detail a range of ongoing efforts to curb religious practices, including broad campaigns against "illegal" religious activities, continuing campaigns against head scarves, measures to monitor Friday sermons at mosques, and reported imprisonment of a religious leader who refused to abide by government demands regarding a local mosque.

i) Campaign Against "Illegal Religious Activities" in Aksu Township

A township in Xinhe (Toqsu) county, Aksu district, detailed plans for a campaign against "illegal" religious activities stretching from November 2010 to March 2011, according to a report about the campaign posted November 27, 2010, on the Xinhe County Government Web site. The plan said the campaign was aimed at such issues as "using 'propagation of religion' to attack the Party and government," the "dual character" of a "small number of religious personnel" (an apparent reference to state-sanctioned religious leaders who do not abide by government-set parameters for religious practice), and the "problem" and phenomenon of having a "pronounced religious atmosphere" and wearing such things as "bizarre" clothes, veils, and beards. Stages of the campaign included: (1) "education activities" for religious leaders and believers, including "criticism" and "self-criticism"; (2) investigation activities to "ferret out," "fathom," and register students in underground religious classes as well as previously sanctioned religious personnel, and religious believers who have religious knowledge but are "unstable" in their ideology; (3) encouraging the reporting of "illegal" religious activities; and (4) "rectifying" problem areas, including by "severely punishing" people in underground religious classes or who are linked to the classes, in accordance with penalties in local village codes of conduct; using "education" and "transformation" activities for groups such as veiled women, men with large beards, and people with

¹⁶⁸² The report titled "Official Repression of Religion Continues in Xinjiang", published by the US Congressional Executive Commission on China, published in July, 2011, available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/official-repression-of-religion-continues-in-xinjiang>

religious knowledge but who are "unstable" in their ideology; and inspecting cultural markets for "illegal" religious publications.¹⁶⁸³

ii) Campaigns Against Veiling and Beards

In addition to the township in Aksu that included veiled women and men with beards in its campaign against "illegal" religious activities, other localities in the XUAR also have carried out campaigns targeting Muslim men with beards and women who wear veils or clothing deemed to carry religious connotations. Under the direction of the Party-controlled XUAR Women's Federation, multiple localities reported continuing a campaign aimed at dissuading women from veiling their hair and faces. As noted in a previous CECC [analysis](#), the federation reported in January 2010 that it had launched the campaign to enable ethnic minority women to "discern what is traditional ethnic dress" and to address why women should "take the initiative to not wear a veil." The Women's Federation in Hoten district reported in January 2011 that it would continue the campaign, "completing education and guidance work" to encourage women to remove their veils while "leading them to uphold a scientific, civilized, and healthy way of life and encouraging them to vigorously participate in productive labour for society," according to a January 27, 2011, report (cached) on the Hoten District People's Government Web site. In Luntai (Bugur) county, Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, the local women's federation described continuing the campaign in order to "let even more ethnic minority women realize their own value in participating in society," according to a September 7, 2010, report on the Luntai County Government Web site. As reported by the Commission in previous analyses, in recent years authorities also have described steps to monitor Muslim men with beards or restrict them from having beards, tying the practice to "religious extremism" and "backwardness." Authorities have detailed steps such as having government departments carry out "beard-shavings" directed at young men and using punitive measures including "severe punishment in accordance with law" (*yifa yancheng*) to deal with men with large beards, as well as women with veils. More recently, management rules in force for the "information corps" in a residential district in Usu city, Tacheng (Tarbaghatay) district, included the presence of "people from outside [the district] wearing abnormal large beards or veiling their faces," along with "residents holding extremist religious thoughts" as scenarios requiring immediate reporting, according to a September 18, 2010, report on the Hongqiao Residential District Office Web site. In Kucha county, Aqsu district, authorities identified people with beards or who wear "bizarre" clothes as "key people" for focusing education work to "transform" their ideology, according to a December 6, 2010, speech from the county's education bureau Party Committee Secretary.¹⁶⁸⁴

iii) Monitoring Sermons

In January 2011, a township in the Qapqal Xibe Autonomous County, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, described implementing a system for government religious

¹⁶⁸³ The report titled "Official Repression of Religion Continues in Xinjiang", published by the US Congressional Executive Commission on China, published in July, 2011, available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/official-repression-of-religion-continues-in-xinjiang>

¹⁶⁸⁴ The report titled "Official Repression of Religion Continues in Xinjiang", published by the US Congressional Executive Commission on China, published in July, 2011, available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/official-repression-of-religion-continues-in-xinjiang>

affairs employees to set the schedule for Friday sermons at the township's mosques and for using "religious information gatherers" of "high political consciousness" to provide information on the sermon delivery and the "ideological trends" of mosque attendees, according to a January 7, 2011, report on the Qapqal Xibe Autonomous County Government Web site. In recent years, authorities elsewhere in the XUAR also have reported on systems of monitoring mosques and sermons.¹⁶⁸⁵

iv) Continued Oversight of Women Religious Specialists

Authorities also have continued to increase oversight of Muslim women religious specialists known as *büwi*. In February 2011, the women's federation in Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture issued directions to "increase the degree of attention" to *büwi*. The following month the federation called for successfully "educating and guiding" *büwi* and making progress in a system of fixed contact between Party members and the women, according to articles posted March 15 and March 30 on the prefecture's women's federation Web site. The township in Xinhe county, Aksu, discussed above, also included *büwi* among groups to receive "education" and "transformation."¹⁶⁸⁶

v) Prison Sentences and Detentions in Shihezi

Authorities in Shihezi municipality detained father and son Muslim religious leaders Qahar Mensur and Muhemmed Tursun on October 1, 2010, on suspicion of "distributing illegal religious works," according to an April 11, 2011, Radio Free Asia report. On April 12, 2011, the Shihezi Intermediate People's Court reportedly sentenced them to 3 years' imprisonment in connection with storing and distributing "illegal religious publications." The publication in question reportedly was an annotated edition of the Quran by 14th-century scholar Ibn Kesir that had official government approval. Sources cited in the RFA article said that authorities were punishing the father and son because Qahar Mensur had refused to comply with government demands, such as bringing government documents into mosques, while he served as muezzin for a mosque.¹⁶⁸⁷

The US department of State's report titled, "2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: China: Xinjiang", portrays the following about the situation of Uighur's in Xinjiang:¹⁶⁸⁸

¹⁶⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸⁶ The report titled "Official Repression of Religion Continues in Xinjiang", published by the US Congressional Executive Commission on China, published in July, 2011, available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/official-repression-of-religion-continues-in-xinjiang>

¹⁶⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸⁸ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/xinjiang/>

Section I. Religious Demography¹⁶⁸⁹

A 2015 report on Xinjiang issued by the State Council Information Office (SCIO) states Uighur, Kazakh, Hui, Kyrgyz, and members of other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities constitute approximately 14.2 million residents in Xinjiang, or 61 percent of the total Xinjiang population. Uighur Muslims live primarily in Xinjiang.

Population of Muslim Minorities in China and Xinjiang¹⁷

Minority Ethnonym	Location	Language Family	Total 2000 Census Population	Total in Xinjiang
Hui	All China, esp. Ningxia, Gansu, Henan, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Yunnan, Hebei, Shandong*	Sino-Tibetan	9,202,978	844,211
Uyghur	Xinjiang	Altaic (Turkic)	8,414,431	8,605,575
Kazak	Xinjiang, Gansu, Qinghai	Altaic (Turkic)	1,321,718	1,319,219
Dongxiang	Gansu, Qinghai	Altaic (Turkic)	395,872	--
Kyrgyz	Xinjiang, Heilongjiang	Altaic (Turkic)	171,549	170,133
Salar	Qinghai, Gansu	Altaic (Turkic)	90,697	--
Tajik	Xinjiang	Indo-European	41,538	41,155
Uzbek	Xinjiang	Altaic (Turkic)	14,702	13,730
Baonan	Gansu	Altaic (Mongolian)	13,216	--
Tatar	Xinjiang	Altaic (Turkic)	4,977	4,728

*Listed in order of size

Source: https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/SUBCOM/other/E-CN_4-SUB_2-AC_5-2003-WG_16.pdf

Muslim and Han Population Growth in Xinjiang, 1940 - 1990¹⁹

Ethnic group				% population increase	% population increase
	1940 - 1941	1982	1990	1940-1982	1982-1990
Uyghur	2,941,000	5,950,000	7,194,675	102.31	20.92
Kazak	319,000	904,000	1,106,000	183.38	22.35
Hui	92,000	571,000	681,527	520.65	19.36
Kyrgyz	65,000	113,000	139,781	73.85	23.70
Tajik	9,000	26,000	33,512	188.89	28.89
Uzbek	5,000	12,000	14,456	140.00	20.47
Tatar	6,900	4,100	4,821	-40.58	17.58
Han	202,000	5,287,000	5,695,626	2,517.33	7.73
Total Population	4,874,000	13,082,000	15,155,778	168.40	15.85

Note: Military figures are not given, estimated at 275,000 and 500,000 military construction corps in 1985. Minority population growth rates during the 1980s are particularly high in part due to reclassification and re-registration of ethnic groups.

Source: https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/SUBCOM/other/E-CN_4-SUB_2-AC_5-2003-WG_16.pdf

¹⁶⁸⁹ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/xinjiang/>

Note: For further details on the events transpired information on Xinjiang kindly access the "Annual Report 2019" of Congressional Executive Commission of China, available at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2019-annual-report>

Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom.

The constitution of the People's Republic of China states citizens enjoy "freedom of religious belief," but limits protections for religious practice to "normal religious activities" without defining "normal." The constitution also stipulates the right of citizens to believe in or not believe in any religion. Only religious groups belonging to one of five state-sanctioned "patriotic religious associations" (Buddhist, Taoist, Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant), however, are permitted to register with the government and legally hold worship services or other religious ceremonies and activities.

Xinjiang has its own counterterrorism law containing similar provisions regarding "religious extremism" as the national law. The law bans the wearing of long beards, full-face coverings, expanding halal practice beyond food, and "interfering" with family planning, weddings, funerals, or inheritance, among other provisions. In November SCIO published a report on cultural protection and development in Xinjiang that said the government promotes the use of standard Chinese language by law, issues religious texts published and distributed according to the law, and provides "important legal protection for the diverse cultural heritage of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang." In October the Xinjiang regional government issued implementing regulations for the counterterrorism law to permit the establishment of "vocational skill education training centres" (which the government also calls "education centres" and "education and transformation establishments") to "carry out anti-extremist ideological education." The revised regulations stipulate, "Institutions such as vocational skill education training centres should carry out training sessions on the common national language, laws and regulations, and vocational skills, and carry out anti-extremist ideological education, and psychological and behavioural correction to promote thought transformation of trainees, and help them return to the society and family. "On October 9, The Standing Committee of the 13th People's Congress of Xinjiang announced that the regional government maintains the right to uphold the basic principles of the party's religious work, adhere to the rule of law, and actively guide religion to adapt to the socialist society. It states, "The judicial administrative department shall organize, guide, and coordinate the propaganda work of relevant laws and regulations, strengthen prison management, prevent the spread of extremism in prisons, and do relevant remoulding, education, and transformation."

Regulations in Urumqi, Xinjiang, prohibit veils that cover the face, home-schooling children, and "abnormal beards." A separate regulation approved by the Xinjiang People's Congress Standing Committee in 2016 bans the practice of religion in government buildings and the wearing of clothes associated with "religious extremism." Authorities in Xinjiang have defined 26 religious activities, including some practices of Islam, Christianity, and Tibetan Buddhism, as illegal without government authorization. These regulations stipulate that no classes, scripture study groups, or religious studies courses may be offered by any group or institution without prior government approval. No religious group is permitted to carry out any religious activities, including preaching, missionary work, proselytizing, and ordaining clergy, without government approval. It also bans editing, translation, publication, printing, reproduction, production, distribution, sale, and dissemination of religious publications and audio-visual products without authorization. Xinjiang officials require minors to complete nine years of compulsory education before they may receive religious education outside of school. Xinjiang regulations also forbid minors from participating in religious activities and impose penalties on organizations and individuals who "organize, entice, or force" minors to participate in religious activities. According to press reports, a regulation in effect since 2016

further bans any form of religious activity in Xinjiang schools and stipulates parents or guardians who “organize, lure, or force minors into religious activities” may be stopped by anyone and reported to police. Xinjiang’s regional version of the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency Law states children affected by ethnic separatism, extremism and terrorism, and/or committing offenses that seriously endanger the society but do not constitute a criminal punishment may be sent to “specialized schools for correction” at the request of their parents, guardians or school. Xinjiang authorities continued to ban giving children any name with an Islamic connotation.¹⁶⁹⁰

Government Practices

According to media and NGO reports, since April 2017 the government in Xinjiang continued to cite concerns over the “three evils” of “ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism” as reasons to have detained an estimated 800,000 to two million Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and members of other majority Muslim groups, mostly Chinese citizens, in prison-like conditions. According to a July China Aid article, Christians were also detained in the same facilities. There were reports of deaths in detention and disappearances. The government targeted individuals for detention based primarily on their ethnic and religious identities, and detainees were reportedly subjected to forms of torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment, including sexual abuse. Police raids and the government’s restrictions on Islamic practices as part of “strike hard” campaigns, which began in 2014, continued throughout the year. Local observers said, however, many incidents related to abuses or pressure on Uighurs went unreported to international media or NGOs.¹⁶⁹¹

According to Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP), two Uighur religious scholars, Muhammad Salih Hajim and Abdulnehed Mehsum, died in detention camps. Authorities detained Hajim in late 2017, along with several members of his family, and in January UHRP learned of his death. UHRP reported that Mehsum died while in detention in Hotan in November 2017, but his death was not made public until May. In August *The Guardian* reported local sources told a reporter that a Uighur named Karim had been jailed and “died after prolonged heavy labour.” He had lived in Muslim-majority countries and owned a Uighur restaurant in a major Chinese city. On November 28, 2017, Mihrigul Tursun, said that while in detention, she saw nine women of the 68 who shared a cell with her die over the course of 3 months. There were also reports of suicides. A Uighur advocacy group reported that more than 10 Uighur women committed suicide during the year in direct response to pressure or abuses by authorities. Reportedly, officials came to their homes and said either the women had to marry a Han Chinese man or the officials would take their parents into detention. To prevent this, the women committed suicide. *The New York Times*, Radio Free Asia, and UHRP reported on the disappearance of several Uighur academics and university administrators during the year. A report released by UHRP in October 2017, identified 231 Uighur intellectuals authorities had caused to disappear, removed from their post, imprisoned, or sent to detention facilities. In October UHRP said Uighur literature professors Abdukerim Rahman, Azat Sultan, and Gheyretjan Osman, language professor Arslan Abdulla, and poet Abdulqadir Jalaleddin had disappeared and

¹⁶⁹⁰ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/xinjiang/>

¹⁶⁹¹ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/xinjiang/>

were believed to be held in detention facilities. Radio Free Asia reported in September that two Kashgar University administrators (Erkin Omer, Muhter Abdughopur) and two professors (Qurban Osman and Gulnar Obul) had been removed from their positions and their whereabouts were unknown. International media reported former president of Xinjiang University Tashpolat Tiyp and former president of Xinjiang Medical University Hospital Halmurat Ghopur separately received two-year suspended death sentences. In August *The New York Times* reported Uighur academic Rahile Dawut, from Xinjiang, who had lectured and written extensively on Uighur culture, disappeared sometime after telling a relative of her intent to travel to Beijing from Urumqi in late 2017. Her family and friends said she was secretly detained as part of the government's crackdown on Uighurs. In March Toronto's *The Globe and Mail* interviewed Nurgul Sawut, a clinical social worker in Canberra who said at least 12 of her family members disappeared in Xinjiang since the beginning of the year. Sawut also stated 54 relatives and close friends in Xinjiang of one couple in Australia had disappeared and were presumably in detention facilities. The article said more than 30 members of the family of Rebiya Kadeer, an activist and former president of the World Uyghur Congress, vanished or were being detained. Gulchehra Hoja, a broadcaster with the Uighur service of Radio Free Asia, stated that more than 20 of her relatives were missing and the government was responsible. The article also reported that Adalet Rahim of Mississauga, Ontario, Canada, said a brother and six cousins were in forced indoctrination programs. Her father, Abdulaziz Sattar, said some 50 of his relatives, among them bureaucrats, teachers, and a medical doctor, had been incarcerated in Xinjiang. Associated Press reported the continued disappearance of 16-year-old Uighur Pakzat Qurban, who arrived at the Urumqi airport from Istanbul on his way to visit his grandmother in 2016.

There were numerous reports of authorities subjecting detained individuals to torture and other physical abuse. In October ChinaAid reported first-hand accounts of a three-part system to which Uighurs were subjected in several detention facilities. According to local residents, each camp consists of areas A, B, and C. Guards first placed "newcomers and Muslims" in C, the worst area, where guards deprived them of food or water for 24 hours. Guards shackled their hands and feet, beat them, and screamed insults at them until they repeatedly thanked the CCP and President Xi Jinping. Then the guards transferred them to area B, where they ate poor quality food and were permitted to use the bathroom. They went outside for 15 minutes every day to sing the national anthem. Guards then moved those considered successfully re-educated in Communist Party beliefs to area A, where the conditions were better.¹⁶⁹²

The September, 2018 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report titled *Eradicating Ideological Viruses* contained an account from a detention centre in Xinjiang where detainees described interrogations and torture, including beatings, staff hanging detainees from ceilings and walls, and prolonged shackling. Detainees also reported being kept in spaces so overcrowded there was no room for all to sleep. One detainee said fellow detainees feared torture when being removed from their cells for interrogations, and one showed him scars after guards hanged the detainee from the ceiling. After being left hanging for a night, he said he would agree to anything. One individual said guards chained him to a bed so at most he could only sit and stand in one place. Guards told him that they would treat detainees the same way that they treat murderers. They also said there was a Xinjiang-wide order that all

¹⁶⁹² <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/xinjiang/>

Uighurs and ethnic Kazakhs would have their feet shackled and their hands chained together with just five to six “rings” apart, making movement very difficult.

In May, 2017 ChinaAid reported an 87-year-old ethnic Kazakh man said he was tortured in a Uighur detention facility in Xinjiang. He said authorities blasted noise from a high-pitched speaker, causing many inmates to slip into comas. He also said authorities forced Muslims to drink poor quality alcohol and eat pork, practices against their religious beliefs. Another ethnic Kazakh with knowledge of the situation said prison officials forced detainees to wear a special helmet that played noise for 21 hours per day, causing many to suffer mental breakdowns. In September *The Guardian* reported that Kairat Samarkand, an ethnic Kazakh Muslim who had been detained outside Karamagay for nearly four months, said he was forced to wear an outfit of “iron clothes” that consisted of claws and rods that left him immobile with his hands and legs outstretched. He said guards forced him to wear it for 12 hours one day after he refused to make his bed. According to Samarkand, guards told him that there is no religion, and that the government and the party would take care of him. Samarkand told *The Washington Post* that guards in detention facilities would handcuff and ankle cuff detainees who disobeyed rules for up to 12 hours, and would subject detainees to waterboarding. In July ChinaAid reported guards forced a woman in a detention facility to take unknown medication and her hair fell out. The woman said prison authorities handcuffed detainees and made them wear 44 pounds of armour for three-12 hours per day. Guards also shaved off Uighur women’s hair, which some of the women considered sacred. Helatti Shamarkhan, a former inmate, said he saw detainees being forcibly vaccinated and medicated.¹⁶⁹³

In September HRW reported that a former detainee said authorities put him in a small solitary confinement cell measuring approximately 2 by 2 meters (43 square feet). They did not give the detainee any food or drink, handcuffed him in the back, and forced him to stand for 24 hours without sleep. NGOs and international media reported arrests and detentions of Muslims in Xinjiang for “untrustworthy behaviour” such as attending religious education courses, possessing books about religion and Uighur culture, wearing clothing with Islamic symbols, and traveling to certain counties. There were also reports of authorities holding children in orphanages after their parents were taken to internment camps.¹⁶⁹⁴

The Economist reported authorities in Xinjiang used detailed information to rank citizens’ “trustworthiness” using various criteria. Officials deemed people as trustworthy, average, or untrustworthy depending on how they fit into the following categories: were 15 to 55 years old (i.e., of military age); were Uighur; were unemployed; had religious knowledge; prayed five times a day; had a passport; had visited one of 26 countries; had ever overstayed a visa; had family members in a foreign country (there are at least 10,000 Uighurs in Turkey); and home schooled their children. *The Economist* said “...the catalogue is explicitly racist: people are suspected merely on account of their ethnicity.” Being labelled “untrustworthy” could lead to being detained by authorities. HRW reported the 26 “sensitive countries” were Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

¹⁶⁹³ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/xinjiang/>

¹⁶⁹⁴ Ibid.

International media reported the government issued guidelines warning officials to look out for 75 “signs” or behaviours that signified religious extremism. These guidelines included growing a beard, praying in public outside of mosques, and abstaining from smoking or drinking alcohol. Radio Free Asia reported in November that government authorities in Hotan, Xinjiang, were using an expanded set of guidelines that included additional behaviours, such as how people stood during prayer and dying hair red with henna. According to another source, authorities considered red hair a sign of affiliation with extremist religious groups because some individuals say the Prophet Mohammad had red hair. Radio Free Asia reported that officials threatened individuals who did not comply with the list of proscribed behaviours with detention. Authorities also pressured students to report information on their family’s religious practices to their teachers, who would then pass the information to security officials.

In July the NGO China Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) published a report saying that, based on Chinese government data, criminal arrests in Xinjiang accounted for 21 percent of all arrests in China in 2017, while the population of Xinjiang comprised less than 2 percent of China’s overall population. CHRD reported the ratio of arrests in Xinjiang increased by more than 300 percent during the 2013-2017 period compared with 5 percent in preceding years. CHRD reported that, although the government does not provide an ethnic breakdown of the arrests, “...criminal punishment would disproportionately target the Uyghur Muslim group based on their percentage of the population.”¹⁶⁹⁵

On July 25, 2018 CHRD reported officials in a Xinjiang village detained the local imam and forced him to provide his students’ names. Soon thereafter, authorities detained a carpenter in the village because he had attended Quranic studies classes 10 years previously. On September 8, 2018, the *New York Times* reported that Abdusalam Muhemet said police in Xinjiang detained him for reciting a verse of the Quran at a funeral. Xinjiang residents said authorities detained people for visiting relatives abroad, possessing books about religion and Uighur culture, and even for wearing a T-shirt with a Muslim crescent. The article said the goal of these actions was to remove any devotion to Islam. HRW reported a witness said he knew “three restaurant owners ... [who] ran ‘Islamic’ restaurants – they got detained because they don’t allow smoking or drinking in their restaurants.... [The authorities] are banning everything Islamic.” A former detainee stated that authorities in the detention centres did not allow people to say “*as-salaam alaikum*,” a religious greeting, but instead forced them to speak Mandarin only. The detainee also stated that if he used Turkic language words, officials would punish him. In September *The Associated Press* reported Gulzar Seley and her infant son, Uighurs who lived in Istanbul and returned to Xinjiang to visit family, were imprisoned. According to Seley’s husband, who remained behind in Istanbul, authorities detained Seley shortly after she arrived at the airport in Urumqi and took her to her hometown, Karamay. Upon being released for a short period, she called her husband in Istanbul to tell him she and her son would not be coming back because she did not have time. She then disappeared, but her husband said he later learned she and their son were in jail. According to *The Guardian*, in June police in Urumqi sentenced Guli, an ethnic Kazakh woman from Kazakhstan, to 15 days detention for not having her identification with her. Local authorities had previously interrogated her, citing reports that she wore a hijab and prayed. Guli described her detention facility as a long, single-story building that held

¹⁶⁹⁵ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/xinjiang/>

approximately 230 women. She said inside the detention centre, guards forced women to sing patriotic songs for two hours on most days, memorize a 10-point disciplinary code, and undergo self-criticism sessions. One woman told Guli she was there because police had found a “happy Eid” message on her phone. Authorities released Guli after eight days and sent her back to Kazakhstan. Under a policy launched in 2017, authorities in Xinjiang built “welfare centres” aimed at providing orphans with state-sponsored care until they turn 18. According to a July *Financial Times* report, a former teacher in detention facilities said detainees’ children were sent to “welfare centres” as they were forbidden to attend school with “normal” children because their parents had political problems. The same article said public tenders issued by local governments since 2017 indicated “dozens” of orphanages were being built. One county in Kashgar built 18 new orphanages in 2017 alone, according to local media.¹⁶⁹⁶

Radio Free Asia reported in July and September that authorities placed children whose parents were in detention facilities in “Little Angel Schools.” The reports described the schools as surrounded by walls topped with barbed wire. Reports on the ages of children held varied, and some said children from six months to 14 years were being held, and were not allowed to go out due to security concerns. Reportedly, one worker at a regional orphanage in southern Xinjiang told Radio Free Asia his facility was seriously overcrowded with children “locked up like farm animals in a shed.” He said, with the overcrowding, authorities “are moving children to mainland China,” although he was unsure of where they were being sent. He added that “it isn’t possible” for parents released from detention to look for their children in orphanages. The CCP Secretary for Hotan Prefecture’s Keriye County said approximately 2,500 children were being held in two newly constructed buildings. International media and NGOs reported the government restricted individuals’ ability to engage in religious practices and forced Muslims in Xinjiang to perform activities inconsistent with their religious beliefs. *The New York Times* reported in September that officials in Hotan set very narrow limits on the practice of Islam, including a prohibition on praying at home if there were friends or guests present. Residents said police sometimes searched homes for forbidden books and items such as prayer mats, using special equipment to check walls and floors for hidden caches. ChinaAid reported that on February 17, authorities in Yili, Xinjiang, ordered Uighurs and ethnic Kazakhs to destroy the Islamic star and crescent symbol on all gravesites. Otherwise, authorities would forcibly demolish the graves. *Bitter Winter*, an online magazine on religious liberty and human rights in China, reported government officials monitored funeral services in Xinjiang and prohibited Muslims from commemorating their dead according to their faith traditions. In February armed police officers detain Ezimet, a Uighur CCP member from Kashgar City, for performing an Islamic funeral prayer at his mother’s burial ceremony several years previously. As of year’s end, Ezimet remained in custody in an undisclosed location. Authorities also implicated his wife and child, and forced them to study government policy. Radio Free Asia reported in June that authorities in Xinjiang affiliated with the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps were building nine “burial management centres,” which included crematoria, in areas with high Uighur populations. Members of the Uighur exile community said authorities were using the centres to remove the religious context from funerary rites. According to the article, other members of the exile community said “authorities use the crematoria to secretly ‘deal with’ the bodies of Uyghurs who have been killed by security

¹⁶⁹⁶ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/xinjiang/>

forces during protests against ... religious repression... or who have died under questionable circumstances in re-education camps.” The article cited a source who said “very few” ethnic corpses brought to his crematorium in Kuchar (Kuche) county came from the “re-education camps.” The source said the corpses of ethnic minorities brought to his crematorium are “normally brought to us with special documentation provided by police.”

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to deny international media reports stating authorities banned Uighur Muslims from Ramadan fasting, and said the constitution provided for religious freedom for Uighurs. Reports published on the official websites of local governments in Xinjiang, however, indicated authorities restricted or banned certain groups of Uighurs from observing Ramadan, including CCP members, their relatives, students, and employees of state-owned enterprises and state-run organizations, and instead hosted education events about the dangers of “religious extremism.” Authorities also hosted morning sessions in order to ensure students and workers ate breakfast. According to *The Independent*, authorities required mandatory 24-hour shifts for local government employees, and mandatory sports activities and patriotic film sessions for students on Fridays throughout the month. Authorities ordered restaurants and grocery stores to remain open and serve alcohol during Ramadan, according to the website of the Qapqal County, Yili (Ili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture government.¹⁶⁹⁷

There were reports of authorities prohibiting students from the middle school level through to the university level from fasting during Ramadan. According to Radio Free Asia, authorities required all Uighur cadres, civil servants, and pensioners to sign a pledge stating they would not fast and would seek to dissuade their families and friends from doing so. The government facilitated participation in the Hajj, and Muslims applied online or through local official Islamic associations. Media reported authorities punished pilgrims attempting to perform the Hajj through routes other than government-arranged options. According to an official media report in *Global Times*, approximately 11,500 Chinese Muslims were expected to make the Hajj pilgrimage during the year, compared to 12,800 in 2017. Approximately 3,300 of them were to receive GPS tracking devices as part of a pilot program allowing the IAC to monitor their location in real time throughout the pilgrimage. According to the manufacturer, SARA and IAC jointly designed the device. In 2016 IAC reported that Saudi Arabia imposed an annual quota on the number of pilgrims from China that was lower than those for other countries. State media said Xinjiang provided nearly a quarter of pilgrims, although independent sources say only 1,400 Uighur Muslims were able to participate. These figures included IAC members and security officials sent to monitor Muslim citizens and prevent unauthorized activities. Uighur Muslims reported difficulties taking part in state-sanctioned Hajj travel due to IAC’s criteria for participation in the official Hajj program. The government confiscated the passports of Uighurs in Xinjiang, and Uighurs reported near universal failure in efforts to regain possession of travel documents. Age restrictions limiting Hajj travel to Uighurs over 60 years old also reduced the number traveling to Mecca, according to media reports. Those selected to perform state-sanctioned Hajj travel were required to undergo political and religious “education,” according to SARA and media reports. Uighurs allowed to attend the Hajj were also reportedly forced to participate in political education every day during the Hajj. Organizations reported the government favoured Hui Muslims over Uighur Muslims in the Hajj application

¹⁶⁹⁷ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/xinjiang/>

process. Muslims that chose to travel outside of legal government channels reportedly often risked deportation when they tried to travel through third countries.

In September, 2018, HRW reported authorities began requiring everyone in a village in Xinjiang to gather for a weekly Chinese flag-raising ceremony. On one occasion, police hit an elderly woman, telling her to take off her headscarf. Authorities confiscated prayer mats and copies of the Quran. Village authorities prohibited children from learning about religion, even at home. In February China Aid reported that officials forced Muslims in Xinjiang to take part in traditional methods of celebration for the Chinese Lunar New Year, despite conflicts with Islam. According to an ethnic Kazakh man, authorities forced ethnic Kazakhs and Uighurs in Xinjiang to eat pork dumplings – a violation of Islamic dietary restrictions. If they refused, public security staff detained them on the spot.¹⁶⁹⁸

Authorities continued to prevent any “illegal” religious activities in Xinjiang and prioritize Chinese language and culture over Uighur language and culture under the rubric of ethnic unity. Authorities promoted loyalty to the Communist Party as the most important value. Reportedly, authorities encouraged thousands of Uighurs to participate against their will in ceremonies wearing traditional Han Chinese clothing, performing tai chi, and singing the national anthem. HRW reported in September that in Xinjiang, officials required individuals to attend political indoctrination meetings and, for some, Mandarin classes. On December 12, the SCIO issued a report on what it said was the progress of human rights over 40 years. The report said the state offered training sessions to clerics on interpreting scriptures and, since 2011, the National Religious Affairs Administration had trained several hundred Islamic clerics from Xinjiang. The central government supported the Xinjiang Islamic Institute. Authorities in Xinjiang maintained extensive and invasive security and surveillance, reportedly in part to gain information regarding individuals’ religious adherence and practices. HRW reported the government required all individuals in Xinjiang to have a spyware app on their mobile phone because the government considered “web cleansing” necessary to prevent access to terrorist information. Failing to install the app, which could identify whom people called, track online activity, and record social media use, was deemed an offense. The report stated that “Wi-Fi sniffers” in public places monitored all networked devices in range.¹⁶⁹⁹

The People’s High Court, Public Security Bureau, Bureau of Culture, and Bureau of Industry and Commerce in Xinjiang continued to implement restrictions on video and audio recordings the government defined as promoting terrorism, religious extremism, and separatism. Authorities prohibited dissemination of such materials on the internet, social media, and in online marketplaces. As part of these measures, police randomly stopped individuals to check their mobile phones for sensitive content. In September HRW stated that in Xinjiang, officials used questionnaires to examine people’s everyday behaviour, inputting the results into a large-scale data analysis program. According to HRW, any indications of religious piety, along with “storing lots of food in one’s home” or owning fitness equipment, could be construed as signs of “extremism.” HRW said the government’s religious restrictions had become so stringent that it had “effectively outlawed the practice of Islam.” At the end of December 2017, HRW reported a continuing effort of authorities in Xinjiang to collect DNA samples, fingerprints, iris scans, and blood types of all residents in

¹⁶⁹⁸ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/xinjiang/>

¹⁶⁹⁹ Ibid.

the region between the ages of 12 and 65. This campaign significantly expanded authorities' collection of biodata beyond previous government efforts in the region, which were limited to biometric information from passport applicants. According to *The New York Times*, authorities collected DNA samples, face-scans, voice recordings, and fingerprints of individuals in Xinjiang after saying they were receiving a free health check, but authorities refused to provide the results of the "check." In patent applications filed in 2013 and 2017, government researchers said they took genetic material from Uighurs and compared it with DNA from other ethnic groups, and were able to sort people by ethnicity. Human rights groups and Uighur activists said collecting genetic material was a key part of the government's campaign in Xinjiang. They said the government would compile the information into a comprehensive DNA database used to track any Uighurs who resisted conforming to the government's wishes.¹⁷⁰⁰

According to an HRW report released in September, an individual who spent months in detention facilities in Xinjiang said in May that guards watched the inmates through video cameras, forcing everyone to remain still until a voice came from the speakers telling detainees they could relax for a few minutes. Guards also watched when inmates went to the bathroom. The same report detailed how the government extended surveillance to life outside the camps. A woman who left Xinjiang in 2017 told HRW that five officials took turns watching over her at home, documenting that they had checked on her. According to the report, the government officials appeared in photographs reading political propaganda together and preparing a bed to stay overnight. The report said having male cadres stay overnight in homes with female inhabitants caused women and girls to be vulnerable to sexual abuse.

Throughout Ramadan, authorities in Hotan Prefecture assigned party cadres to stay in local residences. They observed families throughout the day and ensured they did not pray or fast. According to Radio Free Asia, an official said "During this period, [officials] will get to know the lives of the people, assist in their daily activities – such as farming – and propagate laws and regulations, party and government ethnic and religious policies, and so on." In May CNN reported that authorities had dispatched more than one million Communist officials from other parts of the country to live with local families in Xinjiang. The report stated the government instituted these home stays to target farmer households in southern Xinjiang, where authorities have been waging what the report called an unrelenting campaign against the forces of "terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism." The report also stated the government required families to provide detailed information on their personal lives and political views during the officials' visits. Authorities also subjected families to political education from the live-in officials – whom the government had mandated to stay at least one week per month in some locations. The program started in 2014, according to CNN.

A local Xinjiang government statement online indicated officials had to inspect the homes in which they were staying for any religious elements or logos and instructed the officials to confiscate any such items they found. On August 8, *The New York Times* reported that, in addition to the mass detentions in Xinjiang, authorities intensified the use of informers and expanded police surveillance, including installing cameras in some people's homes. In May *The Economist* reported that in Hotan, Xinjiang, there were police stations

¹⁷⁰⁰ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/xinjiang/>

approximately every 300 meters (1000 feet). The article stated that the government referred to the stations as “convenience police stations.” The stations were part of a grid-management system similar to those Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo started when he was Party Secretary in Tibet from 2011 to 2016. In Xinjiang authorities divided each city into squares, with approximately 500 people in each square. Every square had a police station that monitored the inhabitants. The report adds that every village in Xinjiang had a similar type of “convenience police station.” The same report detailed police activities at a large checkpoint on the edge of Hotan, where a police officer ordered all the passengers off the bus. The passengers (all Uighur) took turns in a booth, where officials scanned identity cards, took photographs and fingerprints, used newly installed iris-recognition technology, and forced women to take off their headscarves. The officials also forced young Uighurs to give authorities access to their phones in order to download their smart phone contents for later analysis.¹⁷⁰¹

The government restricted access to houses of worship. *The Economist* reported in May that in Hotan authorities closed neighbourhood mosques, leaving a handful of large mosques open. The account stated that police forced worshippers to register with them before attending mosques. At the entrance to the largest mosque in Kashgar, the Idh Kha – a famous place of pilgrimage – two policemen sat underneath a banner saying “Love the party, love the country.” Inside, a member of the mosque’s staff held classes for local traders on how to be a good Communist. In Urumqi, the article stated that authorities knocked down minarets and Islamic crescents on the mosques that were permitted to remain open. Other reports said restrictions across Xinjiang that required worshippers to apply for mosque entry permits remained in place. According to a local source, authorities banned individuals under the age of 20 from attending religious services in mosques.

The government reportedly moved against human rights activists. Radio Free Asia reported that on August 16, police threatened prominent Hui Muslim poet Cui Haoxin (whose pen name is An Ran), after he tweeted about the mass incarceration of Uighurs in internment camps. According to Cui, five police officers raided his home and warned him not to use social media. Authorities had previously sent Cui to a weeklong re-education course in eastern China and briefly detained him in connection with his poetry and writings that referenced Xinjiang.

The government also reportedly restricted travel and sought to intimidate or forcibly repatriate Uighur and other Muslims abroad. According to an HRW September report, individuals had to apply to the police for permission and proceed through numerous checkpoints to go from one town to the next in Xinjiang. HRW also reported that authorities recalled passports from people in the region and prohibited communication with individuals outside the country, including relatives. Ethnoreligious minorities also reported increased screening at airport, train station, and roadside security checkpoints. The *Wall Street Journal* reported in August that Chinese security officials told Uighurs living abroad to collect information on other Uighurs. Several Uighurs abroad reported the government denying their passport renewals and instead offering a one-way travel document back to China. Several individuals also reported authorities threatened to put family members of Uighurs living abroad into detention centres if they did not return. HRW reported that in

¹⁷⁰¹ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/xinjiang/>

September an officer called an ethnic Turkic Muslim living in the United States and told him to return to China, threatening to abduct him if he refused. It may not be now, the officer said, “but this is just a matter of time.” HRW reported in June that Chinese authorities contacted Murat, a 37-year-old student living outside the country whose sister was in a detention facility in China, telling her that even though she was in a foreign country, they could “manage” her. Murat stated that she did not join any terrorist organization or any organization against China or join any demonstrations. According to a *Business Insider* report from August the government began compiling a database of its Muslim citizens living abroad. The article said authorities used intimidation tactics to obtain license plate numbers, bank details, and marriage certificate information from Uighur citizens in other countries. In a March 28 article, *The Economist* cited reports issued by human rights groups saying authorities forced hundreds of Uighurs back to China in the past decade from Egypt, Thailand, Vietnam, and elsewhere. These groups said Chinese authorities in foreign countries had detained and interrogated individuals and several hundred were in foreign jails. Chinese officials often recruited local residents on both sides of the country’s southwestern borders and across Central Asia to report the arrival of “suspicious” individuals. *The Economist* report said the government frequently succeeded in having these individuals sent back without going through any official legal process.

Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom.

Because the government and individuals closely link religion, culture, and ethnicity, it was difficult to categorize many incidents of societal discrimination as being solely based on religious identity. Muslims in Xinjiang faced discrimination in hiring and retaining their positions. In Xinjiang, policies discriminating against Uighurs, as well as greater access to economic opportunities for Han Chinese, exacerbated tensions between Uighur Muslims and both the Han Chinese and the government.¹⁷⁰²

In “Annual Report 2019” published by the Congressional Executive Commission on China stresses further:¹⁷⁰³

- In the past year, authorities in the XUAR expanded a system of extrajudicial mass internment camps, arbitrarily detaining one million or more Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui, and others. Security personnel at the camps subjected detainees to torture, including forced ingestion of drugs; punishment for behaviour deemed religious; forced labour; overcrowding; deprivation of food; and political indoctrination. Authorities transferred some detainees from mass internment camps in the XUAR to detention facilities in other parts of China, due to factors including overcrowding in camps within the XUAR and

¹⁷⁰² <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/xinjiang/>

¹⁷⁰³ https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/2019AR_EXECUTIVESUMMARY.pdf

Note: “Report on the Work of the Government” in Xinjiang, delivered at the Second Session of the 13th National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on March 5, 2019, available online at URL: https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/2019NPCWorkReportEN.pdf?mod=article_inline

authorities' desire to conceal information on camp detainees. Some detainees reportedly died in camps due to poor conditions, medical neglect, or other reasons.

- Scholars and rights groups provided strong arguments, based on available evidence, showing that the “crimes against humanity” framework may apply to the case of mass internment camps in the XUAR. Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides a list of 11 acts, any one of which may constitute “crimes against humanity” “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”
- Mass internment camp detainees reportedly included permanent residents of the United States and Australia. American officials stated in March 2019 that Chinese authorities may have detained several American residents in mass internment camps. As of April 2019, authorities had reportedly detained more than a dozen Australian residents. In addition, at least five Australian children reportedly were unable to leave the XUAR due to restrictions on the freedom of movement of their parents in the XUAR.
- Authorities reportedly placed the children of mass internment camp detainees in the XUAR in orphanages, welfare centres, and boarding schools, often despite the willingness of other relatives to care for the children, raising concerns of forcible assimilation.
- XUAR government authorities continued to use surveillance technology and other measures to tighten state control over ethnic minority groups in the region, and to identify individuals to detain in mass internment camps. A Human Rights Watch report documented authorities' continued use of a centralised system known as the “Integrated Joint Operations Platform” (IJOP) to compile and analyse information collected through mass surveillance mechanisms in the XUAR and detect “abnormal” behaviours, targeting individuals for detention in camps or other types of restriction on movement.

Acts listed in Article 7 of the Rome Statute	Possible application to the treatment of Turkic Muslims in the XUAR
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law;	Arbitrary, prolonged detention of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui, and others in mass internment camps in the XUAR since around April 2017;
(f) Torture;	Security personnel in mass internment camps in the XUAR subjected detainees to widespread torture, including through the use of electric shocks and shackling people in painful positions;

Source: https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/2019AR_EXECUTIVESUMMARY.pdf (page.15)

Acts listed in Article 7 of the Rome Statute	Possible application to the treatment of Turkic Muslims in the XUAR
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in Paragraph 3 [Article 7(3) of the Rome Statute], or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph [Article 7 of the Rome Statute] or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;	Security personnel have detained a million or more Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Hui; enforced harsh, widespread restrictions on peaceful Islamic practices of XUAR residents; and subjected Turkic and Muslim XUAR residents to intense surveillance, checkpoints, intimidation, and involuntary biometric data collection.
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons.	Hundreds of intellectuals forcibly disappeared by authorities in the XUAR are among the million or more Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Hui detained in mass internment camps.

Source: https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/2019AR_EXECUTIVE_SUMMARY.pdf (pg,16.)

The 116th US Congress's 2nd Session in Section. 6 - Imposed Sanctions on China to condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, and calling for an end to arbitrary detention, torture, and harassment of these communities inside and outside China imposed sanction.¹⁷⁰⁴

9.4.4 Tibet

9.4.4.1 Tibet and India Relations (trade links)

In 1948-49, relations with Tibet by India were conducted through the Political Officer in Sikkim and the Indian Mission in Lhasa. There was also a Trade Agent in Gyantse.¹⁷⁰⁵ In October 1950 Chinese troops entered Tibet from the East. After crossing the DREHN river which forms the border, they captured Chamdo, the capital of the Eastern Province of Kham and also certain other important places. Representations were made to the Government of China through the agency of the Indian Embassy in Peking emphasising the desirability of a solution by peaceful means. The notes exchanged between the Governments of India and China had since been released to the press. There was a lull in fighting for several weeks.¹⁷⁰⁶

In 1951, Tibet saw political changes of great historical interest. The Sino-Tibetan Treaty, which provided for the assumption by China of control over Tibet's external affairs, for the establishment of Chinese Military Headquarters in Tibet, and the incorporation of the Tibetan forces into the Chinese Army, and for the defence of Tibet's borders by China was

¹⁷⁰⁴ <https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20200525/BILLS-116s3744-SUS.pdf>

¹⁷⁰⁵ Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1948-49', pg 9, published by Ministry Of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations in January 01,1948, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2475?000>

¹⁷⁰⁶ Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1950-51',pg. 12, published by Ministry of External Affairs on January 01,1950, available online at URL:<https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2477?000>

concluded during this year.¹⁷⁰⁷ The cordial relations existing between India and China were strengthened further by a number of events of international importance. On the 29th April, 1954, an agreement was signed concerning Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India at Peking. This agreement contains, inter alia, five principles, popularly known as Panchashila, which have become the guiding principles in the relationship between India and China.¹⁷⁰⁸

Treaties, Conventions and Agreements concluded by India with China during 1954-1955:

- Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India signed at Peking on 29 April 1954; Trade Agreement between the Republic of India and the Republic of China signed at New Delhi on 14 October 1954.¹⁷⁰⁹
- A Protocol with the People's Republic of China regarding the handing over to the Government of China of the postal, telegraph and public telephone services and the Rest Houses operated by the Government of India in Tibet region of China signed on 1 April 1955 at Lhasa.¹⁷¹⁰

Their Holinesses, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama visited (1956) India to attend the 2500th Buddha Jayanti Celebrations. During their stay in India for two months, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, visited almost all the sacred places associated with the Buddha and also some of the important cities and development centres in India. They were received throughout India by people of all faiths with marked warmth and enthusiasm.¹⁷¹¹

In 17 March 1959, during the year under review, our relations with China suffered a serious setback. It will be recalled that in the middle of March 1959 there was a sudden uprising in Lhasa leading to the outbreak of hostilities between the Tibetans and the Chinese forces and, as a consequence, the Dalai Lama, with a small entourage, left Lhasa on. In view of the age-old cultural and religious relationship between Tibet and India, there was a spontaneous outburst of sympathy with the Tibetan people when the news of the disturbances was published in India. The Government of India made it clear that while they sympathised with the Tibetans in their aspirations for autonomy, they fully recognized the suzerainty of China and could not, in any way, intervene in the developments inside Tibet. When, however, the Dalai Lama sought refuge in India, the Government of India, in exercise of their sovereign right, agreed to grant asylum to him and to afford to the Dalai Lama the courtesy which befitted his recognized spiritual position. But even while evincing natural concern at the developments in Tibet, the Government of India categorically repudiated the Chinese suggestion that Indian

¹⁷⁰⁷ Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1951-52', pg. 15, published by Ministry of External Affairs on January 01, 1951, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2478?000>

¹⁷⁰⁸ Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1954-55', pg. 19, published by Ministry of External Affairs on January 01, 1954, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2481?000>

¹⁷⁰⁹ Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1954-55', pg. 69, published by Ministry of External Affairs on January 01, 1954, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2481?000>

¹⁷¹⁰ Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1955-56', pg. 51, published by Ministry of External Affairs on January 01, 1955, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2482?000>

¹⁷¹¹ Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1956-57', pg. 07, published by Ministry of External Affairs on January 01, 1956, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2483?000>

territory was used by the Tibetan rebels as the directing centre for the uprising against the Chinese or indeed for any purpose prejudicial to Chinese interests.¹⁷¹²

In 1958-59 during the month following the Tibetan disturbances, it was noted with surprise and concern that normal facilities and courtesies expected in international relations and specifically embodied in the 1954 Agreement between India and China were being denied to the Indian Representatives and Indian nationals in Tibet. Trade was adversely affected because of new currency regulations and restrictions imposed by the Chinese authorities on border type of trade. Chinese official propaganda challenged the bona fides of India's policies. The Government of India, in various notes, protested to the Chinese Government against their unfriendly attitude and against the manifold difficulties of her representatives and her nationals, but continued to affirm her faith in the importance of continuing friendly relations between the two countries.¹⁷¹³ In the wake of the Dalai Lama, nearly 14,000 Tibetan refugees entered into India through passes in NEFA, Bhutan, Sikkim and the U.P. The Government of India, on humanitarian considerations, made arrangements, in co-operation with the Governments of West Bengal, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, for the reception and relief of the refugees who had come into Indian territory. Camps were opened in Massamari (Assam), Buxa (West Bengal) and later in Dalhousie (Punjab) for the Tibetan refugees. Later, with the co-operation of the Sikkim Darbar, nearly 4,000 of them were put on gainful work in Sikkim. The Government of India established machinery for liaison and co-operation with a non-party Central Relief Committee to utilize the generous contributions in cash and kind received from India and abroad.¹⁷¹⁴

In 14 November 1960, difficulties encountered by Indian representatives and traders in Tibet did not materially decrease and the provisions of the 1954 Agreement were not, fully observed. Indian traders continued to suffer difficulties because of the lack of facilities to repatriate their legitimate profits after the Indian and Tibetan currency were declared as illegal tender. Instances of harassment of and discrimination against Indian, nationals were also reported. In the early part of the year, the Kashmiri Muslims residing in Lhasa and neighbouring regions were subjected to severe hardship and intimidation but it was gratifying to, note that they were eventually permitted to return to India. All these difficulties were brought to the attention of the Chinese Government through official notes and memoranda. Notwithstanding these unfortunate features the Government of India remained firm in their belief that friendly relations between the two countries are vital to the peace of Asia and the World. India continued to support the request for seating the representatives of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and continued to entertain the hope that the relations between the two countries could by persistent endeavours be restored to those of true understanding and mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.¹⁷¹⁵

¹⁷¹² Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1957-58', pg. 31, published by Ministry of External Affairs on January 01, 1957, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2484?000>

¹⁷¹³ Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1957-58', pg. 32, published by Ministry of External Affairs on January 01, 1957, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2484?000>

¹⁷¹⁴ Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1957-58', pg. 32, published by Ministry of External Affairs on January 01, 1957, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2484?000>

¹⁷¹⁵ Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1960-61', Page 28, published by Ministry of External Affairs on January 01, 1960, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2487?000>

Tibetan refugees continued to arrive during the year and their total number rose to 25,000. About 17,000 refugees have been dispersed from transit camps and temporarily provided with work. The Missamari camp has been closed down. A transit camp at Bhalukpong in NEFA was started and 1,800 refugees accommodated there, The Buxa camp now accommodates about 1,500 student lamas. An equal number of old and infirm monks are accommodated at Dalhousie. A handicrafts training-cum-production centre was established at Dalhousie and employs 600 skilled Tibetan refugee craftsmen. A self-help centre consisting of about 200 Tibetan refugees is functioning at Darjeeling. 100 Tibetan refugees have been sent for training in small scale industries to centres at various places in India. A residential school which will eventually accommodate 500 Tibetan refugee children has been opened at Mussoorie. Efforts were being made to establish other similar institutions elsewhere. A land settlement scheme expected to provide for 500 refugees has been started at Bhalukpong in NEFA. The Mysore Government have offered facilities for the settlement of 3,000 refugees on land in their State. About 1,200 refugees are expected to be rehabilitated on land in Ladakh.¹⁷¹⁶

During the year 1961-62, there was a further curtailment of the economic and cultural facilities provided to Indian traders and pilgrims in Tibet under the 1954 Agreement. Indian traders had to contend with restrictions on their movements, a termination of the traditional pattern of barter trade, ban on the export of conventional merchandise to India, and the denial of facilities for the repatriation of their assets and profits to India. At the same time the Chinese persisted in their policy of discouraging the payment of debts by Tibetans to Indian traders. These restrictive trade and fiscal policies, together with the acts of discrimination against Indian traders, led to a serious fall in Indo-Tibetan trade, and caused a sharp decline in the customary number of Indian trading establishments in Yatung. Indian Missions in Tibet, which had been guaranteed certain rights and immunities under the 1954 Agreement, fared no better. The numerous restrictions placed on them greatly reduced their sphere of activity. The Indian Trade Agencies at Gyantse and Gartok were unable to start building of the Agency accommodation (mere mud-huts in Gartok) because of the dilatory and obstructive tactics of the Chinese authorities. The Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 expires on 2 June 1962. Under Article VI of the Agreement a request had to be made by either party by 1 December 1961, for its renewal. Neither party made any such move by the due date; but on 3 December 1961 the Government of China offered to negotiate a new agreement. They sought in particular to separate the Sino-Indian border problem and the question of trade relations between India and Tibet. This was not acceptable to the Government of India. Replying to the Chinese offer, the Government of India asked for a reversal of the aggressive policies pursued by the Government of China during the last few years and the restoration of a climate of peace which would assure the strict observance of the Five Principles both in letter and spirit as essential pre-requisites to negotiations for a new agreement.¹⁷¹⁷

Tibetan refugees continued to arrive during the year, and the total number rose to 33,000. The number of new arrivals till October 1961 was 4,091. 5,000 refugees are still in various transit camps awaiting dispersal. The responsibility for providing educational facilities to the Tibetan refugees was transferred to the Ministry of Education, and a

¹⁷¹⁶ Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1960-61', Page 29, published by Ministry of External Affairs on January 01, 1960, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2487?000>

¹⁷¹⁷ Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1961-62', Page 36, published by Ministry of External Affairs on January 01, 1961, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2488?000>

Central Committee was set up for coordinating such educational activities. A Tibetan Schools Society, with the representatives of the Government of India and the Dalai Lama as members, has been formed. It has been entrusted with the management of the Mussoorie School. The new schools, at Simla and Darjeeling, were opened during the year. The Government took over the Tibetan Refugees Handicraft Training Centre at Dalhousie. The Centre is now being managed by the Indian Co-operative Union on behalf of the Government. Schemes for the re-settlement on land at Periyapattana of 3,000 refugees, and of about 900 more in Ladakh were sanctioned and are being implemented. Offers from the Governments of Madhya Pradesh and Orissa to provide land for the re-settlement of Tibetan refugees in agricultural colonies are being considered.¹⁷¹⁸

During the year 1962-63, the three Trade Agencies at Gartok, Gyantse and Yatung, and the Consulates-General at Lhasa and Shanghai, were closed down. The earlier arrangement, under which our Ambassador in China was accredited to this country respectively, has been altered.¹⁷¹⁹In May-June 1962, in their reply dated 2 June 1962, however, the Chinese Government brusquely, rejected the offer. Also, while notes were being still exchanged on the renewal of the Sino-Indian Trade Agreement of 1954, the Government of China, in May 1962, in sharp contrast to their repeated declaration that they desired to renew the Agreement, suddenly withdrew their Trade Agencies in Kalimpong and Calcutta. The Government of India had always provided the Chinese Trade Agencies with requisite facilities for their functioning. On the other hand the Government of China had denied even normal facilities to Indian Trade Agencies in Tibet, and held out veiled threats when reasonable time for withdrawal was sought. The experience of Indian Trade Agencies in Tibet, and the systematic Chinese aggression made it clear from the beginning that China had no intention of conforming to the provisions of the 1954 Agreement. By their actions the Chinese Government had shown their complete disregard of the letter and the spirit of the Agreement as well as of the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence enunciated in the Preamble to the Agreement. The Agreement itself lapsed on 2 June 1962.¹⁷²⁰

Till 8 September 1962 no Chinese forces had crossed the traditional frontier between India and China in the Eastern Sector along the highest watershed ridge in the region. The massive attacks simultaneously mounted by China in the Eastern and Western Sectors of the India-China border on 20 October 1962 destroyed all hope of settling the India-China differences in accordance with normal international practices. On 24 October 1962, four days after the Chinese massive attack, the Chinese Government proposed that the two countries should agree to respect 'the line of actual control' as defined by China and that the armed forces of each side should withdraw 20 Kilometres from this line and disengage. When these Chinese proposals which were plainly terms of surrender were not accepted by India, China continued her invasion of Indian territory and launched further massive attacks on Jang, Walong, Tawang, Se La, Bomdi La and other places in NEFA and on Indian posts in the Chip Chap, Galwan and Chang Chenmo valleys and the Pangong-Spanggur Lake areas in Ladakh. After over-running large areas of Indian

¹⁷¹⁸ Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1961-62', Page 37, published by Ministry of External Affairs on January 01, 1961, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2488?000>

¹⁷¹⁹ Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1962-63', Page 04, published by Ministry of External Affairs on January 01, 1962, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2489?000>

¹⁷²⁰ Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1962-63', Page 26, published by Ministry of External Affairs on January 01, 1962, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2489?000>

territory, the Chinese Government announced, on the morning of 21 November 1962, a unilateral cease-fire which was obviously calculated to retain the gains of their latest aggression. The wording of the Chinese statement was deliberately vague and ambiguous. Although clarifications were sought, it was clear that the Chinese Government had no intention of defining, with any degree of precision, the base line from which they proposed to carry out Withdrawals in both the Western and Eastern Sectors. The line that they referred to as the 'LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL' of 7 November 1962 was by all indications in the Western Sector the line which the Chinese forces had reached only as a result of their latest massive aggression launched from 20 October. In the Eastern Sector it differed in some places from the highest watershed which is the natural frontier. Though put in the garb of a cease-fire declaration, this was the same as the earlier three-point proposal.¹⁷²¹

Since October 1962 the Indian Consulates-General in Lhasa and Shanghai had been subjected to a number of additional restrictions. Ever since 1959 the movements of Indian staff there had been restricted and they had been denied any contacts with the local population. They were also not permitted to move beyond the municipal limits of the city. The telegraphic contact with the Indian Consulate General in Lhasa was completely cut off between 9 and 25 October 1962. The telephonic communications of the Consulate-General were also interfered with during this period and outsiders were forbidden to enter the premises of the Consulate-General. Supplies of essential commodities such as milk, eggs and firewood were stopped.¹⁷²²

In 15 December 1962, in view of the restrictions and curbs imposed by the Chinese Government it was finally decided by the Government of India to withdraw the Indian Consulates-General at Shanghai and Lhasa with effect from 15 December 1962 as these Consular Posts were no longer able to perform their normal duties. The Chinese Government were informed of this decision and requested to take similar action in respect of the Chinese Consulates-General at Bombay and Calcutta. Indian Consulates-General at Lhasa and Shanghai were closed on 15 December and Officers and staff members returned to India thereafter. The Chinese closed their Consulates-General at Bombay and Calcutta and their officers and staff members left for China.¹⁷²³

The white paper titled "Freedom of Religious Belief" issued by the Information Department of The State Council of PRC states that, Tibet is one of China's ethnic autonomous regions, and the Tibetans mostly believe in Tibetan Buddhism. Since the peaceful liberation of Tibet in 1951, and particularly since the introduction of the reform and opening policies in 1979, citizens' right to freedom of religious belief has been thoroughly carried out in Tibet. Since the 1980s the central government has allocated more than 200 million yuan in special funds for the maintenance and reconstruction of the famous Potala Palace and the Jokhang, Tashilhunpo and Samye monasteries. The State has also established special funds to support the work of compiling and publishing the Tripitaka in the Tibetan language and other major Tibetan Buddhist classics as well

¹⁷²¹ Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1962-63', Page 26, published by Ministry of External Affairs on January 01, 1962, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2489?000>

¹⁷²² Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1962-63', Page 28, published by Ministry of External Affairs on January 01, 1962, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2489?000>

¹⁷²³ Excerpts from 'Annual Report 1962-63', Page 29, published by Ministry of External Affairs on January 01, 1962, available online at URL: <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2489?000>

as the work of establishing the Advanced Buddhism College of Tibetan Language Family of China in Beijing and the Tibet College of Buddhism in Lhasa.¹⁷²⁴

At present, there are in Tibet over 1,700 places for Buddhist activities and a total of 46,000 resident monks and nuns. Small prayer halls or shrines are virtually universal in the homes of believers, and pilgrims coming to Lhasa number well over one million each year. Believers performing Buddhist rituals, and prayer umbrellas and Mani rocks carved with Buddhist sutras can be found all over the Tibet Autonomous Region. In addition, religious activities during the annual Sholton Festival and the traditional practice of circling Mount Kangrinboqe in the Year of the Horse and circling Lake Namco in the Year of the Sheep along pilgrim paths have been carried on and respected by society at large.

The reincarnation of holy men, or "Living Buddhas," is a unique form of succession in Tibetan Buddhism which has long been recognized and respected by the State. In 1992 the Religious Affairs Bureau of the State Council approved the succession of the 17th Karmapa Living Buddha. In 1995 China successfully concluded the search for and identification of the reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Lama and the title-conferring and enthronement of the 11th Panchen Lama after lot-drawing from a golden urn according to the established religious rituals and historical conventions of Tibetan Buddhism, and with the approval of the State Council. These actions highlight the fact that the Tibetan people's right to religious freedom is respected and protected, thus winning endorsement and support from the converts of Tibet.¹⁷²⁵

Considering the special place of the Grand Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism of past generations in Tibetan social life, the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties gradually put the identifying of the reincarnation of the Living Buddhas within the jurisdiction of the central government and into the framework of the State's laws and statutes. In 1792 the Qing government issued an order that the reincarnation of the Grand Living Buddhas above the Hutuktu rank be determined through drawing lots from the golden urn, which later developed into a historical institution and was accepted as a permanent religious ritual in Tibetan Buddhism. The "soul boy" confirmed through lot-drawing from the golden urn as the reincarnation of a Grand Living Buddha must be reported to the central government for approval prior to his official enthronement. The lot-drawing may be dispensed with under special circumstances, but this must also be reported to the central government in advance for approval. The practice of lot-drawing from the golden urn not only upholds the central government's supreme authority and the sovereignty of the State, but religiously displays the "decision by Sakyamuni's Dharma" as well. Since 1792, in the reincarnation system of the Grand Living Buddhas of Tibetan Buddhism over 70 "soul boys" have been identified by confirmation through lot-drawing from the golden urn and with the approval of the central government. Therefore, the approval of the reincarnation of the Grand Living Buddhas by the central government

¹⁷²⁴ Excerpts from The white paper titled "Freedom of Religious Belief" issued by the Information Department of The State Council of PRC, published in 1997, available online at URL: <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/bjzl/t168753.htm>

¹⁷²⁵ Excerpts from The white paper titled "Freedom of Religious Belief" issued by the Information Department of The State Council of PRC, published in 1997, available online at URL: <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/bjzl/t168753.htm>

is a religious ritual and historical convention of Tibetan Buddhism, and is the key to safeguarding the normal order of Tibetan Buddhism.¹⁷²⁶

The Chinese government resolutely opposes attempts to split the country along ethnic lines, and any use of religious fanaticism to divide the people, split the country or harm the unity among all ethnic groups or engage in illegal activities and terrorist actions under the signboard of religion. Meanwhile, the Chinese government firmly upholds national unity and social stability in areas where ethnic minorities live in compact communities, and safeguards the normal religious activities of the ethnic-minority believers. The Chinese government respects the generally accepted principles regarding religious faiths in the international community, and holds that these principles must be applied in accordance with the concrete conditions and be carried out according to the domestic law of each country. The Chinese government opposes creating confrontations in religion or interfering in the internal affairs of another country under the pretext of religion. The facts make it fully clear that remarkable improvements have been achieved in the situation of human rights of the Chinese people, and the freedom of religious belief has enjoyed full respect and legal protection since the founding of New China, particularly in the recent two decades following the implementation of reform and opening policies. The Chinese government will, as always, make ever-greater efforts to safeguard human rights and specifically to protect the freedom of religious belief.¹⁷²⁷

9.4.4.2 Repression of Tibetan Buddhists

In a report titled “2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: China: Tibet” published by Office of International Religious Freedom of US Department of States illustrates the following:

Section I. Religious Demography¹⁷²⁸

According to official data from China’s most recent census in November 2010, 2,716,400 Tibetans make up 90 percent of the TAR’s total population. Han Chinese make up approximately 8 percent. Other ethnicities comprise the remainder. Some experts, however, believe the number of Han Chinese and other non-Tibetans living there is significantly underreported. Outside the TAR, official census data show Tibetans constitute 24.4 percent of the total population in Qinghai Province, 2.1 percent in Sichuan Province, 1.8 percent in Gansu Province, and 0.3 percent in Yunnan Province, although the percentage of Tibetans is much higher within jurisdictions of these provinces designated as autonomous for Tibetans.

Most Tibetans practice Tibetan Buddhism, although a sizeable minority practices Bon, a pre-Buddhist indigenous religion; small minorities practice Islam, Catholicism, or Protestantism. Some scholars estimate there are as many as 400,000 Bon followers across the Tibetan Plateau who follow the Dalai Lama, and some of whom consider themselves Tibetan Buddhist. Scholars also estimate there are up to 5,000 Tibetan Muslims and 700 Tibetan Catholics in the TAR. Other residents of traditionally Tibetan areas include Han Chinese, many of whom practice Buddhism (including Tibetan Buddhism), Taoism,

¹⁷²⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷²⁷ <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/bjzl/t168753.htm>

¹⁷²⁸ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/tibet/>

Confucianism, traditional folk religions, or profess atheism; Hui Muslims; and non-Tibetan Catholics and Protestants.¹⁷²⁹

Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom

The constitution of the People's Republic of China states citizens enjoy "freedom of religious belief," but limits protections for religious practice to "normal religious activities" without defining "normal." The constitution bans the state, public organizations, and individuals from compelling citizens to believe in, or not believe in, any religion. It says religion may not be used to disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens, or interfere with the educational system. The constitution states religious bodies and affairs are not to be "subject to any foreign control." Only religious groups belonging to one of five state-sanctioned "patriotic religious associations" (Buddhist, Taoist, Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant), however, are permitted to register with the government and legally hold worship services or other religious ceremonies and activities. Regulations issued by the central government's State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA) codify its control over the selection of Tibetan religious leaders, including reincarnate lamas. These regulations stipulate that, depending on the perceived geographic area of influence of the lama, relevant administrative entities may deny permission for a lama to be recognized as reincarnated and these entities must approve reincarnations. The State Council has the right to deny the recognition of reincarnations of high lamas of "especially great influence." The regulations also state no foreign organization or individual may interfere in the selection of reincarnate lamas, and all reincarnate lamas must be reborn within China. The government maintains a registry of officially recognized reincarnate lamas. Within the TAR, regulations issued by SARA assert state control over all aspects of Tibetan Buddhism, including religious venues, groups, and personnel. Through local regulations issued under the framework of the national-level Management Regulation of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries, governments of the TAR and other Tibetan areas control the registration of monasteries, nunneries, and other Tibetan Buddhist religious centres. The regulations also give the government formal control over building and managing religious structures and require monasteries to obtain official permission to hold large-scale religious events or gatherings.¹⁷³⁰

The central government's State Council revisions to the Regulations on Religious Affairs became effective on February 1. The revisions require religious groups to register with the government, increase penalties by imposing fines on landlords for "providing facilities" for unauthorized religious activities, and restrict contact with overseas religious institutions, including a new requirement for religious groups to seek approval to travel abroad and a prohibition on "accepting domination by external forces." The revisions increase regulations for religious schools by submitting them to the same oversight as places of worship and impose new restrictions on religious groups conducting business or investments, including placing limits on the amount of donations they can receive and restricting the publication of religious material to guidelines determined by the State Publishing Administration. ¹⁷³¹

¹⁷²⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷³⁰ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/tibet/>

¹⁷³¹ Ibid

Additionally, the revisions require that religious activity “must not harm national security.” While existing regulations stipulate the obligations of religious groups to abide by the law and safeguard national unity, the new revisions specify steps to respond to “religious extremism,” leaving “extremism” undefined. These steps include monitoring groups, individuals, and institutions, and recommending penalties such as suspending groups and cancelling clergy credentials. The new regulations also limit the online activities of religious groups, requiring such activities be approved by the provincial Religious Affairs Bureau.¹⁷³²

A new policy, based on ideas discussed at the national-level Conference on Religion and Work in 2016 and introduced on August 31 in the TAR, requires Tibetan monks and nuns to undergo political training in state ideology. The policy requires monks and nuns to demonstrate – in addition to competence in religious studies – “political reliability,” “moral integrity capable of impressing the public,” and willingness to “play an active role at critical moments.” To establish places of worship, religious organizations must receive approval from the religious affairs department of the relevant local government both when the facility is proposed and again before any services are held at that location. Religious organizations must submit dozens of documents in order to register during these approval processes, including detailed management plans of their religious activities, exhaustive financial records, and personal information on all staff members. Religious communities not going through the formal registration process may not legally have a set facility or worship meeting space. Therefore, each time they want to reserve a space for worship, such as by renting a hotel or an apartment, they need to seek a separate approval from government authorities for each service. Worshipping in a space without pre-approval, either through the formal registration process or by seeking an approval for each service, is considered an illegal religious activity, which may be criminally or administratively punished.¹⁷³³

The TAR government has the right to deny any individual’s application to take up religious orders. The regulations also require monks and nuns to obtain permission from officials in both the originating and receiving counties before traveling to other prefectures or “county-level cities” within the TAR to “practice their religion,” engage in religious activities, study, or teach. Tibetan autonomous prefectures outside the TAR have similar regulations.¹⁷³⁴

At the central government level, the CCP Central Committee’s Central Tibet Work Coordination Group, the CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD), and SARA are responsible for developing and implementing religious management policies, which are carried out with support from the five “patriotic religious associations” (Buddhist, Protestant, Catholic, Islamic, and Taoist). At local levels, party leaders and branches of the UFWD, SARA, and the state-controlled Buddhist Association of China (BAC) are required to coordinate implementation of religious policies in monasteries, and many have stationed party officials and government officials, including public security agents, in monasteries in Tibetan areas. CCP members, including Tibetans and retired officials, are required to be atheists and are forbidden from engaging in religious practices. CCP members who belong

¹⁷³² Ibid.

¹⁷³³ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/tibet/>

¹⁷³⁴ Ibid.

to religious organizations are subject to various types of punishment, including expulsion from the CCP.¹⁷³⁵

Government Practices

During the year, four Tibetans reportedly self-immolated as a means of protest against government policies, compared to six individuals in 2017. Some experts attributed reports of the decreasing number of self-immolations to tighter control measures by authorities. Sources said that during the year, authorities told family members not to discuss self-immolation cases. The NGO Free Tibet reported since 2009 more than 150 Tibetans had set themselves on fire in protest against what they said was occupation and human rights abuses on Tibet's religion and culture under Chinese rule. According to media reports, 16-year-old Gendun Gyatso self-immolated in Ngaba (Chinese: Aba) County, Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP) in Sichuan Province, on December 8 or 9 and died of his injuries. Media said that on December 8, Drugkho (reportedly also known by his monastic name Choekyi Gyatso), a young Tibetan man, set himself on fire in Ngaba shouting, "long live the Dalai Lama." Some news reports stated he may have survived. Reportedly, both Gendun and Drugkho were monks at Kirti Monastery. According to the website *Tibet Sun*, on November 4 in Ngaba, Dupo, another Tibetan youth, died after carrying out a self-immolation, reportedly shouting "Long live the Dalai Lama." On March 7, Tsekho Tugchak (also spelled "Topchag"), a man in his forties, reportedly called out, "Long live His Holiness the Dalai Lama and freedom for Tibet" as he self-immolated in Meruma Township, Ngaba County; the location of his remains was unknown. Ngaba County had also been the site of numerous prior self-immolations by monks from the Kirti Monastery.¹⁷³⁶

There were reports of the forced disappearance, torture, arbitrary arrest, and physical abuse of individuals on account of their religious beliefs or practices. The whereabouts of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, recognized as the 11th Panchen Lama by the Dalai Lama and most Tibetans, remained unknown since his 1995 forced disappearance by Chinese authorities. Nyima was six years old at the time he and his parents were reportedly abducted. Authorities did not provide information on his whereabouts, and stated previously that he was "living a normal life" and did "not wish to be disturbed." The Panchen Lama was considered by the Gelugpa school of Tibetan Buddhism the second-most-prominent leader after the Dalai Lama.

The TCHRD, an NGO run and staffed by Tibetans in exile, reported in May a Tibetan monk's account of torture and sexual abuse in a re-education camp in the TAR. According to TCHRD, the unnamed monk spent approximately four months in a re-education camp in Sog County of Naqchu (Chinese: Naqu) where he said all inmates, except for "two or three laypersons," were monks and nuns. The monk said detainees had to attend self-criticism sessions and participate in military drills; detention officers also beat older monks and nuns who were physically weak and did not understand Chinese. The monk said, "Many nuns would lose consciousness during the [military] drills. Sometimes officers would take unconscious nuns inside where I saw them fondle the nuns' breasts and grope all over their body." He also

¹⁷³⁵ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/tibet/>

¹⁷³⁶ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/tibet/>

stated some inmates “were singled out and beaten up so severely with electric batons that they would lose consciousness. The officers would revive the unconscious inmates by splashing water on their faces. This cycle of losing and reviving consciousness would go on for some time at the end of which the officers would use a black plastic pipe to beat and pour water on all parts of the body and then use electric batons to beat some more. Soon black and blue marks would appear on the victim’s body and render him or her half-dead.” TCHRD reported authorities subjected inmates to torture and collective punishment, food deprivation, sleep deprivation, prolonged wall standing, and beatings.

According to *The Tibet Post*, Geshe Tsewang Namgyal, formerly a monk from Drago Monastery in Kardze (Chinese: Ganzi) County, Kardze TAP, Sichuan Province, reported that authorities tortured him while he was in prison, resulting in permanent injuries to his legs. Authorities released Geshe Namgyal on January 24, after he completed his six-year prison term. Officials arrested him in 2012 for participating in a peaceful protest against China’s policies in Tibet. Limited access to information about prisoners made it difficult to ascertain the exact number of individuals imprisoned on account of their religious beliefs or affiliation, determine the charges brought against them, or assess the extent and severity of abuses they suffered. The U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China’s Political Prisoner Database included 4,037 records of Tibetan political prisoners, of whom 300 were known to be detained or imprisoned as of December 21. Of these, 131 were reported to be current or former monks, nuns, or Tibetan Buddhist reincarnate teachers. Of the 120 cases for which there was available information on sentencing, punishment ranged from two years’ to life imprisonment. Observers, including commission staff, believed the actual number of Tibetan political prisoners and detainees to be much higher, but the lack of access to prisoners and prisons, as well as the lack of reliable official statistics, made a precise determination difficult. Authorities continued to hold an unknown number of persons in detention centres rather than prisons.

According to the NGO International Campaign for Tibet and other sources, on December 10, the anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, police in Ngaba severely beat Sangay (also spelled “Sanggye”) Gyatso, a monk from Kirti Monastery, as he protested for freedom for Tibet. Police detained him, and his whereabouts remained unknown at year’s end. According to the NGO Canada Tibet Committee, in February local authorities detained Karma, a leader of Markor village in the TAR’s Naqchu Prefecture, for challenging an official order to sign a document permitting local authorities to conduct mining activities at Sebtra Zagyen mountain. Local Tibetans consider Sebtra Zagyen a sacred location. The Canada Tibet Committee also carried a report by TCHRD that in April officials detained and beat approximately 30 Tibetans, at least two of whom were monks, after information about Karma’s detention leaked to the Tibetan exile community. According to local sources, Karma’s whereabouts remained unknown at year’s end.¹⁷³⁷

In May TAR authorities detained Gangye, a Tibetan man from Sog County, for possessing religious books written by the Dalai Lama and CDs featuring the religious leader’s teachings, according to news portal *Phayul*. His whereabouts remained unknown at year’s end.

¹⁷³⁷ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/tibet/>

According to local religious community sources, between September 5 and September 9, security forces separately detained three Tibetan monks from Meruma. The monks were reportedly protesting against government policies, specifically the requirement for Tibetans to be at least 18 years old to become monks (historically children as young as toddlers began the process of study to become monks) and the government's interference in monastic management. On September 5, authorities detained Dorje Rabten of Kirti Monastery immediately following his protest. On September 6, they also detained Tenzin Gelek after he protested against Dorje's detention. Similarly, on September 9, officials took Lobsang Dargy into custody following his protest against the detention of both Dorje and Tenzin. Their whereabouts remained unknown at year's end.¹⁷³⁸

According to the Central Tibetan Administration, on January 28, authorities arrested and detained Lodoe Gyatso from Naqchu Prefecture of the TAR after he staged a peaceful protest in front of the Potala Palace in Lhasa. Prior to the protest, Lodoe Gyatso published a video announcing his plans to organize a peaceful demonstration in support of the Tibetan people's commitment to world peace and nonviolence under the guidance of the Dalai Lama. Radio Free Asia reported that in September authorities detained Tibetan monks Nyida, Kelsang, Nesang, and Choeje of Gomang Monastery in Ngaba TAP, Sichuan Province, for publicly protesting against a government housing project near their monastery. The four detainees were reportedly still in Khyungchu County's custody. A fifth monk was reportedly detained and released.¹⁷³⁹

According to a February report by Radio Free Asia, at the end of 2017 authorities convicted Tashi Choeying, a Tibetan monk from Tawu (Chinese: Daofu) County of Kardze TAP in Sichuan Province, on an unknown charge and sentenced him to a six-year prison term. Authorities had held Tashi, who had studied in India, incommunicado since November 2016. Religious community sources said Tashi's conviction may have been due to his communications with the media in India about self-immolation cases in Tawu. In June *Phayul* reported local officials raided the residences of two Tibetans from Kardze TAP, Sichuan Province, and arrested the men for possessing photos of the Dalai Lama. RFA reported in June that authorities released Lobsang Tenzin, formerly a monk at Kirti Monastery in Ngaba County, Sichuan Province, from prison three years before the end of his ten-year prison sentence. He had been jailed in 2011 for allegedly supporting a self-immolation protest. Authorities continued to exercise strict controls over religious practice and maintained intrusive surveillance of many monasteries and nunneries, including through permanent installation of CCP and public security officials and overt camera surveillance systems at religious sites and monasteries.

Provincial, prefectural, county, and local governments continued to station CCP officials in, and established police stations or security offices adjacent to or on the premises of, many monasteries. For example, the TAR had more than 8,000 government employees working in 1,787 monasteries, according to local sources and Chinese government reporting in 2017. Security forces continued to block access to and from important monasteries during politically sensitive events and political religious anniversaries. According to many contacts

¹⁷³⁸ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/tibet/>

¹⁷³⁹ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/tibet/>

in Ngaba County, Sichuan Province, officials placed family members, relatives, and close friends of self-immolators on a security watch list to prevent them from meeting and communicating with international visitors and, in some cases, deprived them of public benefits. Authorities met with family members of individuals who had self-immolated and instructed them not to talk about the cases to limit news of self-immolations and other protests from spreading within Tibetan communities and beyond. There were also numerous reports of officials shutting down or restricting local access to the internet and cellular phone services for this purpose. After a self-immolation in December, authorities reportedly instituted a “clampdown” on the area and blocked internet communication.

The government continued to control the approval process of reincarnations of Tibetan Buddhist lamas and supervision of their religious education. According to local sources, while high-ranking religious leaders and local Tibetan Buddhists attempted to search for the reincarnation of Tenzin Delek Rinpoche, a prominent Tibetan religious leader who died in prison in 2015, security officials closely monitored their efforts and threatened them with imprisonment if the religious leaders continued their search.¹⁷⁴⁰

The government continued to insist that Gyaltsen Norbu, whom it selected in 1995, was the Panchen Lama’s true reincarnation, and not Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, whom authorities had disappeared that same year. According to numerous Tibetan Buddhist monks and scholars, UFDW and Religious Affairs Bureau officials frequently pressured monks and laypersons, including government officials, to attend religious study sessions presided over by Gyaltsen Norbu, and ordered every Tibetan family in Lhako (Shannan) city to send family members to an August teaching session to ensure hundreds of thousands of people paid him respect. In 1995, authorities installed Gyaltsen Norbu in Tashi Lhunpo Monastery in Shigatse (Chinese: Xigaze), the traditional seat of the Panchen Lama, and visited the monastery every summer since. In addition, authorities closely supervised the education of many key young reincarnate lamas. In a deviation from traditional custom, government officials, rather than religious leaders, continued to manage the selection of the reincarnate lamas’ religious and lay tutors in the TAR and some other Tibetan areas. Religious leaders reported that, as part of authorities’ interference in reincarnate lamas’ and monks’ religious education, authorities were incentivizing these young men to voluntarily disrobe by emphasizing the attributes of secular life as compared to the more disciplined and austere religious life. Religious leaders and scholars said these and other means of interference continued to cause them concern about the ability of religious traditions to survive for successive generations.

According to media reports, as of December 2017, the government added seven additional “living buddhas” below the age of 16 to the 2017 list of more than 1,300 approved “living buddhas.” Such individuals reportedly continued to undergo training on patriotism and the CCP’s socialist political system. The BAC announced its database of 1,311 “living buddhas” that it deemed “authentic” was nearly complete. Neither the Dalai Lama nor Tenzin Delek Rinpoche was on the list. The government continued to place restrictions on the size of Buddhist monasteries and other institutions. According to local sources, at Larung Gar, Kardze TAP, Sichuan Province, site of the world’s largest Tibetan Buddhist institute, the government continued its program of evicting monks and nuns that began in 2016. During

¹⁷⁴⁰ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/tibet/>

the year, the government evicted approximately 2,000 monks and nuns from a population that was at least 20,000 in 2016 and demolished an estimated 900 residences, leaving the remaining population at approximately 5,000, according to Human Rights Watch and a local source. Monks and nuns evicted from the institute returned to their hometowns where the source said they were unable to receive “quality religious education” free from government interference. According to Chinese press reports, the government stated the demolition was to prevent fires and promote crowd control. Rights groups said that if safety were the primary motivator for this government action, then other provisions, such as building additional housing that met fire safety codes, could be a way to resolve the issue instead of large-scale demolitions and expulsions. Local sources stated the destruction was to clear the way for tourist infrastructure and to prevent nuns, monks, and laypersons from outside the area, particularly ethnic Han, from studying at the institute. Reportedly, in hopes of saving the institute, Larung Gar’s monastic leadership continued to advise residents not to protest the demolitions.¹⁷⁴¹

In January Human Rights Watch described the Chinese government’s interference at Larung Gar as an “extreme control over religious practices,” “an immediate threat to the religious freedom of all Tibetans,” and “a long-term threat to all Chinese.” The organization also noted “the scale of the Communist Party’s intervention at Larung Gar is unprecedented.” According to local sources, during the year, authorities continued their program of destroying residences at another Buddhist complex at Yachen Gar, also in Kardze Prefecture. During the year, authorities destroyed at least 700 residences and evicted approximately 1,000 monks and nuns from a 2016 estimated population of 10,000 religious practitioners in Yachen Gar. At year’s end, a local source estimated the remaining population to be approximately 5,000. Local sources reported that authorities prohibited monks and nuns from Yachen Gar, who returned to their hometowns in the TAR, from joining any other monastery or nunnery there or participating in any public religious practices. According to reports, authorities continued “patriotic re-education” campaigns at many monasteries and nunneries across the Tibetan Plateau, forcing monks and nuns to participate in “legal education,” denounce the Dalai Lama, express allegiance to the government-recognized Panchen Lama, and study Mandarin as well as materials praising the leadership of the CCP and the socialist system. In many areas, authorities reportedly forced monks and nuns under the age of 18 to leave their monasteries and Buddhist schools to receive “patriotic education.” According to local sources, from 2017 on authorities removed nearly 1,000 minors from various monasteries in Kardze TAP, Sichuan Province. According to other reports, authorities removed 600 minors from Litang Monastery (also known as the Ganden Thubchen Choekhorling Monastery, the largest Buddhist monastery in Litang, Sichuan Province. Authorities removed 20 monks from Jowo Ganden Shedrub Palgyeling monastery in Kham and on July 10 authorities removed as many as 200 young monks from Dza Sershul monastery.¹⁷⁴²

Sources also reported from March to July, in Kyewu Township, Sershul (Chinese: Shiqu) County, Kardze TAP, 77 minors were removed from monasteries. To facilitate the removal of minors, authorities threatened the parents, other family members, and acquaintances, telling them they risked losing social benefits and government jobs if they did not comply

¹⁷⁴¹ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/tibet/>

¹⁷⁴² <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/tibet/>

with official orders. In July media reported the government banned all underage students in the TAR from participating in religious activities during the summer holidays. School officials required students to sign an agreement stating they would not participate in any form of religious activity during the summer.¹⁷⁴³

The Education Affairs Committee, the Municipal People's Government, and the Municipal Education Bureau of the TAR issued an order banning parents from taking their children to monasteries or allowing children to participate in religious events during the Saka Dawa festival in May, according to media reports. Reportedly, authorities also encouraged parents not to participate in the festivities or go to monasteries. The government also required schools to inform the education bureau of students who were absent during the month and taking part in the festival. On August 31, government officials conducted a political training session for a select group of Tibetan monks and nuns in Lhasa from May 31 to June 2. The training session aimed to strengthen participants' political beliefs and prepare them to spread the ideology of the central government in their own monasteries and communities. The government did not disclose the number of participants, but according to Human Rights Watch, a 2016 political training course for 250 Tibetan monks and nuns was reportedly the pilot program for this training session.

In December *Global Times* reported authorities in the TAR launched the opening session of a five-year training program for Tibetan Buddhism teaching staff, including local Tibetan Buddhists as well as monks and nuns. As part of the program, which aims to better adapt Tibetan Buddhism to socialist society, participants are required to study national policies, history, culture, laws, regulations, modern knowledge, and religious studies. A local CCP official reportedly said monks and nuns were "expected to firmly set up the concept that government power is higher than religious power, and that national laws are above religious rules." The launch of this program coincided with the launch of another training course specifically for government officials assigned to Tibetan temples. Officials are required to take part in a three-year training course to manage temples and "better serve" monks and nuns in conducting religious affairs in accordance to laws and regulations. The CCP continued to forbid its members from participating in religious activities of any kind, despite reports that many Tibetan government officials and CCP members held religious beliefs. The TAR regional government punished CCP members who followed the Dalai Lama, secretly harboured religious beliefs, made pilgrimages to India, or sent their children to study with exiled Tibetans.¹⁷⁴⁴

Government officials regularly denigrated the Dalai Lama publicly and accused the "Dalai clique" and other "outside forces" of instigating Tibetan protests, stating such acts were attempts to "split" China. In April TAR Party Secretary Wu Yingjie continued to call for monks and nuns in the region to fight against the "Dalai clique and defend the unity of the motherland." In May Wu continued to instruct various party and government organs that they "must resolutely implement the central government's principles and policies on the Dalai clique's struggle, carry out in-depth anti-secession struggles, and ensure political security." Authorities in the TAR continued to prohibit registration of children's names that

¹⁷⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴⁴ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/tibet/>

included parts of the Dalai Lama's name or names included on a list blessed by the Dalai Lama. Multiple sources reported open veneration of the Dalai Lama, including the display of his photograph, remained prohibited in almost all areas. Local officials, many of whom considered the images to be symbols of opposition to the CCP, removed pictures of the Dalai Lama from monasteries and private homes during visits by senior officials. The government also banned pictures of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, whom the Dalai Lama and nearly all Tibetan Buddhists recognized as the 11th Panchen Lama. Punishments in certain counties inside the TAR for displaying images of the Dalai Lama included expulsion from monasteries and criminal prosecution. Although authorities permitted some traditional religious ceremonies and practices, they continued to maintain tight control over the activities of religious leaders and religious gatherings of laypersons, confining many such activities to officially designated places of worship, restricting or cancelling religious festivals, and preventing monks from traveling to villages for politically sensitive events and religious ceremonies.

The government suppressed religious activities it viewed as vehicles for political dissent. For example, local authorities again ordered many monasteries and laypersons not to celebrate or organize any public gatherings for celebrations of the Dalai Lama's 83rd birthday in July, the anniversary of the March 10, 1959, Tibetan uprising, or the March 14, 2008, outbreak of unrest across the Tibetan Plateau. TAR authorities banned monks and nuns from leaving their monasteries and nunneries during such times. According to local sources, Sichuan and Gansu provincial authorities patrolled major monasteries in Tibetan areas and warned that those holding special events or celebrations would face severe consequences. Local sources reported that in July religious affairs officials instructed senior monks at Draggo and Tawu Monasteries in Kardze TAP not to celebrate the Dalai Lama's birthday. As a result, the monks did not organize any public celebrations. Sources reported they feared repercussions from the government for defying orders, including fear of death. Officials in Gansu Province met with senior monks from Labrang Monastery and Bora Monastery, and also instructed them not to celebrate the Dalai Lama's birthday publicly, according to sources. Authorities warned the monks would face legal consequences for their actions, but did not specify what the consequences were.¹⁷⁴⁵

Authorities deployed the military to monitor prayer festivals in the TAR and other Tibetan areas. During Lunar New Year celebrations in February, multiple local sources reported the authorities, among other measures, deployed military forces at prayer ceremonies at Drepung, Sera, and Gandan Monasteries in the TAR, Draggo and Tawu Monasteries in Sichuan Province, and Kirti and Kumbum (Chinese: Ta'er) Monasteries in Qinghai Province. Authorities hosted a series of meetings in Lhasa instructing monks and nuns to comply with party policy and inspected "armed forces" and CCP officials at Tibetan Buddhist monasteries. In September the government banned the annual Dechen Shedrub prayer festival from occurring in Larung Gar, citing overcrowding and unfinished reconstruction. The ban marked the third consecutive year the government did not allow the 21-year-old festival to take place. The TAR government reportedly maintained tight control over the use of Tibetan Buddhist religious relics and declared them, religious buildings, and religious institutions to be state property. Sources continued to report security personnel targeted individuals in religious attire, particularly those from Naqchu and Chamdo (Chinese: Changdu) Prefectures in the TAR and Tibetan areas outside the TAR, for

¹⁷⁴⁵ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/tibet/>

arbitrary questioning on the streets of Lhasa and other cities and towns. Many Tibetan monks and nuns reportedly chose to wear nonreligious attire to avoid such harassment when traveling outside their monasteries and around the country.¹⁷⁴⁶

The traditional monastic system reportedly continued to decline as many top Buddhist teachers remained in exile or died in India or elsewhere; some of those who returned from India were not allowed to teach or lead their institutions. The heads of most major schools of Tibetan Buddhism – including the Dalai Lama, Karmapa, Sakya Trizin, and Khatok Getse Rinpoche, as well as Bon leader Kyabje Menr Trizin – all resided in exile. The government also banned India-trained Tibetan monks, most of whom received their education from the Dalai Lama or those with ties to the leader, from teaching in Tibetan monasteries in China. In May *India Today* reported Zhu Weiqun, the former head of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, said it was necessary to tighten supervision so monks educated abroad by the “Dalai clique” did not use “local Buddhists to conduct separatist activities.”

Multiple sources also reported that during the past four years the Chinese government increasingly restricted Tibetan Buddhist monks from visiting Chinese cities to teach or to meet with international contacts. Authorities also restricted Tibetans’ travel inside China, particularly for Tibetans residing outside the TAR who wished to visit the TAR, during sensitive periods, including Losar (Tibetan New Year), the Saga Dawa festival, and the anniversary of the March 10, 1959, Tibetan uprising. During the year, many religious figures reported it was very difficult for them to enter the TAR to teach or study. The government also restricted the number of monks who could accompany those who received permission to travel to the TAR. Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns stated these restrictions have negatively impacted the quality of monastic education. Many monks expelled from their TAR monasteries after the 2008 Lhasa riots and from Kirti Monastery after a series of self-immolations from 2009 to 2015 had not returned, some because of government prohibitions.¹⁷⁴⁷

Many Tibetans, including monks, nuns, and laypersons, continued to encounter difficulties traveling to India for religious purposes. In many cases, Public Security Bureau officials refused to approve their passport applications. In other cases, prospective travellers were able to obtain passports only after paying bribes to local officials, or after promising not to travel to India or to criticize Chinese policies in Tibetan areas while overseas. According to a Human Rights Watch annual report, several hundred Tibetans traveling on Chinese passports to attend a teaching session by the Dalai Lama in January were forced to return. In December Chinese authorities refused to grant Tibetans new passports or confiscated issued passports in an attempt to block their travel to India and Nepal to attend the Dalai Lama’s teaching sessions. As a result there was a large reduction in the number of China-based Tibetans attending the teaching compared to previous years. Numerous Tibetans in Gansu, Qinghai, and Sichuan Provinces waited for up to five years before receiving a passport, often without any explanation for the delay, according to local sources. There were also instances of authorities confiscating and cancelling previously issued passports as a way of preventing Tibetans from participating in religious events involving the Dalai Lama in

¹⁷⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴⁷ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/tibet/>

India. Restrictions also remained in place for monks and nuns living in exile, particularly those in India, which made it difficult or impossible for them to travel into Tibetan areas.

Authorities reportedly often hindered Tibetan Buddhist monasteries from delivering religious, educational, and medical services. According to government policy, newly constructed government-subsidized housing units in many Tibetan areas were located near township and county government seats or along major roads. These new housing units had no nearby monasteries where resettled villagers could worship, and the government prohibited construction of new temples without prior approval. Traditionally, Tibetan villages were clustered around monasteries, which provided religious and other services to members of the community. Many Tibetans continued to view such measures as CCP and government efforts to dilute religious belief and weaken the ties between monasteries and communities.¹⁷⁴⁸

Authorities continued to justify interference with Tibetan Buddhist monasteries by associating the monasteries with “separatism” and pro-independence activities, as reported in state media. In August Wu Yingjie, the TAR Party Secretary instructed party members “to adhere to China’s Sinicization of religion, and independence and self-determination should be the guidance principles for those in the Tibetan Buddhism community.” Wu said, “We will expose the reactionary nature of the 14th Dalai Lama and the ‘Dalai clique,’ as well as educate and guide the vast majority of the monks and nuns and religious followers to oppose separatism in order to safeguard the unity of the motherland and ethnic unity.” In accordance with official guidelines for monastery management, the leadership of and membership in the various committees and working groups remained restricted to “politically reliable, patriotic, and devoted monks, nuns, and party and government officials.” General administrative affairs in TAR monasteries, which monks traditionally managed, were instead overseen by Monastery Management Committees and Monastic Government Working Groups, both of which were composed primarily of government officials and CCP members, together with a few government-approved monks. Since 2011, China has established such groups in all monasteries in the TAR and in many major monasteries in other Tibetan areas. During the year, a local source said the CCP had appointed 100 percent of monastic management in Tibetan areas of Sichuan Province, including Kirti Monastery. In January Human Rights Watch reported a 2017 official document said scores of CCP officials would be installed at every level and in each section of the monastic settlement at Larung Gar. The officials “will hold nearly half of the positions on most committees and in most offices, and in most cases will occupy the top positions.” According to the document, six “sub-area management units” that supervise the monks would each be headed by a CCP official rather than a monk.

Senior monks at some monasteries continued to report informal agreements with local officials whereby resident monks would not stage protests or commit self-immolation as long as the government adopted a hands-off approach to the management of their monasteries. The TAR CCP committee and government required all monasteries to display prominently the Chinese flag and the portraits of five CCP chairmen from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping. According to local sources, authorities continued to hinder Tibetan Buddhist monasteries from carrying out environmental protection activities, an important part of traditional Tibetan Buddhist practices, out of fear such activities could create a sense of pride

¹⁷⁴⁸ Ibid.

among Tibetans, particularly children, and an awareness of their distinctness from Chinese culture. In some cases, authorities continued to enforce special restrictions on Tibetans staying at hotels inside and outside the TAR. Police regulations forbade some hotels and guesthouses in the TAR from accepting Tibetan guests, particularly monks and nuns, and required other hotels to notify police departments when Tibetan guests checked in, according to a Radio Free Asia report confirmed by several hotels. On December 12, 2018, the State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China issued a report on what it said was the "progress in human rights" over the previous 40 years. The report said, "Religious beliefs and normal religious activities are protected by law. At the moment Tibet Autonomous Region has 1,778 venues for practicing Tibetan Buddhism, and some 46,000 resident monks and nuns. Tibet now has 358 Living Buddhas, more than 60 of whom have been confirmed through historical conventions and traditional religious rituals. By 2017 a total of 84 monks from Tibet had received senior academic titles in Lhasa and 168 in Beijing."¹⁷⁴⁹

Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom

Because expressions of Tibetan identity and religion are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religion. Tibetans, particularly those who wore traditional and religious attire, regularly reported incidents in which they were denied hotel rooms, avoided by taxis, and discriminated against in employment opportunities or business transactions. According to local sources, in November 13 monks from Kirti Monastery were in Chengdu for scheduled medical examinations, but they missed the appointment. Taxi drivers were not willing to serve them because they were Tibetan monks. Young Tibetan entrepreneurs in Chengdu reported Chinese companies often denied them employment opportunities once the employers identified them in person as ethnic Tibetans, despite prior offers of employment when discussions had taken place solely by phone. Many Han Buddhists continued to demonstrate interest in Tibetan Buddhism and donated money to Tibetan monasteries and nunneries, according to local sources in such monasteries and nunneries. Tibetan Buddhist monks frequently visited Chinese cities to provide religious instruction to Han Buddhists. In addition, a growing number of Han Buddhists visited Tibetan monasteries, although officials sometimes imposed restrictions that made it difficult for Han Buddhists to conduct long-term study at many monasteries in Tibetan areas.¹⁷⁵⁰

9.4.4.3 Internationally, Government Presses "Core Interest" Policy To Isolate Dalai Lama

The '2010 Annual Report' of Congressional-Executive Commission On China states the following on the situation in Tibet:

The Chinese government and Communist Party during the Commission's 2010 reporting year pressed the "core interest" policy that seeks to isolate the Dalai Lama internationally and diminish or end his international influence. The policy is based on Chinese officials' assertions that "Tibet" is one of China's two "core interests" ("Taiwan" is the other); the

¹⁷⁴⁹ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/tibet/>

¹⁷⁵⁰ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china-includes-tibet-xinjiang-hong-kong-and-macau/tibet/>

Dalai Lama is a "splittist"; and that other governments, therefore, should not permit the Dalai Lama to enter their countries and thereby threaten China's "territorial integrity." During the period preceding U.S. President Barack Obama's February 18, 2010, meeting with the Dalai Lama, China's state-run media published demands that the United States "respect China's core interests" by not allowing the meeting to occur. During the period between the October 6, 2009, White House statement confirming that the meeting would take place at a time following the President's November 15 to 18 China visit, and the February 11, 2010, White House announcement that the meeting would take place on February 18, some Chinese media reports expressed exuberance based on the incorrect conclusion that President Obama's decision to travel to China before meeting with the Dalai Lama signalled that Chinese government pressure had caused him to decide to forego meeting the Dalai Lama. The "core interest" policy that aims to isolate the Dalai Lama internationally operates in tandem with the Party's domestic campaign to isolate Tibetans in China from the Dalai Lama. At the same time, the Chinese government seeks to isolate Tibetans in China from the international community with respect to issues such as human rights by asserting that Tibetan affairs are China's "internal affairs" and "brook no interference" from other countries. The results of such Chinese government policies could include further increases of human rights abuses of Tibetans concurrent with a decrease in the ability of the international community to detect, document, and respond to such abuses.¹⁷⁵¹

9.4.4.4 Domestically, Fifth Forum Sets Far-Reaching Objectives for 2010– 2020 Prior To Forum, Politburo Sets "New" Strategy For Governing Tibet

The '2010 Annual Report' of Congressional-Executive Commission On China also states that : ¹⁷⁵²

On January 8, 2010, 10 days prior to the Fifth Tibet Work Forum (Fifth Forum), the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Communist Party met to formulate a "new general strategy for governing Tibet." At the meeting, Politburo members planned the Party's "work on Tibet" for the period ahead, namely "the advancement of work on Tibet's development by leaps and bounds and long-term order and stability in the new situation." China's state-run media reported that the Politburo's "new general strategy" for Tibetan governance would be based on the notion of "four adherences":

- "Insist on adherence to the [Party's] leadership";
- "Insist on adherence to the socialist system";
- "Insist on adherence to the system of regional autonomy for minority nationalities"; and
- "Insist on adherence to a development path with Chinese characteristics and Tibetan traits."

The fourth "adherence" reaffirms the Party's intention to continue the policy of creating a Tibet where the fundamental objectives (the "development path") are Chinese, but

¹⁷⁵¹ Excerpts from The '2010 ANNUAL REPORT' of Congressional-Executive Commission On China, available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2010-annual-report#V.%20Tibet>

¹⁷⁵² Excerpts from The '2010 ANNUAL REPORT' of Congressional-Executive Commission On China, available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2010-annual-report#V.%20Tibeto>

where some "Tibetan traits" will remain. As a governing "strategy," the "adherences" emphasize the high degree of subordination imposed on local ethnic autonomous governments established under China's Constitution and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law. None of the 25 members of the Politburo—the highest ranking bureau within the Party's Central Committee—are Tibetans. Formulation of a "new" Tibetan governance strategy by a body made up of the highest ranking representatives of central Party and government power, and lacking Tibetan representation, demonstrates the poor implementation of "ethnic autonomy" in the Tibetan autonomous areas of China.

The Forum: Highest Level Of Party And State Support

The nine-member Politburo Standing Committee presided at the January 18–20 Fifth Forum, signifying the highest level of Party and state support for policy objectives across the Tibetan autonomous areas of China. Party General Secretary and President of China Hu Jintao and Premier of the State Council Wen Jiabao delivered key addresses. The Fourth Tibet Work Forum took place in June 2001.¹⁷⁵³

i) Maintaining the Rural Priority: Boost Income, Provide Services, Build Infrastructure.

Hu Jintao outlined at the Fifth Forum a series of development goals for 2015 and 2020 that prioritize changes to rural Tibetan areas—where 87 percent of Tibetans lived in 2000, according to official Chinese census data—and that will have the capacity to increase pressure on Tibetan culture in rural areas. The Party and government's heightened emphasis on the link between rural development and regional stability follows Tibetan farmers' and herders' participation in the wave of protests (and some rioting) that began in Lhasa in March 2008 and spread to locations across the Tibetan plateau. By 2015, the gap between the income level of farmers and herders in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the national average must be "markedly narrowed" and by 2020, the gap must be nearly closed, Hu told forum attendees. The government's ability to provide basic public services in rural areas must be "markedly increased" by 2015 and must be near the national level by 2020. Hu said that infrastructure construction must make "great progress" by 2015, and by 2020 infrastructure must be "comprehensively improved." As of September 2010, the Commission had observed few published reports containing details about specific projects that the Fifth Forum would promote in the Tibetan autonomous areas of China. Pema Choling (Baima Chilin), Chairman of the TAR government as of January 15, 2010, said in March that the Fifth Forum adopted "unprecedented new measures" and the TAR government would "initiate some major projects," but he named only one: the "Qinghai-Tibet direct current transmission line." In terms of potential economic, demographic, environmental, and cultural impact, however, the most important infrastructure projects that the central government has announced for completion by 2020 are several new railways that will crisscross the Tibetan plateau.¹⁷⁵⁴

¹⁷⁵³Excerpts from The '2010 ANNUAL REPORT' of Congressional-Executive Commission On China, available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2010-annual-report#V.%20Tibet>

¹⁷⁵⁴Excerpts from The '2010 ANNUAL REPORT' of Congressional-Executive Commission On China, available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2010-annual-report#V.%20Tibet>

ii) New Development: Policy Coordination Across an Expanded Tibetan Area¹⁷⁵⁵

The Fifth Forum for the first time expanded and coordinated the Party's Tibetan policy purview beyond the administrative boundaries of the TAR to include the Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties located in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces. China's state-run media reported that the Fifth Forum "made comprehensive arrangements for speeding up the economic and social development" of the Tibetan areas of those four provinces at both central and provincial government levels. Echoing the principal policy declarations of the January Politburo meeting [see Prior to Forum, Politburo Sets "New" Strategy for Governing Tibet in this section], the Fifth Forum identified four priorities as "the main direction of attack" for resolving "the most conspicuous and most urgent issues restraining economic and social development" (listed in the order reported):

- "Improvement in the people's livelihood";
- "Development of social undertakings";
- "Protection for the ecological environment"; and
- "Construction of the infrastructure."

The policy change more than doubles the number of Tibetans who live within the Fifth Forum's contiguous target area and nearly doubles the area subject to central-level policy coordination. According to official Chinese 2000 census data, of approximately 5.42 million Tibetans in China, approximately 2.43 million lived in the TAR and approximately 2.57 million lived in the Tibetan autonomous areas of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan. The expanded Tibetan policy area, with an area of approximately 2.24 million square kilometres, is nearly double the size of the 1.2-million-square-kilometer TAR. The Party's decision to expand the Tibetan policy area and coordinate policy implementation has resulted in an unprecedented political consequence: Chinese government and Party officials, as well as the Dalai Lama and his representatives, have focused their respective recent policy statements on the same area of administrative geography—all of the Tibetan autonomous areas of China. The Dalai Lama's envoys' November 2008 "Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People" identifies the Tibetan area that the Memorandum seeks to address as "comprising all the areas currently designated by the PRC as Tibetan autonomous areas." The Chinese and Tibetan parties engaged in the China-Dalai Lama dialogue continue, however, to maintain different policy approaches toward the Tibetan autonomous areas.¹⁷⁵⁶

9.4.4.5 Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama or His Representatives¹⁷⁵⁷

The '2010 Annual Report' of Congressional-Executive Commission On China also mentions that The China-Dalai Lama dialogue resumed less than one week after the Fifth Tibet Work Forum (Fifth Forum) concluded. The Dalai Lama's envoys arrived in China on January 26, 2010, for the ninth round of formal dialogue with Communist Party officials.

¹⁷⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵⁶ Excerpts from The '2010 ANNUAL REPORT' of Congressional-Executive Commission On China, available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2010-annual-report#V.%20Tibet>

¹⁷⁵⁷ Ibid.

The 15-month interval between the eighth and ninth rounds of dialogue was the longest since such contacts resumed in 2002. Du Qinglin, head of the Party's United Front Work Department (UFWD) and the most senior Chinese official engaged in discussions with the Dalai Lama's envoys, reportedly briefed the envoys on the Fifth Forum and claimed that the forum showed that "[no] country or party in the world can match China and the [Communist Party] in using the resources of the whole country to support the development of an ethnic region." Neither side reported substantive progress as a result of the ninth round of dialogue and both sides reiterated key positions, but senior figures referred to certain developments in a positive manner. For example, Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama's envoys both emphasized the important role of Fifth Forum developments. Zhu Weiqun, Deputy Head of the UFWD, praised the "better attitude" of the Dalai Lama's Special Envoy, Lodi Gyari. In March 2010, Lodi Gyari referred favourably to the Party's Fifth Forum decision to consider development issues throughout all Tibetan autonomous areas: We welcome the fact that the Fifth Tibet Work Forum has looked into the issues of development in all Tibetan areas—the Tibet Autonomous Region as well as other Tibetan areas. It is our strong belief that all the Tibetan areas must be under a uniform policy and a single administration. If we take away the political slogans, many of the issues that have been prioritized by the Forum are similar to the basic needs of the Tibetan people outlined in our Memorandum. Other developments at the ninth round of dialogue included:

- **Party adds more preconditions on the Dalai Lama.** Du Qinglin listed four types of expression (or criticism) that the Dalai Lama must not "indulge in":
 - a) "National interests brook no infringement";
 - b) "The principles of the Constitution brook no trampling on";
 - c) "National dignity brooks no vilification"; and
 - d) "The common wishes of the people of all ethnic groups brook no deviation."
- **The Tibetan "Note."** The Dalai Lama's envoys provided to UFWD officials a "Note" with additional explanation of the eighth-round "Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People," which elaborated on behalf of the Dalai Lama a more detailed explanation of Tibetan aspirations for "genuine autonomy" than had been available previously. The Note contained "constructive suggestions for a way forward" and addressed "fundamental issues," according to a February 10, 2010, Special Envoy statement.
- **Party rejection of the "Note."** At a February 2 press conference, Zhu Weiqun rejected the Note and claimed that the envoys refused to "revise a single word" of the Memorandum or "make any concession." Zhu repeated that the Party is willing to discuss only the Dalai Lama's "personal future and the future of those around him."

i) Religious Freedom: Tibetan Buddhists "Can Believe Whatever They Want as Long as It's Legal"

The Chinese government and Communist Party's push to define and manage a "normal order" for Tibetan Buddhism, and transform the Tibetan Buddhist community into one that adheres to state-approved positions and practices, creates increasing restraints on the exercise of freedom of religion for Tibetan Buddhists. In March 2010, Lhasa's mayor summed up the limits on freedom of religion: "In Tibet, people can believe whatever they want as long as it is legal."

ii) Strengthening The Role Of Law In Shaping, Controlling Tibetan Buddhism.

During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Chinese government and Communist Party strengthened their push to use policy and legal measures to shape and control what Chinese officials, including President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao, refer to as the "normal order" for Tibetan Buddhism. Hu directed senior Party leadership figures attending the Fifth Tibet Work Forum to guide Tibetan Buddhism "to keep in line with socialist society" and to rely on the Party's "basic principles for religious work" and the government's "laws and regulations" to achieve that end. Some of the principal regulatory instruments to which Hu referred were not issued until recent years; the most recent measure went into effect days before the Fifth Tibet Work Forum commenced. In addition to China's principal regulatory measure on religion, the 2005 Regulation on Religious Affairs, the central and Tibet Autonomous Region governments have issued at least four regulatory measures since 2007 that provide increased state control of Tibetan Buddhism.

- **Effective January 1, 2007.** The TAR People's Government Standing Committee issued the TAR Implementing Measures for the Regulation on Religious Affairs (TAR Measures), imposing stricter and more detailed controls on monks, nuns, monasteries, and nunneries in the TAR than previous measures.
- **Effective March 1, 2007.** The State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) issued the Measures for Putting Professional Religious Personnel on Record (Record Measures), requiring nationwide re-registration of "professional religious personnel."
- **Effective September 1, 2007.** SARA issued the Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism. The measures could transform Tibetan Buddhism in China by empowering the Party and government to gradually reshape the religion by controlling one of the religion's most unique and important features—lineages of teachers that Tibetan Buddhists believe are reincarnations (trulkus) and that can span centuries.
- **Effective January 10, 2010.** The Buddhist Association of China issued the Measures for Confirming the Credentials of Tibetan Buddhist Professional Religious Personnel (Confirming Measures).⁶⁹ The measures provide that Tibetan Buddhist "religious personnel" whose credentials were "confirmed" prior to the measure's effective date need not repeat the confirmation process, but that the monastery or nunnery Democratic Management Committee (DMC) must examine and verify the monk's, nun's, or trulku's conformity with political, professional, and personal criteria. After

the DMC submits an opinion on the applicant to the local Buddhist Association for approval, the association will issue a registration certificate to the "religious professional." The TAR government reported on the date the Confirming Measures took effect that it would complete re-registration by the end of 2010—including recording the government's assessment of the "qualifications" of Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, and "living Buddhas," a Chinese term for *trulkus*.¹⁷⁵⁸

The number of Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns subject to re-registration under the Record Measures and Confirming Measures is substantial. The central government has reported the total number of monks and nuns in the Tibetan areas of China as approximately 120,000 as long ago as 1997 and as recently as June 2009, according to a U.S. State Department report. The impact of the measures could result in substantial losses to the monastic community if authorities apply re-registration in a manner intended to weed out monks and nuns whom authorities suspect of holding beliefs that the government does not deem to be "legal." Such views include religious devotion toward the Dalai Lama and support of the Dalai Lama's recognition in 1995 of Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the Panchen Lama.

iii) Political Imprisonment of Tibetans: Law as a Tool of Repression.

Reports of Tibetan political protest and detention declined during the Commission's 2010 reporting year based on Commission monitoring as of early September. The apparent decline may suggest that Tibetans generally are less willing to risk the consequences of political protest in the presence of the ongoing security crackdown on Tibetan communities, monasteries, nunneries, schools, and workplaces following the wave of Tibetan political protests that began in March 2008. The Commission, however, cannot determine the extent to which the apparent decrease may have resulted from heightened security measures that reduce the frequency of protests and detentions (thus reducing the number of reports of protest and detention), or the extent to which Chinese government suppression of information flow may have prevented reports of protest and detention from reaching international monitoring and reporting organizations (thus reducing such agencies' ability to report protests and detention).¹⁷⁵⁹

China's security and judicial institutions' use of laws on "splittism" and "leaking state secrets" during this reporting year infringed upon Chinese citizens' constitutionally protected freedoms of speech, religion, association, and assembly —first by using the law on "splittism" to punish Tibetans who criticize or peacefully protest government policies, and then by using the law on "leaking state secrets" to punish Tibetans who attempt to share with other Tibetans information about incidents of repression and punishment. For example, a Chinese court reportedly sentenced Dondrub Wangchen to imprisonment on the charge of "splittism" for using film media to disseminate Tibetan views on topics such as Tibetan freedom and the Dalai Lama. Prosecutors reportedly used the charge of "leaking secrets" to seek conviction of Konchog Tsephel and Kunga Tseyang for using their Web sites to share with other Tibetans—including Tibetans outside of China—

¹⁷⁵⁸ Excerpts from The '2010 ANNUAL REPORT' of Congressional-Executive Commission On China, available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2010-annual-report#V.%20Tibet>


¹⁷⁵⁹ Excerpts from The '2010 ANNUAL REPORT' of Congressional-Executive Commission On China, available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2010-annual-report#V.%20Tibet>

information and views on Tibetan experiences of detention, imprisonment, and religious and cultural repression during the ongoing crackdown.

Chinese government officials moved during the Commission's 2010 reporting year to diminish or end the public influence of emergent Tibetan civic and intellectual leaders. Prior to this reporting year, the apparent misapplication of China's Criminal Law to imprison Tibetan leaders and remove them from society involved religious figures, e.g., Bangri Chogtrul (1999), Sonam Phuntsog (1999), Tenzin Deleg (2002), and Phurbu Tsering (2008). During this reporting year, officials misapplied the law in order to imprison environmentalist and art collector Karma Samdrub and charge secularist intellectual Tagyal—both of whom had developed cooperative relationships with the government and avoided "political" activity, according to reports. Some officials may suspect that such leaders could encourage in Tibetan citizens a commitment to civic values and responsibilities that the Party may regard as a potential obstacle to the Party's exclusive exercise of political power. Other officials may have sought retribution against the men for more parochial reasons.

- In Karma Samdrub's case, a court in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region sentenced him on June 24, 2010, to 15 years' imprisonment for "tomb-robbing," a charge first brought against him in 1998 and dropped the same year. Officials revived criminal proceedings against Karma Samdrub after he attained national acclaim as an environmentalist, and then sought the release of two of his brothers whom public security officials detained in August 2009 after an environmental protection organization they founded accused local officials of hunting protected wildlife.
- In the case of Tagyal—an intellectual who worked at a government publishing house and advocated for a more secular Tibetan society—officials in Qinghai province charged him in May 2010 with "inciting splittism" after he used veiled language the previous month to urge Tibetans to avoid corrupt official channels when donating money to aid victims of the April 2010 Yushu earthquake in Qinghai. Other accounts attribute his detention to the publication of a book he wrote about the 2008 Tibetan protests.¹⁷⁶⁰

¹⁷⁶⁰ Excerpts from The '2010 ANNUAL REPORT' of Congressional-Executive Commission On China, available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2010-annual-report#V.%20Tibet>



Source: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2010-annual-report#V.%20Tibet>

9.4.5 China's Restriction on Religion

The report titled “Recent Chinese dealings with faith groups reflect a pattern of government restrictions on religion” published in 2018, states that While the Chinese government asserts that it protects religious freedom, a series of annual Pew Research Center reports on religious restrictions around the globe have detailed government efforts aimed at maintaining strict control over religious beliefs and practices in the country. Two recent events have brought this into focus: China’s agreement with the Vatican on how bishops are appointed, and restrictions China has placed on predominantly Muslim ethnic Uighurs.¹⁷⁶¹

China has long wrangled with the Vatican over naming of bishops in an effort to maintain state control over the church. That dispute was back in the news last month when the Vatican agreed to accept the legitimacy of seven bishops who had been appointed by the Chinese government, breaking with its longstanding policy of not recognizing bishops unless they have been selected by the pope. Some Catholics and others have criticized the agreement for ceding to China too much control over church matters. The deal with the Vatican comes at a time when China also has come under fire for reportedly detaining at least 1 million Uighurs in the country’s northwestern Xinjiang province. The government, however, denies the allegations and says their actions in Xinjiang are necessary to combat religious extremism and separatism.¹⁷⁶²

¹⁷⁶¹ <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/11/recent-chinese-dealings-with-faith-groups-reflect-a-pattern-of-government-restrictions-on-religion/>

¹⁷⁶² <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/11/recent-chinese-dealings-with-faith-groups-reflect-a-pattern-of-government-restrictions-on-religion/>

Center has been [tracking religious restrictions](#) (2007 to 2016), China has been near the top of the list of most restrictive governments. In 2016, the most recent year for which the Center has religious restrictions data, the Chinese government was the *most* restrictive toward religious groups among all the 198 countries included in the study (it scored 8.8 out of 10 on the Government Restrictions Index). The Chinese government restricts religion in a variety of ways, including by banning entire religious groups and detaining their members. For example, the government has legally banned the Falun Gong movement, as well as several Christian groups. At the end of 2017, over 3,000 Falun Gong practitioners remained in state detention, with some reported deaths in prison. In addition, hundreds of members of other groups, including Protestants, Muslims, Buddhists and Catholics, remained imprisoned at year’s end.

The government also routinely prohibits certain religious practices, destroys religious property and detains large numbers of people based on their religious beliefs and affiliations. For instance, since 2014, observers estimate that 2,000 crosses and church buildings have been demolished in the eastern province of Zhejiang under a targeted campaign to remove “illegal” church structures. And in the [Tibet Autonomous Region](#) and nearby areas, monks and nuns have allegedly been evicted from Buddhist monasteries.

The more recent developments in Xinjiang province (with its sizable Muslim population) and elsewhere coincide with tighter government controls over the media, businesses and civil society. Moreover, the country’s president, Xi Jinping, has declared his intention to “Sinicize” all religions — an effort to strengthen control over religious groups by China’s ruling Communist Party. Although government restrictions in China are in the “very high” category, social hostilities on religion – those perpetrated by private actors and social groups – are quite low. In 2016, the country scored in the “low” category (1.3 out of 10) on the Social Hostilities Index, according to Pew Research Center’s most recent religious restrictions study. In other countries included in the study that have high levels of government restrictions, such as Russia and Egypt, restrictions on religion and social hostilities scores are often correlated, but China is an exception.¹⁷⁶³

9.4.6 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR) Country Profile on China¹⁷⁶⁴

Following is the list of reports issued by Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups of the UN Commission on Human Rights on Religious Freedom in China.

Special Rapporteur for Religious Freedom¹⁷⁶⁵
1994 China Visit Report ¹⁷⁶⁶ Document Number: E/CN.4/1995/91 December 22, 1994

¹⁷⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶⁴ <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/CNIndex.aspx>

¹⁷⁶⁵ <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomReligion/Pages/FreedomReligionIndex.aspx>

¹⁷⁶⁶ <https://www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/b65df6bf27f253dd8025671a005c61af?OpenDocument>

Report: Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Religious Tolerance¹⁷⁶⁷
Document Number: E/CN.4/2003/66
January 6, 2003

Report: Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Religious Tolerance¹⁷⁶⁸
Document Number: E/CN.4/2000/65
February 15, 2000

Report: China's Minorities-The Case of Xinjiang and the Uyghur People¹⁷⁶⁹
Document Number: E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2003/WP.16
May 5, 2003

Available online: <https://www.cecc.gov/resources/international-human-rights-materials>

9.5 Human Rights

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is an authoritarian state in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the paramount authority. CCP members hold almost all top government and security apparatus positions. Ultimate authority rests with the CCP Central Committee's 25-member Political Bureau (Politburo) and its seven-member Standing Committee. Xi Jinping continued to hold the three most powerful positions as CCP general secretary, state president, and chairman of the Central Military Commission.

9.5.1 China's Position on Human Rights

In a white paper titled. "Seeking Happiness for People: 70 Years of Progress on Human Rights in China", published by The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China states the following¹⁷⁷⁰:

The progress in human rights in China parallels the country's overall progress in recent times, and results from the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The cause of human rights in China has gone through three phases since 1949:

The first phase: Founded in 1949, the PRC established a basic socialist system and achieved the most extensive and profound social transformation in China's history, laying down the basic political prerequisite and establishing the institutions for developing human rights in China.

Between 1840 and 1949, due to repeated invasions by foreign powers, a corrupt ruling class, and a backward social system, China was gradually reduced to a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. Frequent wars, instability, a shattered economy, and a destitute populace – this is an accurate portrayal of China at that time. The people suffered under

¹⁷⁶⁷ [https://www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/2848af408d01ec0ac1256609004e770b/29a2065e24743d73c1256cee003e5cc0/\\$FILE/G0310306.pdf](https://www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/2848af408d01ec0ac1256609004e770b/29a2065e24743d73c1256cee003e5cc0/$FILE/G0310306.pdf)

¹⁷⁶⁸ [https://www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/80f0e46fc1648260802568ba004b44bf/\\$FILE/G0011063.pdf](https://www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/80f0e46fc1648260802568ba004b44bf/$FILE/G0011063.pdf)

¹⁷⁶⁹ https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/SUBCOM/other/E-CN_4-SUB_2-AC_5-2003-WG_16.pdf

¹⁷⁷⁰ A white paper titled. "Seeking Happiness for People: 70 Years of Progress on Human Rights in China", published by The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China in 2019, available online at URL:

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201909/22/content_WS5d87752fc6d0bcf8c4c13d32.html

the oppression of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism, and had no access to human rights at all. With the founding of the PRC, China achieved and then defended true, complete national liberation and independence, which provided the fundamental guarantee for the subsistence, freedom, and personal security of the people, and created fundamental conditions to effectively protect and continuously improve all of their rights. The PRC established and consolidated the political system of people's democracy, which guarantees the people's rights to be masters of their country. The Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which was adopted on the eve of the founding of the PRC and served as the provisional Constitution of China, stipulates: people have the right to vote and to stand in election in addition to a wide range of political rights and freedoms; and women have the same rights as men in all respects, including politics, economy, culture, education and social life. The 1954 Constitution of the PRC, which was adopted at the First Session of the First National People's Congress (NPC), set up the principles of people's democracy and socialism, established the system of people's congresses, and provided institutional guarantees for ensuring all power in the PRC belongs to the people. It included a chapter specifying the basic rights and obligations of citizens.

The various democratic reforms and social programs carried out by the PRC during this period created conditions for economic and social development and protection of human rights. The land reform in the early 1950s abolished the feudal system of land ownership that allowed for exploitation by the landlord class. As a result, Chinese peasants were economically liberated and became masters of their country. Suppressed rural productive forces were unleashed and peasants' economic status and living standards were greatly improved. The democratic reform of the production and management of state-owned factories, mines, and transportation operators that started in 1950 set up factory management committees and workers' congresses in these entities, and hence made workers true masters of their enterprises. The Marriage Law promulgated in 1950 abolished the feudal marriage system that sanctioned arranged or forced marriages, enabled men's superiority over women, and neglected children's interests. It established a new marriage system featuring monogamy, freedom of marriage, gender equality, and protection of the legitimate interests of women and children. In addition, China promoted education and healthcare, established labor insurance and social relief systems, and created a nascent social security system with public employers being the building blocks.

The second phase: The reform and opening up launched in 1978 opened the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and has emancipated and developed the productive forces to a great extent. As a result the people's rights to subsistence and development and other basic rights are better protected, and the cause of human rights in China has made huge progress.¹⁷⁷¹

Reform and opening up was a great new revolution undertaken by the people of China and led by the CPC under the new conditions of that era. In the course of reform and opening up, the CPC has made respecting and protecting human rights a goal of its governance, and added new elements to advancing the cause. In 1997, the 15th CPC

¹⁷⁷¹ A white paper titled. "Seeking Happiness for People: 70 Years of Progress on Human Rights in China", published by The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China in 2019, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201909/22/content_WS5d87752fc6d0bcf8c4c13d32.html

National Congress committed to: "...ensuring that the people enjoy extensive rights and freedom endowed by law, and respecting and guaranteeing human rights." In 2002, "Human rights are respected and guaranteed" was written into the report to the 16th CPC National Congress as an important goal of socialist political progress. In 2007, the report to the 17th CPC National Congress further pointed out: "We must respect and guarantee human rights, and ensure the equal right to participation and development for all members of society in accordance with the law." And in the same year, this principle was written for the first time into the CPC Constitution. In the course of reform and opening up, China adheres to governance based on the Constitution, which provides the fundamental legal guarantee for comprehensive progress in human rights. In 1982, the Fifth Session of the Fifth NPC adopted the current Constitution of the PRC, which clearly defines the substance and basic form of socialist democracy. It provides that all citizens are entitled to civil rights, political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights. In the following years, the NPC adopted five amendments to the Constitution to better protect human rights. These covered the basic economic system, distribution system, protection of citizens' private property, and social security system. In particular, the amendment adopted at the Second Session of the 10th NPC added the line "The State respects and preserves human rights" into the Constitution, a move that has strongly guaranteed and advanced human rights in China.

In the course of reform and opening up, China has incorporated the protection of human rights into national development strategies and plans. In 1991, the Chinese government published its first white paper on human rights – *Human Rights in China*. It formulated and implemented the National Human Rights Action Plan, which set phased goals and tasks for respecting and safeguarding human rights. China has also made targeted action plans relating to the economy, culture, society, the environment and other fields, as well as plans to protect the rights of specific groups, such as ethnic minorities, women, children, the elderly, and people with disabilities, to ensure that all the people of China can fully enjoy their rights. In the course of reform and opening up, China has established and improved institutions for protecting human rights that are suited to its national conditions. A human rights protection system with Chinese characteristics has taken shape. The Chinese government has put into place a number of systems and mechanisms, including those dealing with subsistence allowances, the minimum wage, labor security supervision, labor dispute settlement, employment assistance, and compulsory education (primary and middle schools). With the promulgation of the General Principles of the Civil Law and Tort Liability Law, China has established a system of protection for the right to dignity. In addition, it has advanced household registration reform, and made consistent improvements to the election system, the community-level self-governance system, the system for transparency of government affairs, the litigation system and the system for intellectual property protection.

The third phase: The 18th CPC National Congress in 2012 marks the advent of a new era for socialism with Chinese characteristics. Guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, China espouses the people-centered development philosophy, works hard to ensure and improve people's

wellbeing, and continues to strengthen legal protection for human rights. As a result, the cause of human rights in China has made headway on all fronts.¹⁷⁷²

In building socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, full respect for and protection of human rights is an important goal of China's endeavors to build a moderately prosperous society in all respects. This establishes the importance of human rights from a strategic perspective. The CPC Constitution amended and adopted at the 18th National Congress reaffirms the principle of respecting and protecting human rights. In 2014, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee adopted the "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Advancing the Rule of Law", which emphasizes the need to "provide stronger judicial protection of human rights" and to "strengthen awareness throughout the whole of society about the need to respect and safeguard human rights." In 2017, the 19th CPC National Congress established Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as the guiding ideology of the CPC, and categorically stated that we should "strengthen legal protection for human rights to ensure that the people enjoy extensive rights and freedoms as prescribed by law." This provides fundamental basis for us to advance the cause of human rights in China.

In building socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, China focuses on achieving the Two Centenary Goals and realizing the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. For this purpose it put forward the Five-point Strategy (promoting economic, political, cultural, social, and environmental progress in a coordinated way), so every citizen's rights can be fully protected in each of these spheres. For this new era it has also introduced the Four-pronged Strategy: to complete a moderately prosperous society in all respects, further reform, advance the rule of law, and strengthen Party discipline, which provides a strong guarantee for advancing the cause of human rights in China on all fronts. China respects and guarantees human rights throughout the process of modernizing its national governance system and capacity. It has strengthened legal protection for human rights and reformed and refined the systems to protect human rights, and it safeguards citizens' rights through the combination of modern institutions and the rule of law.¹⁷⁷³The white paper asserts that following rights are experienced by the people of China:

1. Personal rights and dignity are well respected and protected. Personal rights and dignity are the basic components of human rights, so China has consistently attached great importance to protecting such rights over the past 70 years. The Constitution of the PRC states that the personal dignity of citizens of the PRC is inviolable. The 19th CPC National Congress again emphasized the protection of personal rights, property rights and right to dignity, demonstrating the humane view of protecting people's personal dignity and promoting the well-rounded development of the individual person. The Civil Law in particular elaborates the right to dignity. China is now accelerating the reform of the household registration system. It has relaxed restrictions on the change of domicile, enabling eligible permanent residents with stable employment in urban areas to localize

¹⁷⁷² A white paper titled. "Seeking Happiness for People: 70 Years of Progress on Human Rights in China", published by The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China in 2019, available online at URL:

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201909/22/content_WS5d87752fc6d0bcf8c4c13d32.html

¹⁷⁷³ Ibid

their residency. Inviolability of residence, freedom of correspondence and security of information are fully protected by law.¹⁷⁷⁴

2. China fully safeguards workers' rights. After the economic growth and a policy that prioritizes employment, China's employed population expanded rapidly. During the six years from the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012 to 2018, over 13 million new jobs were created each year, and the total employed population in 2018 reached 775.86 million. The registered unemployment rate remained at a low level below 4.1 percent for a long period of time. The guarantee for remuneration for labor, right to equal pay for equal work, right to rest and leisure, right to occupational safety and health, right to join in and organize a labor union, and right to participate in the democratic management of businesses and public institutions are protected by law, as is women workers' right to special protection. Universal mechanisms to adjust and assess the minimum wage have been established across the country, so as to ensure the basic living conditions of workers and their dependents.

3. China protects people's rights to know, to participate, to express, and to supervise. A mechanism through which public opinion is consulted in drafting laws has been set up and improved. Transparency of administrative work of the government is enhanced, and the channels for public participation in legislation and major administrative decision-making are constantly broadening. By 2018 the state legislatures had solicited public opinion on 172 draft laws, receiving 5.1 million comments from 150 million people. A mechanism in which decisions are made in accordance with the law has been improved. By March 2019, the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) had received 141,807 proposals and 130,299 of them were placed on file, published and transmitted 12,096 samples of public opinion, and adopted and carried out most of the proposals. A public complaints reporting system has been established and improved. The national public complaints information system links public complaints and proposals administrative organs at all levels with more than 90,000 functional departments, town and township governments and sub-district offices, and 41 departments of the CPC and ministries of the central government.

4. China protects freedom of religious belief in accordance with the law. In accordance with the Constitution and the law, the Chinese government supports all religions in upholding the principle of independence and self-management. It also supports religious groups, clerical personnel, and believers in managing their own religious affairs. The government manages religious affairs involving national and public interests but does not interfere in the internal affairs of religions. The state treats all religions fairly and equally.

5. China effectively guarantees ethnic minority rights in administering state affairs. All 55 ethnic minority groups have deputies at the NPC and members in the CPPCC National Committee. The 13th NPC has 438 deputies from ethnic minority groups, accounting for 14.7 percent of the total number of deputies. In recent years, among the

¹⁷⁷⁴ A white paper titled. "Seeking Happiness for People: 70 Years of Progress on Human Rights in China", published by The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China in 2019, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201909/22/content_WS5d87752fc6d0bcf8c4c13d32.html

candidates passing the national civil service admission examination, ethnic minority candidates made up more than 13 percent, higher than the ethnic minority population ratio in the country (8.49 percent). The ethnic autonomous areas enjoy the right of autonomy in a wide range of fields as prescribed by law: politics, economy, education, science and technology, culture and health. In addition to the powers assigned to local authorities, the people's congresses of ethnic autonomous areas also have the power to enact regulations on the exercise of autonomy and other separate regulations in the light of the political, economic and cultural characteristics of the ethnic group or ethnic groups in the areas concerned. The standing committees of all the people's congresses in the 155 ethnic autonomous areas have members of ethnic groups exercising regional autonomy acting as director or deputy director. The chairpersons of autonomous regions, governors of autonomous prefectures, and heads of autonomous counties are all citizens from the ethnic groups exercising regional autonomy of the said areas.

6. The ethnic minorities and ethnic minority areas have leapfrogged in social and economic development. Over the last 70 years, the state has treated the social and economic development of ethnic minorities and ethnic minority areas as an important element of national development. Through a series of strategic measures such as large-scale development of western China, actions to enrich border areas and their residents, efforts to develop smaller ethnic groups, efforts to preserve and promote ethnic minority style villages and towns, paired-up assistance, and special planning for ethnic minority undertakings, the Chinese government has increased its investment in the fight against poverty in ethnic minority areas, which has given a significant boost to local social and economic development. The total GDP of the five autonomous regions of Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Tibet, Ningxia and Xinjiang, and the three provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou and Qinghai where there are a large number of ethnic minorities reached RMB9.06 trillion in 2018, an increase of 7.2 percent over 2017, which was 0.6 percentage point higher than the national average.

7. Women's rights to participation in the administration of public affairs and social and economic development are protected. Women are guaranteed the right to participate in the administration and deliberation of state affairs. The 13th NPC has 742 female deputies, accounting for 24.9 percent of the total, 12.9 percentage points higher than the figure for the First NPC in 1954. And the 13th CPPCC National Committee has 440 female members, making up 20.4 percent of the total, 14.3 percentage points higher than that for the First CPPCC National Committee in 1949. Since the 1990s, every CPC National Congress has attached importance to training and selecting female officials. The number of female civil servants was 65,000 in 1950; this figure had increased to 1.93 million, or 26.8 percent of all civil servants, by 2018.¹⁷⁷⁵

8. Ensuring independent and impartial exercise of judicial and procuratorial powers. China has issued five outlines for five-year reform of the people's courts and five plans on reform of the people's procuratorates. To protect citizen's right of action, it has implemented a case docketing and registration system across the board, which ensures that every case application receives a response. China has reformed the management of

¹⁷⁷⁵ A white paper titled. "Seeking Happiness for People: 70 Years of Progress on Human Rights in China", published by The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China in 2019, available online at URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201909/22/content_WS5d87752fc6d0bcf8c4c13d32.html

judicial personnel, adopted a quota system for judges and procurators, and initiated job security reform for judicial personnel, enabling them to be more regularized and professional. It has fully implemented a judicial responsibility system to ensure that those who have handled a case assume full responsibility for it. It has improved the fast-track sentencing procedure for criminal cases, further separated the handling of simple and complex cases, and formed a multi-layer criminal litigation system with Chinese characteristics. Where conditions permit, local courts and procuratorates under the provincial level have carried out unified management of personnel, funds and property. China is exploring setting up people's courts and people's procuratorates across administrative boundaries. The Supreme People's Court now has six circuit courts, and there are also courts that handle intellectual property and financial cases, and online courts. The state has strengthened the protection of public interest, and public interest lawsuits are filed by procuratorial organs. By March 2019, 157,095 cases of public interest had been handled by procuratorial organs.¹⁷⁷⁶

9.5.2 China's Human Right Abuses

In a report titled "China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, And Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report" published by Executive Commission on China maintains the following:¹⁷⁷⁷

1. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings

There were numerous reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. In many instances few or no details were available. There were reports Shanghai police shot and killed Ju Hailiang on April 13, while he was protesting a decision to demolish his home. Police reportedly also injured Ju's sister and his nephew. Authorities charged Ju's sister, her husband, and their son with "endangering public safety." His sister and her husband were also charged with "disorderly behaviour" for throwing bricks and rocks at the police. In Xinjiang there were reports of custodial deaths related to detentions in the expanding internment camps. Some of these deaths occurred before 2018 and were reported only after detainees escaped to other countries. Abdulreshit Seley Hajim, a Uighur businessperson, died in May or June while being held in an internment camp. According to those interviewed by Radio Free Asia, he died from strikes to the head with a blunt object. Although legal reforms in recent years decreased the use of the death penalty and improved the review process, authorities executed some defendants in criminal proceedings following convictions that lacked due process and adequate channels for appeal.

2. Disappearance

There were multiple reports authorities detained individuals and held them at undisclosed locations for extended periods. The government conducted mass arbitrary detention of Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslims in Xinjiang. China Human Rights

¹⁷⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷⁷ Excerpts from report titled "China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, And Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report" published by Executive Commission on China, available online at URL: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CHINA-INCLUDES-TIBET-HONG-KONG-AND-MACAU-2018.pdf>

Defenders reported these detentions amounted to enforced disappearance, as families were not given information about the length or location of the detention. Human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, who went missing in 2017, remained missing throughout 2018. In September 2017 Radio Free Asia reported Gao's family said they were told he was in police custody at an undisclosed location, although authorities did not release any details surrounding his detention. In November award-winning Chinese documentary photographer Lu Guang disappeared after traveling to Xinjiang to lead a photography workshop. Authorities did not respond to requests by Lu's wife and international advocacy organizations to account for Lu's status and whereabouts. Lawyer Wang Quanzhang was reported alive in the Tianjin Detention Center in July after being held in incommunicado detention for more than three years. Wang had a closed court hearing on the charges against him on December 26. Authorities detained Wang in the July 2015 "709" roundup of more than 300 human rights lawyers and legal associates. The government still had not provided a comprehensive, credible accounting of all those killed, missing, or detained in connection with the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations. Many activists who were involved in the 1989 demonstrations and their family members continued to suffer official harassment. The government made no efforts to prevent, investigate, or punish such acts.¹⁷⁷⁸

3. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The law prohibits the physical abuse and mistreatment of detainees and forbids prison guards from coercing confessions, insulting prisoners' dignity, and beating or encouraging others to beat prisoners. Amendments to the criminal procedure law exclude evidence obtained through illegal means, including coerced confessions, in certain categories of criminal cases. Enforcement of these legal protections continued to be lax. Numerous former prisoners and detainees reported they were beaten, raped, subjected to electric shock, forced to sit on stools for hours on end, hung by the wrists, deprived of sleep, force fed, forced to take medication against their will, and otherwise subjected to physical and psychological abuse. Although prison authorities abused ordinary prisoners, they reportedly singled out political and religious dissidents for particularly harsh treatment. Many human rights advocates expressed concern that lawyers, law associates, and activists detained in the "709" crackdown continued to suffer various forms of torture, abuse, or degrading treatment, similar to the 2017 reports of authorities' treatment of Wu Gan, Li Chunfu, Xie Yang, and Jiang Tianyong. In September, according to Radio Free Asia, Huang Qi, founder and director of 64 Tianwang Human Rights Center, sustained injuries from multiple interrogation sessions. Huang was detained in the city of Mianyang, Sichuan Province, in 2016 for "illegally supplying state secrets overseas." Multiple contacts reported detention officials deprived Huang of sleep and timely access to medical treatment in an attempt to force Huang to confess. In October prosecutors brought more charges against Huang, including "leaking national secrets." The Mianyang Intermediate People's Court had not set a new trial date for Huang since its sudden cancellation of his scheduled trial in June. Huang's mother, Pu Wenqing, petitioned central authorities in October to release him because she believed her son was

¹⁷⁷⁸ Excerpts from report titled "China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, And Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report" published by Executive Commission on China, available online at URL: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CHINA-INCLUDES-TIBET-HONG-KONG-AND-MACAU-2018.pdf>

mistreated. She had not been able to see him in two years. Pu disappeared on December 7 after plainclothes security personnel detained her at the Beijing train station.¹⁷⁷⁹

Members of the minority Uighur ethnic group reported systematic torture and other degrading treatment by law enforcement officers and officials working within the penal system and the internment camps. Survivors stated authorities subjected individuals in custody to electrocution, waterboarding, beatings, stress positions, injection of unknown substances, and cold cells. Practitioners of the banned Falun Gong spiritual movement and members of the Church of Almighty God also reported systematic torture in custody. The treatment and abuse of detainees under the new liuzhi detention system, which operates outside the judicial system to investigate corruption, retained many characteristics of the previous shuanggui system, such as extended solitary confinement, sleep deprivation, beatings, and forced standing or sitting in uncomfortable positions for hours and sometimes days, according to press reports and an NGO report released in August . The law states psychiatric treatment and hospitalization should be “on a voluntary basis,” but the law also allows authorities and family members to commit persons to psychiatric facilities against their will and fails to provide meaningful legal protections for persons sent to psychiatric facilities. The law does not provide for the right to a lawyer and restricts a person’s right to communicate with those outside the psychiatric institution. According to the Legal Daily (a state-owned newspaper covering legal affairs), the Ministry of Public Security directly administered 23 high-security psychiatric hospitals for the criminally insane. While many of those committed to mental health facilities were convicted of murder and other violent crimes, there were also reports of activists, religious or spiritual adherents, and petitioners involuntarily subjected to psychiatric treatment for political reasons. Public security officials may commit individuals to psychiatric facilities and force treatment for “conditions” that have no basis in psychiatry. In February, according to Civil Rights and Livelihood Watch, a human rights oriented website, local security officers sent Chongqing dissident Liu Gang to a psychiatric hospital for the seventh time. Since 2004 Liu often criticized the Chinese Communist Party, and authorities regularly detained him on the charge of “disturbing public order.” Some activists and organizations continue to accuse the government of involuntarily harvesting organs from prisoners of conscience, especially members of Falun Gong. The government denied the claims, having officially ended the long-standing practice of involuntarily harvesting the organs of executed prisoners for use in transplants in 2015.¹⁷⁸⁰

4. Freedom of Expression, Including for the Press

The constitution states citizens “enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration,” although authorities limited and did not respect these rights, especially when they conflicted with CCP interests. Authorities continued tight control of all print, broadcast, electronic, and social media and regularly used them to propagate government views and CCP ideology. Authorities censored and

¹⁷⁷⁹ Excerpts from report titled “China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, And Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report” published by Executive Commission on China, available online at URL: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CHINA-INCLUDES-TIBET-HONG-KONG-AND-MACAU-2018.pdf>

¹⁷⁸⁰ Excerpts from report titled “China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, And Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report” published by Executive Commission on China, available online at URL: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CHINA-INCLUDES-TIBET-HONG-KONG-AND-MACAU-2018.pdf>

manipulated the press and the internet, particularly around sensitive anniversaries and topics.

i) Freedom of Expression: Citizens could discuss many political topics privately and in small groups without official punishment. Authorities, however, routinely took harsh action against citizens who questioned the legitimacy of the CCP. Some independent think tanks, study groups, and seminars reported pressure to cancel sessions on sensitive topics. Those who made politically sensitive comments in public speeches, academic discussions, or in remarks to media, or posted sensitive comments online, remained subject to punitive measures. In July, in the midst of a national outcry over faulty children's vaccines, police visited the homes of concerned parents to attempt to stop their online discussion of the issue. Some parents were shown a document that said police intended to charge parents who attended a planned media session with "colluding with foreign media." The parents subsequently cancelled the press conference. In April Cui Haoxin, a Muslim poet, was detained in a Xinjiang internment camp for one week, which he attributed to the political views he expressed in his poetry and other writings. On August 16, police in Xinjiang threatened Cui in an attempt to stop him from posting information on Twitter about these camps.¹⁷⁸¹

ii) Press and Media Freedom: The CCP and government continued to maintain ultimate authority over all published, online, and broadcast material. Officially, only state-run media outlets have government approval to cover CCP leaders or other topics deemed "sensitive." While it did not dictate all content to be published or broadcast, the CCP and the government had unchecked authority to mandate if, when, and how particular issues were reported or to order they not be reported at all. During the year state media reported senior authorities issued internal CCP rules detailing punishments for those who failed to hew to ideological regulations, ordering a further crackdown on illegal internet accounts and platforms, and instructing the media to engage in "journalism based on Marxism." The rules also planned for greater political and ideological indoctrination efforts targeting at university students. The government tightened ideological control over media and public discourse by restructuring its regulatory system. The CCP's propaganda department has direct control of the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT). Authorities also restructured SAPPRFT in March, relocating some of its responsibilities and renaming it the State Administration for Radio and Television Agency (SARFT). The new structure greatly expands CCP control of film, news media, newspapers, books, and magazines. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), which directly manages internet content, including online news media, also promotes CCP propaganda. On November 14, the CAC issued a statement saying more than 9,800 internet accounts had been "cleaned up" as part of an ongoing campaign. On November 15, the CAC issued a notice that further restricted what opinions could be posted online and said the CAC would start to require detailed logs on users from internet and media firms as part of its new policy targeting dissenting opinion and social movements online. As of November 30, the CAC said it would require internet platforms that could be used to "socially mobilize" or that could lead to "major changes in public opinion" to submit reports on their activities. The government took further action to build its propaganda tools. In March it consolidated China Central Television, China Radio International, and China National Radio into a new

¹⁷⁸¹ Ibid.

super media group known as the “Voice of China.” State media explained the restructuring was meant to “strengthen the party’s concentrated development and management of important public opinion positions.”¹⁷⁸²

Journalists operated in an environment tightly controlled by the government. While the country’s increasingly internet-literate population demanded interesting stories told with the latest technologies, government authorities asserted control over those new technologies (such as livestreaming) and clamped down on new digital outlets and social media platforms. Because the Communist Party does not consider internet news companies “official” media, they are subject to debilitating regulations and barred from reporting on potentially “sensitive” stories. According to the most recent All China Journalist Association report from 2017 on the nation’s news media, there were 231,564 officially credentialed reporters working in the country. Only 1,406 worked for news websites, with the majority working at state-run outlets such as XinhuaNet.com and ChinaDaily.com. This did not mean online outlets did not report on important issues. Instead, many used creative means to share content, but limited their tactics and topics since they were acting outside official approval.

iii) Violence and Harassment: The government frequently impeded the work of the press, including citizen journalists. Journalists reported being subjected to physical attack, harassment, monitoring, and intimidation when reporting on sensitive topics. Government officials used criminal prosecution, civil lawsuits, and other punishment, including violence, detention, and other forms of harassment, to intimidate authors and journalists and to prevent the dissemination of unsanctioned information on a wide range of topics. Family members of journalists based overseas also faced harassment, and in some cases detention, as retaliation for the reporting of their relatives abroad. In 2017 authorities detained dozens of relatives of at least six reporters for Radio Free Asia’s Uighur Service. The reporters, members of the country’s Uighur minority group, were reporting on the Xinjiang internment camps. A journalist could face demotion or job loss for publishing views that challenged the government. In many cases potential sources refused to meet with journalists due to actual or feared government pressure. In particular academics--a traditional source of information--were increasingly unwilling to meet with journalists. Restrictions on foreign journalists by central and local CCP propaganda departments remained strict, especially during sensitive times and anniversaries. Foreign press outlets reported local employees of foreign news agencies were also subjected to official harassment and intimidation and this remained a major concern for foreign outlets.

Journalists who travelled to Xinjiang reported very high levels of surveillance, monitoring, harassment, and interference in their work. Foreign ministry officials again subjected a majority of journalists to special interviews as part of their annual visa renewal process. During these interviews the officials pressured journalists to report less on human rights issues, referencing reporting “red lines” journalists should not cross, and in some cases threatened them with nonrenewal of visas. Many foreign media organizations continued to have trouble expanding or maintaining their operations in the

¹⁷⁸² Excerpts from report titled “China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, And Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report” published by Executive Commission on China, available online at URL: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CHINA-INCLUDES-TIBET-HONG-KONG-AND-MACAU-2018.pdf>

country due to the difficulty of receiving visas. Some foreign media companies were increasingly unwilling to publicize such issues due to fear of provoking further backlash by the government. Authorities continued to enforce tight restrictions on citizens employed by foreign news organizations. The code of conduct for citizen employees of foreign media organizations threatens dismissal and loss of accreditation for those citizen employees who engage in independent reporting. It instructs them to provide their employers information that projects “a good image of the country.”

iv) Censorship or Content Restrictions: The State Council’s Regulations on the Administration of Publishing grant broad authority to the government at all levels to restrict publications based on content, including mandating if, when, and how particular issues are reported. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs daily press briefing was generally open, and the State Council Information Office organized some briefings by other government agencies, journalists did not have free access to other media events. The Ministry of Defence continued allowing select foreign media outlets to attend occasional press briefings. Official guidelines for domestic journalists were often vague, subject to change at the discretion of propaganda officials, and enforced retroactively. Propaganda authorities forced newspapers and online media providers to fire editors and journalists responsible for articles deemed inconsistent with official policy and suspended or closed publications. Self-censorship remained prevalent among journalists, authors, and editors, particularly with post facto government reviews carrying penalties of ranging severity. On February 8, the Guangdong Provincial Propaganda Department revoked the position and official title of Duan Gongwei, chief editor of the Southern Weekly, who oversaw two investigative financial reports about Hainan Airlines Group. The reports showed how the airline, which was reportedly linked to senior Chinese leaders, went on “acquisition sprees” despite operating with large debts.

The CCP Central Propaganda Department ordered media outlets to adhere strictly to the information provided by authoritative official departments, especially with respect to sensitive or prominent situations. Directives often warned against reporting on issues related to party and official reputation, health and safety, and foreign affairs.

Control over public depictions of President Xi increased, with censors aggressively shutting down any depiction that varied from official media storylines. Censors continued to block images of the Winnie the Pooh cartoon on social media because internet users used the symbol to represent President Xi Jinping. A June segment of John Oliver’s Last Week Tonight program on HBO criticizing Xi Jinping resulted in authorities temporarily blocking access to HBO’s online content. It was extremely difficult for foreign journalists to report from the TAR, other Tibetan areas, or Xinjiang without experiencing serious interference. Foreign reporters also experienced restricted access and interference when trying to report in other sensitive areas, including the North Korean border, at places of historical significance to the founding of the Communist party, sites of recent natural disasters, and areas--including in Beijing--experiencing social unrest. Overseas television newscasts, largely restricted to hotels and foreign residence compounds, were subject to censorship. Individual issues of foreign newspapers and magazines were occasionally banned when they contained articles deemed too sensitive. Articles on sensitive topics were removed from international magazines. Television newscasts were blacked out during segments on sensitive subjects.

The CCP also exerted control over the publishing industry by pre-emptively classifying certain topics as state secrets. Government rules ban the sale of foreign publications without an import permit. This includes sales on online shopping platforms, which are banned from offering “overseas publications,” including books, movies, and games, that do not already have government approval. The ban also applies to services related to publications. One year after the death in July, 2017 of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo, the government continued to censor a broad array of related words and images across public media and on social media platforms. Besides his name and image, phrases such as “rest in peace,” “grey,” quotes from his writings, images of candles, and even candle emojis were blocked online and from private messages sent on social media. Attempts to access censored search results resulted in a message saying the result could not be displayed “according to relevant laws, regulations, and policies.” Government censors also blocked online access to news regarding Liu Xiaobo’s widow, Liu Xia.¹⁷⁸³

5. Internet Freedom

The government tightly controlled and highly censored domestic internet usage. According to an official report released in August by the China Internet Network Information Center, the country had more than 802 million internet users, accounting for 57.7 percent of its total population. According to International Telecommunication Union data, 54 percent of the population used the internet in 2017. Major media companies estimated more than 625 million persons obtained their news from social and online media sources. Although the internet was widely available, authorities heavily censored content. The government continued to employ tens of thousands of individuals at the national, provincial, and local levels to monitor electronic communications and online content. The government reportedly paid personnel to promote official views on various websites and social media and to combat alternative views posted online. Internet companies also independently employed thousands of censors to carry out CCP and government directives on censorship. When government officials criticized or temporarily blocked online platforms due to content, the parent corporations were required to hire additional in-house censors, creating substantial staffing demands well into the thousands and even tens of thousands per company.

In April censors temporarily shut down prominent news app Toutiao. It reopened after its owner apologized for failing to promote “core socialist values” through the app and promised to hire 4,000 new in-house censors, bringing the total number to 10,000. Authorities permanently shuttered the company’s other app, Neihan Duanzi, which was used by its 200 million users to share jokes and memes. On March 19, Guangdong province authorities released environmental activist Lei Ping after the government-linked China Biodiversity Conservation and Green Development Foundation submitted a letter to Xinyi police, who had detained Lei after she posted online an investigative report uncovering illegal quarry operations and their effects on local water resources.¹⁷⁸⁴

¹⁷⁸³ Excerpts from report titled “China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, And Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report” published by Executive Commission on China, available online at URL: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CHINA-INCLUDES-TIBET-HONG-KONG-AND-MACAU-2018.pdf>

¹⁷⁸⁴ Excerpts from report titled “China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, And Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report” published by Executive Commission on China, available online at URL: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CHINA-INCLUDES-TIBET-HONG-KONG-AND-MACAU-2018.pdf>

The government continued to issue an array of regulations implementing the Cybersecurity Law, which took effect in 2017. The law allows the government to “monitor, defend, and handle cybersecurity risks and threats originating from within the country or overseas sources.” Article 12 of the law criminalizes using the internet to “create or disseminate[e] false information to disrupt the economic or social order.” For example, Guangzhou anesthesiologist Tan Qindong spent three months in jail for “damaging a company’s reputation” after his criticism of a traditional Chinese medicinal tonic began circulating widely on WeChat. Chinese news reports speculated the arrest most likely occurred at the behest of the tonic manufacturer. Authorities released Tan after he wrote an apology admitting he had “not thought clearly.” The law also codifies the authority of security agencies to cut communication networks across an entire geographic region during “major security incidents,” although the government had previously implemented such measures before the law’s passage.

CAC regulations on Internet News Information Services require websites, mobile apps, forums, blogs, instant communications services, and search engines to ensure news coverage of a political, economic, diplomatic, or commentary nature conforms to official views of “facts.” These regulations extend longstanding traditional media controls to new media, including online and social media, to ensure these sources also adhere to the Communist Party directive. According to January state media reports, authorities closed 128,000 websites in 2017. These were deemed “harmful” due to inappropriate content, which includes politically sensitive materials, as well as pornography and gambling. The pace continued during the year, with the CAC reporting it shuttered 3,673 websites and 1.2 million social media accounts in just the second and third quarters of the year. In July the CAC reported receiving 6.72 million “valid” reports of online “illegal and harmful” information in that month alone. The CAC also required all live-streaming platforms, video platforms, commercial websites, web portals, and apps to register with the CAC. Online content platforms by licensed central media and their affiliates were not required to register. In April state media announced content on short video sites that violated core socialist values would be removed, and the CAC announced it had “talked” to several short video sites. Shortly thereafter, the live streaming and comment section of a prominent platform, Douyin, ceased to function. Various other platforms faced shutdowns for “illicit” or “illegal” content over the last year.

Regulators required a special permit for transmission of audio and visual materials on blogging platforms such as Weibo and instant messaging platforms such as WeChat. Platform managers were made directly responsible for ensuring user- posted content complies with their permit’s scope. This includes television shows, movies, news programs, and documentaries, which many netizens consumed exclusively through social media channels. The rules prohibit the uploading of any amateur content that would fall under the definition of news programming or “sensitive” topics.

The government continued efforts to limit virtual private network (VPN) service use. A new ban on “unauthorized” VPNs went into effect on March 31. While some users, including international companies, were permitted to use VPNs, smaller businesses, academics, and citizens did not have access to authorized VPNs. However, news reports indicated authorities were not strictly enforcing the ban. Authorities stepped up efforts to block VPN service providers ahead of major events such as November trade and internet shows. A software engineer in Shanghai was sentenced to three years in prison

after providing illegal VPNs to hundreds of customers since 2016, reported the government-owned newspaper. Many other websites for international media outlets, such as the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and Bloomberg, in addition to those of human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, remained perennially blocked. In August censors blocked the Australian Broadcast Corporation's (ABC) website and phone app. ABC launched a Chinese-language site in 2017, and in 2018 ABC's stories about Chinese influence in Australia drew strong criticism from official Chinese media.¹⁷⁸⁵

Government censors continued to block websites or online content related to topics deemed sensitive, such as Taiwan, the Dalai Lama, Tibet, and the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre. Thousands of social media and other websites remained blocked, including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Google, and YouTube. While countless news and social media sites remained blocked, a large percentage of censored websites were gambling or pornographic websites. Early in the year, the government warned airlines not to list Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Macau as separate countries on their websites, and it published a list of offending airlines. Officials obligated Marriott hotels to shut down its website for a week and publicly apologize for listing Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau as separate countries. Mercedes Benz was similarly forced to apologize to the government after a posting on its official Instagram account included this quotation, "Look at the situations from all angles, and you will become more open." -- Dalai Lama." Officials' response to the posting included the state-run People's Daily calling Mercedes Benz an "enemy of the people." References to same-sex acts/same sex-relations and the scientifically accurate words for genitalia remained banned following SAPPRFT's 2017 pronouncement listing same-sex acts/relations as an "abnormal sexual relation" and forbidding its depiction. In January domestic media reported a Beijing court agreed to hear a gay-rights activist's lawsuit challenging SAPPRFT regarding homosexuality, although by December no ruling had been announced. Meanwhile, in May a nationally popular Hunan-based television broadcaster blacked out parts of Eurovision, a European music performance, that depicted gay relationships and pixelated an image of the gay-pride flag.

Authorities continued to jail numerous internet writers for their peaceful expression of political views. On June 27, authorities subjected dissident author Peng Peiyu to a two-week detention. Peng's critical writing included an essay entitled "On Xi: A Call to Arms," which he posted online shortly before his arrest. According to his attorney, Peng had been detained "many times before." In addition there continued to be reports of cyber operations against foreign websites, journalists, and media organizations carrying information that the government restricted internet users in the country from accessing. As in the past, the government selectively blocked access to sites operated by foreign governments, including the websites or social media platforms of health organizations, educational institutions, NGOs, social networking sites, and search engines.

While such censorship was effective in keeping casual users away from websites hosting sensitive content, many users circumvented online censorship by using various technologies. Information on proxy servers outside the country and software for defeating official censorship were available, although frequently limited by the Great

¹⁷⁸⁵ Excerpts from report titled "China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, And Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report" published by Executive Commission on China, available online at URL: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CHINA-INCLUDES-TIBET-HONG-KONG-AND-MACAU-2018.pdf>

Firewall. Encrypted communication apps such as Telegram and WhatsApp and VPN services were regularly disrupted, especially during “sensitive” times of the year. The State Secrets Law obliges internet companies to cooperate fully with investigations of suspected leaks of state secrets, stop the transmission of such information once discovered, and report the crime to authorities. This was defined broadly and without clear limits. Furthermore, the companies must comply with authorities’ orders to delete such information from their websites; failure to do so is punishable by relevant departments, such as police and the Ministry of Public Security.

6. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

i) Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

While the constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, the government severely restricted this right. The law stipulates such activities may not challenge “party leadership” or infringe upon the “interests of the state.” Protests against the political system or national leaders were prohibited. Authorities denied permits and quickly suppressed demonstrations involving expression of dissenting political views. Citizens throughout the country continued to gather publicly to protest evictions, forced relocations, and inadequate compensation, often resulting in conflict with authorities or formal charges. Media reported thousands of protests took place during the year across the country. Although peaceful protests are legal, public security officials rarely granted permits to demonstrate. Despite restrictions, many demonstrations occurred, but authorities quickly broke up those motivated by broad political or social grievances, sometimes with excessive force. On March 20-30, more than one thousand residents from Longyan’s Changting County in Fujian province protested outside the local government office against the government’s plan to construct a garbage incinerator one kilometre (0.6 mile) from the town’s residential areas. On March 30, local authorities called in riot police to restore order. Later that day government officials announced they were cancelling the planned incinerator project.¹⁷⁸⁶

7. Freedom of Association

The constitution provides for freedom of association, but the government restricted this right. CCP policy and government regulations require all professional, social, and economic organizations officially register with and receive approval from the government. These regulations prevented the formation of autonomous political, human rights, religious, spiritual, labour, and other organizations that the government believed might challenge its authority in any area. The government maintained tight controls over civil society organizations and in some cases detained or harassed NGO workers. The regulatory system for NGOs was highly restrictive, but specific requirements varied depending on whether an organization was foreign or domestic. Domestic NGOs were governed by the Charity Law and a host of related regulations. Domestic NGOs could register in one of three categories: a social group, a social organization, or a foundation.

¹⁷⁸⁶ Excerpts from report titled “China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, And Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report” published by Executive Commission on China, available online at URL: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CHINA-INCLUDES-TIBET-HONG-KONG-AND-MACAU-2018.pdf>

All domestic NGOs are required to register under the Ministry of Civil Affairs and find an officially sanctioned sponsor to serve as their “professional supervisory unit.” Finding a sponsor was often challenging, since the sponsor could be held civilly or criminally responsible for the NGO’s activities. All organizations are also required to report their sources of funding, including foreign funding. Domestic NGOs continued to adjust to this new regulatory framework. In 2016 the CCP Central Committee issued a directive mandating the establishment of CCP cells within all domestic NGOs by 2020. According to authorities, these CCP organizations operating inside domestic NGOs would “strengthen guidance” of NGOs in areas such as “decision making for important projects, important professional activities, major expenditures and funds, acceptance of large donations, and activities involving foreigners.” The directive also mandates authorities conduct annual “spot checks” to ensure compliance on “ideological political work, party building, financial and personnel management, study sessions, foreign exchange, acceptance of foreign donations and assistance, and conducting activities according to their charter.”¹⁷⁸⁷

In January 2017 the Law on the Management of Foreign NGOs’ Activities in Mainland China (Foreign NGO Management Law) came into effect. The law requires foreign NGOs to register with the Ministry of Public Security and to find a state-sanctioned sponsor for their operations. NGOs that fail to comply face possible civil or criminal penalties. The law provides no appeal process for NGOs denied registration, and it stipulates NGOs found to have violated certain provisions could be banned from operating in the country. The law also states domestic groups cooperating with unregistered foreign NGOs will be punished and possibly banned. Some international NGOs reported it was more difficult to work with local partners, including universities, government agencies, and other domestic NGOs, as the law codified the CCP’s perception that foreign NGOs were a “national security” threat. Finding an official sponsor was difficult for most foreign NGOs, as sponsors could be held responsible for the NGOs’ conduct and had to undertake burdensome reporting requirements. After the Ministry of Public Security published a list of sponsors, NGOs reported most government agencies still had no unit responsible for sponsoring foreign NGOs. Professional Supervisory Units reported they had little understanding of how to implement the law and what authorities would expect of them. The vague definition of an NGO, as well as of what activities constituted “political” and therefore illegal activities, left many business organizations and alumni associations uncertain whether they fell within the purview of the law. The lack of clear communication from the government, coupled with harassment by security authorities, caused some foreign NGOs to suspend or cease operations in the country. As of December 31, approximately 439 of the officially estimated 7,000 previously operational foreign NGOs had registered under the Foreign NGO Management Law, with most focusing on trade and commerce activities. According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, by the end of 2017, there were more than 800,000 registered social organizations, public institutions, and foundations. Many experts believed the actual number of domestic NGOs to be much higher. Domestic NGOs reported foreign funding continued to drop, as many domestic NGOs sought to avoid such funding due to fear of being labelled as “subversive” in the face of growing restrictions imposed by new laws. NGOs existed under a variety of formal and

¹⁷⁸⁷ Excerpts from report titled “China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, And Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report” published by Executive Commission on China, available online at URL: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CHINA-INCLUDES-TIBET-HONG-KONG-AND-MACAU-2018.pdf>

informal guises, including national mass organizations created and funded by the CCP that are organizationally prohibited from exercising any independence, known as government-operated NGOs or GONGOs.¹⁷⁸⁸

8. Freedom of Religion

It has been dealt with section 9.4 (Religions)

9. Freedom of Movement

The law provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, but the government at times did not respect these rights. While seriously restricting its scope of operations, the government occasionally cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which maintained an office in Beijing. The government increasingly silenced activists by denying them permission to travel, both internationally and domestically, or keeping them under unofficial house arrest. In some instances the government pressured other countries to return asylum seekers or UNHCR-recognized refugees forcibly. On July 13, Radio Free Asia reported a Chongqing court had secretly sentenced human rights activists Jiang Yefei and Dong Guangping in July 2017 for “inciting subversion of state power” and “illegally crossing a national border.” Jiang and Dong had fled to Thailand with their families and received refugee status from UNHCR, but Thailand then forcibly returned them from Bangkok in 2015. During their televised “confessions,” Jiang and Dong appeared to have sustained torture while in detention. The families received no notification from authorities concerning the trial. According to contacts, authorities denied Dong’s former lawyer permission to meet with his client when he visited the Chongqing Number 2 Detention Centre in July 2017.¹⁷⁸⁹

i) Abuse of Migrants, Refugees, and Stateless Persons: There were reports North Korean agents operated clandestinely within the country to repatriate North Korean citizens against their will. In addition, North Koreans detained by government authorities faced repatriation unless they could pay bribes to secure their release. North Korean refugees were either detained in holding facilities or placed under house arrest at undisclosed locations. Family members wanting to prevent forced returns of their North Korean relatives were required to pay fees to Chinese authorities purportedly to cover expenses incurred while in detention. While detained North Koreans were occasionally released, they were rarely given the necessary permissions for safe passage to a third country.

ii) In-country Movement: Authorities continued to maintain tight restrictions on freedom of movement, particularly to curtail the movement of individuals deemed politically sensitive before key anniversaries, visits by foreign dignitaries, or major political events, as well as to forestall demonstrations. Freedom of movement for Tibetans continued to be very limited in the TAR and other Tibetan areas (see Tibet Addendum). Uighurs faced new restrictions on movement within Xinjiang and outside

¹⁷⁸⁸ Excerpts from report titled “China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, And Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report” published by Executive Commission on China, available online at URL: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CHINA-INCLUDES-TIBET-HONG-KONG-AND-MACAU-2018.pdf>

¹⁷⁸⁹ Ibid.

the region, as well. Although the use of “domestic passports” that called for local official approval before traveling to another area was discontinued in 2016, identification checks remained in place when entering or leaving cities and on public roads. In Xinjiang security officials set up checkpoints managing entry into public places, including markets and mosques, that required Uighurs to scan their national identity card, undergo a facial recognition check, and put any baggage through airport-style security screening. Such restrictions were not applied to Han Chinese in these areas. On September 26, the Urumqi Evening News announced Xinjiang railway administrative departments would stop selling tickets on all passenger services leaving Xinjiang starting on October 22. This occurred around the time reports surfaced about authorities criminally sentencing Uighurs and other Turkic Muslims en masse of groups of 200-500 persons from the internment camps to prisons in other parts of the country, such as Heilongjiang Province. Although the government maintained restrictions on the freedom to change one’s workplace or residence, the national household registration system (hukou) continued to change, and the ability of most citizens to move within the country to work and live continued to expand. While many rural residents migrated to the cities, where the per capita disposable income was approximately three times the rural per capita income, they often could not change their official residence or workplace within the country. Most cities had annual quotas for the number of new temporary residence permits they could issue, and all workers, including university graduates, had to compete for a limited number of such permits. It was particularly difficult for rural residents to obtain household registration in more economically developed urban areas.¹⁷⁹⁰

The household registration system added to the difficulties faced by rural residents, even after they relocated to urban areas and found employment. According to the Statistical Communique of the People’s Republic of China on 2017 National Economic and Social Development published in February by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 291 million persons lived outside the jurisdiction of their household registration. Migrant workers and their families faced numerous obstacles with regard to working conditions and labour rights. Many were unable to access public services, such as public education for their children or social insurance, in the cities where they lived and worked because they were not legally registered urban residents. From April to June, non-Beijing residents could apply for a Beijing hukou under the special municipality’s new points-based system. Under the new policy, non-natives of the city under the legal retirement age who have held a Beijing temporary residence permit with the city’s social insurance records for seven consecutive years and were without a criminal record were eligible to accumulate points for the hukou. Those with “good employment, stable homes in Beijing, strong educational background, and achievements in innovation and establishing start-ups in Beijing” were reportedly likely to obtain high scores in the point-based competition. The city was to announce the new hukou winners in the fourth quarter of the year. Under the “staying at prison employment” system applicable to recidivists incarcerated in administrative detention, authorities denied certain persons permission to return to their homes after serving their sentences. Some released or paroled prisoners returned home but did not have freedom of movement.

¹⁷⁹⁰ Excerpts from report titled “China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, And Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report” published by Executive Commission on China, available online at URL: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CHINA-INCLUDES-TIBET-HONG-KONG-AND-MACAU-2018.pdf>

iii) Foreign Travel: The government permitted legal emigration and foreign travel for most citizens. Government employees and retirees, especially from the military, continued to face foreign travel restrictions. The government expanded the use of exit controls for departing passengers at airports and other border crossings to deny foreign travel to some dissidents and persons employed in government posts. Throughout the year many lawyers, artists, authors, and other activists were at times prevented from exiting the country. Authorities also blocked the travel of some family members of rights activists and of suspected corrupt officials and businesspersons, including foreign family members. Border officials and police cited threats to “national security” as the reason for refusing permission to leave the country. Authorities stopped most such persons at the airport at the time of their attempted travel. Most citizens could obtain passports, although individuals the government deemed potential political threats, including religious leaders, political dissidents, petitioners, and ethnic minorities, routinely reported being refused passports or otherwise prevented from traveling overseas. Uighurs, particularly those residing in Xinjiang, reported great difficulty in getting passport applications approved at the local level. They were frequently denied passports to travel abroad, particularly to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj, to other Muslim countries, or to Western countries for academic purposes. Since 2016 authorities ordered Xinjiang residents to turn in their passports or told residents no new passports were available. The passport recall, however, was not limited to Uighur areas. Foreign national family members of Uighur activists living overseas were also denied visas to enter the country. During the year the government continued its concerted efforts to compel Uighurs studying abroad to return to China, often pressuring relatives in Xinjiang to ask their overseas relatives to return. Authorities also refused to renew passports for Uighurs living abroad, leading them to either go home or pursue ways to maintain legal status in those countries. Upon return, many of these Uighurs, or persons connected with the Xinjiang residents, were detained or disappeared. Tibetans faced significant hurdles in acquiring passports, and for Buddhist monks and nuns, it was virtually impossible. Authorities’ unwillingness to issue or even renew old passports for Tibetans created, in effect, a ban on foreign travel for the Tibetan population. Han Chinese residents of Tibetan areas did not experience the same difficulties. The government continued to try to prevent many Tibetans and Uighurs from leaving the country and detained many while they attempted to leave (see Tibet Annex). Some family members of rights activists who tried to emigrate were unable to do so.¹⁷⁹¹

iv) Exile: The law neither provides for a citizen’s right to repatriate nor addresses exile. The government continued to refuse re-entry to numerous citizens considered dissidents, Falun Gong activists, or “troublemakers.” Although authorities allowed some dissidents living abroad to return, dissidents released on medical parole and allowed to leave the country often were effectively exiled.

10. Protection of Refugees

i) Refoulement: The government forcibly returned vulnerable asylum seekers, especially North Korean asylum seekers. The government continued to consider North Koreans as “illegal economic migrants” rather than refugees or asylum seekers and

¹⁷⁹¹ Excerpts from report titled “China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, And Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report” published by Executive Commission on China, available online at URL: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CHINA-INCLUDES-TIBET-HONG-KONG-AND-MACAU-2018.pdf>

forcibly returned many of them to North Korea. Human rights groups reported a relatively large number of North Korean asylum seekers being held in detention in Liaoning Province and Jilin Province who were in danger of imminent refoulement.

ii) Access to Asylum: The law does not provide for the granting of refugee or asylee status. The government did not have a system for providing protection to refugees but generally recognized UNHCR-registered refugees and asylum seekers. The government did not officially recognize these individuals as refugees; they remained in the country as illegal immigrants unable to work, with no access to education, and subject to deportation at any time. North Korean refugees and asylum seekers, particularly young women living on the margins of Chinese society, were vulnerable to trafficking and forced marriages as a result of their unrecognized status. Authorities continued to repatriate North Korean refugees and asylum seekers forcibly, including trafficking victims, generally treating them as illegal economic migrants. The government detained and deported them to North Korea, where they faced severe punishment or death, including in North Korean forced-labour camps. The government did not provide North Korean trafficking victims with legal alternatives to repatriation. Numerous NGOs reported the government continued to deny UNHCR access to North Korean refugees and asylum seekers. Authorities sometimes detained and prosecuted citizens who assisted North Korean refugees, as well as those who facilitated illegal border crossings.¹⁷⁹²

iii) Access to Basic Services: North Korean asylum seekers in the country seeking economic opportunities generally did not have access to health care, public education, or other social services due to lack of legal status.

iv) Durable Solutions: The government largely cooperated with UNHCR when dealing with the local settlement in China of Han Chinese or ethnic minorities from Vietnam and Laos living in the country since the Vietnam War era. The government and UNHCR continued discussions concerning the granting of citizenship to these long-term residents and their children, many of whom were born in China.

11. Denial of Fair Public Trial (Judicial non-independence)

Although the law states the courts shall exercise judicial power independently, without interference from administrative organs, social organizations, and individuals, the judiciary did not exercise judicial power independently. Judges regularly received political guidance on pending cases, including instructions on how to rule, from both the government and the CCP, particularly in politically sensitive cases. The CCP Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission has the authority to review and direct court operations at all levels of the judiciary. All judicial and procuratorate appointments require approval by the CCP Organization Department. Corruption often influenced court decisions, since safeguards against judicial corruption were vague and poorly enforced. Local governments appointed and paid local court judges and, as a result, often exerted influence over the rulings of those judges. A CCP-controlled committee decided most major cases, and the duty of trial and appellate court judges was to craft a legal justification for the committee's decision. Courts are not authorized to rule on the

¹⁷⁹² Excerpts from report titled "China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, And Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report" published by Executive Commission on China, available online at URL: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CHINA-INCLUDES-TIBET-HONG-KONG-AND-MACAU-2018.pdf>

constitutionality of legislation. The law permits organizations or individuals to question the constitutionality of laws and regulations, but a constitutional challenge may be directed only to the promulgating legislative body. Lawyers had little or no opportunity to rely on constitutional claims in litigation. In March lawyers and others received central government instructions to avoid discussion of the constitutionality of the constitutional amendments that removed term limits for the president and vice president. Media sources indicated public security authorities used televised confessions of lawyers, foreign and domestic bloggers, journalists, and business executives in an attempt to establish guilt before their criminal trial proceedings began. In some cases, these confessions were likely a precondition for release. NGOs asserted such statements were likely coerced, perhaps by torture, and some detainees who confessed recanted upon release and confirmed their confessions had been coerced. No provision in the law allows the pretrial broadcast of confessions by criminal suspects. Jiang Tianyong remained in prison following his 2017 conviction for inciting state subversion in Changsha, Hunan. A court sentenced him to two years in prison. The case against him was based on his interviews with foreign journalists and his publishing of articles on the internet, actions that, outside the country, were widely seen as normal for someone in his profession. Authorities prevented Jiang from selecting his own attorney to represent him at a trial that multiple analysts viewed as neither impartial nor fair. “Judicial independence” remained one of the reportedly off-limit subjects the CCP ordered university professors not to discuss.¹⁷⁹³

12. Surveillance state

Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The law states the “freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens are protected by law,” but authorities often did not respect the privacy of citizens. Although the law requires warrants before officers can search premises, officials frequently ignored this requirement. The Public Security Bureau and prosecutors are authorized to issue search warrants on their own authority without judicial review. There continued to be reports of cases of forced entry by police officers. Authorities monitored telephone calls, text messages, faxes, email, instant messaging, and other digital communications intended to remain private. Authorities also opened and censored domestic and international mail. Foreign journalists leaving the country found some of their personal belongings searched. In some cases, when material deemed politically sensitive was uncovered, the journalists had to sign a statement stating they would “voluntarily” leave these documents behind in China.

According to media reports, the Ministry of Public Security used tens of millions of surveillance cameras throughout the country to monitor the general public. Human rights groups stated authorities increasingly relied on the cameras and other forms of surveillance to monitor and intimidate political dissidents, religious leaders and adherents, Tibetans, and Uighurs. These included facial recognition and “gait recognition” video surveillance, allowing police not only to monitor a situation but also to quickly identify individuals in crowds. The monitoring and disruption of telephone and internet

¹⁷⁹³ Excerpts from report titled “China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, And Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report” published by Executive Commission on China, available online at URL: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CHINA-INCLUDES-TIBET-HONG-KONG-AND-MACAU-2018.pdf>

communications were particularly widespread in Xinjiang and Tibetan areas. The government installed surveillance cameras in monasteries in the TAR and Tibetan areas outside the TAR (see Special Annex, Tibet). The law allows security agencies to cut communication networks during “major security incidents.”¹⁷⁹⁴

According to Human Rights Watch, the Ministry of State Security partnered with information technology firms to create a “mass automated voice recognition and monitoring system,” similar to ones already in use in Xinjiang and Anhui Province, to help with solving criminal cases. According to one company involved, the system was programmed to understand Mandarin Chinese and certain minority languages, including Tibetan and Uighur. In many cases other biometric data such as fingerprints and DNA profiles were being stored as well. This database included information obtained not just from criminals and criminal suspects but also from entire populations of migrant workers and all Uighurs applying for passports.

The government continued implementing a “social credit system,” which collects vast amounts of data to create scores for individuals and companies in an effort to address deficiencies in “social trust,” strengthen access to financial credit instruments, and reduce public corruption. Unlike Western financial credit-rating systems, the social credit system also collected information on academic records, traffic violations, social media presence, quality of friendships, adherence to birth control regulations, employment performance, consumption habits, and other topics. This system is intended to promote self-censorship, as netizens would be liable for their statements, relationships, and even information others shared within closed social media groups. An individual’s “social credit score,” among other things, quantifies a person’s loyalty to the government by monitoring citizens’ online activity and relationships. There were indications the system awarded and deducted points based on the “loyalty” of sites visited, as well as the “loyalty” of other netizens with whom a person interacted. The system also created incentives for citizens to police each other. Organizers of chat groups on messaging apps were responsible for policing and reporting any posts with impermissible content, making them liable for violations.¹⁷⁹⁵

Although the government’s goal is to create a unified government social credit system, there were several disparate social credit systems under several Chinese technology companies, and the specific implementation of the system varied by province and city. In Hangzhou the scoring system, which applies to residents 18 years or older, included information on individuals’ education, employment, compliance with laws and regulations (such as tax payments), payment of medical bills, loan repayment, honoring contracts, participating in volunteer activities, and voluntary blood donations. There were several cases in which an individual’s credit score resulted in concrete limitations on that person’s activities. Users with low social credit scores faced an increasing series of consequences, including losing the ability to communicate on domestic social media platforms, travel, and buy property. In April state media reported the social credit system

¹⁷⁹⁴ Excerpts from report titled “China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, And Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report” published by Executive Commission on China, available online at URL: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CHINA-INCLUDES-TIBET-HONG-KONG-AND-MACAU-2018.pdf>

¹⁷⁹⁵ Excerpts from report titled “China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, And Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report” published by Executive Commission on China, available online at URL: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CHINA-INCLUDES-TIBET-HONG-KONG-AND-MACAU-2018.pdf>

“blocked” individuals from taking 11 million flights and four million train trips. In a separate use of social media for censorship, human rights activists reported authorities questioned them about their participation in human rights-related chat groups, including WeChat and WhatsApp. Authorities monitored the groups to identify activists, which led to users’ increased self-censorship on WeChat, as well as several separate arrests of chat group administrators. The government instituted the “double-linked household” system in Xinjiang developed through many years of use in Tibet. This system divides towns and neighborhoods into units of 10 households each, with the households in each unit instructed to watch over each other and report on “security issues” and poverty problems to the government, thus turning average citizens into informers. In Xinjiang the government also required Uighur families to accept government “home stays,” in which officials or volunteers forcibly lived in Uighurs’ homes and monitored families for signs of “extremism.” Those who exhibited behaviors the government considered to be signs of “extremism,” such as praying, possessing religious texts, or abstaining from alcohol or tobacco, could be detained in re-education camps.¹⁷⁹⁶

An article titled, “In a China using prisoner organs for transplants” provides the following details on PRC’s human rights violations:¹⁷⁹⁷

British surgeons today accused China of using organs from executed prisoners in its booming transplantation trade. "It's important that people thinking of going for transplantation in China are fully aware there's a possibility that their donor organ may come from someone who has been executed," Professor Stephen Wigmore, the British Transplantation Society's head of ethics, told Guardian Unlimited.

The World Organisation to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong released a report that claimed hospitals in China were racing to complete operations before tighter regulations come into force in July, 2006. Another report by the same body last month claimed an "organ bank" of prisoners waiting to be executed for organ-harvesting existed in Shenyang, in Liaoning province. In December 2005, China's deputy health minister, Huang Jiefu, made the first official admission that the country harvested organs from executed prisoners. He said regulations were needed to "standardise" the practice. Amnesty International estimates China executed 3,400 people in 2004 and sentenced 6,000 to death. According to estimates in the state-run China Daily newspaper, up to 20,000 donor operations are performed in the country each year. China claims all executed organ donors give their consent for the use of their organs, but human rights groups say strong taboos in Chinese culture about being buried with missing organs make it unlikely all donors are consenting. New rules banning the sale of human organs from the start of July 2006 and requiring that donors provide their written consent were announced by Beijing last month. However, it was uncertain whether they would make much difference. The sale of organs is already officially illegal in China, although there is an extensive black market trade.

¹⁷⁹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷⁹⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/apr/19/china.health?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487>

A report titled “China’s Global Threat to Human Rights”, published by Human Rights Watch maintains that China’s government sees human rights as an existential threat and further stated the following:¹⁷⁹⁸

Beijing’s Rationale

The motivation for Beijing’s attack on rights stems from the fragility of rule by repression rather than popular consent. Despite decades of impressive economic growth in China, driven by hundreds of millions of people finally emancipated to lift themselves out of poverty, the Chinese Communist Party is running scared of its own people. Outwardly confident about its success in representing people across the country, the Chinese Communist Party is worried about the consequences of unfettered popular debate and political organization, and thus afraid to subject itself to popular scrutiny. As a result, Beijing faces the uneasy task of managing a huge and complex economy without the public input and debate that political freedom allows. Knowing that in the absence of elections, the party’s legitimacy depends largely on a growing economy, Chinese leaders worry that slowing economic growth will increase demands from the public for more say in how it is governed. The government’s nationalist campaigns to promote the “China dream,” and its trumpeting of debatable anti-corruption efforts, do not change this underlying reality. The consequence under President Xi Jinping is China’s most pervasive and brutal oppression in decades. What modest opening had existed briefly in recent years for people to express themselves on matters of public concern has been decisively closed. Civic groups have been shut down. Independent journalism is no more. Online conversation has been curtailed and replaced with orchestrated sycophancy. Ethnic and religious minorities face severe persecution. Small steps toward the rule of law have been replaced by the Communist Party’s traditional rule *by law*. Hong Kong’s limited freedoms, under “one country, two systems,” are being severely challenged. Xi has emerged as the most powerful leader of China since Mao Zedong, building a shameless cult of personality, removing presidential term limits, promoting “Xi Jinping thought,” and advancing grandiose visions for a powerful, yet autocratic, nation.

Subversion of the United Nations

The Chinese government, allergic to foreign pressure about its domestic human rights problems, does not think twice about twisting arms to protect its image in international forums. Because a central purpose of the United Nations is to promote universal human rights, the UN has been a key target. The pressure has been felt all the way to the top. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has been unwilling to publicly demand an end to China’s mass detention of Turkic Muslims, while heaping praise on Beijing’s economic prowess and the BRI. At the UN Human Rights Council, China routinely opposes virtually every human rights initiative that criticizes a particular country unless it is watered down enough to secure that government’s consent. In recent years, China has opposed resolutions condemning human rights violations in Myanmar, Syria, Iran, the Philippines, Burundi, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Yemen, Eritrea, and Belarus. China also seeks to distort the international rights framework by suggesting that economic progress should precede the need to respect rights and by urging “win-win cooperation” (subsequently renamed

¹⁷⁹⁸ <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/china-global-threat-to-human-rights>

“mutually beneficial cooperation”), which frames rights as a question of voluntary cooperation rather than legal obligation. When China’s human rights record came up for a routine review in 2018 and 2019 at the Human Rights Council, Chinese officials threatened critical delegations while encouraging allies to heap praise. Beijing also flooded the speakers list reserved for civil society organizations with government-sponsored groups tasked with lauding its record. Meanwhile, its diplomats gave blatantly false information to the reviewing body, threatened delegations with consequences if they attended a panel discussion of abuses in Xinjiang, and sought to prevent an independent group focused on Xinjiang from speaking at the council. To top it off, Chinese authorities mounted a large photo display outside UN meeting rooms depicting Uyghurs as happy and grateful to them. At UN headquarters in New York, a major Chinese government priority has been to avoid discussion of its conduct in Xinjiang. Often working in tandem with Russia, China also has taken an increasingly regressive approach to any action on human rights in the Security Council, where it has veto power. For example, Beijing has been clear that it will not tolerate pressure on Myanmar, despite a UN fact-finding mission’s conclusion that Myanmar’s top military leaders should be investigated and prosecuted for genocide. Along with Russia, China opposed—though unsuccessfully—the Security Council even discussing Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis. In September, as 3 million civilians faced indiscriminate bombing by Russian and Syrian jets, China joined Russia to veto a Security Council demand for a truce.¹⁷⁹⁹

9.5.3 International Human Rights Materials related to China

Core United Nations Documents Signed, Ratified, or Acceded to by China
<p>International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights¹⁸⁰⁰</p> <p>Adopted by the General Assembly December 16, 1966 Effective January 3, 1976 Ratified by China March 27, 2001 China's Reports Document Number: E/1990/5/Add.43 (1999) (Hong Kong SAR)¹⁸⁰¹ Document Number: E/1990/5/Add.59 (2004)¹⁸⁰² UN Concluding Observations Document Number: CESCR/E/2002/22 (2001) (Hong Kong SAR)¹⁸⁰³ Document Number: CESCR/E/C.12/1¹⁸⁰⁴/Add.107 (2005)</p>
<p>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights¹⁸⁰⁵</p> <p>Adopted by the General Assembly December 16, 1966 Effective March 23, 1976 Signed by China October 5, 1998; not yet ratified</p>

¹⁷⁹⁹ <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/china-global-threat-to-human-rights>

¹⁸⁰⁰ <https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm>

¹⁸⁰¹ [https://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/\(Symbol\)/e25c388bac7f33e7802568e2004d4b85?Opendocument](https://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/e25c388bac7f33e7802568e2004d4b85?Opendocument)

¹⁸⁰² [https://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/\(Symbol\)/9fbfe806f28f1eb4c1256f4a004bc5d8?Opendocument](https://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/9fbfe806f28f1eb4c1256f4a004bc5d8?Opendocument)

¹⁸⁰³ <https://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G02/409/53/PDF/G0240953.pdf?OpenElement>

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China's Reports

Document Number: CCPR/C/HKSAR/99/1 (1999)¹⁸⁰⁶

Document Number: CCPR/C/HKSAR/99/1/Add.1 (1999)¹⁸⁰⁷

UN Concluding Observations

Document Number: CCPR/A/55/40 (2000) (Hong Kong SAR)¹⁸⁰⁸

Convention on the Rights of the Child¹⁸⁰⁹

Adopted by the General Assembly November 20, 1989

Effective September 2, 1990

Ratified by China March 3, 1992

China's Reports

Document Number: CRC/C/11/Add.7 (1995)¹⁸¹⁰

Document Number: CRC/C/83/Add.9 (Part I) (2004) (Hong Kong SAR)¹⁸¹¹

Document Number: CRC/C/83/Add.9 (Part II) (2004) (Macau SAR)¹⁸¹²

UN Concluding Observations

Document Number: CRC/A/53/41 (1998)¹⁸¹³

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment¹⁸¹⁴

Adopted by the General Assembly December 10, 1984

Effective June 26, 1987

Ratified by China October 4, 1988

China's Reports

Document Number: CAT/C/7/Add.14 (1993)¹⁸¹⁵

Document Number: CAT/C/20/Add.5 (1995)¹⁸¹⁶

Document Number: CAT/C/39/Add.2 (1999)¹⁸¹⁷

UN Concluding Observations

Document Number: CAT/A/45/44 (1990)¹⁸¹⁸

Document Number: CAT/A/48/44 (1993)¹⁸¹⁹

Document Number: CAT/A/51/44 (1996)¹⁸²⁰

Document Number: CAT/A/55/44 (2000)¹⁸²¹

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination¹⁸²²

¹⁸⁰⁶ [https://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/\(Symbol\)/cef97ff5fb840c3d802567fb005588d0?Opendocument](https://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/cef97ff5fb840c3d802567fb005588d0?Opendocument)

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¹⁸⁰⁸ <https://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/681/55/PDF/N0068155.pdf?OpenElement>

¹⁸⁰⁹ <https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm>

¹⁸¹⁰ [https://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/\(Symbol\)/d0f6d82c145d1ee3412562d7004e4c0f?Opendocument](https://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/d0f6d82c145d1ee3412562d7004e4c0f?Opendocument)

¹⁸¹¹ <https://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/437/74/PDF/G0443774.pdf?OpenElement>

¹⁸¹² <https://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/437/79/PDF/G0443779.pdf?OpenElement>

¹⁸¹³ <https://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/201/37/PDF/N9820137.pdf?OpenElement>

¹⁸¹⁴ <https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm>

¹⁸¹⁵ <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ae3c4.html>

¹⁸¹⁶ [https://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/\(Symbol\)/965d131aab901b358025654500531742?Opendocument](https://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/965d131aab901b358025654500531742?Opendocument)

¹⁸¹⁷ [https://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/\(Symbol\)/605f11cadd2fafc2802568c1004b4d24?Opendocument](https://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/605f11cadd2fafc2802568c1004b4d24?Opendocument)

¹⁸¹⁸ <https://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N90/154/75/IMG/N9015475.pdf?OpenElement>

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Adopted by the General Assembly December 21, 1965

Effective January 4, 1969

Acceded to by China December 29, 1981

China's Reports

Document Number: CERD/C/275/Add.2 (1996)¹⁸²³

Document Number: CERD/C/357/Add.4 (2000)¹⁸²⁴

Document Number: CERD/C/357/Add.4,Part II (2000)¹⁸²⁵

Document Number: CERD/C/357/Add.4,Part III (2000)¹⁸²⁶

UN Concluding Observations

Document Number: CERD/A/38/18 (1983)¹⁸²⁷

Document Number: CERD/A/42/18 (1987)¹⁸²⁸

Document Number: CERD/A/45/18 (1990)¹⁸²⁹

Document Number: CERD/A/51/18 (1996)¹⁸³⁰

Document Number: CERD/A/56/18 (2001)¹⁸³¹

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees¹⁸³²

Adopted by the General Assembly December 14, 1950

Effective April 22, 1954

Acceded to by China September 24, 1982

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees¹⁸³³

Adopted by the General Assembly December 16, 1966

Effective October 4, 1967

Acceded to by China September 24, 1982

Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime¹⁸³⁴

Adopted by the General Assembly November 15, 2000

Effective December 25, 2003

Acceded to by China February 8, 2010

¹⁸²³ [https://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/\(Symbol\)/99e3a35c28469e3680256552004fd40a?Opendocument](https://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/99e3a35c28469e3680256552004fd40a?Opendocument)

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¹⁸²⁶ [https://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/\(Symbol\)/7fdcf4dd94917be2c1256a8d00479935?Opendocument](https://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/7fdcf4dd94917be2c1256a8d00479935?Opendocument)

¹⁸²⁷ <https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/CECC%20-%20CERD%20Concluding%20Observations%20-%201983%2C%201987%2C%201990%2C%201996%2C%202001.pdf>

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¹⁸²⁹ Ibid

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¹⁸³² <https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/refugees.htm>

¹⁸³³ <https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/protocolrefugees.htm>

¹⁸³⁴ <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4720706c0.html>

<p>Convention on the Rights of Disabled Persons¹⁸³⁵</p> <p>Adopted by the General Assembly December 13, 2006 Effective May 3, 2008 Ratified by China August 1, 2008</p>
<p>Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action¹⁸³⁶</p> <p>Adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women September 15, 1995 Endorsed by the General Assembly December 22, 1995</p>
<p>Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development¹⁸³⁷</p> <p>Issued by the International Conference on Population and Development October 18, 1994</p>
<p>Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100)¹⁸³⁸</p> <p>Adopted by the International Labour Organization June 29, 1951 Effective May 23, 1953 Ratified by China November 2, 1990</p>
<p>Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111)¹⁸³⁹</p> <p>Adopted by the International Labour Organization June 25, 1958 Effective June 15, 1960 Ratified by China January 12, 2006</p>
<p>Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138)¹⁸⁴⁰</p> <p>Adopted by the International Labour Organization June 26, 1973 Effective June 19, 1976 Ratified by China April 28, 1999</p>
<p>Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 144)¹⁸⁴¹</p> <p>Adopted by the International Labour Organization June 21, 1976 Effective May 16, 1978 Ratified by China November 2, 1990</p>

¹⁸³⁵ <https://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml>

¹⁸³⁶ <https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3dde04324>

¹⁸³⁷ <https://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/offeng/poa.html>

¹⁸³⁸ https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C100

¹⁸³⁹ https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312256:NO

¹⁸⁴⁰ https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312283:NO

¹⁸⁴¹ https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312289:NO

Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182)¹⁸⁴²

Adopted by the International Labour Organization June 17, 1999
Effective November 19, 2000
Ratified by China August 8, 2002

Safety and Health in Construction Convention, 1988 (No. 167)¹⁸⁴³

Adopted by the International Labour Organization June 20, 1988
Effective June 11, 1991
Ratified by China March 7, 2002

Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (No. 155)¹⁸⁴⁴

Adopted by the International Labour Organization June 22, 1981
Effective August 11, 1983
Ratified by China January 25, 2007

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Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups of the UN Commission on Human Rights

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention¹⁸⁴⁵

July 1996 China Preparatory Visit Report
Document Number: E/CN.4/1997/4¹⁸⁴⁶
December 17, 1996
October 1997 China Visit Report
Document Number: E/CN.4/1998/44/Add.2¹⁸⁴⁷
December 22, 1997
September 2004 Mission to China
Document Number: E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.4¹⁸⁴⁸
December 29, 2004
Report: Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Torture and Detention
Document Number: E/CN.4/2005/6¹⁸⁴⁹
December 1, 2004
Report: Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
Document Number: E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1¹⁸⁵⁰
November 19, 2004

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¹⁸⁴⁵ <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Detention/Pages/WGADIndex.aspx>

¹⁸⁴⁶ <https://www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/e1f423e674324e7e8025664f0057310f?Opendocument>

¹⁸⁴⁷ <https://www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/2a5b902348361462c125661700513f8c?Opendocument>

¹⁸⁴⁸ <https://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/102/74/PDF/G0510274.pdf?OpenElement>

¹⁸⁴⁹ <https://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/167/19/PDF/G0416719.pdf?OpenElement>

¹⁸⁵⁰ <https://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/165/70/PDF/G0416570.pdf?OpenElement>

Individual Cases Reported by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention¹⁸⁵¹

Special Rapporteur on Torture

Report: Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Torture and Detention/Addendum-Summary of Cases Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received

Document Number: E/CN.4/2004/56/Add.1

March 23, 2004

Report: Questions of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Document Number: E/CN.4/2002/76/Add.1

March 14, 2002

Report: Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Torture and Detention

Document Number: E/CN.4/2000/9

February 2, 2000

Individual Cases Reported by the Special Rapporteur on Torture

Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions¹⁸⁵²

Report: Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Disappearance and Summary Executions/ Addendum-Summary of Cases Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received

Document Number: E/CN.4/2004/62/Add.1¹⁸⁵³

March 26, 2004

Report: Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Disappearance and Summary Executions/ Addendum-Summary of Cases Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received

Document Number: E/CN.4/2003/3/Add.1¹⁸⁵⁴

February 12, 2003

Report: Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Disappearance and Summary Executions/ Addendum-Summary of Cases Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received

Document Number: E/CN.4/2000/3/Add.1¹⁸⁵⁵

February 2, 2000

Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression¹⁸⁵⁶

Report: Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Freedom of Expression/ Addendum-Summary of Cases Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received

Document Number: E/CN.4/2003/67/Add.1¹⁸⁵⁷

February 20, 2003

Report: Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Freedom of Expression

¹⁸⁵¹ <https://www.cecc.gov/china-cases-reported-by-the-working-group-on-arbitrary-detention-office-of-the-united-nations-high>

¹⁸⁵² <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Executions/Pages/SRExecutionsIndex.aspx>

¹⁸⁵³ [https://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/e78b0e031782f1d6c1256e6e004546d1/\\$FILE/G0412400.pdf](https://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/e78b0e031782f1d6c1256e6e004546d1/$FILE/G0412400.pdf)

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¹⁸⁵⁶ <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/OpinionIndex.aspx>

¹⁸⁵⁷ [https://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/dfa4a1075593fff8c1256cf000375d31/\\$FILE/G0311113.pdf](https://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/dfa4a1075593fff8c1256cf000375d31/$FILE/G0311113.pdf)

<p>Document Number: E/CN.4/2001/64¹⁸⁵⁸ February 13, 2001 Report: Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Freedom of Expression Document Number: E/CN.4/2000/63¹⁸⁵⁹ January 18, 2000</p>
<p>Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers¹⁸⁶⁰</p> <p>Report: Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Independence of the Judiciary Administration of Justice, Impunity/Addendum-Situations in Specific Countries or Territories Document Number: E/CN.4/2004/60/Add.1¹⁸⁶¹ March 4, 2004 Report: Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Independence of the Judiciary Administration of Justice, Impunity Document Number: E/CN.4/2001/65¹⁸⁶² February 1, 2001 Report: Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Independence of the Judiciary Administration of Justice, Impunity Document Number: E/CN.4/2000/61¹⁸⁶³ February 21, 2000</p>
<p>Working Group on Minorities (now Forum on Minority Issues)¹⁸⁶⁴</p> <p>Report: China's Minorities-The Case of Xinjiang and the Uyghur People Document Number: E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2003/WP.16¹⁸⁶⁵ May 5, 2003</p>
<p>Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing¹⁸⁶⁶</p> <p>Report: Annual Report by the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing Document Number: E/CN.4/2003/5¹⁸⁶⁷ March 3, 2003</p>

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¹⁸⁵⁸ [https://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/49befd74b4768e26c1256a2c0056e5a4/\\$FILE/G0111123.pdf](https://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/49befd74b4768e26c1256a2c0056e5a4/$FILE/G0111123.pdf)

¹⁸⁵⁹ [https://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/16583a84ba1b3ae5802568bd004e80f7/\\$FILE/G0010259.pdf](https://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/16583a84ba1b3ae5802568bd004e80f7/$FILE/G0010259.pdf)

¹⁸⁶⁰ <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Judiciary/Pages/IDPIndex.aspx>

¹⁸⁶¹ [https://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/e746e77d9202c4eec1256e54002c7384/\\$FILE/G0411506.pdf](https://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/e746e77d9202c4eec1256e54002c7384/$FILE/G0411506.pdf)

¹⁸⁶² [https://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/9fa9a2a029af027bc1256a2b00547f1d/\\$FILE/G0110830.pdf](https://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/9fa9a2a029af027bc1256a2b00547f1d/$FILE/G0110830.pdf)

¹⁸⁶³ [https://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/5623e0e2de90104b802568b900514f15/\\$FILE/G0011177.pdf](https://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/5623e0e2de90104b802568b900514f15/$FILE/G0011177.pdf)

¹⁸⁶⁴ <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Minorities/Pages/TheformerWGonMinorities.aspx>

¹⁸⁶⁵ https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/SUBCOM/other/E-CN_4-SUB_2-AC_5-2003-WG_16.pdf

¹⁸⁶⁶ <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Housing/Pages/HousingIndex.aspx>

¹⁸⁶⁷ [https://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/a33f08e29d0dce39c1256d3c0052b725/\\$FILE/G0311362.pdf](https://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/a33f08e29d0dce39c1256d3c0052b725/$FILE/G0311362.pdf)

9.6 Migration

9.6.1 Internal Migration

China has restricted internal movement in various ways. Official efforts to limit free migration between villages and cities began as early as 1952 with a series of measures designed to prevent individuals without special permission from moving to cities to take advantage of the generally higher living standards there. The party decreased migration to cities during the 1960s and 1970s for economic and political reasons. In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, large numbers of urban youths were "sent down" to the countryside for political and ideological reasons. Many relocated youths were eventually permitted to return to the cities, and by the mid-1980s most had done so. The success of the agricultural reforms under Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s and early 1980s dramatically increased the food supply in China's cities, making it possible for more people to come in from rural areas and survive without food ration cards. Because of the increased food supply, the authorities temporarily relaxed the enforcement of migration restrictions. This relaxation, however, was short-lived, and in May 1984 new measures strengthened residence regulations and reinstated official control over internal migration. Additionally, in March 1986 a draft revision of the 1957 migration regulations was presented to the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress calling for stricter population control policies. Nonetheless, migration from rural areas to urban centres continued. The problem of too-rapid urbanization was exacerbated by the agricultural responsibility system, which forced a reallocation of labour and left many agricultural workers unemployed.

The central government attempted to control movement through the household registration system and promote development of small cities and towns, but within this system many people were still able to migrate primarily for employment or educational purposes. Leaving their place of official registration for days, months, or even years, unemployed agricultural workers found jobs in construction, housekeeping, or commune-run shops or restaurants. This temporary mobility was permitted by authorities because it simultaneously absorbed a large amount of surplus rural labor, improved the economies of rural areas, and satisfied urban requirements for service and other workers. The most significant aspect of the temporary migration, however, was that it was viewed as a possible initial step toward the development of small, rural-oriented urban centres that could bring employment and urban amenities to rural areas. Although the temporary migration into the cities was seen as beneficial, controlling it was a serious concern of the central government. An April 1985 survey showed that the "floating" or non-resident population in eight selected areas of Beijing was 662,000, or 12.5 percent of the total population. The survey also showed that people entered or left Beijing 880,000 times a day. In an effort to control this activity, neighbourhood committees and work units (*danwei*) were required to comply with municipal regulations issued in January 1986. These regulations stipulated that communities and work units keep records on visitors, that those staying in Beijing for up to three days must be registered, and that those planning to stay longer must obtain temporary residence permits from local police stations.


Although some cities were crowded, other areas of China were underpopulated. For example, China had little success populating the frontier regions. As early as the 1950s,

the government began to organize and fund migration for land reclamation, industrialization, and construction in the interior and frontier regions. Land reclamation was carried out by state farms located largely in Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region and Heilongjiang Province. Large numbers of migrants were sent to such outlying regions as Nei Monggol Autonomous Region and Qinghai Province to work in factories and mines and to Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region to develop agriculture and industry. In the late 1950s, and especially in the 1960s, during the Cultural Revolution, many city youths were sent to the frontier areas. Much of the resettled population returned home, however, because of insufficient government support, harsh climate, and a general inability to adjust to life in the outlying regions. China's regional population distribution was consequently as unbalanced in 1986 as it had been in 1953. Nevertheless, efforts were still underway in 1987 to encourage migration to the frontier regions.¹⁸⁶⁸

9.6.2. Characteristics of China's Internal Migrant Population¹⁸⁶⁹

The OECD report titled “China's Internal Migrant Labour” states the following:
The number of China's Migrant Population increases steadily:

- According to NHFPC, during the period of 2008 to 2013, immigrant population increases from 201 million to 240 million.
- According to NBS, during the period of 2008 to 2013, the total peasant workers increase from 225M to 270M; the migrant peasant workers increase from 140M to 170M.



Source: http://www.oecd.org/dev/Liu%20Yunzhong_chinalabor-1007.pdf

The direction of labour flow has no major change since 1980s.

- In 2013, Provinces that attract most of immigrant labours still were Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, et al.
- Provinces from which most of labour move still were Anhui, Sichuan, Hunan, et al

¹⁸⁶⁸ <http://countrystudies.us/china/35.htm>


¹⁸⁶⁹ http://www.oecd.org/dev/Liu%20Yunzhong_chinalabor-1007.pdf

Sort	Provinces/Attraction	Province/Emigrant
1	Guangdong	Anhui
2	Zhejiang	Sichuan
3	Jiangsu	Hunan
4	Shanghai	Henan
5	Beijing	Guizhou
6	Fujian	Jiangxi

Source: http://www.oecd.org/dev/Liu%20Yunzhong_chinalabor-1007.pdf

Education attainment has increased dramatically

- In 2010, per capita education years above 15 years old was 9.05 years; In contrast, per capita education years in 2000 was 7.85 years, and in 1990 it was about 6 years.
- The average education attainment in China changed from junior secondary school into senior secondary school in 2010.




Source: http://www.oecd.org/dev/Liu%20Yunzhong_chinalabor-1007.pdf

Education attainment has increased dramatically ¹⁸⁷⁰

- As to immigrant labour, only can data about peasant worker be available in 2010. Peasant workers who graduated from junior or senior secondary school accounted for 73% .
- The migrant peasant worker who got the diplomacy certificate or above accounted for 14%. Specially, 22% of the peasant worker under age 30 got their diplomacy certificate or above.


¹⁸⁷⁰ http://www.oecd.org/dev/Liu%20Yunzhong_chinalabor-1007.pdf



Source: http://www.oecd.org/dev/Liu%20Yunzhong_chinalabor-1007.pdf

The industry that the migrant workers take is stable in the last 3 years.

- Manufacturing is the most one to attracts migrant workers, which accounts for about 40%.
- Then the wholesale and retail sector follows, which is about 18%.
- Hotel and catering sector is the third one, which is about 10%.




Source: http://www.oecd.org/dev/Liu%20Yunzhong_chinalabor-1007.pdf

The monthly income of peasant workers increases steadily from 2008 to 2014.¹⁸⁷¹

- The nominal monthly income doubled from 1350Yuan in 2008 to 2900Yuan in 2014.
- The ratio of peasant worker income to urban unit employee increases from 0.55 to 0.6.
- Peasant worker income in east region is the highest. Fortunately, the differences of monthly income among different regions is not significant.


¹⁸⁷¹ http://www.oecd.org/dev/Liu%20Yunzhong_chinalabor-1007.pdf



Source: http://www.oecd.org/dev/Liu%20Yunzhong_chinalabor-1007.pdf

The coverage rate of peasant worker by social security goes up.

- In China, there are 5 types of social insurance: endowment, employment injury, medical, unemployment and maternity insurance.
- Among these 5 types of insurances, the coverage rates of unemployment insurance and endowment insurance rise more significantly.



Source: http://www.oecd.org/dev/Liu%20Yunzhong_chinalabor-1007.pdf

The report published by The ILO titled “Labour Migration in China and Mongolia” states the following:¹⁸⁷²

The most populous nation of the world, China experiences the most extensive internal migration today. Internal migration in China is characterized by two important features: first, most migrants leave their farmlands for urban areas and/or for non-agricultural activities; second, such labour flows are basically directed from the interior to coastal areas, and/or from central and western regions to eastern areas. These two features

¹⁸⁷² Excerpts from the report titled “Migration in China and Mongolia”, available online at URL: <https://www.ilo.org/beijing/areas-of-work/labour-migration/lang--en/index.htm>

overlap, and are closely interrelated with the macro socio-economic structure.

According to national statistics, by the end of 2009, China had a total of 229.8 million rural migrant workers. Among them, 145.3 million rural migrant workers worked outside of their hometowns for a period over six months and almost 84.5 million worked within their hometowns for a period over six months. Around 70 per cent of migrant workers are employed in China's eastern areas with two thirds of them working in large or medium cities and half of them moving between different provinces. Approximately 60 per cent of migrant workers are mainly concentrated in manufacturing and construction. Rural migrant workers in China have become an important and integral part of industrial workers. They have created wealth for the society, increased income for rural residents, made great contribution to the development of urban and rural areas, and the modernization of the country. Priority 1 of the ILO Decent Work Country Programme for China is to promote employment and employability and to reduce inequalities with focus on the unemployed and internal rural migrants. One major outcome is to improve rights, protection and employability of migrants and to strengthen legal assistance for them. The ILO Country Office for China and Mongolia has carried out policy consultations, programmes and technical cooperation on migration issues with Chinese tripartite constituents and other social partners.¹⁸⁷³

In the report titled "Urbanization in China and how urban housing demand can be met", published by International Political Economy (Berlin) Migration in China's pre reform era (till the late 1970s), migration was strictly limited. With gradual reformation of the household registration system (hukou system) and introduction of market reforms in combination with rising rural urban inequality and huge rural labour surplus migration started to accelerate since the early 1980s. The regional disparities determine the direction of migration flow. Thus, labour transfer from low productivity to high productivity sectors was and continues to be predominant, resulting in large migration flows especially from rural to urban areas. The hukou system, after fundamental reforms, rather than stopping migration, works now as an entitlement distribution system. It separates the two aspects of internal migration: the actual movement and the granting of full community membership at the destination. Rural as well as urban migrants are allowed to move to and work in the/another city or town. However, in general, for an ordinary person it is very difficult to change hukou registration from rural to urban areas³ or from smaller to larger cities (Chan, 2013). Thus, a vast majority is not eligible for a local registration at their migration destination and remains with their previous, e.g. rural hukou, excluding them from respective hukou benefits and entitlements. They are considered as temporary residents and often described as floating population (renkouliudong), indicating a temporary stay. Because of the floating population's nature, it is only measurable as stock. The other category of migration is receiving local residency rights (bendihukou), usually only accessible by a small privileged group (rich, highly educated or certain family relations) and can be measured as flow. Their migration rate has declined slightly in relation to the Chinese population, with about 17 to 21 million people annually since the early 1980s. (Chan and Buckingham, 2008; Chan, 2013) The floating population, on the other hand, has grown rapidly in numbers as shown in table

¹⁸⁷³Excerpts from the report titled "Migration in China and Mongolia", available online at URL: <https://www.ilo.org/beijing/areas-of-work/labour-migration/lang--en/index.htm>

1. The number is expected to surpass 300 million and may reach 400 million by 2025 (Hays, 2012).

Trend of floating population in China between 1982 and 2010

1982	1990	1995	2000	2010
6.6 mio	21.6 mio	43.1 mio	78.8 mio	221 mio

Source: Liang, (2012)

Simultaneously, the floating population's share of China's total population has increased significantly between the years 2000 and 2010, from 6.34% to 16.58% respectively. (Liang, 2012) The biggest share of the floating population is made up by rural urban migrants. Their numbers have increased largely during the last years. In 2010, the number of rural migrant workers stood at 160 million (Xinhua, 2012), which makes up 72.4% of the floating population. The increasing share is a distinctive sign for the high rural urban disparity. More than 100 million more farmers will move to urban areas over the next decade (Hays, 2012). Impact of urbanization drivers As the urban population grew at around 4% annually from 1981 to 2008, the corresponding figure for the urban built-up area was 6%. This rapid expansion meant a fivefold of urban areas between the respective years. (Yeh et al., 2011) Considering that the number of cities remained stable from 1998 onwards (Li and Piachaud, 2006), urbanization was increasingly driven by rapid urban area expansion. This has led to significant changes of the city's urban structure, away from city based urbanization to sprawling cities and to less clear distinctions between urban and rural settlements. This development occurred predominantly in densely populated coastal areas (Zhu et al., 2007). Urban population growth has largely been fuelled by rural urban migration. Between 1978 and 1999 rural urban migration constitutes 75% of the total increase in urban population (Zhang and Song, 2003) whereas most migrants remain with their rural hukou. Currently more than 70% of the population of China has rural hukou, and of the rural hukou workforce 22% are working in urban areas (Meng, 2012). Thus, due to this distortion, the proportion of China's urban population has changed, with an increasing share of a de facto urban population against those with an urban hukou status.. The de facto population in the figure is following the definition of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and is stated with migrants with minimum residence duration of 6 months or one year, and can be referred to as the just introduced floating population. In the early 2000s, in export centres such as Shenzhen and Dongguan, migrant labour accounted for the great majority (70% to 80%) of the workforce (Chan, 2013). Without rural to urban migration urbanization and the rapid economic growth would barely have taken place. When excluding the floating population from urban population statistics, China's current urbanization rate would be significantly lower. Between 1979 and 2009 China's urban population has increased by 440 million, of which 340 million was attributable to net migration and urban in situ growth (Chan, 2013).

However, the large scale of migration has challenged the absorption capacity of non-agriculture sectors and cities. Migration has caused social tensions and urban society stratification undermining a comprehensive balanced urban development. Integration barriers to new urban arrivals Migrants face criticism from public and officials, often channelled in open discrimination. Particularly rural migrants are criticized for overstraining urban infrastructure such as transportation and housing, increasing the crime rate, violating birth control policy and spreading sexually transmitted diseases. In

face of the rise in laid off urban employees of state owned enterprises (SOEs), migrants are blamed for increasing urban unemployment, which animated cities to tightened migration control. Though studies indicate that migrant labour and urban local labour are rather complementary than competitive. In China's large cities, the social and economic segregation of rural migrants, the status hierarchy based on geographic origin, and the segmentation of the urban labour market persist. (Fan, 2008) Here, most rural migrants occupy the lowest social levels and occupations and are treated as outsiders rather than being integrated. They work for low pay, often under horrendous conditions in the informal sector, not having established a stable contractual relationship with the enterprise causing unstable occupation and income. Frequently they work in jobs the urban population dislikes to occupy, characterized by the 4 Ds, "dirt, drain, danger and disgrace." (Shi, 2008, p. 4) When compared with urban hukou residents, rural migrant workers are more disadvantaged in the urban labour market in terms of occupation, earnings, working intensity, and social protection. Many are treated as second class citizens and taken advantage of. (Meng, 2012; Frijters, 2011)

Reasons for migration

China's industrialization, market reforms, urbanization and hukou reformation have stimulated classic push and pull factors for migration (OECD, 2010). Economic gains from wage differentials and job opportunities in urban areas are now the most important driving forces. The older generation tends to be driven more by push factors such as land shortage or difficult living conditions. Rural women often are driven by push factors determined by difficult social and work environments. (Tuñón, 2006) Migrants from the younger 'second' generation (born after 1980), in particular those from rural areas, tend to be more influenced by pull factors, including higher earnings, urban lifestyle and personal development aspiration. They have directly been influenced by China's rapid urbanization and reform policies, inspiring many for a city life. Young migrants not only go for higher earnings, but increasingly desire to follow career steps at their place of destination. For many years the older generation has been associated with the image of being tolerant to any work. The younger ones are more reluctant regarding accepting overloaded work and are tired of being looked down upon.¹⁸⁷⁴

9.6.3 Family characteristics of internal migration in China¹⁸⁷⁵

In a report by US National Library of Medicine National Institutes of Health, data from the 1986 survey of migration conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) were used to examine family characteristics of internal migrants to urban areas in China. The influence of the family either directly or indirectly is considered as part of life cycle events. 2% of households in 74 cities and towns were surveyed (100,267 persons). Data were analysed 1) for persons who moved within 10 years of the survey (47% -17,890 out of 38,104 in-migrants), and 2) by last move by age regardless of when (72% between 1966-86). The literature and conditions in China strongly support that family welfare is likely to be a significant underlying influence on patterns and selectivity of migration in China. The CASS survey reveals that the most movers were from nuclear families aged

¹⁸⁷⁴Excerpts from the report titled "Urbanization in China and how urban housing demand can be met", published by International Political Economy (Berlin), available online at URL: https://www.ipe-berlin.org/fileadmin/institut-ipe/Dokumente/Working_Papers/ipe_working_paper_27.pdf

¹⁸⁷⁵<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12343797>

25-44 years, followed by stem families (a couple plus 1 or more parents). 6 factors are identified for sustaining co-residence within generations. Migrations during 1977-86 showed that 41% of males aged 20-24 years had moved at least once (18% were married), while for females the figure was 25% (50% were married). 56% of males moving at ages 25-29 years were married, and 90% of migrant males aged 30-34 years were married. 78% of married females aged 25-29 years and 94% of those aged 30-34 years moved. 23% of widowed females aged 50-54 years were in-migrants, and 69% were aged 65 years and widowed. The opportunity for 2- and 3- generation households is expected to decline over the next 50 years as the population ages and becomes larger than the supporting population. 44% of young-old women (75-74 years) with no children and 25-33% of young-old women total had moved within the last 10 years. 43% of women aged 75 years or older with 5 or more children moved within 10 years, while only 24% with no children had. Women aged 35-54 years had low rates of movement with high parity, while those aged 25-44 with 1 or no children had higher rates of movement. Parity is increasingly unimportant as the 1-child family becomes the norm. In early adult life study and training are a reason for movement, while in later adult life marriage is important. Family factors are important reasons for female movement regardless of age. Life cycle and reasons for movement are discussed. Temporary migrants stated other reasons such as visiting or business but relatives providing housing. 73% of in-migrants considered their income to be better after the move.¹⁸⁷⁶

9.6.4 Outer Migration

Emigration and Immigration

Through most of China's history, strict controls prevented large numbers of people from leaving the country. In modern times, however, periodically some have been allowed to leave for various reasons. For example, in the early 1960s, about 100,000 people were allowed to enter Hong Kong. In the late 1970s, vigilance against illegal migration to Hong Kong was again relaxed somewhat. Perhaps as many as 200,000 reached Hong Kong in 1979, but in 1980 authorities on both sides resumed concerted efforts to reduce the flow.

In 1983 emigration restrictions were eased as a result in part of the economic open-door policy. In 1984 more than 11,500 business visas were issued to Chinese citizens, and in 1985 approximately 15,000 Chinese scholars and students were in the United States alone. Any student who had the economic resources, from whatever source, could apply for permission to study abroad. United States consular offices issued more than 12,500 immigrant visas in 1984, and there were 60,000 Chinese with approved visa petitions in the immigration queue. Export of labor to foreign countries also increased. The Soviet Union, Iraq, and the Federal Republic of Germany requested 500,000 workers, and as of 1986 China had sent 50,000. The signing of the United States-China Consular Convention in 1983 demonstrated the commitment to more liberal emigration policies. The two sides agreed to permit travel for the purpose of family reunification and to facilitate travel for individuals who claim both Chinese and United States citizenship. Emigrating from China remained a complicated and lengthy process, however, mainly because many countries were unwilling or unable to accept the large numbers of people who wished to emigrate.

¹⁸⁷⁶ <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12343797>

Other difficulties included bureaucratic delays and in some cases a reluctance on the part of Chinese authorities to issue passports and exit permits to individuals making notable contributions to the modernization effort. The only significant immigration to China has been by the overseas Chinese, who in the years since 1949 have been offered various enticements to return to their homeland. Several million may have done so since 1949. The largest influx came in 1978-79, when about 160,000 to 250,000 ethnic Chinese fled Vietnam for southern China as relations between the two countries worsened. Many of these refugees were reportedly settled in state farms on Hainan Island in the South China Sea.¹⁸⁷⁷

Migration Policy Institute published a report titled “Emigration Trends and Policies in China: Movement of the Wealthy and Highly Skilled”, states the following:¹⁸⁷⁸

As a result of market-oriented reforms beginning in the 1970s that reduced barriers to emigration, China has become one of the world’s leading source countries of migrants. As of 2013, it provided 4 percent of the world’s migrants—a testament to its vast population of 1.4 billion rather than to its emigration rate, which remains one of the lowest in the world. Emigration from China may be categorized in two major streams: those who are highly skilled and/or wealthy, and those who are low-skilled or unskilled. High-skilled and high-value emigration from China is rising fast, while low-skilled and unskilled emigration is stagnant—a divergence that has been widening since the late 2000s. The emigration rate of China’s highly educated population is now five times as high as the country’s overall rate. China’s wealthy elites and growing middle class are increasingly pursuing educational and work opportunities overseas for themselves and their families, facilitated by their rising incomes.¹⁸⁷⁹

This group often applies for skilled migrant or immigrant investor visas; a number of countries offer residence permits to wealthy foreigners willing to invest a certain sum in the destination country. Chinese nationals dominate many of these immigration pathways in highly developed countries such as the United States, Australia, and Canada. For example, in 2014-15, 31 percent of all international students enrolled in U.S. higher education institutions were Chinese nationals. In 2014, China was the second-largest recipient of U.S. employer-sponsored work visas (H-1B), and 85 percent of all U.S. immigrant investor visas (EB-5) were granted to Chinese nationals. Interviews and surveys suggest that while their economic position enables emigration, high-skilled Chinese nationals are motivated by a complex mix of political, economic, and social concerns about China.

Unskilled migration from China, on the other hand, is proceeding at a much slower pace. Though government reforms have liberalized exit controls and facilitated overseas employment, making the process safer and more orderly, old restrictions have been replaced by regulations that also serve to deter migration. Increasingly detailed government regulations have slowed down the recruitment process, while driving up costs for migrants as more and more actors become involved. Unlike skilled migrants who can switch visa categories with relative ease, low-skilled or unskilled migrants have little opportunity to settle overseas as a result of stringent return requirements included in

¹⁸⁷⁷ <http://countrystudies.us/china/35.htm>

¹⁸⁷⁸ https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TCM_Emigration-China-FINAL.pdf

¹⁸⁷⁹ Ibid.

bilateral labour agreements. Government reforms have thus inadvertently served to polarize emigration and further entrench social inequality.¹⁸⁸⁰

Concerns about “brain drain” in the late 1980s have now given way to a variety of government efforts to connect with China’s diaspora members without necessarily expecting their permanent return. These include targeted recruitment programs for skilled diaspora members in academia and the science and technology sectors, conferences and online portals to engage with overseas experts, in-country associations for overseas students and professionals, and temporary exchange programs and special visas for second- generation diaspora members. The key to China’s success in engaging its diaspora lies in its public- private partnerships, which involve many local government and private stakeholders, and have achieved remarkable results.¹⁸⁸¹

9.6.5 UN Migration Agency and China¹⁸⁸²

In the People's Republic of China (PRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) began its operations in 2007, when the IOM Liaison Office in China officially opened in Beijing. After having held observer status since 2001, on 30 June 2016, China officially became IOM’s 165th member state, opening a new chapter of cooperation. In the same year, IOM Beijing officially became Country Office assuming oversight functions over its Sub-Office in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the PRC, where IOM has been operational since 1952, as well as for its Country Office in Mongolia, overseen by the IOM Chief of Mission for China and Mongolia based in Beijing. In the past decades, China has increasingly become a source and a destination country for migrants from all over the world: in 2017, there were 10 million Chinese migrants living and working overseas, and approximately a million international migrants registered in China. These growing migration flows bring with them cases of irregular migration from and into China. To respond to an increasingly mobile population, China has taken steps to engage in international migration governance by strengthening regional and international cooperation on migration issues. In December 2018, China supported the adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM).¹⁸⁸³

With China becoming a prominent actor in global migration debates, IOM’s work in the country touches nearly every aspects of migration from facilitating human mobility to preventing and combating irregular migration and human trafficking. Main areas of work include:

- **Immigration and Border Management:** IOM supports the Chinese government to enhance immigration and border management-related structures, policy and operational systems in order to respond more effectively to border challenges and to institute good migration governance. Under the EU-funded “EU-China Dialogue on Migration and Mobility Support Project” (MMSP), IOM has facilitated exchanges to foster cooperation between China and Europe on immigration and border management, and has organized

¹⁸⁸⁰ https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TCM_Emigration-China-FINAL.pdf

¹⁸⁸¹ Ibid

¹⁸⁸² <https://www.iom.int/countries/china>

¹⁸⁸³ Ibid

technical trainings to enhance the capacity of Chinese and EU Member States' officials to detect and prevent smuggling of migrants and human trafficking, as well as to assist vulnerable migrants at risk.

- **Migrant Protection and Assistance:** In China, IOM has undertaken various counter-trafficking activities to assist the implementation of China's Second National Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking for the period 2013-2020. In particular, IOM supports the Government of China's efforts to prevent and respond to human trafficking including provision of assistance to trafficked persons, both in China mainland and in Hong Kong and Macau SARs, China. IOM has also provided support for assisted voluntary return and reintegration of vulnerable migrants from and to China.
- **Labour Migration and Human Development:** Recognizing the potential of the private sector as a driver of change, IOM has increasingly engaged with private enterprises that employ migrant workers to promote ethical recruitment and decent work practices. In line with IOM's Private Sector Partnership Strategy 2016-2020, CREST Operational Framework and IRIS principles, IOM through its Sub-Office in Hong Kong SAR of the PRC implements a number of programs aimed at promoting ethical recruitment and decent work among private sector partners by strengthening their policies to protect foreign domestic workforce. In mainland China, IOM facilitates dialogue around labour migration policies and programmes, amongst other aspects of migration and mobility between China and the EU, as well as undertakes activities to facilitate pre-departure orientation for prospective migrants and other relevant stakeholders.
- **Migration and Development:** IOM promotes the mainstreaming of migration into policy development by supporting China's engagement in regional and international processes and frameworks to maximize the development impact of migration and mobility through mechanisms that address migration as a global phenomenon.
- **Data and Research:** In collaboration with Chinese think tanks, academia and other partners, IOM undertakes research and provides evidence-based tools to its counterparts to address knowledge and policy requirements on a variety of migration-related topics.
- **Resettlement and Movement Management:** In Hong Kong SAR of the PRC, IOM provides transit assistance to passengers traveling under IOM auspices, and makes travel arrangements for persons who require international migration and return assistance as well as provides support to individual migrants when requested.¹⁸⁸⁴

¹⁸⁸⁴ <https://www.iom.int/countries/china>

9.7 Urbanization

The proportion of urban population is an important mark for the development of urbanization. With the reforms, opening up and economic development, China's urbanization has been greatly improved.¹⁸⁸⁵ In 1987 China had a total of twenty-nine provincial-level administrative units directly under the central government in Beijing. In addition to the twenty-one provinces (*sheng*), there were five autonomous regions (*zizhiqu*) for minority nationalities, and three special municipalities (*shi*) the three largest cities, Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin. (The establishment of Hainan Island as a provincial-level unit separate from Guangdong Province was scheduled to take place in 1988.) A 1979 change in provincial-level administrative boundaries in the northeast region restored Nei Monggol Autonomous Region to its original size (it had been reduced by a third in 1969) at the expense of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning provinces. Urban areas were further subdivided into lower-level administrative units beginning with municipalities and extending down to the neighbourhood level.¹⁸⁸⁶

The pace of urbanization in China from 1949 to 1982 was relatively slow because of both rapid growth of the rural population and tight restrictions on rural-urban migration for most of that period. According to the 1953 and 1982 censuses, the urban population as a percentage of total population increased from 13.3 to 20.6 percent during that period. From 1982 to 1986, however, the urban population increased dramatically to 37 percent of the total population. This large jump resulted from a combination of factors. One was the migration of large numbers of surplus agricultural workers, displaced by the agricultural responsibility system, from rural to urban areas. Another was a 1984 decision to broaden the criteria for classifying an area as a city or town. During 1984 the number of towns meeting the new urban criteria increased more than twofold, and the urban town population doubled. In the mid-1980s demographers expected the proportion of the population living in cities and towns to be around 50 percent by the turn of the century. This urban growth was expected to result primarily from the increase in the number of small-and medium-sized cities and towns rather than from an expansion of existing large cities.

China's statistics regarding urban population sometimes can be misleading because of the various criteria used to calculate urban population. In the 1953 census, *urban* essentially referred to settlements with populations of more than 2,500, in which more than 50 percent of the labour force were involved in non-agricultural pursuits. The 1964 census raised the cut-off to 3,000 and the requirement for non-agricultural labour to 70 percent. The 1982 census used the 3,000/70 percent minimum but introduced criteria of 2,500 to 3,000 and 85 percent as well. Also, in calculating urban population, the 1982 census made a radical change by including the agricultural population residing within the city boundaries. This explains the dramatic jump in urban population from the 138.7 million reported for year-end 1981 to the 206.6 million counted by the 1982 census. In 1984 the urban guidelines were further loosened, allowing for lower minimum population totals and non-agricultural percentages. The criteria varied among provincial-level units.

¹⁸⁸⁵ http://english1.english.gov.cn/2005-08/08/content_27315.htm

¹⁸⁸⁶ <http://countrystudies.us/china/35.htm>

Although China's urban population--382 million, or 37 percent of the total population in the mid-1980s--was relatively low by comparison with developed nations, the number of people living in urban areas in China was greater than the total population of any country in the world except India and the Soviet Union. The four Chinese cities with the largest populations in 1985 were Shanghai, with 7 million; Beijing, with 5.9 million; Tianjin, with 5.4 million; and Shenyang, with 4.2 million. The disproportionate distribution of population in large cities occurred as a result of the government's emphasis after 1949 on the development of large cities over smaller urban areas. In 1985 the 22 most populous cities in China had a total population of 47.5 million, or about 12 percent of China's total urban population. The number of cities with populations of at least 100,000 increased from 200 in 1976 to 342 in 1986.

In 1987 China was committed to a three-part strategy to control urban growth: strictly limiting the size of big cities (those of 500,000 or more people); developing medium-sized cities (200,000 to 500,000); and encouraging the growth of small cities (100,000 to 200,000). The government also encouraged the development of small market and commune centres that were not then officially designated as urban places, hoping that they eventually would be transformed into towns and small cities. The big and medium-sized cities were viewed as centres of heavy and light industry, and small cities and towns were looked on as possible locations for handicraft and workshop activities, using labour provided mainly from rural overflow.¹⁸⁸⁷

In 2003, the urban population reached 523.76 million and the proportion of urban population is 40.53 percent. Comparing with 1990, China's urban population rose 221.81 million, up 14.12 percentage points. Comparing with developed countries, China remains at a low level of urbanization. In 1998 the average level of urbanization in the world was 47 percent. The level of urbanization in developed countries and regions was 75 percent. The rise of the urbanization in China is based on the expansion of the urban areas and the increase of the population. In the decade of 1990 to 2000, the cities at prefectural level in China rose from 185 to 259, rising 40 percent while the cities at county level rose from 268 to 400, up 49 percent. Meanwhile, the number of towns also rose drastically. The increase of cities and expansion of urban areas promoted the urbanization level in China. The improvement of agricultural productivity and the development of secondary and tertiary industries helped rural people to transfer to the urban areas, which facilitated the development of urbanization in China.¹⁸⁸⁸

¹⁸⁸⁷ <http://countrystudies.us/china/35.htm>

¹⁸⁸⁸ http://english1.english.gov.cn/2005-08/08/content_27315.htm

Tendency of population changes in urban and rural areas in 1990-2003 (Unit 10,000)

Year	Urban Area		Rural Area	
	Total Population	Proportion (%)	Total Population	Proportion (%)
1990	30195	26.41	84138	73.59
1991	31203	26.94	84620	73.06
1992	32175	27.46	84996	72.54
1993	33173	27.99	85344	72.01
1994	34169	28.51	85681	71.49
1995	35174	29.04	85947	70.96
1996	37304	30.48	85085	69.52
1997	39449	31.91	84177	68.09
1998	41608	33.35	83153	66.65
1999	43748	34.78	82038	65.22
2000	45906	36.22	80837	63.78
2001	48064	37.66	79563	62.34
2002	50212	39.09	78241	60.91
2003	52376	40.53	76851	59.47

Source: http://english1.english.gov.cn/2005-08/08/content_27315.htm

9.7.1 Welfare System

A study published by Cambridge titled, “The Divided Chinese Welfare System: Do Health and Education Change the Picture?” states the following about China’s Welfare System:¹⁸⁸⁹

The Chinese welfare system has undergone dramatic changes over the past thirty-five years. Recent research into its size, structure and redistributive effects suggests that the Chinese welfare system has diverged into three divided systems: the more generous and progressive urban system, the minimal and regressive rural system and the growing yet still small and regressive migrant system . Most existing studies of the Chinese system have focused on the redistributive effects of pensions and social assistance (Gao and Riskin, 2009; Lu *et al.*, 2013; Cai and Yue, 2016; Wang *et al.*, 2016). Recent years have seen a surge of good quality, large-scale household surveys in China, enabling analysis of social welfare and family well-being at the micro level. However, the lack of precise measurements of health and education benefits in survey data remains a hurdle when including them in welfare analyses on China. Embedded in the Household Registration System (Hukou), the Chinese social welfare system has always been divided along the urban–rural lines. Urban China used to have a full employment policy under which all urban citizens had secure jobs. The jobs came with low wages but generous and comprehensive social benefits, such as pensions, health care, housing, food and education (Hussain, 1994; Saunders and Shang, 2001). This system, however, was cut back alongside the market economic reforms and rising unemployment. Housing, as part of the urban social benefit package, was gradually privatised. Social insurance – mainly

¹⁸⁸⁹ Excerpts from Cambridge report titled “The Divided Chinese Welfare System: Do Health and Education Change the Picture?” , available online at URL:<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-policy-and-society/article/divided-chinese-welfare-system-do-health-and-education-change-the-picture/2469C3A7B7344D4825638048A5A9A7C4/core-reader>

pensions and health insurance – which had previously been the sole responsibility of employers, shifted to be shared among employers and employees (Hussain, 1994; Saunders and Shang, 2001). The Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (or Dibao) program was established in 1999 to provide cash subsidies to poor urban families (Wu and Ramesh, 2014). Meanwhile, rural citizens had access to the farmland for production purposes, and had to be self-reliant or turn to their extended families when in need. Only those without the ability to work, or who lacked family support, could apply for assistance from the government. As a result, the rural social welfare system was minimal and covered only a fraction of rural residents (Wong, 1998).¹⁸⁹⁰

Since 2003, the Chinese government has undertaken a series of actions to address the needs of the previously uncovered or under-covered populations. Emphasis has been placed on unifying the welfare systems across the urban–rural–migrant populations (Carrillo and Duckett, 2011; Frazier, 2014; Mok and Lau, 2014; Ngok and Huang, 2014). In rural China, agricultural taxes were eliminated nationwide in 2006; the Dibao program was expanded to rural areas nationwide in 2007; and, in 2008, the rural cooperative medical insurance that had collapsed during the market reforms was restored and expanded to provide health insurance to most rural residents. In urban areas, a new health insurance scheme for non-employees was piloted in 2007 and implemented in 2009. The 2008 Labour Contract Law mandated all employers to sign labour contracts with employees, including migrant workers, and to provide social insurance coverage for them.¹⁸⁹¹

More recently, several new regulations were issued to further broaden the social welfare coverage. The 2010 Social Insurance Law stipulated the establishment of a unified old-age and health insurance system for all urban and rural citizens, regardless of employment status. In February 2014, the government issued the Social Assistance Regulations to provide cash and in-kind assistance to those with low incomes and/or with specific health, education or housing needs. In July 2014, the State Council launched fundamental reforms of the Hukou system to enable greater mobility between rural and urban areas and broader social benefit coverage for all citizens.¹⁸⁹²

9.7.2 Household Registration System

Hukou is a legal document that records the household population’s basic information, including the name of the natural person, date of birth, relatives, and marital status. Introduced 60 years ago, a *hukou* is a key identification document for Chinese citizens and an important administrative tool for the government to monitor its population. Some have criticized the *hukou* system, stating that it prevents the free flow of labour, creates idle capacity, and results in economic losses. In recent years, the Chinese government has pursued patchwork reforms of the *hukou* system to respond to these criticisms.¹⁸⁹³

¹⁸⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹¹ Excerpts from Cambridge report titled “The Divided Chinese Welfare System: Do Health and Education Change the Picture?”, available online at URL: <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-policy-and-society/article/divided-chinese-welfare-system-do-health-and-education-change-the-picture/2469C3A7B7344D4825638048A5A9A7C4/core-reader>

¹⁸⁹² Ibid.

¹⁸⁹³ <https://www.china-briefing.com/news/chinas-hukou-system/>

On January 9, 1958, the 91st meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress passed the announcement of the President's Order of the People's Republic of China, which was implemented from the date of promulgation.¹⁸⁹⁴

Article 1 *These Regulations are formulated in order to maintain social order, protect citizens' rights and interests, and serve socialist construction.*

Article 2 *Citizens of the People's Republic of China shall perform household registration in accordance with the provisions of these Regulations. Household registration of active-duty military personnel shall be handled by military organs in accordance with relevant regulations governing active-duty military personnel. The registration of the registration of foreigners and stateless persons residing in the People's Republic of China shall be governed by these Regulations unless otherwise provided by laws and regulations.*

Article 3 *The registration of household registration shall be in the charge of public security organs at all levels. Cities and towns with public security police stations use the jurisdiction of the police station as the hukou jurisdiction; townships and towns without public security police stations take the township and town jurisdiction as the hukou jurisdiction. The township and town people's committees and the police station are the household registration agencies. For households living in institutions, groups, schools, enterprises, institutions, and public dormitory units, each unit will designate a person to assist the household registration authority to handle household registration; for households with scattered residence, household registration will directly register households. Household registration of non-active military personnel living in military organs and military dormitories shall be designated by various units to assist the registration organ in registering the household registration. The household registration of production cooperatives such as agriculture, fishery, salt industry, forestry, animal husbandry, and handicrafts shall be designated by the cooperative to assist the registration authority to handle registration. For household registrations other than cooperatives, the household registration office directly handles household registration.*

Article 4 *The household registration authority shall establish an account registration book. Each city, water and town with public security police station shall be issued with a household registration book. Rural households are issued to the household registration book by the cooperative; units other than the cooperative are not issued to the household registration book. The household registration book and the matters registered in the household registration book have the effect of proving citizenship.*

Article 5 *The registration of household registration takes the household as the unit. A person who lives in the same place with the supervisor is a household, and the supervisor is the head of the household. A self-supporting family living alone, with the person as the head of the household. A total of one or separate households living in institutions, groups, schools, enterprises, institutions, etc. and in public dormitories. The head of the household is responsible for reporting household registration in accordance with the provisions of these regulations.*

¹⁸⁹⁴ <https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/regulations-on-household-registration-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china>

Article 6 Citizens shall be registered as permanent residents in places where they often live. A citizen may only be registered as permanent residents in one place.

Article 7 Within one month after the birth of the baby, the head of the household, relatives, dependents or neighbours shall report the birth registration to the registration authority of the place where the baby is usually resident. Abandoned infants shall be reported to the registration authority by the adopter or the childcare agency for birth registration.

Article 8 Citizens die. Before the city is buried, in the rural area, within one month, the head of the household, relatives, dependents or neighbors shall report the death registration to the household registration authority and cancel the household registration. If a citizen dies in the place of temporary residence, the registration office of temporary residence shall notify the registration office of permanent residence to cancel the household registration. If a citizen is killed due to an accident or the cause of death is unknown, the head of the household or the founder shall immediately report to the local police station or the township or township people's committee.

Article 9 If a baby dies after birth and before reporting for birth registration, both birth and death registration shall be declared at the same time.

Article 10 When a citizen moves out of his / her household registration jurisdiction, the person or the head of the household shall report to the household registration authority before moving out to register for the removal, obtain a migration certificate, and cancel the household registration. Citizens relocating from rural areas to cities must hold employment certificates from the city's labour department, admission certificates from schools, or certificates approved by the city's hukou registration authority, and apply to the hukou registration authority for permanent residence. Citizens moving to border areas must obtain approval from the public security organs of the county, city, or municipal district where they are permanently resident.

Article 11 Citizens who are enlisted for active duty shall, before enlisting in the army, declare the eviction registration to the resident registration authority of the place of residence by themselves or the household, and submit the eviction registration, cancel the household registration, and will not issue a migration certificate.

Article 12 The arrested offender shall be notified by the arresting organ to notify the offender's family members at the same time as the offender's household registration office to cancel the household registration.

Article XIII citizen migration, from the time they arrive to move into the city within three days, in the countryside within 10 days, presided over by a person or household to migrate documents to declare the household registration office moved to the registration, hand in migration documents. Citizens who do not have a migration certificate shall apply to the hukou registration authority at the place of immigration to declare their registration for migration:

1. Military personnel who are demobilized, transferred and retired shall have the certificates issued by the military service organs of the county or city or military organs above the regiment;

2. Overseas Chinese and international students who come back from abroad shall have the passport or entry certificate of the People's Republic of China;
3. The person released by the people's court, people's procuratorate or public security organ shall rely on the certificate issued by the release organ.

Article 14 Prisoners on parole and suspended sentences, controlled elements and other persons who are deprived of political rights according to law must be reported to the people's courts of counties, cities and municipal jurisdictions or public security agencies for approval before they are relocated. It is possible to go through the registration of moving out; after arriving at the place of moving in, one should immediately report to the registration authority of the household registration.

Article 15 *If a* citizen stays for more than three days in a city other than the city or county of permanent residence, the head of the temporary residence or himself shall report the temporary residence registration to the household registration authority within three days, and apply for cancellation before leaving; temporary residence In hotels, the hotel will set up a passenger registration book to register at any time. Citizens staying temporarily within the city or county of their habitual residence, or in rural areas outside the city or county of their habitual residence, do not apply for temporary residence registration except for those who temporarily stay in a hotel and register at any time with the guest registration book set by the hotel.

Article 16 Citizens who leave their place of habitual residence for private affairs for more than three months shall apply to the household registration authority for an extension of time or go through relocation procedures; if there is no reason to extend the time and the conditions for relocation, they shall return to their place of habitual residence .

Article 17 *When the content of the* household registration needs to be changed or corrected, the household head or the individual shall report to the household registration authority; the household registration authority shall make changes or corrections after checking the facts. When the household registration authority considers it necessary, it may ask the applicant for proof of changes or corrections.

Article 18 Citizens who change their names shall be dealt with in accordance with the following provisions:

1. When a person under the age of 18 needs to change his name, he or his parents or adopters should apply to the household registration authority for registration change;
2. When a person over 18 years of age needs to change his name, he / she shall apply to the registration authority for registration change.

Article 19 *When a* citizen causes a change in household registration due to marriage, divorce, adoption, claim, separation, merger, disappearance, recovery, or other reasons, the head of the household or himself shall report to the household registration authority for registration change.

Article 20 *In any of the following situations, the public security administration shall be given a punishment or be held criminally responsible according to the severity of the circumstances:*

1. Failure to declare an account in accordance with the provisions of these regulations;

2. Fake account registration;
3. Forging, altering, transferring, lending or selling account documents;
4. Impersonating someone else's account;
5. The hotel manager does not handle passenger registration in accordance with regulations.

Article 21 The hukou registration organ, if it finds counter-revolutionaries and other criminals in the hukou registration work, it shall request the judicial organ to pursue criminal responsibility according to law.

Article 22 The hukou book, booklet, forms, and certificates shall be uniformly formulated by the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China and printed by the public security organs of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government. Citizens should pay the cost of labor when they receive the household registration book and the migration certificate.

Article 23 The organs of self-government of national autonomous areas may, in accordance with the spirit of these regulations and in light of the specific local conditions, formulate separate measures.

Article 24 These Regulations shall take effect as of the date of promulgation.¹⁸⁹⁵

In a special report by Congressional Executive Commission on China titled “China's Household Registration System: Sustained Reform Needed to Protect China's Rural Migrants” maintains the following:¹⁸⁹⁶

China's hukou (household registration) system has imposed strict limits on ordinary Chinese citizens changing their permanent place of residence since it was instituted in the 1950s. Beginning with the reform period in the late 1970s and accelerating during the late 1990s, national and local authorities relaxed restrictions on obtaining urban residence permits. While these moves are a step forward, recent reforms often contain high income and strict housing requirements that work against rural migrants who seek to move to China's cities. Migrants who do not meet these requirements usually cannot obtain public services such as health care and schooling for their children on an equal basis with other residents. These uneven reforms to the hukou system discriminate against poor migrant workers in favour of the wealthy and educated. Rural migrants who obtain housing and jobs in cities still may not meet legal requirements for a “stable source of income” and a “stable place of residence.” Official Chinese press statements portray recent hukou reforms as eliminating discrimination in the household registration system. Instead, these reforms have shifted the hukou system from a method of restricting changes in permanent residence to a barrier preventing some of China's most vulnerable citizens from receiving public services.

¹⁸⁹⁵<https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/regulations-on-household-registration-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china>

¹⁸⁹⁶Excerpts from special report by Congressional Executive Commission on China titled “China's Household Registration System: Sustained Reform Needed to Protect China's Rural Migrants”, available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/issue-papers/cecc-special-topic-paper-chinas-household-registration-system-sustained>

The Commission encourages the Chinese government to continue hukou reforms, building on positive steps already taken, by focusing on measures that would protect the interests of China's poor migrants and enhance their upward mobility. The Commission recommends that the Chinese government:

- Continue to liberalize urban *hukou* requirements, but emphasize non-discriminatory criteria;
- Steadily eliminate current rules that link *hukou* status to public services;
- Support private efforts to provide social services to migrants;
- Engage in international dialogue on internal migration and *hukou* reform;
- Eliminate *hukou* restrictions that contravene domestic and international law;
- Remove structural barriers limiting the voices of migrants and rural residents.¹⁸⁹⁷

9.7.2.1 Origins of the PRC Hukou System (1950s to 1970s)

Since its establishment in the 1950s, the Chinese *hukou* system has categorized citizens according to both place of residence and eligibility for certain socioeconomic benefits (the latter via designation as either “agricultural” or “non-agricultural” residents). Authorities issue citizens *hukou* identification through a registration process administered by local authorities. Parents pass their *hukou* status to their children, solidifying these administrative categories into inheritable social identities.¹⁸⁹⁸

The *hukou* system traditionally served three main purposes: resource distribution, migration control, and the monitoring of targeted groups of people. To assure the economic livelihood and political loyalty of China's industrial workers, the Chinese government provided non-agricultural *hukou* holders with food rations and grain subsidies and granted non-agricultural and urban residents greater employment opportunities, subsidized housing, free education, medical care, and old-age pensions. Regulations prevented rural residents from obtaining many public services their urban counterparts received and forced agricultural *hukou* holders to sell their agricultural products at a discounted rate to the government, as a means of financing national development plans. The *hukou* system also imposed strict controls on internal migration. Rural residents who wished to permanently move to an urban area had to separately apply to change both their place of permanent residence and their agricultural status. Additional regulations required travelers to obtain authorization from their place of residence and temporary registration at their destination. These limits effectively blocked upward social mobility for most rural citizens. By the 1970s, the system became so rigid that “peasants could be arrested just for entering cities.” Police also employed *hukou* registration as a tool to monitor certain suspect citizens or groups, including political opponents and certain classes of common criminals. Such groups faced greater police scrutiny and often became the targets of political campaigns.¹⁸⁹⁹

¹⁸⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹⁸ Excerpts from special report by Congressional Executive Commission on China titled “China's Household Registration System: Sustained Reform Needed to Protect China's Rural Migrants”, available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/issue-papers/cecc-special-topic-paper-chinas-household-registration-system-sustained>

¹⁸⁹⁹ Ibid.

9.7.2.2 Changes Hukou System From 1970s to 1990s

Privatization of farming in the 1970s and 1980s led to a surplus of rural labour. Concurrently, economic development increased labour demand in urban areas. To accommodate these pressures, Chinese authorities implemented reforms that enhanced the mobility of rural residents. The extension of the temporary residence system to towns and small cities provided legal channels for rural laborers to move between their rural homes and unskilled jobs in urban areas. Beginning in 1984, the introduction of the “self-supplied food grain” *hukou* allowed rural residents to obtain residence status in market towns if they had local employment and housing and could provide their own food rations. The government also encouraged the liberalization of residency restrictions for wealthy and educated individuals. Introduced in 1992, the “blue stamp” *hukou* policy permitted wealthy individuals to buy an “urban” designation by investing large sums of money in urban areas. Local governments competed to attract wealthy, educated, and highly skilled individuals by offering local *hukou*.¹⁹⁰⁰

Apart from the legal procedures described above, millions of rural Chinese migrants also migrated to urban areas without any formal registration. Gradual abandonment of rationing increased the ability of unregistered migrants to purchase food in urban markets, facilitating unregistered migration. According to one estimate, only about half of the 80 million migrants (as of 1995) were formally registered as temporary residents. Despite these reforms, both unregistered migrants and those holding temporary residence permits faced severe limits on their ability to obtain public services such as subsidized health care or education for their children on an equal basis with established urban residents. Authorities also employed an administrative detention regime, the custody and repatriation system, to hold and deport those rural migrants lacking fixed housing, stable jobs, or proper documentation.¹⁹⁰¹

9.7.2.3. Recent Reforms in Hukou system

Since the late 1990s, Chinese authorities have deepened and expanded prior *hukou* reforms. These efforts have occurred sporadically, most recently in 2001 and 2003-4, and have been followed by central directives to slow down the pace of change. Reforms include: relaxing limitations on migration to small towns and cities, streamlining *hukou* registration in some provinces and large cities, and instituting many individual reforms aimed at addressing the abuse of migrants. Since late 2004, central authorities have also made efforts to eliminate discriminatory local regulations that limit urban employment prospects for migrants. First, in 1997, the State Council initiated an experimental program to allow rural migrants in designated small towns and cities to obtain local *hukou*. These reforms required migrants seeking to transfer their *hukou* status to have (1) a “stable job or source of income” and (2) a “stable place of residence” for over two years. Applicants who satisfied these criteria could obtain *hukou* registration in the given small city or town and receive education and other

¹⁹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰¹ Excerpts from special report by Congressional Executive Commission on China titled “China's Household Registration System: Sustained Reform Needed to Protect China's Rural Migrants”, available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/issue-papers/cecc-special-topic-paper-chinas-household-registration-system-sustained>

public services on equal terms with other local residents. In 2001, the State Council expanded this program to include all small towns and cities.¹⁹⁰²

Second, since 2001, many provinces and large cities have also begun to allow migrants who satisfy certain criteria to obtain local *hukou* in urban areas. As with the State Council decision on small cities and towns, these measures generally require that applicants possess a “stable place of residence” and a “stable source of income.” Many provincial and municipal regulations define these terms stringently. For example, Nanjing municipal regulations define “stable place of residence” as private ownership of a house, or residence in corporate- or government-owned housing. Hebei provincial regulations bar migrants living in rented apartments from receiving local *hukou*. Many regulations interpret “stable source of income” to mean formal employment by a private enterprise or government bureau, or establishment of a private enterprise with a stable source of income, rather than the unskilled jobs held by many migrants. Many local regulations expressly exclude low-income workers with salaries under officially-determined limits. Many provincial and municipal regulations grant local *hukou* in urban areas based on educational or financial criteria. Zhejiang province directs large and medium-sized towns to grant local *hukou* to individuals who purchase homes of a certain size or price. Non-local residents with higher educational levels enjoy similar benefits. Chongqing municipality grants local *hukou* to persons with a 2-year college degree (*dazhuan*) or higher who purchase a house or apartment that measures 30 square meters or more.¹⁹⁰³

Regulations such as those listed above provide preferential *hukou* treatment for the wealthy and educated, while maintaining significant barriers against migrant workers performing low-wage jobs. Even if rural migrants obtain housing and employment in urban areas, these may still be insufficient for the purposes of the “stable source of income” and “stable place of residence” requirements. In some cases, low-income migrants who do meet financial requirements suffer additional discrimination.

According to the regulations of one Zhejiang city, unskilled laborers must possess both a stable place of residence and a stable source of income and also must reside in the city for five years in order to qualify for a local *hukou*. In contrast, business owners who satisfy residential and income criteria may receive a local *hukou* after paying two years of taxes totalling more than 5,000 yuan. Skilled and educated individuals do not have to reside in the city for a specified period of time in order to qualify for a local *hukou*. As a result of these restrictions, the impact of these reforms has been limited. In the city of Ningbo in Zhejiang province, officials expect 30,000 people out of a total migrant population of 2 million to meet the stable income and permanent residency requirements set in 2001 for obtaining a local urban *hukou*. After similar reforms in Shijiazhuang city in Hebei province, 11,000 applicants out of a total migrant population of 300,000 migrant workers filed applications. Municipal plans to grant local *hukou* on the basis of investment criteria have also had limited impact. More than two months after the Beijing

¹⁹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁹⁰³ Excerpts from special report by Congressional Executive Commission on China titled “China's Household Registration System: Sustained Reform Needed to Protect China's Rural Migrants”, available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/issue-papers/cecc-special-topic-paper-chinas-household-registration-system-sustained>

municipal government reformed its *hukou* policy in 2001 to grant local *hukou* to wealthy investors, only one applicant applied who could meet the requirements.¹⁹⁰⁴

Local Chinese government officials often portray these reforms as eliminating *hukou* discrimination against rural residents and migrants because they have ended distinctions between different *hukou* types. For example, Jiangsu province announced in March 2003 that it planned to end the labelling of *hukous* as agricultural, non-agricultural, blue-stamp, and other types, thereby “breaking” urban-rural divisions. Other provinces have announced similar reforms. These changes do not abolish *hukou* identification entirely, however. They leave intact the remaining component: registration by permanent residence. As a result, migrants must still satisfy the criteria set by local authorities to obtain a local *hukou* in a given urban area.¹⁹⁰⁵

Third, in addition to the general trends discussed above, Chinese authorities have adopted a variety of measures to address abuse of migrants. Some measures reflect public concern with police abuses. In 2003, the State Council abolished the coercive custody and repatriation system often used to detain unregistered migrants after a young migrant was beaten to death in police custody, sparking a national outcry. In Hangzhou city in Zhejiang province, the public security bureau announced an end to mass dragnet sweeps to round up undocumented migrants. In Shenyang, police announced the elimination of the temporary residence permit system and all associated fees (reducing the ability of police to extort additional payments from migrants) in favour of an automatic “sign-in” registration system for migrants arriving in the city.

Fourth, in December 2004, the State Council issued a directive to eliminate discriminatory measures that limit employment prospects for migrants in urban areas. This policy has already had some impact. In the spring of 2005, the Beijing municipal government abolished long-standing regulations that prohibited migrants from renting apartments and office space and excluded them from certain occupations.¹⁹⁰⁶

9.7.2.4. Hukou Discrimination

As one Chinese academic has noted, “the current reforms do represent a reform, but they ignore the forest for the trees . . . The truly critical problem in *hukou* reform is how to peel away the political, economic, and cultural rights that are associated with the residence permit.” While recent reforms loosen the *hukou* system for the privileged, they do not address the primary problem still facing poor migrants: the continued linkage of *hukou* registration to public services. Restrictions on public services often apply both to unregistered migrants as well as to long-term residents who have complied with the procedures for acquiring a temporary residence permit.¹⁹⁰⁷

¹⁹⁰⁴ Ibid

¹⁹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰⁶ Excerpts from special report by Congressional Executive Commission on China titled “China's Household Registration System: Sustained Reform Needed to Protect China's Rural Migrants”, available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/issue-papers/cecc-special-topic-paper-chinas-household-registration-system-sustained>

¹⁹⁰⁷ Ibid

Educational barriers illustrate this problem. Until 1998, children lacking local *hukou* were barred from attending local public schools. National regulations placed the responsibility for their education on the local government of their *hukou* registration rather than that of actual residence. Recently, national authorities have taken positive steps to ameliorate this problem. A 2003 State Council directive (unaccompanied by additional funding) instructed local governments to make efforts toward providing education for migrant children within their jurisdiction. Some local governments, however, have interpreted this directive in ways that minimize their responsibility for the education of migrant children. For example, 2004 Zhejiang provincial regulations require that children holding on-local *hukou* generally be educated in the place of their *hukou* registration. Only in cases where no “guardian” (including grandparents and extended family) resides in the place of registration may parents seek discretionary approval for their children to enter local public schools.¹⁹⁰⁸

Both national and local regulations permit the levying of additional educational fees on migrant children based on their *hukou* status. Government-established schedules often set these fees at several hundred yuan per semester, representing a significant fraction of an average migrant’s annual income. Shandong authorities officially charge students without local *hukou* 300 yuan and 500 yuan per semester in additional school fees (beyond those paid by students holding local *hukou*) at the elementary and junior high levels, respectively. In practice, however, public schools often view migrants as a source of additional income, charging them unauthorized fees amounting to several thousand yuan per year. Some authorities have made efforts to curb such practices, but these have encountered resistance from local governments unwilling to bear the financial burden for educating migrant students absent additional funding.

Local authorities often oppose private efforts to form schools to educate migrant children. Although the State Council’s 2003 directive on migrant education gives a degree of central support to the establishment of such schools, it applies stringent physical and financial requirements that are difficult for these schools to meet in practice. In some urban areas, private migrant schools are often targeted for elimination by local governments. In others, they lead a precarious legal existence. A study of five privately-run migrant schools in Chengdu municipality revealed only two with formal authorization to operate, one of which was in the process of having its status revoked. Motives behind local government hostility toward such private schools include fear of competition with revenue-generating local public schools, unwillingness to assume formal responsibility and liability for migrant schools, and general discriminatory attitudes toward migrants.¹⁹⁰⁹

Official discrimination against migrants on the basis of their *hukou* status exists in the provision of other public services as well. Many localities condition access to their health insurance programs on local *hukou* registration. Local plans aimed at expanding coverage tend to retain these limits. For example, when Lucheng city in Shanxi province announced that it would allow local residents to participate in a municipal cooperative

¹⁹⁰⁸ Ibid

¹⁹⁰⁹ Excerpts from special report by Congressional Executive Commission on China titled “China’s Household Registration System: Sustained Reform Needed to Protect China’s Rural Migrants”, available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/issue-papers/cecc-special-topic-paper-chinas-household-registration-system-sustained>

health care program beginning in 2005, it limited access to local *hukou* holders. Discrimination against rural *hukou* holders in the provision of public services is exacerbated by other structural and political barriers. Two examples include: inadequate rural representation in local people's congresses (LPCs) and skewed university admission requirements.

Although lacking in significant power, LPCs allow a limited form of popular political participation in China. But the LPC electoral structure disadvantages rural *hukou* holders, including migrants. By law, rural LPC deputies represent four times as many constituents as their urban counterparts, leaving migrant and rural interests underrepresented. In addition, voting rights are commonly linked to *hukou* registration. Migrants lacking local *hukou* are often required to vote in their place of registration. Some localities, including Beijing, have undertaken reforms aimed at allowing migrants to vote in their place of actual residence. However, these reforms generally require migrants to first return to their place of *hukou* registration and obtain official approval to vote in their place of actual residence. Such voting requirements pose considerable obstacles to poor migrants exercising their voting rights.¹⁹¹⁰

Educational opportunities are similarly skewed, limiting the upward mobility of rural residents and migrants. The Ministry of Education employs a strict system of *hukou*-based quotas to allocate available spaces for college admission. These quotas are biased in favour of the residents of large cities. In 2000, authorities allocated Beijing (with 10 million permanent residents) 25,000 college admission slots, and Shandong province (with nearly 100 million permanent residents) 80,000 slots. Such quotas limit educational opportunities available for rural *hukou* holders. A Chinese student with a Beijing *hukou* can score nearly 150 points lower than a rural Chinese student in Shandong province (on a test with a maximum score of 750), but the former can still receive a college admission slot while the latter is refused.¹⁹¹¹

The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights notes with deep concern the de facto discrimination against internal migrants in the fields of employment, social security, health service, housing, and education that indirectly result[s], inter alia, from the restrictive national household registration system (*hukou*) which continues to be in place despite official announcements regarding reforms.¹⁹¹²

9.7.2.5 Impact of *hukou* on China's economy

Since 2014, the Chinese government has been gradually phasing out the distinction between agricultural and urban *hukou*. As part of the reform initiative, in 2016, the State Council announced a target of granting urban residency status to 100 million rural migrants by 2020. The target specifies that the number of urban *hukou* holders should increase by one percent each year and reach 45 percent of the total population in 2020.

¹⁹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹¹ Excerpts from special report by Congressional Executive Commission on China titled "China's Household Registration System: Sustained Reform Needed to Protect China's Rural Migrants", available online at URL: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/issue-papers/cecc-special-topic-paper-chinas-household-registration-system-sustained>

¹⁹¹² Ibid.

Hukou reforms such as these ultimately aim to reduce the inequities between different types of *hukou* holders and improve labour mobility in the economy. It also seeks to boost domestic consumption as migrant workers without urban *hukou* often keep more savings for future needs, including marriage, education, and retirement.¹⁹¹³

For example, research finds that migrant workers in Guangdong, Fujian, and Sichuan save around half of their income for potential future expenses. Meanwhile, this cohort tend to spend less on durable goods due to their temporary residency in urban cities. In many ways, China's *hukou* system is a relic of the country's centrally-planned economy that existed before the economic reform and opening-up began in 1978. While China is no longer a centrally planned economy, the legacy of population management continues to impact its economy. Since *hukou* restricts the free mobility of Chinese workers, it strains overall economic growth. These effects are exacerbated because China has a shrinking workforce that peaked in 2011 and has decreased every year since then, leading to double-digit growth in labour costs. Rural migrant workers may be a solution to China's shrinking workforce and rising labour costs. In 2017, there were an estimated 286.5 million rural migrant workers in China, accounting for around 35 percent of the entire working population. Of these rural migrant workers – 86 percent of migrant workers attended secondary school and 32.9 percent received vocational training – making them a vital asset to the Chinese economy. *Hukou* reform is therefore an important part of China's broader economic reform policy, which seeks to transition the economy towards expanding and advancing the services sector and boosting domestic consumption. Reducing restrictions on labour mobility through *hukou* reform also widens much-needed access to social services and offer a boost to the country's transitioning economy.¹⁹¹⁴

An article published on south china morning post titled "Could this be the end for China's notorious household registration system?" maintains that China is reviewing its decades-old household registration system to enable migrant workers to stay in cities as the country grapples with an ageing population and a shrinking work force. Sun Lijun, deputy minister of public security, said on Thursday that his ministry is considering changes in policy to make it easier for the migrant workers to become the urban residents. But any changes to the system would not apply to congested the megacities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen that the authorities deem overpopulated, Sun said. Under the "hukou" household registration system introduced the 1950s, Chinese people are classified as either rural or urban residents depending on where they were born. Rural residents can enjoy certain land use rights but are not officially allowed to live in cities or have access to government services in those areas such as education and health care. But as China's economy developed, around 300 million rural residents migrated to cities to earn a living, putting the system under intense strain. Addressing a national symposium on social management, Sun stressed the need to come up with a new system in which household registration was based on the place in which the person spent the most time – not where they were born. Gu Shengzu, a member of the National People's Congress's Standing Committee, has acknowledged publicly that there are major inequalities between urban and rural residents in more than 60 kinds of benefits. Retired Tsinghua University history professor Qin Hui said the unfairest part of the household registration

¹⁹¹³ <https://www.china-briefing.com/news/chinas-hukou-system/>

¹⁹¹⁴ <https://www.china-briefing.com/news/chinas-hukou-system/>

system was its “bullying of the migrant poor”. The system had led to inequality in human rights, property rights, and public services. The central government has been working to narrow the gaps. In 2016, the State Council, the cabinet, issued a document to allow more non-urban residents to settle in cities, and said it planned to transfer the hukou of more than 13 million people per year. According to the 13th five-year plan [for 2016-2020], 100 million people should be resettled [in cities], and there is just one year to go on that timetable. It will be very difficult to complete the task.¹⁹¹⁵

9.7.3 The Social Credit System

The State Council issued a circular titled “Outline of the Construction of the Social Credit System (2014-2020)” that states the following:¹⁹¹⁶

According to the "Strengthening Government Integrity, Business Integrity, Social Integrity, and Judicial Trustworthiness" proposed by the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, "establishing and improving a social credit reporting system, praising integrity, and punishing dishonesty" proposed by the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Party The Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Strengthening and Innovating Social Management, "Building and Improving a Social Credit System", and "The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China "(hereinafter referred to as the" Twelfth Five-Year Plan "Outline) The overall requirements for "accelerating the construction of a social credit system "are formulated in this Outline. The planning period is 2014-2020.

i) The general idea of social credit system construction

The Party Central Committee and the State Council attach great importance to the construction of a social credit system. Relevant regions , departments and units have explored and advanced, and social credit system construction has made positive progress. The State Council established an inter-ministerial joint meeting system for the construction of a social credit system and promoted the construction of the credit system, promulgated and implemented the "Credit Management Regulations", and a number of regulations and standards for the construction of a credit system have been issued. Although some progress has been made in the construction of China's social credit system, the contradictions that do not match, coordinate, or adapt to the level of economic development and the stage of social development are still prominent. The main problems include: the credit information system covering the whole society has not been formed, the credit records of social members are seriously missing, the trustworthiness incentives and disciplinary punishment mechanisms are not yet perfect, the trustworthiness incentives are insufficient, and the cost of credit failure is low; the credit service market is underdeveloped and the service system Immature, non-standard service behaviour, insufficient credibility of service institutions, lack of rights protection mechanism for credit information subjects; low social integrity awareness and credit

¹⁹¹⁵ <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2187689/could-be-end-chinas-notorious-household-registration-system>

¹⁹¹⁶Excerpts from **The State Council issued a circular titled “Outline of the Construction of the Social Credit System (2014-2020)”**, available online at URL: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-06/27/content_8913.htm

level, social atmosphere for fulfilling contracts and fulfilling promises, honesty and trustworthiness have not yet formed, and major production safety accidents, food and drug safety incidents have occurred from time to time, such as commercial fraud, counterfeiting and sales, tax evasion and fraud, false reporting and fraud, academic misconduct, and so on. The credibility of government affairs and the credibility of justice are still far from the expectations of the people.¹⁹¹⁷

The Guiding ideology and goal principles is to comprehensively promote the construction of a social credit system, we must adhere to the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thinking of the "Three Represents", and the scientific concept of development, in accordance with the spirit of the 18th National Congress of the Party, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee, and the "Twelfth Five-Year Plan". Based on the improvement of credit laws, regulations and standard systems, and the formation of a credit information system covering the whole society, the main content is to promote the construction of government integrity, business integrity, social integrity and judicial credibility, in order to promote the construction of integrity culture, establish trustworthy incentives and punishment for loss of trust. The main goal of the social credit system construction is: by 2020, basic laws and regulations and standard systems for social credit will be basically established, a credit information system covering the whole society based on the sharing of credit information resources will be basically completed, and the credit supervision system will be basically sound.¹⁹¹⁸The main principles of social credit system construction are:

The government promotion and social co-construction. Give full play to the role of government in organizing, guiding, promoting and demonstrating. The government is responsible for formulating and implementing development plans, perfecting laws and standards, and cultivating and supervising the credit service market. Gradually establish and improve the credit laws and regulations system and credit standard system, strengthen credit information management, standardize the development of credit service system, and maintain the security of credit information and the rights and interests of information subjects. Overall planning and step-by-step implementation. Aiming at the long-term, systematic and complex construction of the social credit system, the top-level design is strengthened, based on the present, focusing on the long-term, overall planning, systematic planning, and planned and step-by-step organization and implementation. Focus on breakthroughs and strengthen applications. Select key areas and typical regions to carry out credit construction demonstration. Actively promote the social application of credit products, promote the interconnection, cooperation and sharing of credit information, improve the social credit reward and punishment linkage mechanism, and create a social credit environment of honesty, self-discipline, trustworthiness and mutual trust.¹⁹¹⁹

¹⁹¹⁷ Excerpts from **The State Council issued a circular titled “Outline of the Construction of the Social Credit System (2014-2020)”**, available online at URL: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-06/27/content_8913.htm

Note: Details on Social Credit System used as a surveillance measure are also touched upon Human Rights Chapter of the Compendium.

¹⁹¹⁸ Excerpts from **The State Council issued a circular titled “Outline of the Construction of the Social Credit System (2014-2020)”**, available online at URL: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-06/27/content_8913.htm

¹⁹¹⁹ Ibid

ii) Promote the construction of integrity in key areas

Accelerate the promotion of integrity in government affairs. Government credibility is the key to the construction of a social credit system. The credibility level of various government behaviour actors plays an important role model and guiding role for the credibility of other social entities. Insist on administration according to law. The lawful administration will be run through the whole process of decision-making, execution, supervision and service, and the government affairs will be fully disclosed. Under the premise of protecting national information security, business secrets and personal privacy, the credit information in the administrative management will be disclosed in accordance with the law to establish effective Information sharing mechanism. Effectively improve government work efficiency and service levels, and transform government functions.¹⁹²⁰

iii) Further promote the construction of business integrity.¹⁹²¹

Credit construction in the financial sector. Innovate financial credit products, improve financial services, maintain the safety of financial consumers' personal information, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of financial consumers. Increasing the punishment of financial fraud, financial fraud, malicious evasion of bank debt, insider trading, manufacturing and sales of fake insurance policies, fraudulent insurance fraud, disclosure of false information, illegal fund-raising, and fraudulent foreign exchange evasion and fraudulent behaviour, and standardizing the financial market order.

Credit construction in the tax field. Establish a cross-department credit information sharing mechanism. To carry out the exchange, comparison and application of tax-related information such as taxpayer basic information, various transaction information, property retention and transfer information, and tax payment records. Further improve the tax credit rating and release system, strengthen the tax classification management in the tax field, and give play to the reward and punishment of the difference in credit assessment for taxpayers. Establish a tax blacklist system.

Credit construction in the price field. Instruct enterprises and operators to strengthen price self-discipline, standardize and guide operators' price behavior, implement the system for operators to clearly mark prices and publicize charges, and focus on implementing "clear prices" Urge operators to strengthen internal price management, and establish and improve internal price management systems in accordance with the conditions of operators. Improve the price integrity system for operators, do a good job in information disclosure, and promote the implementation of a reward and punishment system.

Credit construction in the field of engineering construction. Promote the construction of a credit system for the engineering construction market. Accelerate the construction of credit laws and regulations in the engineering construction market, and formulate credit standards for all parties and employees in the engineering construction market.

¹⁹²⁰ Ibid

¹⁹²¹ Ibid.

Credit construction in the field of government procurement. Strengthen government procurement credit management, strengthen linkage disciplinary action, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of government procurement parties. Formulate credit record standards for suppliers, review experts, government procurement agencies, and related practitioners. Establish a list of bad behaviour records of government procurement suppliers in accordance with the law.¹⁹²²

Credit construction in the field of e-commerce. Establish and improve e-commerce enterprise customer credit management and transaction credit evaluation systems, and strengthen the quality supervision of e-commerce enterprises to develop and sell credit products. Promote the identity identification system for e-commerce subjects and improve the real-name system for online stores. Strengthen the quality inspection of products in online stores, and severely investigate and deal with fraudulent acts such as counterfeiting, MLM activities, false advertising, sub-optimal filling, and service breach of contract in the field of e-commerce. Crack down on internal and external collusion, forgery of traffic, and commercial reputation, and establish an industry-limited ban system for untrustworthy subjects. Promote the exchange and sharing of e-commerce credit information and related information in other areas of society, and promote e-commerce and offline transaction credit evaluation.

Credit construction in statistics. Carry out corporate integrity statistical commitment activities to create a good atmosphere of honest reporting and glorious, dishonest and fraudulent. Improve the statistical integrity evaluation standard system. Establish and improve the enterprise statistical integrity evaluation system and the integrity archives of statistical practitioners. Strengthen law enforcement inspections, severely investigate and deal with fraudulent activities in the field of statistics, and establish a system for reporting and public exposure of statistical dishonesty.

iv) Comprehensively promote the construction of social integrity.¹⁹²³

Credit construction in the fields of medicine, health and family planning. Strengthen the credit management of medical and health institutions and the construction of industry integrity style. Establish the value concept of the doctor's sincerity, adhere to the practice of benevolence and benevolence. Cultivate the concept of honest practice, honest procurement, honest diagnosis and treatment, honest charging, honest medical insurance, adhere to the principles of honest medical services such as reasonable inspection, reasonable medication, reasonable treatment, and reasonable charges. Integrity pharmacy creation activities, formulate credit evaluation index standards for medical institutions and medical doctors, pharmacists, nurses and other medical personnel, promote hospital evaluation and periodic evaluation of physicians, conduct comprehensive evaluation of medical ethics of medical personnel, and punish illegal and untrustworthy behaviours such as bribery and excessive diagnosis, Establish a credible

¹⁹²² Excerpts from **The State Council issued a circular titled "Outline of the Construction of the Social Credit System (2014-2020)"**, available online at URL: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-06/27/content_8913.htm

¹⁹²³ Excerpts from **The State Council issued a circular titled "Outline of the Construction of the Social Credit System (2014-2020)"**, available online at URL: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-06/27/content_8913.htm

medical service system. Accelerate the improvement of the credit system in the field of drug safety, and establish credit files for drug R & D, production and distribution companies. Actively carry out the drug safety integrity commitment activities with the theme of "integrity first, quality win", effectively improve the level of drug safety credit supervision, severely crack down on counterfeiting and counterfeiting, and ensure the safety and effectiveness of the people's drug use. Strengthen credit construction in the field of population and family planning, and carry out credit information sharing work on population and family planning.

Credit construction in the field of social security. In disaster relief, relief, pension, social insurance, charity, lottery, etc., establish a comprehensive credit system to combat all kinds of fraudulent acts such as fraud and donation. Establish and improve the integrity system of application, review and withdrawal in the implementation of social assistance, affordable housing and other livelihood policies, strengthen the review of the conditions related to the application of related livelihood policies, and strengthen the supervision of the dynamic management of social assistance and the use of affordable housing. Untrustworthy and illegal individuals are included in the credit blacklist. Build information systems for checking the economic status of households, establish and improve the identification mechanism for low-income families, and ensure the fair, just and healthy operation of livelihood policies such as social assistance and affordable housing. Establish and improve the social insurance integrity management system, strengthen social insurance handling management, strengthen labour security supervision and law enforcement in the field of social insurance, standardize insurance participation and payment behaviour, and increase social insurance agreements such as designated hospitals, designated pharmacies, and industrial injury insurance agreement medical institutions. The disciplinary efforts of service agencies, their staff, and various types of insured persons for violations, frauds, and frauds to prevent and defraud insurance. Further improve the social insurance fund management system, increase the transparency of fund collection, management, payment and other links, promote the construction of social insurance integrity system, standardize insurance participation and payment behaviour, and ensure the safe operation of social insurance funds.

Credit construction in the field of labour. Further implement and improve the enterprise labour security law-abiding and integrity system, and formulate social publicity measures for major labour security violations. Establish a system for publicizing the employer's illegal wage arrears, and improve the evaluation method for the employer's labour security integrity rating. Standardize employment behaviour, strengthen the management of labour contract performance and arbitration, and promote enterprises to actively develop harmonious labour relations. Strengthen labour security supervision and law enforcement, and increase efforts to crack down on illegal activities. Strengthen the integrity construction of the human resources market, standardize professional intermediary behaviours, and crack down on various illegal behaviours such as black intermediaries and illegal employment.

Natural person credit construction. Highlight the basic role of natural person credit construction in the construction of the social credit system, rely on the national population information resource database, establish and improve the natural person's credit records in economic and social activities, and achieve full coverage of natural person credit records nationwide. Strengthen the professional credit construction of key

groups, establish civil servants, corporate legal representatives, lawyers, accounting practitioners, certified public accountants, statistical practitioners, registered tax agents, auditors, assessors, certification and inspection and testing practitioners, securities and futures practitioners, Credit records of executives, insurance brokers, medical staff, teachers, scientific research personnel, patent service practitioners, project managers, news media practitioners, tour guides, and practicing veterinarians of listed companies, promote the use of professional credit reports, and guide the construction of professional ethics And code of conduct.¹⁹²⁴

An article titled, “Life inside China’s Social Credit Laboratory: The party’s massive experiment in ranking and monitoring Chinese citizens has already started” published in Foreign Policy magazine states the following about the Social Credit System in China¹⁹²⁵:

In what it calls an attempt to promote “trustworthiness” in its economy and society, China is experimenting with a social credit system that mixes familiar Western-style credit scores with more expansive — and intrusive — measures. It includes everything from rankings calculated by online payment providers to scores doled out by neighbourhoods or companies. High-flyers receive perks such as discounts on heating bills and favourable bank loans, while bad debtors cannot buy high-speed train or plane tickets. By 2020, the government has promised to roll out a national social credit system. According to the system’s founding document, released by the State Council in 2014, the scheme should “allow the trustworthy to roam everywhere under heaven while making it hard for the discredited to take a single step.” But at a time when the Chinese Communist Party is aggressively advancing its presence across town hall offices and company boardrooms, this move has sparked fears that it is another step in the tightening of China’s already scant freedoms.

But it has been hard to distinguish future promises — or threats — from the realities of how social credit is being implemented. Rongcheng is one place where that future is visible. Three dozen pilot systems have been rolled out in cities across the country, and Rongcheng is one of them. According to Chinese officials and researchers, it’s the best example of the system working as intended. But it also illustrates those intentions may not be as straightforward as they like to claim. The system is the brainchild of city hall staff, says He Junning, the deputy director of the Rongcheng Social Credit Management Office.¹⁹²⁶

The bureaucrat, wearing square glasses and a black checkered sweater, shares the social credit department with seven other employees on the second floor of the city hall. The system they have devised assigns 1,000 points at the beginning to each of Rongcheng’s

¹⁹²⁴ Excerpts from **The State Council issued a circular titled “Outline of the Construction of the Social Credit System (2014-2020)”**, available online at URL: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-06/27/content_8913.htm

¹⁹²⁵ Excerpts from an article titled, “Life inside China’s Social Credit Laboratory: The party’s massive experiment in ranking and monitoring Chinese citizens has already started” published in Foreign Policy magazine on April 3,2018, available online at URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/03/life-inside-chinas-social-credit-laboratory/>

¹⁹²⁶ Excerpts from an article titled, “Life inside China’s Social Credit Laboratory: The party’s massive experiment in ranking and monitoring Chinese citizens has already started” published in Foreign Policy magazine on April 3,2018, available online at URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/03/life-inside-chinas-social-credit-laboratory/>

740,000 adult residents. From there, the math begins. Get a traffic ticket; you lose five points. Earn a city-level award, such as for committing a heroic act, doing exemplary business, or helping your family in unusual tough circumstances, and your score gets boosted by 30 points. For a department-level award, you earn five points. You can also earn credit by donating to charity or volunteering in the city's program.

He stresses that "anything that influences your points needs to be backed by official facts with official documents." That reduces subjectivity and limits penalties to mainly breaking laws and regulations. Depending on their score bracket, residents hold a grade ranging from A+++ to D. Some offenses can hurt the score pretty badly. For drunk driving, for example, one's score plummets straight to a C. On the other hand, triple As are rewarded with perks such as being able to rent public bikes without paying a deposit (and riding them for free for an hour and a half), receiving a \$50 heating discount every winter, and obtaining more advantageous terms on bank loans.

Companies are also included in the gauntlet of social credit. They can remain in good standing if they pay taxes on time and avoid fines for things such as substandard or unsanitary products — a sore point for Chinese people, who tend to mistrust firms and service providers due to frequent scams and food safety scandals. High-scoring businesses pass through fewer hoops in public tenders and get better loan conditions.¹⁹²⁷

The Congressional Research Services report titled, "China's Corporate Social Credit System", gives the following details:¹⁹²⁸

China's construction of a nationwide social credit system has been identified as a major concern by both the executive branch and some Members of Congress, because of the broad controls such a system is likely to give the Chinese government over U.S. citizens and companies operating in China. Recent reports of Chinese officials invoking the social credit system to pressure U.S. firms to take positions that align with Beijing's interests raise questions for Congress about how to respond to the potential threat the system may pose to U.S. firms operating in China. After several pilot programs, China began constructing a nationwide social credit system in 2014, guided by a document issued by China's cabinet, the State Council, Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020). The plan describes the system as necessary to build "trust" in the marketplace and broader society, and establishes a 2020 implementation deadline. Since the plan was published, the social credit system has developed into two connected but distinct systems: a system for monitoring individual behaviour, still in early pilot stages, and a more robust system for monitoring corporate behaviour: the Corporate Social Credit System (SCS).¹⁹²⁹

The Corporate SCS is currently a network of initiatives operated by state and private actors at the national and local levels, connected by shared data platforms and the common goal of regulating corporate behaviour in China. The network's overarching structure consists of three components:

¹⁹²⁷ Ibid

¹⁹²⁸ The Congressional Research Services report titled, "China's Corporate Social Credit System", published on January 17, 2020, available online at URL:<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11342>

¹⁹²⁹ <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11342>

Data Aggregation. A firm’s social credit profile is the aggregate of potentially hundreds of data points compiled by dozens of government entities. In October 2015, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s powerful economic planning agency, launched the National Credit Information Sharing Platform (NCISP). The NCISP, operated by the NDRC in cooperation with 45 other government ministries, serves as the data “backbone” of the Corporate SCS, integrating all national and local level corporate regulatory data. To structure the database, all companies registered in China have been assigned a Unified Social Credit Code, a common identifier used across all datasets linked to the Corporate SCS.¹⁹³⁰

Evaluation. As government departments collect information on firms, they create “blacklists” of firms that are found to have violated regulations repeatedly or engaged in illicit financial behaviour. National and local government departments have a wide mandate to create blacklists for violations that fall under their jurisdiction. Consequently, there are hundreds of official blacklists covering everything from severe offenses, such as tax evasion and falsifying emissions data, to minor offenses such as failing to file a change of address. Some departments also publish laudatory “redlists” of firms with exemplary records, such as the State Taxation Administration (STA) “Grade A Taxpayer List.” The National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System (NECIPS), a public online database run by the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), records each time a firm is added to a blacklist or redlist and identifies “businesses with irregularities.” Firms placed on multiple blacklists or that commit particularly serious offenses can be added to SAMR’s forthcoming “heavily distrusted entities list”—the closest analogue to a national blacklist.

Joint System of Punishments and Rewards. The primary enforcement mechanism of the Corporate SCS is a “joint system of punishments and rewards,” a set of legal cooperation agreements by which government agencies enforce each other’s blacklists. Under this framework, a firm blacklisted by the STA for tax offenses can be subject to customs penalties and more frequent financial audits based on cooperation agreements between the STA and China’s customs and financial authorities. Firms on the STA’s “Grade A Taxpayer” redlist, on the other hand, are not only eligible for expedited and less costly tax filings, but are also eligible for other benefits, such as customs fee waivers and low-interest loans. The system is designed, in the words of President Xi Jinping, “to make everything convenient for the trustworthy, and ensure the untrustworthy cannot move a single step.” Although much remains to be done and data sharing gaps persist, reports indicate that China’s Corporate SCS is moving beyond its pilot stages and is on track for at least partial implementation in 2020. Many laws passed and regulations issued since 2014 include clauses stating that noncompliance with certain provisions will be recorded in the Corporate SCS. In July 2019, the State Council issued Guiding Opinions on Accelerating the Building of the Social Credit System, which urges government agencies to “fully employ next-generation information technologies such as big data and artificial intelligence to achieve comprehensive credit monitoring.” China’s central government has issued only general guidelines for the buildout of the Corporate SCS. Consequently, no single standardized national social credit score is currently assigned to companies. Instead, various national and local government entities, as well as some third-party

¹⁹³⁰ Ibid.

companies, are issuing their own social credit ratings to firms based on NCISP and NECIPS records. In September 2019, the NDRC announced it had completed its first “social credit evaluation” of 33 million domestic Chinese firms and assigned each of them a “Comprehensive Public Credit Rating.” This NDRC rating is the closest analogue to a national corporate social credit rating, but government documents indicate that it will only serve as a baseline for corporate social credit evaluation and will not take precedence over local or sector-specific ratings. Multinational firms are already subject to the system’s data reporting requirements, according to the U.S.-China Business Council and the EU Chamber of Commerce. Some are already being rated by third-party companies authorized to issue corporate social credit reports: one such company, Xinhua Credit, launched an English-language version of its web portal in September 2019, providing one of the first platforms for non-Chinese firms to access corporate social credit data.¹⁹³¹

Policy Implications:¹⁹³²

New Government Market Access Controls. Chinese officials and some international observers contend that the Corporate SCS may create a more level playing field by merging domestic and multinational firms into a single, nominally more transparent regulatory regime. Certain provisions and rating criteria, however, could be used to discriminate against multinational firms, including for political purposes. For example, the Civil Aviation Administration of China pressured multiple international airlines in early 2018 to change their websites’ descriptions of Taiwan, stating that failure to comply would be recorded in each airline’s social credit records. Additionally, SAMR’s “heavily distrusted entities list” includes provisions that might be used to target U.S. firms. The list is to include, for example, firms that “threaten national and public interest” or “infringe on the rights and interests of customers.” Two U.S. companies—FedEx and Flex Ltd.—were accused of the latter following supply disputes with Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei in mid-2019. The NCISP also includes political data that tracks the number of Communist Party members employed by firms; firms that hire fewer Party members or avoid Party-building activities may be penalized under the Corporate SCS framework. The Corporate SCS may also lead to a more opaque market access regime and increase compliance costs for U.S. firms operating in China. A recent report published by the EU Chamber of Commerce estimates that multinational firms in China will be subject to approximately 30 different ratings under the Corporate SCS, the requirements of which will be dispersed across numerous government documents. Firms are also required to disclose to the Chinese government detailed data and other information about their operations and capabilities, which may include proprietary information or sensitive intellectual property.

Expansion of China’s Economic Influence. The State Council’s 2014 Planning Outline explicitly identifies the Corporate SCS as a means of “enhancing China’s soft power and international influence.” To that end, Beijing has framed “credit cooperation” as a central component of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and is working to export the Corporate SCS more broadly. Several countries in Asia and the Middle East participating in the BRI have engaged in credit cooperation initiatives organized by the NDRC. Saudi Arabia, a

¹⁹³¹ The Congressional Research Services report titled, “China’s Corporate Social Credit System”, published on January 17, 2020, available online at URL: <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11342>

¹⁹³² Ibid.

strategic U.S. partner, is constructing its own Corporate SCS as part of its BRI cooperation with China. If the Corporate SCS is exported more broadly along the BRI, the Chinese government could potentially monitor and influence the behaviour of U.S. firms and their interactions with Chinese companies in global markets, even if they are not directly operating in China.

Select Legislation in the 116th Congress. In the 116th Congress, the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-76) requires the Department of Commerce to conduct an assessment of whether dual-use items subject to U.S. export control laws are being used to develop China’s social credit system. Additionally, the UIGHUR Act of 2019 (H.R. 1025) includes a provision that would require the Department of State to submit a report to Congress detailing the social credit system’s potential impact on the geopolitical and economic interests of the United States.¹⁹³³


9.8 Demographic Statistics.

China Demographics: China is classified as an upper middle-income country by the World Bank, and its rapid growth over the decades has pulled hundreds of millions of its citizens out of poverty. About 10% of the population in the country lives on \$1 USD a day, compared to 64% just 35 years ago. Although 56 different ethnic groups are officially recognized in China, 91.51% of Chinese are Han Chinese. Only one other group – Zhuang – has a larger than 1% share of the population. Other ethnic groups are growing at a higher rate than Han Chinese, but because of the massive dominance of Han Chinese, this is not expected to dramatically alter China’s ethnic composition.

9.8.1 Population of China (2020)

¹⁹³³ The Congressional Research Services report titled, “China’s Corporate Social Credit System”, published on January 17, 2020, available online at URL:<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11342>

1,438,424,514



Source: <https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/china-population/>

According to current projections, China's population will finally peak in 2030 with a shrinking labour force and an over-65 population of 240 million. Only Japan has aged faster than China. China has another very serious demographic problem due to sex-selective abortion and its one-child policy, resulting in a ratio of 120 boys for every 100 girls. It's estimated that the percentage of men in their late 30's who have never married will quintuple by 2030, and this large number of unmarried young men will have a detrimental impact on population growth. By 2026, both India and China are estimated to have 1.46 billion residents each, but India will start to take 1st place with a growth continuing until 2060, while China's population is expected to decline after 2030.

9.8.1.1 China Population Growth

The size of China's population has long been a hot political issue in China. After rapid population growth in the middle of the 20th century, the Chinese government sought to limit population growth by introducing the famous "one-child policy." The scheme, which rewarded couples that agreed to have just one child with cash bonuses and better access to housing, proved so successful that the birth rate of 1.4 children per woman fell below the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman. As a result, experts are now concerned that China's low birth rate, combined with its aging population, will damage its future economic development. The one-child policy was met with a great deal of resistance, particularly in rural areas. Families who breach this policy tend to lie on census polls, so the true population of China may be a bit skewed. This means that Chinese population

statistics have become less reliable since the policy began in the 1970s. The policy was ended by the Chinese government in 2016. Much of China's economic growth has been attributed to its abundant and cheap workforce, combined with its low social costs. However, with the number of young Chinese falling and the number of elderly Chinese increasing, it is not certain whether China's economy can continue to grow at the same rapid rate. China also has an abnormal ratio of male to female births. Whereas in most countries more girls are born than boys, in China the reverse is true. Many suspect that this is because of a preference for boys among Chinese families. In the year 2010, China took up its most recent official census efforts. The country hired approximately ten million workers to help manage the enormous task of discovering the statistics of over one billion residents. The growth from 2000 to 2010 was roughly 5.8% over the decade.

Population Growth rate

Year ▼	Population	Growth Rate	Density (km ²)	Population Rank	Density Rank
2020	1,439,323,776	0.39%	153.31	1	79
2019	1,433,783,686	0.43%	152.72	1	79
2018	1,427,647,786	0.47%	152.07	1	79
2017	1,421,021,791	0.49%	151.36	1	79
2016	1,414,049,351	0.51%	150.62	1	79
2015	1,406,847,870	0.55%	149.85	1	79
2010	1,368,810,615	0.57%	145.80	1	79
2005	1,330,776,380	0.62%	141.75	1	73
2000	1,290,550,765	0.79%	137.47	1	71
1995	1,240,920,535	1.07%	132.18	1	73
1990	1,176,883,674	1.82%	125.36	1	71
1985	1,075,589,361	1.47%	114.57	1	75
1980	1,000,089,235	1.55%	106.53	1	74
1975	926,240,885	2.28%	98.66	1	76
1970	827,601,394	2.70%	88.15	1	82
1965	724,218,968	1.86%	77.14	1	85
1960	660,408,056	1.53%	70.34	1	84
1955	612,241,554	2.00%	65.21	1	81
1950	554,419,273	0.00%	59.05	1	83

Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs “World Population Prospects (2019 Revision)”.
Available online: <https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/china-population/>

9.8.1.2 China Population Projections

China's has slowed significantly since the implementation of the one-child policy, and that slowing is projected to continue. The population is predicted to grow at increasingly slower rates until 2030, at which point the population should actually begin to decrease.

Year ▲	Population	Growth Rate	Density (km ²)	Population Rank	Density Rank
2020	1,439,323,776	0.39%	153.31	1	79
2025	1,457,908,249	0.26%	155.29	1	82
2030	1,464,340,159	0.09%	155.98	2	84
2035	1,461,083,029	-0.04%	155.63	2	89
2040	1,449,031,423	-0.17%	154.35	2	90
2045	1,429,312,248	-0.27%	152.25	2	92
2050	1,402,405,170	-0.38%	149.38	2	97
2055	1,369,594,144	-0.47%	145.88	2	101
2060	1,333,030,631	-0.54%	141.99	2	103
2065	1,295,284,571	-0.57%	137.97	2	104
2070	1,258,054,226	-0.58%	134.00	2	106
2075	1,221,580,151	-0.59%	130.12	2	111
2080	1,185,891,301	-0.59%	126.32	2	116
2085	1,151,799,202	-0.58%	122.69	2	117
2090	1,120,466,932	-0.55%	119.35	2	119
2095	1,092,115,205	-0.51%	116.33	2	121

Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs “World Population Prospects (2019 Revision)”.


Available online: <https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/china-population/>

9.8.2 Fertility in China

A Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of **2.1** represents the **Replacement-Level Fertility**: the average number of children per woman needed for each generation to exactly replace itself without needing international immigration. A value below 2.1 will cause the native population to decline




Source: <https://www.worldometers.info/demographics/china-demographics/#tfr>




Source: <https://www.worldometers.info/demographics/china-demographics/#tfr>

9.8.3 Life Expectancy in China



Source: <https://www.worldometers.info/demographics/china-demographics/#life-exp>




Source: <https://www.worldometers.info/demographics/china-demographics/#life-exp>

9.8.4. Infant Mortality Rate and Deaths of Children under 5 Years Old in China




Source: <https://www.worldometers.info/demographics/china-demographics/#u5-infa-title>



Source: <https://www.worldometers.info/demographics/china-demographics/#u5-infa-title>

9.8.5 China Urban Population

Currently, **59.7 %** of the population of China is **urban** (856,409,297 people in 2019)



Source: <https://www.worldometers.info/demographics/china-demographics/#urb>

9.8.6 Population Density

The 2019 population density in China is 153 people per Km² (396 people per mi²), calculated on a total **land** area of 9,388,211 Km² (3,624,807 sq. miles)

Largest Cities in China

S No.	CITY NAME	POPULATION
1	Shanghai	22,315,474
2	Beijing	11,716,620
3	Tianjin	11,090,314
4	Guangzhou	11,071,424
5	Shenzhen	10,358,381
6	Wuhan	9,785,388
7	Dongguan	8,000,000
8	Chongqing	7,457,600
9	Chengdu	7,415,590
10	Nanjing	7,165,292
11	Nanchong	7,150,000
12	Xi'an	6,501,190
13	Shenyang	6,255,921
14	Hangzhou	6,241,971
15	Harbin	5,878,939
16	Tai'an	5,499,000
17	Suzhou	5,345,961
18	Shantou	5,329,024
19	Jinan	4,335,989
20	Zhengzhou	4,253,913
21	Changchun	4,193,073
22	Dalian	4,087,733
23	Kunming	3,855,346
24	Qingdao	3,718,835
25	Foshan	3,600,000
26	Puyang	3,590,000
27	Wuxi	3,543,719
28	Xiamen	3,531,347
29	Tianshui	3,500,000
30	Ningbo	3,491,597

Source: <https://www.worldometers.info/demographics/china-demographics/#urb>

9.9 Annual Work Report tabled at the third session of 13th National People's Congress.

Premier Li Keqiang delivered a government work report including '**a review of our work in 2019 and the first few months of 2020**' on May 22, 2020 on behalf of the State Council to the legislature for deliberation at the third session of the 13th National People's

Congress (NPC). Premier Li Keqiang expressed the following points on Demographics in his speech to the 13th NPC (3rd Session):¹⁹³⁴

I. Advancing the reform and development of social programs to safeguard and improve living standards

- **ETHNIC MINORITIES:** We will uphold and improve the **system of regional ethnic autonomy, support ethnic minorities and ethnic minority areas** in accelerating development, and forge a strong sense of community among the Chinese people.

II. Advancing the reform and development of social programs to safeguard and improve living standards

- **RELIGIONS:** We will fully implement the **Party's fundamental policy on religious affairs and encourage religious leaders** and believers to play an active part in promoting economic and social development.

¹⁹³⁴ Excerpts from work report including ‘a review of our work in 2019 and the first few months of 2020’, available online at URL: <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-22/Full-text-Premier-Li-s-speech-at-the-third-session-of-the-13th-NPC-QHaP1FpB8k/index.html>